

THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.

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THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A
COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE
EDWARD MEREDITH COPE, M.A.
FORMERLY SENIOR FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE;

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
BY
JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, M.A.
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF ST JOHN'S COLLEGE,
AND PUBLIC ORATOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

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CORRIGENDA.

(*In the notes.*)

VOL. III.

- p. 12, line 21, *read* 'II 4. 9.'
- p. 30, line 1, *for* 'by' *read* 'at.'
- p. 42, line 17, *for* 'Naturum fassend,' *read* 'Natur umfassend.'
- p. 62, line 19, *read* 'writings.'

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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Γ.

οὐκ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν
ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ὅσα ὥς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ.

Ἐπειδὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἐν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύ-

CHAP. I:

In the Introduction, pp. 276—370, I have already given a complete paraphrase of the contents of this book, exhibiting the main divisions and general principles of arrangement and the connexion of its several parts: and have added, in five appendices, dissertations on some special points which seemed to require a more detailed treatment than they could conveniently receive in mere notes. Referring to this for information on all such general matters, I may confine myself in the commentary to special details of language, allusion, and such like particulars. This book, by the extreme brevity of expression which characterises it, leaving even more than usual to the reader's ingenuity to supply, by the consequent difficulty of translation, and the obscurity of many of the allusions, offers at least as many impediments and stumbling-blocks to the embarrassed commentator as either of the two preceding; and it is to be feared that the explanation and illustration are not likely to be much shorter than before, in spite of what has been already done in the Introduction.

With the end of Book II we finish the treatment of what (according to the Latin division) is termed *inventio*, the invention and supply of all the various kinds of arguments, which the orator has to invent, or find for himself; and we now proceed to the analysis of (1) *λέξις*, *elocutio*, verbal style, including *ὑπόκρισις*, delivery, *pronuntiatio* and *actio*, (Aristotle omits the latter, at all events in the treatment of it, confining *ὑπόκρισις* to the mode of speaking, declamation, § 4): and (2) *τάξις*, the order and disposition, together with the ordinary topics, of the several divisions of the speech. The first is examined in the first twelve chapters, the second from the thirteenth to the end. These three general divisions of the art are expressed by Cicero, Orator § 43, *tria videnda sunt oratori, quid dicat* (πίστεις), *quo quidque loco* (τάξις), *et quomodo* (λέξις).

§ I commences with a partial repetition of the concluding summary of the preceding chapter. The three modes of proof are enumerated, *πίστεις, ἥθος, πάθος*: (1) the direct logical proof, by argument; (2) the con-

CHAP. I.
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τερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν εἰσὶ, καὶ ταῦτα ποῖα, καὶ διὰ τί τοσαῦτα μόνα· ἢ γὰρ τῷ αὐτοῖ τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδείχθαι πείθονται πάντες. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι· ἔστι 2 γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δὲ τόποι. περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι 3 ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη

veying a favourable impression by the exhibition of character *in and by the speech*; and (3), working on the feelings of the audience, so as to bring them to that state of mind which is favourable to the orator's purpose; to excite an angry or a calm temper, love or hatred, envy, jealousy, righteous indignation, and so on, according to circumstances and the immediate occasion.

'The enthymemes too have been stated, whence they are to be supplied; for of enthymemes there are special (εἶδη) as well as common topics (τόποι)'. See the quotation from Spengel's *Study of Ancient Rhetoric* prefixed to II 23.

§ 2. 'The next subject to be treated of is style' (the manner of expressing oneself; including not only the language, but the manner of *delivery*; both in voice, declamation, the pronunciation, tone, rhythm, &c.; and—here Aristotle stops, and the Latin rhetoricians add—*action*, the appropriate gesticulation, management of the hands and the body in general, and especially the features): 'for it is not sufficient to know *what* to say, it is necessary also to know *how* to say it; and this contributes greatly to the impression conveyed of a certain *character* in the speech'. The tone of voice, the expression of the features, the gestures employed, the kind of language used, quite independently of the arguments, will materially assist the impression of moral (or any particular) character which the orator wishes to assume, on the minds of the audience. The ἦθος of III 16.8 is part of this, the moral character imparted by the choice of language, of terms, tone and expression, significant of moral purpose, προαίρεσις.

§ 3. 'Now first of all, inquiry was naturally directed to that which is first in the natural order, the sources from which things themselves derive their plausibility or power of persuasion' (i. e. what are the sources of rhetorical proof of facts themselves; which of course is the basis of the entire art or practice, and therefore 'first in the order of nature'); 'and secondly, the due setting out (disposal) of these by the language;

κατὰ φύσιν, ὃ περ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι· τρίτον δὲ τούτων, ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὐπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπό-

and thirdly (τούτων, of such things as these, the divisions of Rhetoric), what has the greatest force (or influence, *is especially effective* as a means of persuasion), but has not yet been attempted (regularly, systematically, as an art, no serious attempt has yet been made upon it), that which relates to *delivery*'.

§ 3. πρῶτον ἐξηγήθη κατὰ φύσιν] A similar phraseology occurs at the beginning of the Poetics, I 1, ult. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. And de Soph. El. init. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. Victorius.

διαθέσθαι] denotes the 'disposal' or 'disposition', i.e. the investing of the speech with a certain character, putting it in a certain state, by the use of language: as the ἀκροαταί of a speech are said διατίθεσθαι πως, to be brought into such and such a disposition or state of feeling by it: a common use of the verb. It does not mean here distribution, ordering, arrangement, which is not the special office of the graces and proprieties of language or style. There is another sense in which this verb is used by later writers, as Polybius, Dionysius, Diodorus, with λόγους and the like, *disponere, in publicum proponere, in medium proferre*, to *dispose* or *set out* (διά), as wares in a market for sale, *étaler*; which may possibly be the meaning here, though, I think, it would be less appropriate. Victorius renders it *explanare*. διάθεσις, in Longinus quoted below, seems to correspond to διατίθεσθαι here in the sense in which I have explained it.

ἐπικεχείρηται] is a striking instance of that abnormal formation of the passive, which I have explained and illustrated in Appendix B on I 12. 22 [Vol. 1. p. 297].

ὑπόκρισις, 'acting', properly includes, besides declamation, the management of the voice, to which Aristotle, as already mentioned, here confines it, § 4, that of the features, arms, hands, and the entire body: and so it is treated by the Latin rhetoricians, Cicero, Quintilian, &c. Longinus, *Ars Rhet.*, (apud Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* I 310,) has a chapter upon it, following another περὶ λέξεως. His description of it is, *μίμησις τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐκάστω παρισταμένων ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν καὶ διαθέσεις σώματός τε καὶ τόνου φωνῆς πρόσφορος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν. δύναται δὲ μέγιστον εἰς πίστιν κ.τ.λ.* Dionysius, *de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene*, c. 22, p. 1023 (Reiske), says of the great orator, *κοσμοῦντος ἅπαντα καὶ χρηματίζοντος (σχηματίζοντος, Sylburg) τῇ πρεπούσῃ ὑποκρίσει ἧς δεινότητος ἀσκητῆς ἐγένετο, ὥς ἅπαντες τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν λόγων, κ.τ.λ.* See Quint. XI 3. 5, on the effect of *pronuntiatio*, 'delivery, declamation', where he says that even an indifferent speech set off by the vigour and grace of action will have more weight or effect than the very best without it: in § 6 he quotes the opinion of Demosthenes, who assigned successively the first, second, and third place to declamation (*pronuntiatio*), and so on till his questioner stopped. In § 7 he quotes Aeschines' saying to the

κρισιν. καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψωδίαν ὁψὲ παρήλθεν· ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγωδίας οἱ ποι- p. 111.

Rhodians, who were admiring the *de Corona* as he recited it to them, *Quid si ipsum audissetis? et M. Cicero unam in dicendo actionem dominari putat.* Cic. de Or. III 56. 213, from which the whole passage of Quintilian is taken. Also Brutus, LXVI 234, Lentulus' opinion. XXXVIII 141, 142. XLIII 168 (Spalding ad loc. Quint.). On Demosthenes' dictum, Bacon, *Essays*, Of Boldnesse, init., has this remark: A strange thing that that part of an Oratour which is but superficial, and rather the vertue of a Player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts of Invention, Elocution, and the rest; nay almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plaine. There is in humane Nature generally more of the foole then of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men's mindes is taken are most potent.

‘(And this is not at all surprising) because in fact it was not till late that it made its way into the tragic art and rhapsody; for the poets at first (in the earliest stages of the drama) used to act their tragedies themselves’ (and therefore, as there was no profession of acting or professional actors, it was not likely that an art of acting should be constructed; the poets acted, as they wrote, as well as they could by the light of nature, without any rules of art).

ῥαψωδία. On ῥαψωδοί and ῥαψωδεῖν, see Plat. Ion, 530 B, et seq., Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. 4 § 3. Heyne, *Excursus II ad Il.* Ω, § 3; Vol. VIII. p. 792. F. A. Wolf, *Proleg. ad Hom.*, p. 99 seq. Nitzsch, *Quaest. Hom.* IV. p. 13 seq.

ὁψὲ παρήλθεν] *infra* § 5, ὁψὲ προήλθεν; Poet. IV 17, τὸ μέγεθος (τῆς τραγωδίας)...ὁψὲ ἀπεσεμνύθη, also V 3.

ὑπεκρίνοντο αὐτοί] Plut. Sol. xxxix (Victorius), ὁ Σόλων ἐθεάσατο τὸν Θέσιπιν αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς. Liv. VII 2, *Livius —idem scilicet, id quod omnes tum erant, suorum carminum actor.* Victorius thinks that this statement is confirmed by Hor. A. P. 277, *quae canerent agerentque peruncti faccibus ora*, which means that ‘the poets themselves had their faces smeared’. Donaldson, *Theatre of the Greeks*, Ed. vii. p. 59, n. 10.

‘It is plain then that there is something of this kind in Rhetoric also as well as in poetry’ (declamation may be studied and practised for the purposes of Rhetoric, as well as for those of acting in tragedy and comedy or of rhapsodical recitation): ‘which, in fact, (i. e. the ‘poetical’ declamation), has been dealt with (treated artistically, see note on I 1. 3), besides others, by Glaucon of Teos in particular’.

This tautological repetition of καί, καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν, is not unfrequent in Aristotle. Compare Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη—οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. Ib. 1253 a 31, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθέν—οὕτω καὶ χωρισθέν.

Glaucon of Teos, an Ionian city on the coast of Asia Minor, is most probably the same as a Glaucon mentioned by Ion, Plat. Ion 530 D (so Stallbaum's note ad loc.), as following his own profession as a rhapsodist, which seems suitable enough for one who writes on the art of tragic declamation, especially as acting and rhapsodizing are actually coupled

ηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν
 ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν· ὁ περ
 ἕτεροὶ τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν καὶ Γλαῦκων ὁ Τήιος.
 4 ἐστὶ δὲ αὕτη¹ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὕτῃ δεῖ χρῆσθαι
 πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλη καὶ πότε
 μικρὰ καὶ πότε μέση, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξεῖα
 καὶ βαρεῖα καὶ μέση, καὶ ῥυθμοῖς τίσι πρὸς ἕκαστον.
 τρία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ

¹ αὕτη

together by Aristotle in the preceding sentence. I should be disposed also to identify with him of Teos, the Glaucon quoted in Poet. xxv 23 —seemingly as a poetical critic, which is also a kindred pursuit. See in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* the *third* article on Glaucon.

Tyrwhitt ad loc. Poet. seems in favour of the supposition that the three Glaucons are one. A Glaucon who wrote a work on γλῶσσαι (sic), Athen. xi 480 F, was at all events not far removed from the same studies. Schneider, ad Xen. Conv. iii 6.

§ 4. ἔστι δ' αὕτη] So all MSS and Edd., except Buhle, who reads αὕτη. This surely must be right: αὕτη seems to have no meaning here. Victorius retaining αὕτη translates 'haec'.

'This (declamation, ὑπόκρισις) resides in the voice, in the mode of employing it, that is, for (the expression of) any emotion; that is to say, sometimes loud, sometimes low, sometimes intermediate (between the two, middling, neither the one nor the other); and in the mode of employing the accents (or *tones* of voice), that is to say acute, grave, middle' (circumflex, from the combination of the two others, ˘ = ~), 'and certain measures (times) in respect of each. For there are three things that are the subjects of such enquiries, magnitude (intensity, volume of sound), tune, time'.

οἷον] is here in both cases *videlicet*, 'that is to say', a direct specification of certain definite things; not, as usual, 'for instance', as an example or specimen, which supposes *other* things of the same kind, besides those expressly mentioned. Thus οἷον here does not mean that the three kinds of sounds and accents mentioned are mere *examples* of a much larger class, but they *specify* the exact number of kinds which are intended to be distinguished in either case. This is common in Aristotle. Instances are, few out of many, Pol. i 6, sub fin., δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχον...μέρος. c. 7 sub fin. ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ...οἷον ἡ δικαία. c. 8, 1256 a 36, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας κ.τ.λ. c. 13, 1260 a 6, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. ii 5, 1264 a 26, οἷον φρούρους. Ib. c. 6, 1265 a 35, οἷον, 'I mean to say.' De Sens. c. 5, 443 a 10, τὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷον πῦρ ἀῖρ ὕδωρ γῆ. Plat. Gorg. 502 D. [Cf. *supra* ii 19. 26.]

On the modulation of the voice in the expression of the various emotions, see Cic. de Or. iii. cc. 57, 58, §§ 215—219, where it is illustrated at length.

On the accents, and μέγεθος, ἁρμονία, ῥυθμός, and their application to Rhetoric, see Introduction, Appendix C to Book iii, p. 379 seq.

μέγεθος ἀρμονία ῥυθμός. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν 5 πολιτειῶν. οὕτω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὁψὲ προήλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνομενον. ἀλλ' ὅλης P. 1404.

'Now one might almost say (it is pretty nearly true to say) that these are the men that gain all the prizes in (*lit.* out of, as the *produce* or profit derived from, got out of them,) the contests (dramatic and rhapsodical), and as in these the actors have more power, influence, effect (over the audiences, and those who adjudge the prizes), than the poets nowadays, so likewise (has acting or declamation) in civil and social contests (the contests of the law-courts, and public assembly—comp. III 12. 2) by reason of the defects (the *vicious*, depraved character) of our constitutions' (as that of Athens, where I, Aristotle, am now writing).

The vice or defect, which permits these irregular and extraneous appeals to the feelings, and the influence which 'acting' thereby acquires, are attributed here to the *constitution*—comp. I 1. 4, where 'well-governed states', εὐνομούμεναι πόλεις, states which are under good laws and institutions, are said to forbid them: if that of Athens were sound and healthy and right, ὑγιής, ὀρθή, opposed to μοχθηρά, they would not be allowed *there*. In the next section, 5, the defect is attributed to the *audience*: in the one case the institutions themselves are in fault, in the other the tempers and disposition of the hearers, whose taste and judgment are so depraved that they *require* the stimulus of these distorting (διαστρέφοντα, I 1. 5) emotions.

On the influence of *acting* in producing emotion, and thereby persuasion, see by all means Cicero's description, de Or. III 56 § 213, seq., which furnishes an excellent illustration of what is here said. Note particularly the case of Gracchus, § 214. After a quotation from his speech Cicero adds, *quae sic ab illo esse acta constabat oculis voce gestu, inimici ut lacrimas tenere non possent*. And Orat. c. XVII, *est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia, quum constet e voce et motu*, § 55 and the rest.

§ 5. 'But no art has been as yet composed of it; for in fact it was not till late that that of composition made any advance: and it (ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ) is thought low and vulgar' (in the sense of popular and unsubstantial, directed to show, not substance) 'and rightly so considered' (or, 'when considered aright'; so Victorius. But the other is the more *natural* interpretation of ὑπολαμβάνειν; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius 'Si vere *iudicare* volumus': 'consider' in the two renderings has *different* senses).

φορτικός, see note on II 21. 15, opposed to χαρίεις in the sense of mental refinement and cultivation, *Molestos et illepidos, quos Graeci μοχθηροὺς καὶ φορτικούς dicerent*; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Attici 18. 4

οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιον μηδὲν πλείω ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὡς μήτε λυπεῖν μήτε εὐφραίνειν. δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τᾶλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδείξαι περίεργα ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὁμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ (Gaisford). See Twining on Poet. note 263, pp. 540—544, where a number of examples illustrative of its various applications are collected. φορτικῶς, ἐπαχθῶς, ἐπιπλάστως (Suidas). The last of these two equivalents helps to explain a distinction in Eth. Eudem. I 4. 2, of arts φορτικά, περὶ χρηματισμόν (engaged in money-making, mercenary), βάνανσοι (mechanical), which is subsequently explained, λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον. This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: and ἐπιπλάστως 'beplastered' seems to correspond to this. And this same signification is plainly conveyed by the word here in the Rhetoric, which is immediately followed by ἀλλ' ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας, i. e. not only ὑποκριτική, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικόν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind, want of mental cultivation in persons: and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial, and in this point of view too low and vulgar to be entertained by a man of science or philosopher. It has precisely the same meaning in Pol. I 11, 1258 b 35. See Eaton ad loc.

'But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific, (directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ εἶναι: I 7. 36—37, see note,) we must bestow the requisite (τῇ) pains and attention upon it, not that it is right (to do so), but as necessary (for success in *persuading*): for, as to strict justice, *that* implies, (requires, *subaudi* ἐστίν,) looking for no more in the delivery of the speech than (to speak it) in a manner which will give neither offence nor delight: for fairness requires that the case be fought on the facts alone, and therefore everything else outside the direct proof (of them) is superfluous: but still, as has been already said, they have vast influence by reason of the vice or defects (depraved taste and judgment) of the hearer'. Quint. II 17. 27 seq. *Imperiti enim iudicant, et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sunt, ne errent. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientum conciones, atque omne concilium, nihil invidia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes: perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus, et prope in sola delectatione ponatur. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt.* §§ 28, 29.

οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος] If it be supposed (with Vater) that ὡς is omitted in this clause, comp. c. 3 § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι.

6 ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει
 τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει
 γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν· οὐ μέντοι
 τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ
 πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδά-
 7 σκει. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ ταῦτὸ ποιήσει τῇ

§ 6. 'Now (attention to) style (mode of speaking) is nevertheless in some slight degree necessary (has some slight portion of necessity) in every kind (department) of instruction: for it makes *some* difference in the clearness of an explanation whether we speak in one way or another; not however so much (as is generally supposed), but all this is mere fancy (φαντασία 'the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality, note on I 11. 6), and addressed to (for the sake of, to gratify) the hearer: for no one teaches geometry in this way'. These tricks and graces of style, declamation and acting, have no power of instruction, and therefore are never addressed to any *student*; but only to a popular audience like that of the orator, which requires to be flattered or have its ears tickled (as Plato says in the *Gorgias* [463 C, *κολακείας μόριον τὴν ῥητορικὴν*, and 502 E, *ὥσπερ παιστὶ...χαρίζεσθαι*]); to be amused and conciliated, as well as instructed and convinced

§ 7. 'Now *that* (the art which applies ὑποκριτικὴ to Rhetoric), whenever it reaches us (arrives), will produce the same effects as the art of acting (i. e. the application of it to dramatic poetry, § 3): some indeed have already to a trifling extent made the attempt to treat of it, as Thrasymachus in his *ἔλεοι*; in fact, a capacity for acting is a natural gift' (part of that general love of imitation which is the foundation of all the imitative or fine arts, Poet. c. 1) 'and less subject to rules of art' (more, or somewhat, spontaneous, αὐτοσχεδιαστική, extemporaneous, Poet. IV 14, of tragedy in its earliest stage), 'but when applied to language (declamation) it (the practice of it) may be reduced to an art. And therefore those who have the faculty (of ὑποκριτικὴ κατὰ λέξιν) obtain prizes in *their* turn' (again, *πάλιν*; of which τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν is an explanation, Victorius), 'as do also rhetoricians in respect of (by) their acting or declamation: for written speeches (in the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος) owe more of their effect to the style and language than to the thought or intellectual part'; διάνοιαν (Rhet. II 26. 5, Poet. XIX 2) meaning here the logical part of Rhetoric, the direct and indirect arguments.

Thrasymachus and his *ἔλεοι* are described by Plato, *Phaedr.* 267 C, τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόνων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πηνίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος. ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὥς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος.

On Thrasymachus see *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. IX Vol. III p. 268 seq., on the *ἔλεοι* 274, Spengel, *Artium Scriptores* [pp. 95—97, and Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I esp. p. 244, also K. F. Hermann's *Disputatio de Thrasymacho Chalcedonio sophista*,

ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις· καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἄθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μείζον ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

8 ἥρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινήσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέ- p. 111.
φυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν,

Gottingen, 1848, pp. 15, and Mayor's note on Juv. VII 204, *paenituit multos vanae sterilisque cathedrae, sicut Thrasymachi probat exitus*. Quint. III 3, 4, *Nec audiendi quidam...qui tres modo primas esse partes volunt, quoniam memoria atque actio natura non arte contingant...licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit* (sc. ἀτεχνότερον εἶναι), where Quintilian makes him be referring to the present passage, though he is misled by the words οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις, into supposing that the sentence, καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, is a quotation from Thrasymachus.]

οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. III 12, 5, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν κριτῇ κ.τ.λ. at the end of the section.

§ 8. 'Now the origin of this was due, as is natural, to the poets: for not only are all names imitations (copies of *things*, which they are supposed to represent), but there was also the voice ready for use, the most imitative of all our members; and so it was (in virtue of the same imitative faculty, Victorius) that the arts were composed, that of rhapsodizing and of acting and of course (γε, to be sure) others'.

κινεῖν, in the sense of *originating* anything, 'to stir, set in motion', is found in Plut. Solon. 95 B, ἀρχομένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Θέσπιν ἤδη τὴν τραγῳδίαν κινεῖν¹ (Victorius). Sext. Empir., adv. Math. VII 6, quotes Aristotle as having said that Empedocles πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεινηκέναι: and Quintilian, III 1, 8, doubtless also with reference to Aristotle, repeats this, *primus post eos...movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur*. Sext. Empir. again, p. 546, Bekk. adv. Math. X, πρὸς ἠθικοὺς § 2, of Socrates' 'origination' of the study of Moral Philosophy, ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν δόξας κεινηκέναι. See Spalding ad loc. Quint., who quotes Athen. XIV 629 C, ὅθεν ἐκινήθησαν αἱ καλούμεναι πυρρίχαι. *Movere* eodem sensu apud Quint. III 6, 10, 103, IV 1, 29.

ὀνόματα μιμήματα] This is the Platonic theory, Cratyl. 423 A seq.

¹ Welcker, *Nachtrag*, p. 239, note 175, accuses Bentley of a 'wonderful blunder' in the interpretation of κινεῖν in this passage, in saying, viz., that it signifies 'the first beginning of tragedy'—which it most undoubtedly does—and understands it himself of 'disturbing, altering', as κινεῖν νόμους (and the proverb μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, "let well alone," *quieta non movere*, "let sleeping dogs lie"). He says that Bentley's rendering is *längst widerlegt*. [Bentley, *On Phalaris*, I pp. 284, 386, ed. Dyce, pp. 262, 309, ed. Wagner.]

ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν
μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἥ τε
ῥάψωδια καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ

The conclusion is, 423 B, ὄνομα ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῆς ἐκείνου, ὃ μιμεῖται καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ, ὃ ἂν μιῇται. "Olympiodorus ad Philebum Platonis tradit Democritum nomina vocales imagines rerum appellare consuevisse, ὅτι ἀγάλματα φωνήεντα καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τῶν θεῶν, ὡς Δημόκριτος." Victorius. Aristotle himself, de Interpretatione, sub init. 16 a 3, calls words τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, and afterwards, line 7, ὁμοιώματα, signs or representatives, and copies, of *mental* affections, i. e. impressions, a theory quite different from that of Plato, which is here adopted. On the terms applied by Aristotle to express the nature of words, see Waitz, on Organon 16 a 4. Of the four employed, he says, σύμβολον is a subjective σημεῖον, and ὁμοίωμα an objective μίμημα. On imitation and the natural love of it, the origin and foundation of all the fine arts, see the first three chapters of the Poetics. In c. 4, init. imitation or mimicry is described as natural to man from infancy, and *characteristic* of humanity. [Dionysius Halic. *de comp. verb.* p. 94 (quoted in Farrar's *Chapters on Language*, chap. XI), μεγάλη τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις, ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικούς ἡμᾶς καὶ θετικούς τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα.]

τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κ.τ.λ.] This is introduced to account for the poets having been the first who devoted themselves to the study of style or language, in this sense. Words being the copies of things, the poets, whose object is imitation, addicted themselves to the study of them, in order to be able better to represent the things of which they were images. Victorius.

αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν] Some of the writers on rhapsodizing, with which was naturally combined the criticism of Homer, are mentioned in Plat. Ion. 530 C, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotus of Thasos (Xenoph. Conv. III 6), and Glaucon, probably of Teos, mentioned above, § 3.

§ 9. 'And as the reputation which the poets acquired in spite of the simplicity of what they said (the silliness of the thoughts expressed) was thought (by those who imitated them) to be due to their language, it was for this reason that the language (of prose) first took a poetical colour, as that of Gorgias. And still, even at this day, the mass of the uneducated think the discourses of speakers of this kind mighty fine. Such however is not the fact, but the language of prose and poetry is distinct'.

To the same effect Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 3, (v. 457, Reiske). Lysias' predecessors were not of his opinion about style—his was the ἀφελὴς λόγος, the 'smooth and simple' style—ἀλλ' οἱ βουλόμενοι κόσμον τινὰ προσεῖναι τοῖς ὅλοις ἐξήλλαττον ἰδιώτην, καὶ κατέφυγον εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν μεταβολαῖς τε πολλαῖς χρώμενοι καὶ ὑπερβολαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τροπικαῖς ἰδέαις, ὀνομάτων τε γλωττηματικῶν καὶ ξένων χρήσει, καὶ τῶν οὐκ εἰσθότων σχηματισμῶν τῇ διαλλαγῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ καινολογίᾳ καταπληττόμενοι τὸν ἰδιώτην, κ.τ.λ. This was the new style introduced by Gorgias and his followers Polus and Licymnius (Alcidamas, &c.). Hermogenes, περὶ

ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πο-
ρίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη
ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου. καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ
τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς τοιούτους οἶονται διαλέγεσθαι
κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα λόγον
καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον·

ἰδεῶν, β', περὶ δεινότητος (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 395); on the third
kind of δεινότης represented by Gorgias and his school, οἱ σοφισταί; ὁ
φαίνόμενος λόγος δεινὸς οὐκ ὦν τοιούτος. γίνεται γὰρ τὸ πλείστον περὶ τὴν
λέξιν, ὅταν τραχείας καὶ σφοδράς τις ἢ καὶ σεμνὰς συμφορήσας λέξεις εἴτ'
ἐξαγγέλλῃ ταύταις ἐννοίας ἐπιπολαίους καὶ κοινάς.

λέγοντες εὐήθη κ.τ.λ.] Cic. Orat. LII 175, of Isocrates, also a follower
of Gorgias, *Quum enim videret oratores cum severitate audiri poetas
autem cum voluptate, tum dicitur numeros secutus quibus etiam in ora-
tione uteremur, quum iucunditatis causa tum ut varietas occurreret
satietaati.* So Theophrastus, *Dion. Lys. Iud. c. 14*, condemns this af-
fected poetical language of the Sicilian school of rhetoricians as childish,
τὸ ἴσον καὶ ὁμοιον παιδιῶδες, and unworthy of a serious purpose, καθ' ὅσον
ποίημα· διὸ καὶ ἦττον ἀρμόττει τῇ σπουδῇ κ.τ.λ. Plato, *Rep. X 601 A—B*.

On Gorgias' novel and poetical style and the figures that he intro-
duced into Rhetoric, see *Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philology*,
No. VII Vol. III pp. 66—7, 73—5, and on the rhetorical figures, which are
classified, 69—72. Comp. Cic. Orat. § 175 [*paria paribus adiuncta et
similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria, quae sua sponte,
etiamsi id non agas, cadunt plerumque numerose, Gorgias primus invenit,
sed eis est usus intemperantius.* See also Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*,
I esp. pp. 57—64. As a specimen of the poetical style of Gorgias we have
his metaphorical term for vultures, ἔμψυχοι τάφοι, parallels to which may
be found in the poets Lucretius and Spenser, *Lucr. v 924, vivia videns vivo
sepeliri viscera busto*, and *Faery Queen II 8. 16* (quoted by Munro), *To be
entombed in the raven or the knight*. That this fancy for poetic prose was
with Gorgias a 'ruling passion strong in death', is proved by the phrase
used at the close of his life, 'At last Sleep lays me with his brother
Death'. Another of his death-bed utterances, ὥσπερ ἐκ σαπροῦ καὶ ῥέοντος
συννοικίου ἀσμένως ἀπαλλάττομαι (Thompson's ed. of the *Gorgias*, p. 184),
may be illustrated by Waller's lines, *The soul's dark cottage, battered
and decayed, Lets in new light through chinks that time has made*].

λόγου] prose, opposed to ποιήσις. *infra* § 9, c. 2 §§ 3 and 6, ψιλοὶ λόγοι,
§ 7, ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, § 8, ὁ λόγος τῶν μέτρων. Poet. II 5, VI 26.
Plato *Rep. III 390 A, ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει*. 'This is shewn by the result :
for even the tragic writers no longer employ it (sc. τῇ λέξει) in the same
way (as the earlier tragedians did), but just as they passed from the
(trochaic) tetrameter to the iambic measure because of all other metres
this most resembles prose, so also in the use of words (names or nouns)
they have dropped all that are contrary to the usage of ordinary conver-
sation, and have dropped also those with which the earliest (dramatic)
writers (*subaudi ποιήσαντες*; especially Æschylus) used to adorn (their

οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν

compositions), a practice which is even now retained by the writers of hexameters (Epics): it is absurd therefore to copy those who themselves no longer employ that (the original) style'.

ὥσπερ καὶ...οὕτω καὶ] This tautological repetition of καὶ in an antithesis is characteristic of Aristotle's style. [Cf. *supra* § 3.]

ἐκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν] Poet. IV 17, 18, 19. μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρον τὸ ἱαμβεῖον ἐστὶ...πλείστα γὰρ ἱαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κ.τ.λ. III 3. 3 ult. where this passage is referred to. III 8. 4. Welcker, *Nachtrag*, p. 239.

ὁμοιότατον τῶν ἄλλων] In translating this I have purposely retained the ungrammatical and illogical 'other' with the superlative, because the same blunder is equally common in our own language. Swift, *Tale of a Tub*, 'The most perfect of all others', Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* 'of all other, they are...most infallible'. Bacon, *Essay Of Envy*, 'one of the most able of his predecessors' (of whom he is *not*, and cannot be, *one*), 'of all other affections (envy) the most importune and continual'. The examination of this, and the other irregular use of ἄλλος, (πολιταὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξένοι [Plat. Gorg. p. 473 C]), and the analogies in English, is reserved for an Appendix [this Appendix was apparently never written, though its intended preparation is also hinted in Mr Cope's translation of the Gorgias, p. 11. Compare note I to II 9. 9, τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα].

διάλεκτον] for 'common conversation' (properly dialogue): compare c. 2. 5, ἡ εἰωθυῖα διάλεκτος, and Poet. XXII 14. In a somewhat different application διάλεκτος is the third and highest stage of 'sound', (1) noise, ψόφος, which even *inanimate* things, brute matter, wood and stone, are capable of producing: (2) φωνή, φθόγγος, the *indistinct voice* of an animal: and (3) διάλεκτος, the *distinct* utterance of the μέρονες ἄνθρωποι, the power of *conversation*, characteristic of humanity. This distinction lies in the power which man has, and other animals (I believe) want, of pronouncing *consonants*, which produce distinct, articulate words. On *speech*, as the characteristic of man, see Pol. I 2, 1253 a 10, seq. where λόγος is substituted for διάλεκτος, [also Isocr. Paneg. § 48, τοῦτο μόνον (sc. τοὺς λόγους) ἐξ πάντων τῶν ζώων ἴδιον ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες, and Cicero, de Off. I 16. 50, (*ferae*) *rationis et orationis expertes*, de Oratore I §§ 32, 33].

οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν] Of this change, the lowering of the language of tragedy to the level of common life, the earliest author (as we are told in c. 2. 5) was Euripides, in his *later* plays, which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus, and Ion. The change was completely carried out in the New Comedy of Menander, Philemon, Diphilus, &c. On this *everyday* character of Euripides' later and worse compositions—which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus and Ion—to which the language was

ἔστιν, ¹οἷς [δ'] ¹οἱ πρότερον ¹ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ
ἑξάμετρα ποιοῦντες ¹. διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτους οὐ
10 αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρωῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. ὥστε φανε-
ρὸν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀκρι-
βολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἴας λέγο-
μεν. περὶ δ' ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

I ἔστω οὖν ἐκείνα τεθεωρημένα, καὶ ὠρίσθω λέξεως CHAP. II.
P. 1404 b.
ἀρετὴ σαφὴ εἶναι. σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ
δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον· καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν

¹⁻¹ [The rendering given at the foot of p. 11 follows Bekker's Oxford ed. of 1837, which has οἷς δ' (*sic*) οἱ πρότερον ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἑξάμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφείκασι· but there is nothing to shew that Mr Cope deliberately preferred this to the text as printed in Bekker's third edition; which is also approved in Spengel's note, except that he would strike out the first ἀφείκασιν, and not the second.]

made to conform, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* ch. xxv. §§ 2, 3. In Arist. Ran. 959, Euripides is made to take credit for it, οἰκεία πράγματ' εἰσάγων, οἷς χρώμεθ', οἷς ξύνεσμεν.

§ 10. 'And therefore it is plain that we must not go into exact detail in describing all that may be said about style, but confine ourselves to the kind of which we are now speaking (i.e. the use of it in Rhetoric). The other (the general view of the subject) has been treated in the Poetics'.

There is a useful note on the various senses of ἀκρίβεια in Aristotle in Grant's *Ethics*, I 7. 18. Here it is used in the first of these, of accuracy, or exactness, as shewn in *minute detail*, a complete survey of an entire subject.

CHAP. II.

Some general remarks upon Style and its virtues, and the various classifications of these in ancient and modern systems of Rhetoric, are given in the Introduction, as preliminary to the paraphrase of this chapter, pp. 279—282. [Volkman, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 43.]

§ 1. 'Let so much suffice for the consideration (observation) of *that* (τὰ περὶ ποιητικῆς, c. I. 10); and (now) let it be regarded as settled (or determined) once for all that one virtue of style is to be perspicuous: for a sign of this is, that if the speech (or language) do not explain its meaning, it will fail to perform its own proper function'.

This is a reference to the rule first laid down by Plat. Rep. I 352 D seq., and adopted by Aristotle who constantly recurs to it—see especially Eth. Nic. II 5, init.—that the virtue or excellence of anything, knife, horse, or anything that can be employed *as an instrument*, is determined by its ἔργον or special function, in the due performance of which it lies. If the special function of language is to explain one's meaning, it is plain that if it fail to do that—if it is not perspicuous—it does not answer its intended purpose.

μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῇ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τὰλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ

‘And neither mean nor exaggerated’ (beyond or above the true valuation of the subject it is employed upon, turgid, pompous, inflated), ‘but decent, appropriate, suitable’ (a precept of *propriety*): ‘for though it may be (ἴσως) poetical language is not tame, yet it is by no means suitable to prose’. Comp. Poet. XXII 1, λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῇ καὶ μὴ ταπεινῇ εἶναι. These are the two indispensable excellences of style, (1) clearness or perspicuity, and (2) propriety. On these see Introduction, p. 280.

§ 2. ‘Of nouns and verbs’ (the ultimate elements, and principal components, of language: see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III. p. 371. Poet. XXI 8—9) ‘perspicuity is produced by (the use of) *proper* names, a character not tame but ornate is imparted by all the rest of the (kinds of) words which are enumerated in the Poetics (c. XXI 4): to alter language in this way’ (from the received and familiar expressions to which we are accustomed), ‘invests it with a higher dignity’ (because it makes it unusual, and strange; not familiar, which ‘breeds contempt’): ‘for men have the same feeling in regard of language as they have to strangers as compared with their fellow-citizens’ (they disregard those whom they are in the habit of seeing every day, but are struck with the appearance of strangers, and pay them attention, if not always respect). To the note on κύρια ὀνόματα, Introd. p. 282, note 2, add that in the Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, and 30 (31) 6, these are called οἰκεία ‘proper’, by a different metaphor.

ἐξαλλάξαι] *infra* § 5, ἐξαλλάττειν τοῦ πρέποντος, c. 3. 3, τὸ εἰωθὸς ἐξαλλάττειν (which explains it: comp. Poet. XXII 3 *infra*). So Poet. XXI 4, and 20, ὄνομα ἐξηλλαγμένον, XXII 3, (λέξις) ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικόν, Ib. § 8, ἐξαλλαγαὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων. From which it results that the meaning of the term is ‘a change out of, or departure from ὀνόματα κύρια, the vulgar language, the ordinary mode of expression’, for which something novel, unusual, striking is substituted. Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 179, λόγους διεξιὼν πολὺ τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ’ ὑμῖν ἐξηλλαγμένους; Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, περὶ συγκρίσεως ult. (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 280), λέξιν περιττὴν καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένην, καὶ ἀσυνήθη. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene, c. 10, ἐξηλλαγμένον τοῦ συνήθους χαρακτήρος, Ib. c. 15, περιττὰ καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένον τοῦ συνήθους, de Thuc. Iud. c. 28, τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξαλλάττειν ἐκ τῶν ἐν ᾗθει, Ep. II ad Amm. c. 3 ἡ ἐξηλλαγμένη τῆς συνήθους χρήσεως. Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v.

§ 3. ‘And therefore a *foreign* air must be given to the language; for people are admirers of (or wonder at) what is far off, remote, and

3 πάσχουσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν. διὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον θαυμάσται γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά τε ποιεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεί· πλείον γὰρ ἐξέστηκε περὶ αὐ καὶ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψαλλομένοις λόγοις πολλῶν ἐλάττωσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δούλοις καλλεπόιτο ἢ λίαν νέει, ἀπρεπέστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν· ἄλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπισυστελλόμενον καὶ αἰχμαλόμενον τὸ πρῶτον.

all that is wonderful (καὶ τὰ θαυμάσια) is, that one can understand an 'aggressive' Poet. XXIV 17, τὸ δὲ θαυμάσιον ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐκ τούτου γὰρ προσηλόντες ἀπαρρίπτεται ἀν' ἡμετέραν. Comp. 111 21, ὅτι τὰ θαυμάσια ἐκ τούτου, and the translation of our copy is learning: see the note.

ξένη] *infra* § 6, ξενίζον. Poet. XXII 3.

'Now in verse of all kinds there are many ways of producing this effect, and there they are appropriate. Language has suffered considerable, and the character (personality) of the writer has borne its share, are further removed from common life; and out of and above the ordinary level of humanity, Hist. Art. 114 f.—But if prose composition thus (under of giving novelty and variety to the language), must be much more carefully used' (προσέτι, ὅτι ἀπὸ ἀρμόττει ἐκεί, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἐλάττω, τούτῳ, ὅτι τούτῳ τούτῳ, ἀρμόττει ἐκεί, 'because the subject (theme, argument) is less common, less elevated, and thus it is true a fortiori is prose, for even in the other 'in poetry, if a slave or a very young man were to use that language it would be rather unbecoming, or (if any one else did so, on a very trifling subject, but on the contrary even in that 'poetry, not 'poetry' as I have it, 'poetry' consists in a due construction and organization (arrangement); the adaptation of the language to the circumstances (subject or occasion) is as the occasion requires. Comp. Cic. de Orat. III 21 153. Orat. II 202. Also XXI 79, ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre. Ποίηται ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμιλῶν, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμιλῶν. § 72, Quam enim indecorum est de stulticiis quam apud unam eadem dicat amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de multis populis Romani summis et sublimiter! De stulticiis dicere: ὁμιλῶν τῶν ὁμιλῶν. On the language of poetry and prose, comp. below, Essay II 3-11.

καλλεπόιτον. Comp. Poet. April. 172. καλλεπόιτον λόγους ὁμιλῶν τε καὶ ὁμιλῶν, ὅτι καλλεπόιτον, ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμιλῶν τῶν ὁμιλῶν. Thuc. VI 23. Poet. II 202. 203 f. τὰς ἀσφῶν ὁμιλῶν τῶν... ἀν' αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμιλῶν καλλεπόιτον. Vespasian, Inst. Hist. Fr. p. 261 c.

¹ ὑπόθεσις, anything that is subjected as a foundation, a proposition or hypothesis, the basis of an argument, a few principles assumed, a theory, an underlying principle on which a scheme is to be built, the just ground plan of a play, and so forth.

4 διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιούντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκóτως. τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκείνο δὲ τούναντίον, ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἶνους τοὺς μεμιγμένους,¹ καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν

¹ μεμιγμένους·

§ 4. 'Hence—from the necessity of paying attention to the selection of appropriate language in respect of characters and subjects—may be inferred (διὸ) the necessity of disguising the art employed, and of avoiding the appearance of speaking, not naturally, but artificially' (πλάττειν *figere*, of *fiction*, or artificial composition), 'for the one is persuasive, the other the contrary', (comp. c. 8 § 1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον, πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ.) 'For people take offence at (*lit.* are at variance with, in opposition to) (one who employs artifice) as at one who has a design upon them, just as they do at mixed wines'.

Victorinus quotes Plut. Symp. IV p. 661 D, διὸ φεύγουσι τὸν μεμιγμένον οἶνον οἱ πίνοντες· οἱ δὲ μιγνύοντες πειρῶνται λανθάνειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντες. From this curious coincidence it seems that "mixed wine" must have been proverbial for a concealed enemy: mixed wine, 'the mixing of liquors', being, as was supposed, of a much more intoxicating character than unmixed. Philinus is arguing against ποικίλη τροφή: *simple* food is always best.

'And as is the case with Theodorus' voice (*lit.* Theodorus' voice is affected) in comparison with that of all the rest of the actors' (there should be a colon, instead of a comma, at μεμιγμένους· καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου is continued from τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν: it is an instance of the art disguising art, an artificial voice assuming the appearance of one natural and simple): 'for *his* voice *appears* to be that of the speaker (though it is in reality disguised), but the others as though they belonged to other people' (were assumed, with the character represented).

Theodorus, a celebrated tragic actor, is mentioned—generally with Polus or Aristodemus—by Dem. de F. L. § 274, *dis*; Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 17, sub fin., 1336 b 28, from which it appears that, like other great artists and performers, ancient and modern, he presumed upon his reputation and artistic skill: also by Plutarch, frequently, as Bellone an pace cl. f. Ath. c. 6, 348 F, de sui laud. c. 7, 545 F (a dictum of his to Satyrus the comic poet), Praecepta gerendae reipublicae, c. 21, 816 F, Theodorus and Polus taken as types of τὸν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ πρωταγωνιστὴν: *probably*, by Diogenes Laertius, who at the end of his account of Aristippus, II 8, § 103, 4, enumerates twenty Theodoruses (including the philosopher who gives occasion to this digression), and amongst them one οὗ τὸ φωνασκικὸν (on the exercise of the voice) βίβλιον παγκαλόν: a subject so germane to the profession of a tragic actor, that, although Diogenes says no more about him, one cannot help suspecting that he must be the same with the one here mentioned. Fabricius in his catalogue of Theodoruses, Vol. x, names him with a special reference to the passage of Aristotle's Politics, and a general one to Plutarch,

5 εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι. κλέπτεται δ' εὖ, εἰάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ· ὃ περ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

ὄντων δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τοσαύτ' ἐχόντων εἶδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ χρηστέον (ὅπου δέ, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν,

Valckenaer *Diatrise ad Eur. Fragm.* p. 182 b. He is omitted in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*.

§ 5. 'And this cheat (disguise, delusion) is fairly effected' (the assumed character escapes observation, is *stolen* from the view), 'if the composer selects for his composition words out of the ordinary language (of common life); such as are the verses of Euripides, who gave us the earliest specimen (hint or glimpse, *ὑπό*) (of this kind of writing)'.

κλέπτεται] Comp. *infra* § 10, οὐ κλέπτεται οὐν, c. 7. 10, οὕτω κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής. Rhet. ad Alex. 15 (16) §§ 5, and 6, κλέπτειν τὴν μαρτυρίαν, Ib. 35 (36) § 4, τὰ δ' ἔξω κλέπτεται. Aesch. Choeph. 839, οὗτοι φρέν' ἂν κλέψειαν ὤματωμένην. Soph. Phil. 57, τὸ δ' οὐχὶ κλεπτέον (not to be disguised), Aj. 188, εἰ δ' ὑποβαλλόμενοι κλέπτουσι μύθους οἱ μεγάλοι βασιλῆς, et alibi ap. Soph. (Wunder's note ad loc.). Ib. 1135, κλέπτῃς, 1137, πόλλ' ἂν κακῶς λάθρα σὺ κλέψειας κακά. Eur. Fragm. Ἰππόλυτος καλυπτόμενος, 12, εὐρόοισι στόμασι τὰληθέστατα κλέπτουσι. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 19, τάσεις (tension, pitching) φωνῆς αἱ καλούμεναι προσφθαῖα διάφοροι, κλέπτουσαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν κόρον. Ib. Ars Rhet. c. x § 14, κλέπτοντα τὴν ἀκρόασιν ("captata furtim auditorum attentione," Reiske). Bacon, Essays, *Of great Place*, "And do not think to steal it."

ὑπέδειξε] as I have pointed out, *Introductio* p. 284, note 2, q. v., may also signify 'traced as a guide', for his successors to follow. See also p. 285, note 1, on Euripides' style, and Archimelus' epigram there given.

'And of the nouns and verbs' (or subject and predicate, *Introductio* p. 371, Appendix A to Bk. III), 'of which the speech (or language, in general) is composed, of which the nouns have so many kinds as have been considered in the treatise on Poetry' (c. XXI, where, in § 4, eight varieties are enumerated, and then defined *seriatim*, §§ 5—20), 'of these words, foreign or obsolete, and (long) compound words' (Aeschylean compounds), 'and words invented (manufactured for the occasion), are to be rarely employed, and in rare places (on rare occasions); *where* (these are), we will state by and by: (in cc. 3 and 7). The *why*, has been already stated; and that (the *why*) is because *it* (the use of them) varies (from the ordinary standard) towards, in the direction of, exaggeration (or excess) beyond propriety (what is becoming)'.

Ὁν γλῶτται, διπλὰ ὀνόματα, see *Introductio* on c. 3, pp. 287, 8. πεποιημένον δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὅλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τινων αὐτὸς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής· οἷον τὰ κέρατα ἔρυνγας καὶ τὸν ἱερέα ἀρητῆρα (*Poet.* XXI. 17).

τό τε διὰ τί εἴρηται· ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον γὰρ ἐξαλλάττει 6 τοῦ πρέποντος), τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόναι χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. σημεῖον δὲ ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες χρῶνται· πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις· ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἂν εὖ ποιῇ

§ 6. 'The proper (ordinary) name, and the special name of anything' (οἰκείον, the thing's *own* or right name, its special designation, Victorius), 'and the metaphor, are alone serviceable for the language of prose. And a sign of this is, that these alone are used by everybody (are of universal application); for everyone makes use of metaphors¹, and the common' (sanctioned by common usage) 'and appropriate words in his ordinary conversation: and therefore it is clear that good composition will have a *foreign* air (an air of novelty, something unusual, above the flatness and monotony of ordinary, vulgar, talk: § 3), that (the art employed in it) may escape detection (pass unobserved, § 4), and that it will be clear and perspicuous, (in virtue of the *κύρια* and *οἰκεία ὀνόματα*). And in these, as we said (*ἦν*, in §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6), consists the excellence of the rhetorical speech²'.

With the 'foreign', unusual character of good composition, comp. Demetr. περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 77, (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 280), τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι τούτῳ περιττὴν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένην καὶ ἀσυνήθη μᾶλλον, οὕτω γὰρ ἕξει τὸν ὄγκον, ἡ δὲ κυρία καὶ συνήθης σαφὴς μὲν, λειτὴ δὲ καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητος.

κύριον ὄνομα is ὁ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι (Poet. XXI 5), opposed to γλῶττα ᾧ ἕτεροι: the common, usual, *established*, term, for expressing anything, opposed to the foreign and barbarous, or archaic and obsolete γλῶττα. The word derives its special meaning from the original signification of κύριος, 'carrying authority', 'authoritative'; whence 'authorised, established, fixed (by authority), settled', as κύριος νόμος, δόγμα, κυρία ἡμέρα, ἐκκλησία, opposed to the *irregular* ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος, convoked at uncertain times on special occasions: and hence applied to the established, settled, regular name of a thing. See further on κύριον ὄνομα in note 2, Introd. pp. 282, 3. [On κύριος, compare notes on I 2. 4 and 3. 4.]

οἰκείον ὄνομα expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor. It is something 'of one's own', appropriate, peculiar, characteristic, special. This is the Latin '*nomen proprium*', of which Cicero says, de Or. III 37, 149, *quae propria sunt, et certa* ('definite') *quasi vocabula rerum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis* (naturally belonging to them). From these are distinguished *quae transferuntur* (all metaphorical words)

¹ Schrader quotes Cic. Orator, c. 24 § 81, *Translatione frequentissime sermo omnis utitur, non modo urbanorum, sed etiam rusticorum, siquidem est eorum gemmare vires, suture agros, laetas esse segetes, luxuriosa frumenta.*

² 'If the orator confines himself to these, his style may be novel and ornamental, yet without forcing itself unduly upon the attention, and perspicuous.' Paraphr. in Introd.

τις, ἔσται τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέχεται καὶ σαφηνιεῖ. αὕτη δ' ἦν ἡ τοῦ ρητορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή.
7 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμία χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμίας. λέγω δὲ κύρια τε καὶ συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύ- P. 1405.
εσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις.

et quasi alieno in loco collocantur: aut iis quae novamus et facimus ipsi (all foreign innovations on the ordinary language, *aliena*, Cicero, γλῶτται, διπλὰ ὀνόματα, πεποιημένα, &c.). Cicero and the Latins do not distinguish κύρια and οἰκεία. Yet, as Victorius has pointed out, he uses terms exactly corresponding to those of Aristotle: de Or. III 39, 159, *quod omnes translatis et alienis magis quam propriis et suis*. For even if we understand here *suis* of *their own language* (as I suppose we should), this is immediately followed by *nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum proprium non habet*; and in pro Caecina, c. 18 § 51, we have, *res ut omnes suis certis ac propriis vocabulis nominentur*. οἰκείος stands for κύριος, Metaph. Δ 29, 1024 a 32, of Antisthenes, εὐθὺς φέτο μὴν ἀξίων λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἑνός.

§ 7. This is a parenthetical note: it has little to do with Rhetoric except so far as it occupies common ground with poetry, in the use of synonyms. 'Of names (words) *homonyms* (ambiguous words, with more than one meaning) are useful to the Sophist' (the fallacious reasoner; see II 24. 2, the topic of ὁμωνυμία, and the note)—'for those are the (principal) instruments of his (logical) frauds or cheats; to the poet, *synonyms*'. The *homonym* and the *synonym* are defined at the commencement of the Categories. The former is a word of more than one signification, of which the several definitions do *not* agree; so that the *name* being the same, the one signification can be employed fallaciously for the other: synonyms are words which can be variously applied, in which the name and the definition (or meaning) *do* agree; as animal, can be said with truth of man and ox. Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Ar.* § 42, p. 116, on synonyms. Of homonyms Quintilian says, Inst. Or. VII 9. 2, *singula afferunt errorem, quum pluribus rebus aut hominibus eadem appellatio est*, (ὁμωνυμία dicitur) *ut Gallus; avem enim, an gentem, an nomen, an fortunam corporis significet incertum est: et Ajax Telamonis an Oilei filius. Verba quoque quaedam diversos intellectus habent, ut cerno*: (with the application of it in suits of law). Of this logical application of κακουργεῖν, see the examples quoted in note on I 1. 10.

'By proper and synonymous I mean such words as πορεύεσθαι and βαδίζειν: these are both of them proper and identical in meaning'. According to Trendelenburg, u. s., πορεύεσθαι is the *genus* and βαδίζειν the *species*, both predicable of animals in the same sense: "Aristoteles enim constanter vocabulum (συνώνυμος) ita frequentavit, ut vel eiusdem generis formas vel genus et species, quatenus communi nomine comprehenduntur, synonyma diceret." The use of these to the poet lies

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τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἑκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἶδη
[μεταφορᾶς¹], καὶ ὅτι² τούτων πλείστον δύνανται³ καὶ ἐν
ποιήσῃ καὶ ἐν λόγοις αἱ μεταφοραί, εἴρηται, καθάπερ
8 ἐλέγουμεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τοσοῦτο³ δ' ἐν λόγῳ
δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοπονεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἑλατ- p. 114.

¹ μεταφορᾶς *sine uncinis*.²⁻³ τοῦτο πλείστον δύνανται³ τοσοῦτω

in this, that they help him to give variety to his diction, and relieve him from the necessity of constantly repeating the same word.

'Now what each of these things is'—i.e. the things already enumerated, *nomina propria, translata, συνώνυμα* &c. (Victorius)—'and the number of the kinds of metaphors, and that this, metaphor, is most effective both in poetry and prose, has been already stated, as we said (§ 2, τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων—τάλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς), in our work on poetry'. Max Schmidt, in his tract *On the date of the Rhetoric*, Halle, 1837 (frequently referred to in the Introd.), and before him Victorius, notices here, that the synonyms alone of all the words here referred to do not appear in the Poetics; from which each of them infers a *lacuna* in that work: more especially as Simplicius had left on record that Aristotle had treated of them in his book on poetry. There is another loss in that work indicated by a reference in *Rhet.* I 11. 29 [and III 18. 7] to the Poetics for an account of τὸ γελοιόν, which is now no longer to be found there.

§ 8. 'And they require all the more diligent attention (*φιλοπονεῖν* 'labour *con amore*,' fond, affectionate, loving, care and pains), to be bestowed upon them in prose, in proportion as the sources from which prose draws its aids or supplies are fewer than those of verse': see *ante* § 3. I have translated *τοσοῦτω* which seems much more likely than *τοσοῦτο*. If the latter be retained, it can only mean 'so much as I have described', but where? or when? I have no doubt that *τοσοῦτω* is the right reading. [*οὕτω* A (quod Bekkerum fugit) Q, unde iam Victorius *τοσοῦτω* restituit.] Spengel.]

'And perspicuity' (perhaps rather, 'clearness' in the sense of vivid, graphic, representation¹), 'and pleasure, and the foreign air, are conveyed by metaphor more than in any other way', (more than by any other kind of word which can be used to give an extraneous interest to language). *ἔστι δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστω τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόντως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ γλώτταις, πολλὴ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι*. Poet. XXIII. 16. The *pleasure* derived from metaphors is that we learn something from them; they bring into view hitherto unnoticed resemblances between things the most apparently dissimilar. *τὸ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ το ὁμοιον θεωρεῖν*, Poet. XXII 17. Top. Z 2, 140 a 9. This is the fourth kind of metaphor, that from analogy, and by far the commonest and most attractive. On the pleasure of learning, see I 11. 21 and 23, III 10. 2.

'And it can't be derived (acquired) from anyone else'. This does not of course mean that one writer or speaker cannot *borrow* a metaphor

¹ Demetrius, however, *περὶ Ἑρμηνείας* § 82, (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 281), says, *ἐνια μέντοι σαφέστερον ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λέγεται καὶ κυριώτερον ἢ περ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κυρίοις, ὥς τὸ ἐφρίξεν δὲ μάχη* (II. N 339), κ.τ.λ. but this *is* by the vividness of the description.

τόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων. καὶ τὸ
 σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα ἢ μετα-
 9 φορά, καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτὴν παρ' ἄλλου. δεῖ

from another; but that the invention of metaphors is a mark of original genius, and therefore cannot be *taught*, derived from another in the way of instruction. Not that metaphors in general are *confined* to men of genius, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται, § 6; but they all shew originality more or less, and are marks of *natural* (not acquired) ability, or genius, each in proportion to its merit. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο (τὸ μεταφορικόν) οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἐστὶ λαβεῖν, εὐφυνίας τε σημείον ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν. Poet. XXII 17. And therefore, the more remote the resemblance between the two objects brought together by the metaphor, the more ingenuity and natural ability is required for detecting it.

Harris, *Philol. Inq.*, Part II, ch. 10, takes this view of the meaning; "that metaphor is an effort of genius and cannot be taught is here again (in the present passage) asserted in the words, καὶ λαβεῖν...παρ' ἄλλου." Whately, on the other hand, denies that this means, "as some interpreters suppose, that this power is entirely a gift of nature, and in no degree to be learnt: on the contrary he expressly affirms that the 'perception of resemblances' on which it depends is the fruit of 'philosophy': but he means that metaphors are not to be, like other words and phrases, selected from common use and transferred from one composition to another, but must be formed for the occasion" [*Rhetoric*, chap. III p. 277 ult.]. Whatever Aristotle may have said *elsewhere*, it is certain that what he says in the *Poetics*, and therefore in this passage which is repeated from it, is what Harris has described: the close connexion of παρ' ἄλλου λαβεῖν with the following εὐφυνία shews this unmistakably. Besides this, a remark about borrowing metaphors from other people's speeches or writings is not only trivial in itself, but here altogether out of place: and if it were not, why should metaphors be singled out from all other forms of speech as things that should not be borrowed? Is not purloining your neighbour's thoughts or expressions or *bons mots* equally reprehensible in all cases? or may γλῶτται and πεποιημένα and the rest, all of them be 'borrowed', and metaphors alone excepted? Victorius, according to Schrader, renders it, "non licet *semper* sumere ipsam ab alio auctore," which he approves, and interprets, that you musn't be always begging or borrowing your metaphors from others, when you can and ought to invent them yourself. In my copy of Vettori's Commentary [Petri Victorii Commentarii in Opera Aristotelis, 5 vols. folio, published at Florence, 1548—1583], these words do not occur: the passage is there explained, as it should be, of 'acquiring metaphors' from any one but oneself: they being due to a natural ingenuity. Victorius also says that this remark, upon the inventive power which they presuppose, is introduced as an additional recommendation of metaphors: and refers to one of the topics of Top. III., the degrees of good, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐστὶ παρ' ἄλλου πορίσασθαι ἢ ὁ ἐστὶ παρ' ἄλλου, what can't be procured from another, any *native* excellence or advantage, is superior to anything that *can*. Also c. I, 116 b 10, τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ

δέ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἀρμοττούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπρεπὲς φανέται διὰ τὸ παρ' ἄλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς νέω φοινικίς, οὕτω γέροντι τί· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πρέπει

φύσει (αἰρετώτερον) τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει, τὸ δ' ἐπικτήτων, the superiority of the *natural* to the *acquired*.

§ 9. 'Epithets' (including not only single adjectives, but any ornamental or descriptive addition to a plain ὄνομα κύριον, as a sauce to a joint; see Introd. p. 289) 'and metaphors must be made appropriate (in the former, to the subjects to which they are applied, in the latter to those to which we *transfer* them from something else): this appropriateness will proceed from the proportion' (between the epithet or metaphor and the thing it is applied to in either case: "si ex proportione duxerimus, observaverimusque ut ipsa sibi mutuo respondeant, similemque rationem inter se habeant." Victorius): 'otherwise (εἰ μὴ εἰσιν ἀρμόττουσαι) the impropriety will be apparent, *glaring*, (by the juxtaposition), because the opposition of two contraries becomes most apparent when they are placed side by side of one another. But (on the contrary) we must consider, as a scarlet coat is suitable to a youth, so also (what is suitable) to an old man: for the same dress is not becoming to both'.

φανέται, φαίνεσθαι] in the emphatic sense, equivalent to φανερόν εἶναι—which *occurs* in the parallel passage, II 23. 30—is illustrated in note on II 2. 1, and I 7. 31 [p. 141]. The observation that παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μᾶλλον φαίνεται is a favourite one with Aristotle. The parallels from the Rhetoric are quoted in note on II 23. 27. Add Dem. de F. L. § 192, παρ' ἄλληλα γὰρ ἔσται φανερώτερα.

An inappropriate *epithet* may be illustrated by the substitution of *amabile* and *formosum* for *horrendum* and *informe* in Virgil's line, *Monstrum horrendum informe ingens cui lumen ademptum*: a *metaphor* is inappropriate when you bring some incongruous notion into juxtaposition with the object which you 'invest' with your metaphor, like an old man with the incongruous dress of a scarlet coat;—although *viridis* is not inappropriate to *senectus*, though greenness and old age might seem incongruous, because in this application of the metaphor the *proportion* or ratio is observed between the *freshness* implied in the green vegetation and the freshness and vigour of old age, and the two are thus brought under a common genus. When old age is called the evening of life the metaphor is appropriate, because there is a true proportion or analogy; evening: the day :: old age: man's life; evening and old age are under a common *genus*, viz. the close of a period, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, *infra*; comp. Poet. XXI 10, ταμείν, ἀρύσαι· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τι ἔστιν. But when Shakespeare [*Hamlet*, III i. 59] speaks of *taking arms against a sea of troubles* there is neither proportion nor congruity: and in such cases, when the two notions are placed side by side, and so brought directly into contrast, the incongruity becomes at once apparent. This kind of solecism is usually called 'confusion of metaphor'.

10 ἐσθής. καὶ εἰάν τε κοσμεῖν βούληται, ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιούτων
τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ γένει φέρειν τὴν μεταφορὰν, εἰάν τε
ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων. λέγω δ' αὖτον, ἵπαι τα
ἐναντία ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γένει, το φέρειν τὸν μὲν πιναχέ-
οντα εὐχισθαι τὸν δὲ εὐχόμενον πιναχεῖν, ὅτι ὁμοίᾳ
αἰτήσῃ, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιῖν ὥς καὶ Ἰφικράτης
Καλλιᾶν μητραγύρτην ἀλλ' οὐ ἐξελούχον. ὁ δ' ἐξ ἑ

§ 10. 'And if you want to set off anything of praise as a poet's offering, you must take your metaphor from the sphere of human, more humanistic or valuable things that fall under the same genus, if drawn from the sphere. As an instance of my meaning, such metaphors are "the servants of the species, under the same genus, to say that one that prays, begs, and one that begs, prays, is to do this; because both of them are made of petition". These are the two extremes of the genus petition, or supplication; praying the highest form, begging the lowest, "as also Hesiod speaks, καὶ ἰππύρεας (called) Καῖες (where he would be depicted as, *periphrasis* instead of *ἐκδούλον* "a household priest", instead of "servant of the myrtle torch"). The other (Caesars, supposed, that he has explained, never could have been initiated for he would have been incapable of such a mistake, else he would not have coined this periphrasis but *ἐκδούλον*—for it is true (after Aristotle, by way of explanation, that they are both attached to the service of a goddess (both come under the common genus "servants of a goddess", but the one is a "house of honour, the other of dishonour". It is worth now citing the Fragment of a Cathedral a ballad-singer.

τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει. Τότε ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀντιθέτοις ἐκ τῶν ἀντιθέτων, ἀντι-
τίθων: τὰ πλείοντα ἀντιθέτων ἀντιθέτων τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἀντιθέτων ἀντιθέ-
των, Categ. c. 6, 6 a 17.

Kassius is the third of that name, the son of the third Ἰππικράτης, of that noble and wealthy Athenian family, of which the heads bore and these names alternately during several generations, Aesch. *Man. 265*, Ἰππικράτης Κασσίου καὶ Ἰππικράτης Κασσίου. The son of Ἰππικράτης, mentioned in his family, is expounding his gene to him by Xenophon, *Hellen. VI 3 3*, Κασσίου ὁ Ἰππικράτης. His place in the domestic world of course have rendered him much more susceptible to the slight conveyed by Iphicrates' ignorance, or ignorance, mistake. The substitution of the one word for the other, though evidently interpreted by Cassius (hence his reply) as a mistake made in appearance of the Athenian ignorance the two—perhaps unfairly, to save the dignity—is much more likely to have been intentional and malicious. Cassius was a vain swollen man—see Xenoph. *l. c.* § 3, 4th. and Cassius' speech §§ 4, 5, 6,—and Iphicrates, the self-made man, who had risen to distinction by his own merits, ἡ δὲ αὖτις αἰὶς, would doubtless have enjoyed a joke at the expense of the generous and empty descendant of Tapageiros (Xen. *l. c.*), and hereditary δοῦλος of the Great Mysians. Xenophon mentions him as one of the ambassadors to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in virtue of his heredi-

ἀμύητον αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δαδούχον· ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ

ditary *προξενία* of that state. There is a good account of this Callias by Mr Elder in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* He is the entertainer of the Sophists in the Protagoras, and the host of Xenophon's 'Banquet'. On Callias and his family, its wealth and splendour, see Böckh, *Publ. Econ. of Athens*, Bk. IV c. 3, pp. 42, 3 (Lewis' Transl.), and Heindorf's learned note on Protag. 311.

The δαδουχία was, as we have seen, an office of great distinction. The δαδούχος led the procession of the μύσται from Athens to Eleusis on the fifth day of the great Eleusinia, the *torch-day*, ἡ τῶν λαμπάδων ἡμέρα. See *Dict. Antiq.* Art. 'Eleusinia,' p. 373 b. Rich, *Dict. Gr. and Rom. Ant.* s. v. p. 232.

μητραγύρτης, on the contrary, implies everything that is vile and contemptible: it is the designation of a class of profligate beggars, chiefly women, who attached themselves to the worship of some particular deity—usually Cybele, the *Magna Mater*, from which *μητραγύρτης* is taken—at whose festivals they attended to ply their profession, that of ἀγείρειν, collecting alms, *stipem cogere*, and then practised every kind of imposture and indulged in every variety of licentiousness. They seem also to have gone their rounds through the great houses in cities, Plat. Rep. II 364 B—C, fortune-telling, and with charms and spells (as to draw down the gods from heaven) and other nostrums for sale. They carried about with them an image of the goddess in whose name they asked alms. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 629, compares them to mendicant friars or *Béguines*, and designates them *viles Metragyrtes*. Menander wrote two or three plays upon them, the Θεοφορουμένη and Μητραγύρτης (or Μηναγύρτης, so Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.*, Menander, IV 163, on which see Lobeck, *ibid.* 645, note), and the Ίέρεια, which, from the lines εἰ γὰρ ἔλκει τὸν Θεὸν τοῖς κυμβάλοις ἄνθρωπος εἰς ὃ βούλεται, Lobeck supposes (apparently with little reason) to have been directed against the Μητραγύρται. Meineke, *ib.* Menand. IV 140. Compare on their character, Antiphanes, Fragm. Μισοπονήρου, Meineke, *Ib.* III 86, αὐται δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι μετὰ γε νῇ Δία τοὺς μητραγυρτοῦντάς γε· πολὺ γὰρ αὐτῷ γένος μιαιώτατον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ. On incantations and the like, see Ruhnken ad ἐπαγωγαί, p. 114. To this extremity Dionysius the younger, once tyrant of Syracuse, was finally reduced, αὐτὸς δὲ Διονύσιος τέλος μητραγυρτῶν καὶ τυμπανοφορούμενος οἰκτρῶς τὸν βίον κατέστρεψε: Clearchus ap. Athen. 541 c (Victorius). The *μητραγύρται*, male and female, did not confine themselves to a single goddess, though Cybele was their favourite, but also attached themselves to the service of Isis; and apparently to that of Demeter and Cora (from the present passage); of Opis and Arge, Hdt. IV 35; and in general, of those whose worship was of an *orgiastic* character, see by all means Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 10, s. v. ἀγείρειν. Here there are two goddesses implied, Demeter in δαδούχος, and Cybele in *μητραγύρτης*. There is a short article in *Dict. Antiq.* on the subject under ἀγύρτης.

ἀγείρειν is used to signify collecting alms, or begging, several times by Herodotus; twice, for instance, in IV 35. By Homer, ἀγείρεσθαι and ἀγυρ-

τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον. καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσό-
λακας, αὐτοὶ δ' αὐτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ'

τάζειν, Od. τ [XIX] 284. Plato, Rep. II 364 B, 381 D. Dem. π. τ. ἐν χερρόν. 96. 17, ἀφ' ὧν ἀγείρει καὶ προσαιτεῖ καὶ δανείζεται. Hence ἀγύρτης, ἀγυρτρία, 'a vagabond', one that goes about collecting for a deity. Aesch. Agam. 1244, Cassandra of herself, καλουμένη δὲ φοιτάς, ὡς ἀγυρτρία, Blomfield's Gloss. ad loc. Soph. Oed. R. 387, μάγον τοιόνδε...δόλιον ἀγύρτην. Lysippus, Comic. ap. Meineke, Lys. II p. 746, Fragn. Cratin. Δραπετ. 11, Ib. II 51 Eubul. κυβενταί, Fr. 2, v 5, σφάλλων, ἀγύρτης οἷστρος. Rhes. 503, of Ulysses, ἀγύρτης πτωχικὴν ἔχων στολήν. Ib. 715, βίον δ' ἐπαϊτῶν εἶρπ' ἀγύρτης τις λάτρης.

The next is a case of the same kind ; of two possible designations of actors one takes the lowest and most contemptuous, the other the opposite and highest and most complimentary. Διονυσοκόλακες represents them as parasites or flatterers, not worthy to be companions or friends of the god ; the lowest and most degraded form of *service*, of Dionysus the patron deity of the stage and its belongings (Aristophanes *passim*) τεχνίται as 'artists', or 'artistes'—as the lower kind of professional performers, singers, dancers, posture-makers, are fond of calling themselves nowadays. by way of dignifying their profession : the term is actually applied to them by Dem. de F. L. § 212, of Philip who collected at a festival πάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ; on which Ulpian (quoted by Shilleto ad loc.) τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς οὕτω καλεῖ κωμικοὺς τε καὶ τραγικοὺς. Shilleto adds, *ut aiunt in Graecis artificibus*, Cic. pro Murena 13 (29). [Ar. Problems 30. 10, 956 b 11, διὰ τί οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνίται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πονηροὶ εἰσιν; referred to by Aulus Gellius, XX 4. Comp. Alciphron, III 48, (Δικύμιον τὸν τραγῳδὸν) ὃν ἐγὼ τῆς ἀχαρίστου φωνῆς ἔνεκα αὐτοκόρυδον καλεῖσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ χοροῦ τῶν Διονυσοκόλακων ἔκρινα (Otto Lüders, *die Dionysischen Künstler*, 1873, pp. 58—63).]

The common *genus* or notion which unites Διονυσοκόλακες and τεχνίται as 'contraries' is that of service to a deity : the τεχνίται as well as the κόλακες being assumed as actors, to be devoted to his especial service. The distinction is that between true *art*, and low buffoonery. This, as far as I can see, is the whole meaning of the passage.

Victorius however, and Schweighäuser on Athen. VI 249 F, drag in here, wholly as I can conceive beside the point, another sense of Διονυσοκόλακες in which it was applied to the flatterers of Dionysius of Syracuse—of whose filthy and disgusting practices Theophrastus (quoted in Wytenbach on Plut. p. 53, F) gives some revolting examples—in a double sense, of Dionysus and Dionysius : see their notes for the explanation of this. (It is supposed by them and Mr Shilleto u. s. to be a joke ; if so, it is of a very frigid description.) Wytenbach says (note ad Plut. l. c.) "Actores scenici honesto nomine dicebantur οἱ περὶ Διόνυσον τεχνίται, per contemptum Διονυσοκόλακες" : which is no doubt all that is meant here, though he refers to Victorius' note, who makes a great deal more out of it. This special sense of τεχνίται is fully confirmed by another passage of Athen. V 198 B describing a magnificent procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus (cc. 25—30), μεθ' οὓς ἐπορεύετο Φιλίσκος ὁ ποιητής, ἱερεὺς ὧν Διόνυσου, καὶ πάντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνίται. It

ἄμφω μεταφορὰ, ἣ μὲν ῥυπαινόντων ἣ δὲ τούναντίον.
καὶ οἱ μὲν λησται αὐτοὺς ποριστὰς καλοῦσι νῦν· διό

occurs also in Diog. Laert. x 4. 8, Epicurus called τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα (Plato's followers) Διονυσοκόλακας, καὶ αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα χρυσοῦν (which is translated 'Dionysii assentatores' in Cobet's corrected version, though *Dionysius* can surely have nothing to do with the matter, any more than here). Here also the word is a term of reproach; and seems by this time to have become *proverbial* for gross and low flattery: "tanquam assentatores eos, non sodales, insimulans." Victorius. Victorius understands the term, as here used, to express the lowest order of attendants on the stage (parasites of Bacchus), such as the scene-shifters, candle-snuffers, and such like menials of a modern theatre, but another passage of Athen. xi 538 F,—καὶ ἕκτοτε οἱ πρότερον καλούμενοι Διονυσοκόλακες Ἀλεξανδροκόλακες ἐκλήθησαν, διὰ τὰς τῶν δώρων ὑπερβολὰς· ἐφ' οἷς καὶ ἦσθη ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος. This occurs in a list of the entertainments which were exhibited in a great marriage-feast given by Alexander after the capture of Darius, taken from a work of Chares, 'the histories of Alexander'. Now whether ἐφ' οἷς ἦσθη refers to Alexander's delight at their gifts (neut.) or at themselves (masc.), that is, their acting, in either case their employment could not have been of the mean and degrading character attributed to it by Victorius—in the one case they were too rich, in the other, if they amused him, they must have been actors, or at all events above the degree of menials, though their acting may have been mere grimace and buffoonery.

'And one (to vex and lower them) calls them' (whether this means any 'one' in particular, we do not know) 'parasites of Dionysus (low buffoons), whereas they themselves style themselves *artists*· and each of these is a metaphor (*artist* as applied to them is a metaphor, I suppose, because the proper object of art is *production*—τέχνη μέτα λόγου ποιητική, ταῦτόν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική: and *ποίησις* being distinguished from *πρᾶξις*, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἄλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. Eth. Nic. vi 4, 1140 a 7 seq.—and these men *produce* nothing; their profession is practical, ends in *πρᾶξις*, or action), 'the one for the purpose of (*lit.* belonging to) blackening (soiling, defaming), the other the contrary'.

ῥυπαίνειν (ῥύπος, dirt), Eth. N. i 9, 1099 b 3, ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, 'their bliss is tarnished, sullied, defiled, defaced'. Pherecrates, ap. Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.* ii 352, Pherecr. Fr. Inc. 48, ap. Photium, Suidam, Thomam Magistram. "Schol. ad Ar. Nub. 97, εἰς δουλείαν ἐῤῥυπαίνεται ὁ φιλόσοφος. Simile est ἐπισμῇν." Meineke, Id. ad fragm. Cratini, Cleobul. 9, ap. Schol. ad Arist. Thermoph. 389, τί γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἐπισμῇ τῶν κακῶν; Dion. de Isocr. Iudicium, c. 18, καὶ οὗτ' Ἀριστοτέλει πείθεσθαι ῥυπαίνειν τὸν ἄνδρα βουλομένῳ.

'And pirates nowadays call themselves *purveyors*'. So Pistol, in *Merry Wives of Windsor*, i 3. 49, "Convey the wise it call: Steal, foh! a fico for the phrase!"

νῦν] referring to the early times spoken of by Thucyd., i 5, when the Greeks ἐτράποντο πρὸς ληστείαν...οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνῃν τούτου τοῦ ἔργου,

ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν, τὸν δ' ἀμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορθησαί. τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου φησί,

κώπης ἀνάσσων κάποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν,

ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μείζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατ' ἀξίαν οὐ
11 κέκλεπται οὖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἀμαρ-
τία, ἐὰν μὴ ἡδείας ἢ σημεῖα φωνῆς, οἷον Διονύσιος
προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγὴν

φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. On what follows, see Homer, Od. III 73, and elsewhere.

On the actual πορισταί at Athens, see Schneider's note on Arist. Pol. I 11, ult., *Comm.* p. 65.

'And therefore (by the same rule) wrong may be called error, and error wrong' (both of them kinds of injury or offence; that is here the supposition in ἀμαρτάνειν; but the one is a crime because it is done with a bad προαίρεσις or moral purpose, the other a venial offence; ἀνευ δὲ κακίας ἀμάρτημα κ.τ.λ. Eth. N. v 10, 1135 b 18 seq.) 'and stealing either taking or robbing (on a grand scale)'.

'A phrase like that of Euripides' Telephus, "He lords it over the oar (*sways* it, like a sceptre, the emblem of royalty), and having on his departure for Mysia," is unbecoming (inappropriate), because *ruling, swaying, lording*, is too big, pompous, for the value (measure, merits) (of the object described); and so, the disguise (concealment) is not effected (the art or effort becomes apparent, *supra*, § 5).

κώπης ἀνάσσων κάποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν] The rest of the sentence is supplied by the Schol. ἐτραυματίσθη πολεμίῳ βραχίονι. The first line should be read [not, as in the MSS, κώπας ἀνάσσειν, καὶ ἀποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν, but] as it is by Dindorf, *Poet. Sc.*, Fragm. Eur. Tel. 20, and Wagner, Fragm. Tel. 10 (*Fr. Trag. Gr.* II 359), κώπης ἀνάσσων κάποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν. ἀνάσσειν takes the genit. and dative, not the accus. κώπης ἀναξ and ἀνάσσειν *et similia* are found elsewhere in Eurip. Helen. 1048, Cyclops [86], and Aesch. Pers. 378. In Aeschylus the pompous phrase is much more characteristic. The cautious and sober Sophocles never employs it.

§ 11. 'There is also a fault (which may be committed) in the (composition of, and the sound thence arising of the) syllables of a word if (i. e. if ever, or when) they are not signs or marks (indications, representations) of sweet or agreeable voice' (i. e. if, when they are pronounced, or expressed by the voice, they don't produce an agreeable sound; φωνή is the sound of the voice, or the voice as uttered, and forming words) 'as Dionysius the Brazen calls poetry in his elegies "Caliope's screech," because they are both *voices*'—and so far his metaphor was right: both terms fall under the same genus, φωνή, the met. εἶδος πρὸς εἶδος—'but his metaphor is a bad one by reason of its insignificant sounds'.

κραυγὴ] a screech, scream, any harsh and dissonant sound. κράζειν,

Καλλιόπης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωναί· φαύλη δὲ
12 ἢ μεταφορὰ ταῖς ἀσήμεοις φωναῖς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν

with which it is connected, expresses the harsh voices of certain animals as the 'croak' of the raven and the frog, and the 'bawling' of a man, all suggestive of disagreeable associations. The 'badness of the metaphor' seems to reside in this. ἄσμος φωνή is, it is true, nothing but a non-significant voice or sound,' applied, Poet. xx §§ 5, 6, 7, to sounds like syllables, and conjunctions, which signify nothing by themselves, but only in combination with other sounds or words; and opposed to σημαντικά, sounds which *do* signify something each by itself, as noun and verb §§ 8, 9. But these non-significant sounds, which represent discordant and unmeaning cries, are here to be interpreted as *expressing* also the associations which they suggest, and so κραυγή, which suggests all these disagreeable cries and screams, is particularly ill applied as a metaphor to the sweetest of all voices, such as that of a Muse.

'Dionysius the Brazen', so called from having first suggested the use of *bronze* money at Athens, Athen. xv 669 D, was a poet and rhetorician, *ibid.*, whose floruit is to be referred to the earlier part of the fifth cent. B. C., judging from a remark in Plut. Nic. c. 5, 526 B, where we are told that there was in Nicias' household a man called Hiero, who claimed to be the son of Dionysius the Brazen. A further account of him is to be found in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*, Dionysius no. 16; and a collection of the fragments of his elegies, amounting to seven, in Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* p. 432 [p. 468, 2nd ed.]. In fragm. 5 there is a still worse specimen of his metaphors preserved, which beats even the κόπης ἀνάσσει, and in the same kind of fault. καὶ τινες οἶνον ἄγοντες ἐν εἰρεσίῃ Διονύσου, συμποσίου ναῦται καὶ κυλικῶν ἐρέται.

[On the Bronze coinage of Athens, see Beule's *Monnaies d'Athènes*, pp. 73—77. It seems impossible to say with certainty, either when it first came in, or what is the date of the oldest bronze money extant. Leake supposes it probable that it came in soon after the first unsuccessful attempt to introduce it, while Beule thinks that the early extant bronzes are of the age of Alexander. It is certain they were in circulation in the time of Philemon, the Comic poet. See Leake's *Numismata Hellenica* (European Greece), p. 22. These details are due to Professor Churchill Babington.]

On harshness of sound in composition, see Hermog. περὶ ἰδεῶν Τομ. α'. c. 7, περὶ τραχύτητος, Spengel *Rhet. Gr.* II 299. Of the second class, the ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν σκληραί, the harshness arising 'out of themselves' from the disagreeable combination of the letters, ἀταρπός, ἔμαρπτεν, ἔγναμψε, and such like, are given as examples. In the same treatise Τομ. β'. c. 4, (II 359), there are some remarks upon the connexion of sounds with pleasant associations, which make the sounds themselves pleasant.

§ 12. 'Further, they must not be far-fetched, but from things kindred (cognate) and of like form must be transferred notions (in the form of words) hitherto nameless in the fashion of names (so as to become new names), any one of which as soon as spoken will be clearly perceived

δεῖ ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μετα-
φέρειν τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὀνομασμένως, ὃ λεχθέν δηλόν
ἐστίν ὅτι συγγενές, οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδο- P. 1405 b.
κιμοῦντι

ἄνδρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα· P. 115.

ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἐστὶ δ' ἄμφω πρόσθεσίς τις·

to be near of kin, as in the popular (famous) aenigma, 'I saw man
gluing upon man bronze with fire'; for the process was nameless, but
both of them are a kind of *application* (the common genus); and
accordingly he 'the author of verses, gave the name of 'giving' to the
application of the cupping glass.'

πόρρωθεν] *infra* c. 3. 4, ἀσαφείς δὲ ἂν πόρρωθεν. Demetrius, *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*,
78, μήτε μὴν πόρρωθεν μετασημεγμένους 'μεταφωραῖς. χρηστέον', ἀλλ' αὐτίκην
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου. Cic. de Or. III 41. 163. *Deinde videndum est ne longe
simile sit ductum.* Syntem patrimonii, scopulum libentius dixerim;
Charybdim bonorum, voraginem potius. *Facilis enim ad ea quae
visa, quam quae audita, mentis oculi feruntur.* Ib. II 63. 255, ὅς τις, *in quo,
ut ea quae sint frigidiora vitemus—etenim cavendum est ne
arcessitum dictum putetur...* Quint. VIII Proem. 25, *sunt optima minime
arcessita.* Similarly of arguments *supra*, I 2. 12, II 22. 3. Top. A 105 a 2.

ἀνώνυμα ὀνομασμένως] Cic. de Or. III 38. 155, *tertius ille modus trans-
ferendi verbi late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustia,*
post autem incunditas delectatioque celebravit. In fact, to say nothing
of others, words which stand for moral and intellectual operations,
notions, abstractions, conceptions, are and must be ultimately derived
by metaphor from objects of sense: see Locke, who gives a list of
them, *Essay*, Bk. III ch. 1. 5, Berkeley, *Three Dialogues*, Dial. III: Vol. I
p. 202 (4to. ed.), "most part of the mental operations" (this is saying
far too little) "being signified by words borrowed from sensible things;
as is plain in the terms, comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c." Whewell,
Nov. Org. Renov. Bk. IV 1, p. 260. Renan, *Orig. du Langage*, p. 124,
seq. Leibnitz, *Nouv. Essais sur l'entend. hum.* III 1. 5 (quoted by
Renan), Max Müller, *Lect. on science of Lang.* 1st series, Vol. I p. 377
seq.

The second line of this aenigma, which completes it, is found in
Athen. X 452 C, the only author, who says Victorius, who gives it entire,
οὕτω συγκόλλως ὥστε σύναιμα ποιεῖν. ταῦτο δὲ σημαίνει τῆς σικίας προσέ-
λην. It is inserted amongst the αἰνίγματα, No. VIII in the Anthology,
Vol. IV p. 288, Jacobs' ed., and preceded by another on the same subject
in four lines. The first line is also quoted, *Post. xxi* 5, Demetr.
περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 102, (Demetrius recommends that aetiological ex-
pressions of this kind *should be avoided*), and *Plut. Symp. Sept. Sep.*
154 B (Victorius). Harris, *Philol. Inq.* Pt. II ch. 10, on aenigmas. [On
the cupping-instrument referred to in the riddle, compare *Juvenal* XIV 38
(with Mayor's note), *iam pridem caput hoc ventosa cucurbita quaerit.*

κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν. καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὖ ἡνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπικεῖς· μεταφοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι
13 εὖ μετενήνεκται. καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος

Bronze specimens about four inches high, found by Pompeii, may be seen in the Museum at Naples.]

‘And in general, from all ingenious, well-constructed, aenigmas good metaphors may be derived : for all metaphors convey (imply) an aenigma, plainly therefore a metaphor (so borrowed from a good aenigma) must be itself well converted (i. e. a well-selected metaphor)’. Cicero thought less highly of aenigmas as a source of metaphors ; at all events metaphors, accumulated till they become aenigmas, are reprehensible. De Or. III 42. 167, *est hoc (translatio) magnum ornamentum orationis, in quo obscuritas fugienda est : etenim hoc genere fiunt ea quae dicuntur aenigmata.*

εὖ μετενήνεκται] is rendered by Cicero (according to Victorius) *ratione translata*, and *quae sumpta ratione est*, de Or. III 40. 160. τὸ ἐπικεῖς μεταφέρωμεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Eth. N. v. 14, sub init.

§ 13. ‘And (metaphors should be taken) from things fair and noble (*subaudi* δεῖ λαβεῖν μεταφοράς) : but the beauty of a word (especially a *πουν*, which can represent some visible or audible object), as Licymnius says, resides either in the sound or the sense (the thing signified), and the ugliness in like manner’.

When Aristotle wrote τὸ μὲν, he seems to have intended to introduce τὸ δὲ to correspond as the second member of the division, which was afterwards carelessly changed into ἡ. It is surprising however that he never corrected such palpable blunders as these, for which he must have had frequent opportunities. Did he think that they were of no consequence in writing, of which the object was instruction only? He says at any rate, III 1. 6, that no one pays much attention to style in teaching geometry.

ἀπὸ καλῶν] Cic. de Or. III 41. 163, seq. *Et quoniam haec vel summa laus est in verbis transferendis ut sensum feriat id quod translatum sit, fugienda omnis turpitudine earum rerum ad quas eorum animos qui audient trahet similitudo. Nolo dici morte Africani castratam esse rempublicam ; nolo stercus curiae dici Glauciam : quamvis sit simile, tamen est in utroque deformis cogitatio similitudinis.* Quint., VIII 6. 14—17, quotes the line of Furius Bibaculus (Hor. Sat. II 5. 41), *Iuppiter hibernas cana nive conspuat Alpes.*

κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος] Theophrastus, according to Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας, §§ 173—5 (*Rhet. Gr.* III 300, ed. Spengel), recognised three sources of beauty in words, (1) the appeal to the sight, the direct suggestion of beautiful objects by the words which are associated with them ; (2) to the ear, by the sound of the words themselves ; and thirdly διάνοια, by the ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’, Licymnius’ σημαυνόμενον, and Aristotle’s δυνάμει the *vis*, virtue, force, i. e. significance, its *power* of suggestion. These are illustrated by Demetrius, l. c., the first by ῥοδόχροον, ἀνθοφόρου χροάς : the second by Καλλίστρατος, Ἀννοῶν, (the λλ and νν seem

τὸ μὲν, ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ
σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσανύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον,
ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων
οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τόδε
ἀντὶ τοῦ τόδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι ψευδός· ἐστι

to have pleased his ear): and the third by ἀρχαῖος as compared with παλαιός, the former being suggestive of higher and nobler associations: οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι ἄνδρες ἐντιμότεροι. It seems from this that the distinction between the first and third of these sources of beauty in a word is that the first is the *direct* suggestion, by *word-painting*, of a beautiful object of sight, as a rosy cheek or skin: the third is the remoter suggestion of beauty, *by inference* from association, as ἀρχαῖος suggests worth and respect; this form of suggestion has an intellectual character, and is therefore represented by Theophrastus as διάνοια. To the direct suggestions of sight in the first class, Aristotle afterwards adds all the other senses—as music to the ear, a well-remembered flavour to the palate, smell to the nose, soft and warm things to the touch. The second of the three, is the actual sound of the word, *suggesting* nothing else; Licymnius' ψόφοι, and Theophrastus' and Demetrius' πρὸς ἀκοήν.

τοῖς ψόφοις] There are [as already remarked *supra* p. 12, on I § 9, διάλεκτος], three degrees of *sound* in an ascending scale. The first and lowest is ψόφος 'noise', such as even inanimate things are capable of *when struck*. The second is voice, φωνή or φθόγγος, (as distinguished from speech,) which is shared by all animals that have a *throat*. The third is distinctive of the human race, διάλεκτος (sometimes called λογός), *discourse*, articulate speech. ψόφος as distinguished from φωνή will include all *sounds* which, though human, do not proceed from the voice and organs of speech: such as sneezing, coughing, hissing, whistling (ποππυσμός) and so on. These particulars are taken from two passages, Ar. Hist. Anim. IV 9, 535 a 27—b 3, and Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 14 (p. 72, Reiske). Of sound, ψόφος, in its most general sense, as the *object of hearing*, see de Anima II 8. De Sens. c. 3, init. Ib. c. 1, 437 a 10. Hist. An. I 1. 29, 488 a 31, seq., of the distinctions of animals, in respect of the *sounds* they make.

What is known of Licymnius, I have collected in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX Vol. III pp. 255—7. [Plato Phaedrus p. 267 C, τὰ δὲ Πάλον πῶς φράσωμεν μουσεῖα λόγων... ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνίαν, ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποιήσιν εὐεπείας. Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*. I 75, 76.]

'And again thirdly (a third observation upon metaphors), which solves (furnishes an answer to, serves to refute) the sophistical argument (theory or position); for it is *not* true, as Bryson said, that no one ever uses (that there is no such thing as) foul or indecent language, if (if—as the case really is, i. e. since or because) the same thing is signified by saying this or that (by using the broad word or disguising it by a veil of ὑποκορισμός), for this is false: for one term is more *properly* applied to an object than another (represents it more *literally* and directly), and is more assimilated to it, and more nearly *akin* to it, by setting the

γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὠμοιωμένον μᾶλλον
καὶ οἰκειότερον τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὁμμάτων.
ἔτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ
οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον θετέον· ἄμφω
μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἴσχρον σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλ’

thing more directly before the eyes (and so making it more *vivid, striking, and impressive*).

Of Bryson, I have collected what is known in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. v Vol. II pp. 143—6. In this dogma of the impossibility of indecent language he seems to have anticipated the Stoics—see Cicero’s famous letter to Paetus on this Stoic *libertas loquendi*, u. s. p. 144 note. *Suo quamque rem nomine appellare* was their statement of this ‘liberty’, to call everything its right and proper name without shame or disguise, to call a spade a spade, to use the language of a Swift or Aristophanes. Aristotle answers Bryson by a simple denial of the fact. It is *not* true that there is no difference in the use of words in respect of their moral effect upon us; the broad and literal expression presents the abomination much more vividly and impressively to the mind, naked as it were, than the same notion when half hidden from the view by a decent veil which conceals a great deal of its deformity. On this subject of plain speaking, besides Cicero’s letter to Paetus (ad Div. IX 22), already referred to, see Cic. de Off. I 35. 128 where the Stoics are again introduced. Cicero takes the moral and delicate side of the question. Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 23, ἴδοι δ’ ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν τοῖς μὲν ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια (the covert insinuation: this is the difference between coarse and refined indelicacy). Ar.’s opinion upon the subject is given much more strongly and decidedly, Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 b 3, ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, θεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν· ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτιοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύγγενος. Perhaps one of the wisest observations the author ever made. Comp. Quint. VI 3.29.

‘And besides, it is not under the same conditions and circumstances that it signifies this or that, so that on this ground again we must assume that one (mode of expression) is fairer or fouler than another: for though both of them *do* express (or signify) beauty and deformity, yet not *qua* beautiful and deformed (in so far as they are beautiful and the reverse, and in no other respect): or, if the latter also, at all events in different degrees’. These two different effects of αἰσχρολογία seem to be thus distinguishable. We are first told that the use of the broad word is offensive because it suggests directly and immediately, paints on the mind a vivid picture of the ugly, foul or impure object: nothing is said of any further, indirect, associations connected with it, and the bad effect arises solely from the *strength* or vividness of the impure or ugly impression. But in the second case the effect of the plain speaking and its associations is contrasted with those that may be produced by softening the term, or employing one which *signifies* the

οὐχ ἢ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αἰσχρόν· ἢ ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει. διαφέρει δ' εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἢ ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, ἢ ἔτι φαν-
14 λότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ἔστι

same thing, but suggests an entirely different and innocent set of associations. As in the instances given by Cic. in de Off. 1 35. 128 *liberis dare operam*. Here all the associations which would be at once suggested by the broad, obscene word, are diverted, and another set introduced, connected solely with children, as the result of the intercourse, and perfectly free from all impurity. In the one case it is the mere comparison of strength and intensity that makes the difference, in the other there is a difference of *kind*. 'The fair term and the foul term it is true *mean* the same thing, point to the same object, but not in respect of beauty and deformity alone simply and solely (ἥ), but besides that, there are associations suggested by which the one may be invested with a moral and the other with an immoral character, either altogether, or at all events in different degrees': ἄμφω γάρ...μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. An example of these words suggestive of unpleasant associations which are willingly avoided by the well-bred and refined under the name of *αἰσχρολογία*, is to be found in Plat. Gorg. 494 C, where Socrates is made to apologise to Callicles for shocking him by the use of terms such as ψωρᾶν, κνησιᾶν.

'These are the sources from which metaphors may be taken; from things beautiful either by the voice (the sound of the word itself when uttered), or by the force or meaning' (what it indirectly suggests: as *δύνασθαι*, to have the power, force, virtue, when applied to words, denotes their 'value', in the sense of *meaning* or signification, see note on I 9.36; so *δύναμις* the subst. may of course be similarly employed), 'or by (i.e. conveyed by) the sight or any other sense'. These terms have been already explained. ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει is illustrated by Victorius from Cic. de Or. III 40. 161, *Nam ut odor urbanitatis, et mollitudo humanitatis, et murmur maris, et dulcedo orationis, sunt ducta a ceteris sensibus; illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae ponunt paene in conspectu animi quae cernere et videre non possumus*.

'But it is preferable (διαφέρει here, to surpass, excel) to say *rose-fingered* dawn, rather than *purple-fingered*, or, still worse, *red-fingered*.' The latter suggests cooks' hands, or other vulgar associations. The rose on the contrary reminds one of what is agreeable to the *sight*, and the *smell*. Add to this from Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.*, Bk. III ch. 1 § 1, (Vol. II p. 142, 2nd ed.), that the last of the three epithets compared is the vaguest and most general, and therefore the worst: the second better, because more special; and the first best of all, because the most particular, the red (*purple* Campbell says) of the rose. He also mentions the gratification of the *two* senses.

§ 14. 'In the epithets also, the application of them may be made (they

μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιῆσθαι ἀπὸ φάυλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, οἷον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος, οἷον ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησε

χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων·

καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν. ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ
15 ὑποκορίζεσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς ὃς ἔλαττον
ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἄρι-

may be derived, for application) from what is mean and low (morally bad in this sense), or foul and ugly, or disgraceful (another kind of badness), for instance "matricide", or from what is (nobler and) better, as "a father's avenger". The one represents the fair side of Orestes' act, the other its bad aspect. "Locus ex Eur. Oreste 1587, ὁ μητροφόντης, ἐπὶ φόνφ πράσσω φόνον inquit Menelaus, Orestem criminans: cui se defendens respondet Orestes, ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ ὃν σὺ προῦδακας θανεῖν."

On *ἐπίθετα*, see Introd. on c. 3. p. 289. Ernesti's *Lex. Technologiae Gr.*

‘And Simonides, when the victor in the mule-race offered him only a small fee, refused to write (the ode on this occasion) on the plea of being offended (shocked) at the notion of “composing an ode on half-asses,” but when the other gave him as much as he wanted (as satisfied him), he wrote at once, “All hail, daughters of storm-footed mares” [“Hurrah, for the brood of the storm-footed coursers!”], and yet they were daughters of the asses as well’. Dion., de Comp. Verb. c. 25 (Vol. v 201, ed. Reiske), quotes a pentameter verse, without the author's name, which contains an analogous epithet, κοῦραι ἐλαφροπόδων ἔχνε' ἀειράμεναι. On Simonides' greed of gain and miserly habits, see Aristoph. Pax 697—9. Ar. Eth. N. IV 2. ult. (ὁ ἐλευθέριος) Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος, which has the air of a proverbial expression for a miser. Comp. his dictum in II 16.2, on the comparative advantages of money over wisdom. The case of Simonides is referred to by Whately, *Rhet.* c. III (p. 277, *Encycl. Metrop.* Enc. of mental philosophy), in illustration of the “employment of metaphors (*epithets*, not metaphors) either to elevate or degrade a subject,” of which he says in the note “a happier instance cannot be found” than this.

§ 15. ‘Further the same thing may be effected (as by epithets in the way of elevation or depreciation) by diminutives’, *lit.* ‘diminutives are, or amount to, much the same thing as epithets’. As epithets, so diminutives, may be applied to diminish the good or bad of a thing, according as a favourable or unfavourable view is to be taken of it. On ὑποκορίζεσθαι, ὑποκορισμός, see note on I 9.29. Add Gräfenhan, *Geschichte der Klass. Philologie*, I p. 459. It will be seen by the examples quoted in the note referred to, that the term includes much more than mere diminu-

στοφάνης σκώπτει ἐν τοῖς Βαβυλωνίοις, ἀντὶ μὲν χρυσίου χρυσιδάριον, ἀντὶ δ' ἱματίου ἱματιδάριον, ἀντὶ δὲ λαιδορίας λαιδορημάτιον καὶ νοσημάτιον. εὐλα- p. 116.
βεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.

tives, and is extended to the expression of all coaxing, flattering, soothing, endearing phrases; and does *not* (properly) include expressions of contempt, which *is* however conveyed by many diminutives. The two terms are therefore by no means co-extensive: Aristotle, who has merely illustrated this form of language by *examples* of diminutives, has taken them alone as the most distinctive class of words which convey by the termination endearment and contempt. The form of *endearment* used in *extenuation* diminishes the bad, the *contemptuous* employment of them diminishes the good.

There are no less than thirteen varieties of Greek diminutive terminations, which may be found in Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 103. Donaldson, *Gr. Gr.* § 361, 3. f. aa, p. 320, gives only ten. Both of them have omitted a form Ἀπτικίων, which occurs in Arist. Pax 214, where the Schol. has καταφρονήσεως ἔνεκα. It is to be noted that some of these diminutives in -διον have the ι long, though by the ordinary rule it is short. τῶκιδιον, Ar. Nub. 93. οὐσιδίων, Nicom. Inc. Fr. ap. Meineke, IV. 587. σπηιδίων, Arist. Fragm. et octies ap. Comic. Fragm. ἀργυρίδιον, Av. 1622. ἱματιδίων, Lysistr. 470. δικαστηρίδιον, Vesp. 803, and others, ap. Fritzsche ad Arist. Ran. 1301. πορνιδίων has the ι long and short, Arist. Ran. 1301, and Nub. 997. The long ι arises from a contraction, so that πορνιδίων must be, derived from πορνιδιον, and is a diminutive of a diminutive. [Kühner *Gr. Gr.* § 330.]

On Latin diminutives, Madvig, *Lat. Gr.* § 182. "By means of *lus*, *la* or *lum*, and *culus*, *cula* or *culum*, are formed diminutives (*nomina diminutiva*) which denote littleness, and are often used by way of endearment, commiseration, or to ridicule something insignificant, e.g. *hortulus*, a little garden, *matricula*, a (poor) mother, *ingeniolum*, a little bit of talent."

On English diminutives see a paper by Sir G. C. Lewis, *Phil. Mus.* I 697 seq. in Marsh's *Lect. on the Eng. Lang.*, Smith's ed. p. 218; and Latham's *Eng. Lang.* c. xv § 337; also a paper by J. C. Hare in (Hare and Thirlwall's) *Phil. Mus.* Vol. I. p. 679. These are in *kin*, *ling*, and *et*, *let* (from the Norman, French and Italian (E. M. C.), Marsh. *Lect.* u. s. *Lect.* XIV. § 6). To which Latham adds *ie* (Scotch), (*lassie*, *doggie*), *en* (chicken, kitten), *et* and *let*, trumpet, lancet, pocket, owlet, brooklet, streamlet; *ock* (Grimm), bullock, hillock: paddock, buttock, hummock (Lewis). "The Greek word *μείωσις* means diminution; *ὑποκόρισμα* means an endearing expression. Hence we get names for the two kinds of diminutives; viz. the term *meiotic* for the true diminutives, and the term *hypocoristic* for the dim. of endearment." Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, III 664 (ap. Latham). The *contemptuous* diminutive in English is *ling*; lordling, bantling, foundling, underling, hireling.

'By diminutive I mean that which diminishes the evil and the good (which belongs to the proper meaning of a word; by the addition of a

- 1 τὰ δὲ ψυχρά ἐν τέτταρσι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἐν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οἷον Λυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς

termination), of which Aristophanes' sarcasm in the *Babylonians* is a specimen, where he substitutes χρυσιδάριον for χρυσίον (this again is diminutive of diminutive), ἱματιδάριον for ἱμάτιον, λοιδορημάτιον for λοιδορία, and νοσημάτιον' (Fritzsche, ap. Meineke l. c., by a very probable conj., reads νοσημάτιον, which is certainly much more germane to the matter). 'We must, however, be very careful (in the use of this figure), and be on our guard against exaggeration in both' (in the employment of ἐπίθετα and ὑποκορισμός). On these diminutives of Aristophanes, Meineke, *Fragm. Babyl. xxx. Fr. Comic. Gr.* II. 982, observes: "Usurpasse autem videtur poeta istas verborum formas, ut Gorgiam et qui eius in dicendo artem sectarentur rideret, quemadmodum etiam in Acharnensibus saepissime ista ornamenta orationis vituperat." This explains σκάπτει.

παρatreiv] 'to lie in wait for', see on II 6.20. In the word here there is no 'evil purpose' implied. It is rather 'to wait upon', watch for an opportunity.

CHAP. III.

From the graces and excellences of style we now pass on to some of its defects. These are comprehended under the term ψυχρά, 'faults of taste', expressions stale and cold, flat, lifeless, opposed to πρόσφατα 'fresh'. The import and origin of this word, as applied to style, are illustrated in *Introd.* pp. 286, 7. The faults lie mostly in some kind of exaggeration, or turgid and bombastic phraseology, the error of excess. Add to the examples there given, *Dem. de Cor.* § 256, de F. L. § 207, τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦτο ὄνομα (the name of εὐεργέτης applied to Philip).

Demetrius, *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 116, refers (in his chapter *περὶ ψυχροῦ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ*) to this division with the author's name. All the details are omitted, and only one of the examples, the ὑγρὸν ἰδρώτα in § 3, is given. There is no doubt a *lacuna*.

§ 1. 'Faults of taste are shewn (are made to appear; arise, grow) in four points of style or language; first in compound words, instances of which are Lycophron's 'many-visaged heaven', his 'vast-topped earth', and his 'narrow-passaged shore'.

On διπλὰ ὀνόματα, see *Introd.* p. 287. All the compound words mentioned are words compounded of two *significant* elements, ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα, *Poet.* XXI. 1, 2, i. e. of words which have an independent sense of their own; opposed to such as are only significant in combination with others, as prepositions, conjunctions, particles.

πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανόν] "quod plurimam variamque faciem habeat ob sidera ipsa, nisi fallor." Victorius. Compare Plato's famous epigram: ἀστέρης εἰσαθρεῖς ἀστὴρ ἐμός· εἶθε γενοίμην οὐρανός, ὥς πολλοῖς ὄμμασιν εἴς σε βλέπω. *Anthol. Πλάτωνος*, I (Vol. I. p. 102, ed. Jac.), Bergk, *Plat. Epigr.* 14, *Lyr. Gr.* p. 445. [*Anthol. Gr.* VII 669].

μεγαλοκορύφου] κορυφή is a *mountain-top*. Το one who lived in Greece and knew nothing beyond it, the Earth might well seem to be covered with vast summits.

καὶ ἀκτὴν δὲ στενοπόρον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὠνόμαζε, πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας “ μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν P. 1406.

[ἀκτὴν στενοπόρον] also belongs to the mountainous character of Greece. The cliffs come down precipitously to the very edge of the sea (in which there are *no tides*), leaving but a narrow passage for horseman or foot-passenger. The word is used appropriately enough by the poet Aeschylus, P. V. 729, and Eur. Iph. Aul. 1497; also by Herod. VII 211.

[Blass, in his brief notice of Lycophron, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II p. 235, while conjecturing that several of the phrases here quoted must have come from a panegyric in glorification of Athens and her heroes, and of Theseus in particular, is led by the Sophist's application of *πέλωρον ἄνδρα* to Xerxes in § 2, to refer ἀκτὴν στενοπόρον to the Hellespont. It would be more reasonable, however, to take the hint supplied by his allusion to Sciron in the same section, and explain it of the narrow path which runs like a cornice along the precipitous sides of the cliffs of Sciron on the coast of Megara (Eur. Hippol. 1208, Σκείρωνος ἀκτάς, Strabo IX p. 391, αἱ Σκειρωνίδες πέτραι πάροδον οὐκ ἀπολείπονται πρὸς θαλάττῃ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ ἐπὶ Μεγάρων, and Pausanias I 44 § 6 (Bekker), τὴν ὀνομαζομένην ἀπὸ Σκίρωνος (ἑδὸν) Σκίρων πρῶτος ἐποίησεν ἀνδράσιν ὁδεύειν εὐζώνοις. Hadrian (as Pausanias adds) made this narrow ledge εὐρυχωρῇ, but the cliff and its pathway have since once more become an ἀκτὴ στενοπόρος, which is described by Leake (*Northern Greece*, II 414) as ‘only practicable by foot-passengers’.]

On Lycophron the Sophist, see *Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Phil.* No. v, Vol. II. p. 141 seq. Not to be confounded with Lycophron the tragic poet, the author of Cassandra, who lived at Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, towards the middle of the third cent. B.C.

‘And the name given by Gorgias, “beggar-witted or pauper-witted flatterer”. πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, as Victorius understands it, *inops ingenium*. Or perhaps rather one who prostitutes his literature and intellectual accomplishments to flattery and sycophancy to make a living by them, ‘making his Muse a beggar.’ [“This can hardly mean ‘arm an dichterischer Begabung,’ as Rost and Palm explain. Liddell and Scott give with greater probability “living (or rather starving) by his wits.” It might also mean, “one whom poverty inspires” (*cui ingeni largitor Venter*). Wit and poverty are the hackneyed attributes of the Greek parasite, and in a comic poet the epithet would probably have been thought happy. A similar compound, *πτωχαλάζων*, is quoted from Phrynichus com. (Meineke, *C. G.* II p. 582).” Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179 note.]

ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ κατευορκήσαντας] ‘forsworn, and oath-observing’. The objection here is to κατευορκήσαντας, in which the *κατά* is superfluous. All that Gorgias meant might have been equally well expressed by the simple *εὐορκεῖν* ‘to keep one's oath’; or rather the simple opposition of false and true, which he has exaggerated into two long words. *εὐορκεῖν*, though itself a compound, seems to be regarded here as a single word. The Schol. has on this, καὶ τὸ κατευορκῆσαι λέγεται ἐπὶ ἀληθῶς ὁμόσαντος· οὐχ ἀρμόζει δὲ ἡ λέξις αὕτη ρηθῆναι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς

πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γιγνομένην," καὶ "τελεσφόρον ᾤθη τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενήσεται," καὶ "τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθῶ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν," καὶ "κυανόχρων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος;" πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιητικὰ διὰ τὴν δίπλωσιν ² φαίνεται. μία μὲν οὖν αὕτη αἰτία, μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην πέλωρον ἄνδρα,

εἰπόντος τὸ ἀληθές, οἷον ὅτι ὑπὲρ γῆν ὄντος τοῦ ἡλίου ἡμέρα ἐστιν, i. e. this is like expounding 'it is day' into the longer and more pompous phrase 'the sun is above the earth.'

μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν πληρουμένην πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γιγνομένην] 'And Alcidas' phrases, "His soul saturated with wrath, and his face growing the colour of fire" (fire-coloured)'. This, as I have noted in the account of him in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III, p. 266, is an exemplification of three of the new figures which Gorgias, his master, had recently introduced into Rhetoric, ἀντίθεσις, παρίσωσις or ισόκωλον, and ὁμοιοτέλετον, on which see Ib. No. VII, III 69—72. The ψυχρόν objected to is of course the διπλοῦν ὄνομα, πυρίχρων ['flame-flushed'].

'And "end-fulfilling deemed he would be their zeal", and "end-fulfilling established he the persuasion of his words", and "dark-blue-coloured the sea's foundation". (κυάνεος is indigo blue, also dark in general)—'for all these have a poetical character arising from (due to) the doubling'.

τελεσφόρος may be translated by Shakespeare's "thought-executing" fires; but that is poetry [*King Lear* III. 2. 4.—τελεσφόρος became commoner in later Greek prose, as remarked by Lobeck, *Phrynichus*, p. 673 (referred to by Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, p. 491 *infra*).

An account of Alcidas will be found in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III, pp. 263—8 (omit pp. 264, 5, where the proof of a paradox is unnecessarily undertaken). [See also Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, pp. 491—528 of *Transactions of Vienna Academy*, XLIII 2, 1863; and Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II pp. 317—335.]

§ 2. On the second defect of rhetorical style, γλώτται, see *Introd.* p. 288.

'Now this is one cause (of ψυχρότης); another is the employment of obscure and unintelligible words. As Lycophron calls Xerxes a "hugeous" man, and Sciron' (the famous robber who gave name to the Scironian rocks; put to death by Theseus, after Hercules the greatest eradicator of nuisances from the land of Attica) 'a "bale" of a man'.

γλώτται] Whether those which have never been much in use, unusual; or those which have gone out of use, obsolete or archaic; or those which belong to a foreign language or dialect. Comp. Julius Caesar's rule, *tanquam scopulum fugere inauditum atque insolens verbum* (Aulus Gellius I 10).

πέλωρον] This word frequent in Hom. and Hes. under the forms πέλωρ, πέλωρος (subst.), πέλωρος and πελώριος (adj.); πελώριος twice in Aesch.

καὶ Σκίρων σίννις ἀνὴρ, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ 3 τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον. τρίτον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπι-

and once in Eurip. Iph. T., had it seems become obsolete in Arist.'s time. Comp. *infra* γ § 11.

σίννις ἀνὴρ] If σίννις stands for the actual robber, ὁ Πεισοκάμπτης, rival and contemporary of Procrustes, and Sciron, all of whom Theseus disposed of, he may be translated a "Turpin-man;" but the word is also used to represent the "incarnation of all mischief and destructive agency"—see Monk on Eur. Hippol. 981, and the authors cited; comp. the old poetical words σίνεσθαι, σίνος, (σίντης of the great robber and ravager, the mischievous, destructive lion, Hom. Il. xx 165,) and σίνις. Both σίνος and σίνις occur in Aeschylus in the abstract sense of mischief or destruction, and if σίννις is to be so understood here, as I rather think it should, *dale*, an old English word of similar import, may serve to express it. [Suidas s. v. Σίνις' ὄνομα ληστοῦ βλαπτικοῦ.]

ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει] 'And Alcidas "toys to poetry."'. The rest of the phrase is supplied below § 4, "to apply to or introduce *toys* in poetry". ἄθυρμα is a childish amusement, ἀθύρειν to sport like a child, of a child's sport or pastime. So employed by Homer, Pindar, Apoll. Rhod., Anthol. (*quinquies*), Euripides (in his Auge, Fragm. VIII Wagner, VI Dindorf) νηπίοις ἀθύρμασιν, and by Plato in the solemn semi-poetical Leges, VII 796 B. See Donaldson on Pind. Nem. III 44, παῖς ἐὼν ἄθυρε, also Meineke ad Fragm. Crat. Ὀδυσσῆς, XVI; Suidas ἄθυρμα, παίγνιον. It seems from this that 'toy' is the corresponding English word; which is actually used by Spenser in the same more general sense of 'a childish sport or amusement,' and *in this sense* is with us obsolete. *Faery Queen*, Bk. I. Cant. 6, 28 "To dally thus with death is no fit *toy*, Go, find some other play-fellowes, mine own sweet boy." 'Gawd' is another word now obsolete that might represent it.

τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν] and 'the *outrecuidance* of his nature'. ἀτασθαλία, ἀτάσθαλος, ἀτασθάλω, a poetical word denoting 'mad, presumptuous arrogance', found in Homer and Herod., and also in an epitaph of Archedice quoted by Thucyd. VI 59, οὐκ ἦρθη νοῦν ἐπ' ἀτασθαλίην. ['Retchlessness,' for recklessness, is similarly an unfamiliar word with ourselves, and may serve as an illustration, if not a rendering of this use of ἀτασθαλία.]

καὶ ἀκράτῳ—τεθηγμένον] and 'whetted with the unadulterated' (hot and heady, like pure unmixed wine) 'wrath of his mind'. The γλώττα here is τεθηγμένον, a not very rare, but usually poetical, metaphor for exasperated, excited, provoked, irritated; *sharpened* like a knife or tool, or an animal's teeth. Examples from the tragic poets are supplied by Valck. on Eur. Hippol. 689, ὀργῇ συντεθηγμένος φρένας: it is opposed to ἀμβλύνειν as Aesch. Theb. 721, τεθηγμένον τοί μ' οὐκ ἀπαμβλυνεῖς λόγῳ, comp. P. V. 308, Soph. Aj. 585, γλώσσαν τεθηγμένην. Ib. Fragm. 762, *Inc. Trag.* Dind., Eur. Cycl. 240, Electr. 836. Xenophon however has employed it several times; Cyrop. I 2. 10, 6. 19, 6. 41, II 1. 4, 5, 7, Mem. III 3. 7. Lat. *acuere*. [Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas* p. 492, notes that

θέτοις τὸ ἢ μακροῖς ἢ ἀκαίροις ἢ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι·
 ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιήσει πρέπει γάλα λευκὸν εἶπειν, ἐν
 δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν ἀπρεπέστερα, τὰ δέ, ἂν ἡ κατακορῇ,
 ἐξελέγχει καὶ ποιεῖ φανερόν ὅτι ποίησις ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ
 δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ· ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ

its repeated use by Xenophon need not prevent us from regarding this use of *θήγειν* in prose as a kind of provincialism; it appears among the *γλῶτται κατὰ πόλεις* in Bekker's *Anecdota*, Ἀρκάδων ἄορ ξίφος. θήγει ἀκουᾶ.]

§ 3. 'The third vice of style lies in the misuse of "epithets", that is, in introducing them either too long, or out of season (out of *place*, *we* say), or too frequent (numerous); for in poetry it is suitable enough to say "white milk" (a Homeric epithet of course; as red wine, fair women, &c. in ballad poetry), but in prose it is not only less appropriate, but also, if they be employed to satiety (excess), they convict (detect, expose, the *art* of the composition) and make it plain that it is poetry: for, to be sure, it must be used; for it varies the customary style and gives a foreign air to the language'.

On *ἐπίθετα* see Introd. p. 289. The over-long 'epithets' are illustrated by those of Aeschylus in Tragedy, and Aristophanes in Comedy—who sometimes strings together an entire line of epithets, as ἀρχαιομελισιδωνι-φρυνιχήρατα, of Phrynichus' μέλη [Vesp. 220]. Such epithets are of course most inappropriate to prose. The excessive length may also be shewn in the 'descriptive additions' to a substantive, which often takes the place of a regular *epithet*.

δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ] i. e. to a limited extent; taking care at the same time that the poetical character of the language be not *marked* and *ap-parent* (reading αὐτῇ the *vulgata lectio* retained by Bekker). Spengel with A^c αὐτῷ: Victorius and Vater αὐτοῖς; but the *variation of the customary language* is far more applicable to *poetical usages* than to *epithets*: in fact I doubt whether ἐξαλλάττει could be applied to ἐπίθετα with any satisfactory meaning).

ἐξαλλάττει] *supra* c. 2 § 2, note, and § 5. ξενικὴν τὴν λέξιν] *supra* c. 2 § 3.

'But the mean should always be our aim, for (the reverse of moderation, excess) does more mischief than careless, random, speaking, (over-doing it, exaggeration, is worse than entire carelessness, taking no pains at all): for the one no doubt wants the good, but the other (*has*) the bad (the defect in the one case is negative, the mere absence of special excellence, in the other it is positive). And this is why Alcidas (epithets) appear tasteless; because he employs them, not as the mere seasoning but as the actual meat (*pièce de résistance*, the substance, not the mere adjunct or appendage); so frequent, and unduly long (*μείζονσι τοῦ δέοντος*, too long) and conspicuous are they'. Victorius is doubtless right in his opinion that these three words are a repetition in slightly altered terms of the three views of epithets at the commencement of the section; *unseasonableness*, the importunity with which they engross the attention, is now represented by the conspicuousness or

ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μέζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῇ λέγειν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἢ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὥς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μέζουσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἷον οὐχ ἰδρῶτα ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἰδρῶτα, καὶ οὐκ εἰς Ἴσθμια ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἴσθμίων πανήγυριν, καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν

undue prominence which produces the same effect. A fair specimen of this pompous inflated writing, in epithet and metaphor, is given in Auctor. ad Heren. IV 10. 15, *nam qui perduellionibus vendidit patriam non satis supplicii dederit si praeceps in Neptunias depulsus erit lacunas. Paeniteat igitur istum qui montes belli fabricatus est, campos sustulit facis.*

[ἐπιδήλοις, 'obtrusive', 'glaring'. Bernays proposes ἐπὶ δήλοις, apparently without due cause, though Vahlen quotes it with approval.]

[The little that is left of Alcidas seems to justify Aristotle's strictures on his want of taste in the use of epithets: e.g. *περί σφιστῶν*, § 6, *ἀντίτινος καὶ προσάντης* ἢ τῶν χαλεπωτέρων ἐπιμέλεια, § 7, ὁ ποδῶκης δρυμεύς, § 16, *εὐκύτερ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγχινόια* χρώμενον ὑγρῶς καὶ φιλανθρωπίως μεταχειρίζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, § 17, ἡ γραφή... ἄπορον καὶ δεσμών την ψυχὴν καθίστησι καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοσχεδαστικοῖς εὐροίας ἀπάσης ἐπὶπροσθεν γίγνεται, 'where for εὐροίας we should surely read εὐπορίας which is a suitable contrast to ἄπορον and is supported by § 26, τοῖς αὐτομάτοις εὐπορήμασιν ἐμποδὼν ἔστιν, and by the fact that εὐπορία, εὐπορος, ἄπορία and ἄπορος occur at least ten times in the thirty-five sections of the rhetorician's diatribe, e.g. § 34, which is also an instance of the superabundance of epithets here criticised; τὴν γνώμην εὐλυτον καὶ τὴν μνήμην εὐπορον καὶ τὴν λήθην ἀδελον'. See also Vahlen, *Alkidamas*, u. s. pp. 508—510, and Blass (who has edited Alcidas, Gorgias, and Antisthenes in the same volume as Antiphon), *die Attische Beredsamkeit* II 328.]

'For instance, (he says) not 'sweat', but "the moist sweat"; and not 'to the Isthmian games', but "to the general assembly ('great convocation) of the Isthmian games"; and not 'laws', but "laws the kings of cities"; and not 'running', but "with the impulse of his soul at speed"; and not merely 'a Museum, or haunt of the Muses', but "a Museum of all Nature that he had received"; and "sullen-visaged (or sullen-looking, with sullen aspect) the care (solicitude, anxiety, of his soul"; and "artificer" not of 'favour', but "of universal public favour"; and "steward (administrator, dispenser) of the pleasure of the hearers"; and "concealed", not 'with boughs', but "with the boughs of the wood"; and "he clothed", not 'his body', but "his body's shame"; and "counter-imitative (responsive-answering) the desire of his soul"; and "so extravagant (inordinate, [abnormal], the excess of the wickedness".

πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἀλλὰ δρομαίᾳ
τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμῇ, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσεῖον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς
φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν
φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ πανδήμου
χάριτος δημιουργός, καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων
ἡδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις p. 117.
ἀπέκρυσεν, καὶ οὐ τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν ἀλλὰ τὴν
τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
ἐπιθυμίαν (τοῦτο δ' ἅμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον,

πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους] Fragm. Pind. quoted by Plat. Gorg. 484 B, νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεῖς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, and Sympos. 196 C, οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι. [Also by Herod. III 38, καὶ ὁρθῶς μοι δοκεῖ Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλεία φήσας εἶναι, quoted by Thompson on Gorg. u. s.]

τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον] I have above translated this quite literally, and own that I do not fully understand it: παραλαβὼν seems suspicious: A^o has περιλαβὼν, which does not much mend the matter. Perhaps all the meaning lies on the surface, and there is none underneath. Victorius says that μουσεῖον is *locus a musis bonisque artibus frequentatus*: and translates, *cum naturae museum accepisset*: adding, *appellatur igitur hic quoque τῆς φύσεως epitheton, cum adponatur illi nomini ad naturam eius explanandam*. [Vahlen discusses the phrase in his article on Alcidas, u. s., pp. 494—6, and suggests that the passage originally stood as follows: δρομαίᾳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμῇ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον, which he translates “*mit der Seele Sturmesdrang den Wissensschatz der Naturum fassend*.” μουσεῖον occurs in a well-known passage of the Phaedrus, 267 B, τὰ δὲ Πλάτῳ πῶς φράσωμεν αὐτὸ μουσεῖα λόγων, ὡς διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν, and an interesting account of the word may be found in Thompson's note. Vahlen, who holds that μουσεῖα λόγων there means *Redeschulen, in denen man das διπλασίως und das δι' εἰκόνων, διὰ γνωμῶν λέγειν, lernen konnte*, suggests that by τὸ τῆς φύσεως μουσεῖον Alcidas here intends to express what in ordinary language would have been expressed by some such phrase as ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία. In illustration of this view, he quotes a fragment of Diogenes Laertius, VIII 2. 56, where Ἀλκίδαμος ἐν τῷ Φυσικῷ says of Empedocles, Ἀναξαγόρου διακοῦσαι καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ τοῦ μὲν τὴν σεμνότητα ζηλῶσαι τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τοῦ δὲ τὴν φυσιολογίαν.—In Stobaeus, 120. 3, the quotation of two lines of Theognis ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλκιδάμαντος Μουσείου shews that as a title of a book (whatever its exact meaning may be) the term is not so modern as might be supposed. (Compare Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit* II 322, note).]

ἀντίμιμον—ἐπιθυμίαν] ἀντίμιμος ‘corresponding by, in the way of, imitation’, ἀντίμορφος ‘corresponding in form’, ἀντίτυπος ‘stroke answering stroke’, ἀντίστροφος of an ‘answering wheel’ of a chorus. Aristoph. Thesm. 18, ὀφθαλμον ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τροχῷ. Thuc. VII 67, ἀντιμήμησις.

ὥστε ποίημα γίνεται), καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολήν. διὸ ποιητικῶς λέγοντες τῇ ἀπρεπείᾳ τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ὅταν γὰρ γιγνώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλη, διαλύει τὸ σαφὲς τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖν·

From the passage of Aristoph. it seems that this word, like ἀντίστροφος, should have after it a dative of the object to which it answers; what that object was in Alcidas' declamation Aristotle has not informed us.

'And this is at the same time a compound word and an epithet, so that it becomes quite a poem (a mere bit of poetry: plain prose is turned by this inflated style into poetry)'.
 ἔξεδρος, from the analogy of ἔκτοπος, ἐκτόπιος, and the actual use of the word—as ἔξεδρον χώραν ἔχειν, of birds of omen in an unlucky quarter of the heavens, Arist. Av. 275; ἔξεδροι φρενῶν λόγοι 'words beside the seat of the wits', Eur. Hippol. 985, οὐκ ἔξεδρος, ἀλλ' ἐντοπος ἀνὴρ, Soph. Phil. 212—must mean 'out of its proper seat or place', 'abroad'; and hence as an exaggeration of *excess*, 'extravagant', as translated.

On these extracts from Alcidas Victorius remarks, "Cum autem haec omnia a mediis quibusdam orationibus sumpserit, ut vitiosae tantum locutionis exemplum sint, non est quod miremur aut plenam sententiam in nonnullis non esse; aut desiderari, ut in hac, verbum unde casus nominum regantur."

'And so this poetical diction by its unsuitableness introduces absurdity and tastelessness into their composition, and obscurity which is due to the verbiage: for whenever (a speaker or writer) accumulates words (throws a heap of them) upon one already informed (already acquainted with his meaning), he destroys (breaks up, dissolves, effaces) all perspicuity (distinctness) by the cloud (or darkness, obscurity) in which he involves his meaning' (*lit.* which he brings *over* it; ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει, I 1. 7, see note: *to over-cloud*, over-shadow, obscure).

ἀδολεσχίαν] the accumulation of unnecessary or unmeaning words: ἀδολεσχία is idle, empty, chatter, prating. It is applied to Socrates and the Sophists by Aristoph. Nub. 1480, 1485, and Eupol. τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολεσχῆν, Fragm. Inc. x (Meineke, II 553), comp. XI (Ib.) ἀδολεσχέειν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδαξον, δ σοφιστά. Aristoph. Fragm. Tagenist. III (Meineke II 1149) ἡ Πρόδικος ἡ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἰς γέ τις. *Supra* II 22. 3, *infra* III 12. 6, Eth. N. III 13, 1118 a 1, de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15.

ἐπεμβάλλη]. "Similiter locutus est Plat. Cratyl. 414 D, de inculcatis alicui nomini syllabis, ὥστε ἐπεμβάλλοντες ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τελευτῶντες ποιοῦσι μὴδ' ἂν ἕνα ἄνθρωπον συνεῖναι ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα. Illae enim impediunt ne unde ductum id nomen sit videri possit. Idem affirmavit M. Varro, de L. L. multa enim verba litteris commutatis sunt interpolata." Victorius.

'And people in general, use their compound words (τοῖς, those that they *do* use) when it (what they want to express) is nameless (has no single word to represent it) and the word is easily put together (the combination is easily made), as χρονοτριβεῖν: but if this be carried too far

οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι τοῖς διπλοῖς χρωῶνται, ὅταν ἀνώνυμον ἦ καὶ ὁ λόγος εὐσύνθετος, οἷον τὸ χρονοτριβεῖν· ἀλλ' P. 1406
 ἂν πολὺ, πάντως ποιητικόν. διὸ χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῇ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφώ-
 δεις· αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ

(overdone), it (the result) becomes absolutely poetical. And this is why compound words are most serviceable to the dithyrambic poets—τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλὰ μάλιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις, Poet. XXII 18—for these are noisy, “full of sound and fury”; full of pompous, high-sounding phrases’ (on ψόφος see III 2.13); ‘and obsolete or unusual, to Epic poets, for language of this kind has a stately (majestic, dignified, proud, solemn, and scornful or disdainful) air; and metaphor to writers in iambics, for these they (i.e. the tragic poets) now-a-days—since they have quitted the tetrameter—employ, as has been already stated. III 1.9 comp. *infra* 8.4, and Poet. IV 18. The reason, conveyed by γάρ, is this: I say iambics, not tetrameters, because now-a-days, &c.

[χρονοτριβεῖν. Compare our ‘pastime,’ which is also a λόγος εὐσύνθετος. So in Daniel’s *Ulysses and Siren*, “*Delicious nymph! suppose there were No honour or report, Yet manliness would scorn to wear The time in idle sport.*” Isocr. Paneg. § 41, ἡδίστας διατριβάς.]

On compound words, as connected with dithyrambic poetry, Demetrius, περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 91, says, ληπτέον δὲ καὶ σύνθετα ὀνόματα, οὐ τὰ διθυραμβικῶς συγκεῖμενα, οἷον θεοτεράτους πλάνας, οὐδὲ ἄστρον δορύπορον στρατόν, ἀλλ’ εὐκρίτα τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς συνθεῖας συγκεκλιμένοις (such as νομοθέται, ἀρχιτέκτονες): comp. § 78, the accumulation of metaphors will make διθυράμβον ἀντὶ λόγου.

The dithyramb at Athens became at and after the end of the fifth cent. the wildest, and (in point of style) most licentious and most extravagant of all the kinds of poetry. See note in *Introd.* on III 9, pp. 307, 8, and the *reff.* to Aristoph. there given; Bode, *Gesch. der Hell. dichtk.* Vol. II. Pt. II. p. 111 seq. and 290 seq.; and Müller, *H. G. L.* s. XXX. To use words suited to a dithyrambic poet is therefore an exaggeration of the ordinary defect of the introduction into prose of poetical language.

Plat. Phaedr. 238 D, οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, Ibid. 241 E, ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους. Cratyl. 409 C, (σελαναία) διθυραμβώδεις γε τοῦτο τοῦνομα. Dionys. Dinarch. Iud. c. 8, of the imitators of Plato, διθυραμβώδη ὀνόματα καὶ φορτικὰ εἰσφέροντες, Lys. Iud. c. 3, Γοργίας ... οὐ πόρρω διθυράμβων ἔνια φθεγγόμενος, de adm. vi. dic. in Dem. c. 29, Ep. ad Pomp. c. 2 (of Socrates’ poetical outburst, Phaedr. 237 A), ψόφοι ταῖτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ διθυράμβοι, (p. 763 R) and (764) where the words of Phaedr. 238 D (u. s.) are quoted. Hor. Od. IV 2.10, of Pindar, *per audaces nova dithyrambos verba devolvit*, Donaldson, *Theatre of Gks.* p. 37, note 3; and the references. διθυραμβεῖν is a step beyond τραγωδεῖν in pomp and exaggeration of language.

σεμνὸν γάρ] σεμνός, contracted from σεβόμενος, *lit.* an object of worship: applied again to the *heroic measure* or rhythm, III 8.4.

On these *passive* forms in Greek and Latin, see Donaldson, *New*

αὔθαδες· ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις· τούτοις γὰρ
4 νῦν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ
ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ
μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται
γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμωδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ
σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δέ, ἃν πόρρωθεν.

Crat. § 410, *Varron.* p. 406 (ed. II), 97. Add to the Greek examples given *σεμνός* and *ἐρυννός* and to the Latin, *somnius* (sopio).

καὶ αὔθαδες] This means that the *unusual* γλῶτται affect an air of independence and hauteur; they, like the αὐθάδης, the self-pleaser, self-willed, stubborn, haughty, independent *man*, will not conform to ordinary usage, and scornfully affect singularity. *Comp. Poet.* XXIV 9, τὸ γὰρ ἡρώϊκον στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν, διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα.

§ 4. 'And further, the fourth vice of style is shewn in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are laughable—for the *comic* poets also employ metaphors—others from their exaggeration of the stately (solemn) and tragic (pompous) style: if far-fetched, they are obscure'. πόρρωθεν, see on III 2. 12. 'As Gorgias, "things (πράγματα, actions, occurrences, events, business) all fresh and raw"'. This certainly is a good exemplification of what it is designed to illustrate: it is obscure. It seems, however, to mean nothing more than 'recent events', events *fresh*, and with the blood in them: the metaphor from a beast just killed. It therefore corresponds to πρόσφατος, 'fresh', which also stands for 'recent'. πρόσφατος is specially applied to 'fresh meat'. See Lobeck *On Phrynichus*, p. 375, note: examples of πρόσφατος are there given, p. 374. "And these things *thou* hast sown in disgrace, and reaped in misery". For it smells too much of poetry'. [Both the extracts probably belong to the same context, and may perhaps be combined by rendering them thus: 'all was green and unripe (fresh and flushed with sap), and this was the crop that you sowed in shame to reap in ruin'. χλωρὰ καὶ ἔναιμα possibly refer to the green and unripe stalks of corn, with the sap still fresh in them. This assumes that αἶμα can be used metaphorically of 'sap', both coming under the generic notion of 'vital juice'. If so, the metaphor is a sufficiently bold one. Thompson (ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179) notes that ἀναιμα (which is the reading of Q, Y^b and Z^b) is 'well supported, and cannot but be right,' and remarks that while the metaphor of sowing and reaping is a mere commonplace, "pallid and bloodless affairs" would need apology even from a modern.]

A metaphor, nearly resembling the first of these two, occurs in Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, § 116, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν μεταφορᾷ τὸ ψυχρὸν, τρέμοντα καὶ ὠχρὰ τὰ πράγματα. Longinus *περὶ ὕψους* 3.2, ταύτη καὶ τὰ τοῦ Λεοντίνου Γοργίου γελάται γράφοντος, "Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεὺς." καὶ "γύψες ἔμψυχοι τάφοι" [*comp. supra* I § 9, on the poetical style of Gorgias].

Hermogenes also, *περὶ ἰδεῶν Τομ. α'*, *περὶ σεμνότητος* 226 (p. 292, Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. II.) gives some examples of exaggerated metaphors, ἐκνευρισμένοι, καὶ τὸ πεπρακὸς ἐαυτὸν, καὶ τὸ λωποδυνῶν

οἶον Γοργίας “χλωρὰ καὶ ἔναιμα τὰ πράγματα· σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχροῦς μὲν ἔσπειρας κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας” ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων, καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ “οὐδὲν τοι-οὔτον ἄθურμα τῇ ποιήσει προσφέρων.” ἅπαντα γὰρ

τὴν Ἑλλάδα: and a few lines below, *τάφους ἐμψύχους τοὺς γύπας*, but without the author's name. The objection to some of these metaphors, as the ‘sowing and reaping’, the ‘selling oneself’, and above all, Alcidas’ ‘mirror of human life’, seems to shew a change of taste from ancient to modern criticism. We certainly should object to none of these; and the ‘mirror’ in particular has become one of the commonest metaphors in our language. The ‘sowing and reaping’ appears in Plato, Phaedr. 260 c (see Thompson’s note), and Aesch. Pers. 821. In Cic. de Orat. II 65. 261 (without comment), *ut sementem feceris ita metes*. I Ep. ad Cor. xv. 42—4. Ep. ad Gal. vi. 7 (and Lightfoot ad loc.). “They that sow in tears shall reap in joy: he that now goeth forth weeping, and beareth forth good seed, shall doubtless come again with joy, and bring his sheaves with him,” Psalm cxxvi. 6, 7. Possibly the antithesis, one of Gorgias’ new inventions, may have helped to offend Aristotle’s tastes, and it is the effect of the whole phrase, and not of the harmless metaphor alone, that has unconsciously provoked his disapprobation: yet the same occurs in the simple psalm.

[καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον. Alcidas elsewhere uses this metaphor from a mirror, in the form of a *simile*, περὶ σοφίστων, § 32, εἰς δὲ τὰ γεγραμμένα κατιδόντας ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ θεωρῆσαι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιδόσεις ῥαδίον ἐστίν. The present passage and those already quoted in § 3 τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυνεν κ.τ.λ. (Odys. VI 128) and κυανόχρων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος, probably belong to a declamation on Odysseus (or on the Odyssey); while τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθῶ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν (§ 1), and πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκούντων ἡδονῆς (§ 3), point with equal probability to a pamphlet on Rhetoric.]

‘And as Alcidas (follower of Gorgias), (called) philosophy a “fortress to threaten” (a standing menace to), the laws; and the Odyssey a “fair mirror of human life”; and “introducing no such toys, or gawds, in his poetry”—for all such things are subversive of credibility, for the reasons already stated’. These are, that forced metaphors, and all such-like artificial graces and ornaments, make the art and the labour of composition apparent; make the speech appear studied and affected, and therefore *premeditated* and unreal, and without *serious purpose*: οὐκ εἶ κλέπτεται: the language of genuine emotion, of earnest and real conviction, which are required for persuasion, being always simple and natural. Probably the most perfect example of art thus disguised by art is to be found in Mark Antony’s speeches over Caesar’s body in *Julius Caesar*; and the first thing he does is to impress upon his audience the entire artlessness and unstudied simplicity of

ταῦτα ἀπίθانا διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα. τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περίττωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν· εἶπε γὰρ “αἰσχρόν γε ὦ Φιλομήλα.” ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰπὼν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃ ἔστιν.

his address: *I am no orator as Brutus is, but, as you know me all, a plain, blunt man that love my friend, &c* [III 2.221].

ἐπιτείχισμα] in the first extract from Alcidas, is interpreted in this passage in the Lexicons of Rost and Palm, and Liddell and Scott—in Stephens' *Thesaurus* it is quoted but *not* explained—'a bulwark or defence of the laws'. But ἐπιτείχισμα in its proper literal sense seems to be invariably used of an offensive, not defensive, fortification, to command and annoy an enemy's country, like Decelia, which, τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπφκέιτο, Thuc. VII 27. 3 (Bekker, in Thuc. VIII 95, reads τείχισμα for ἐπιτείχισμα, on this account) as indeed is required by the ἐπί with which it is compounded; and *philosophy* may be used in the attack, as well as the defence, of established laws and institutions, whether it be understood as speculation or scientific research.

'And Gorgias' address to the swallow, when she discharged her excrement' [rather, 'dropped her leavings'] upon him as she flew over, is in the best style of tragic diction, (τὸ δὲ Γ. ἄριστα, sc. εἰρηται,) "For shame, Philomel", said he. For to a bird it was no disgrace to have done it, but to a young (unmarried) lady it was. And therefore he was right in his reproach to describe (speak of) her as she *was*, and not as she *is*'. The simplicity of all this is delightful. I could fancy Aristotle winking to his imaginary reader as he wrote the explanation, ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ., a bird, you know, &c. [The anecdote illustrates the habit of irony ascribed to Gorgias in 7 § 11, *infra*, μετ' εἰρωνείας ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει, as noticed in Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 180.]

περίττωμα] in medicine and natural history is 'a secretion'. It occurs constantly all through Ar.'s writings on Nat. Hist. Plut. Symp. p. 727 D (Victorius), in telling the same story, uses the broad Aristophanic word: Γοργίας δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς χελιδόνος ἀφείσης ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀπόπατον, ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτήν, οὐ καλὰ ταῦτ', εἶπεν, ὦ Φιλομήλα.

On the transformation of Procne and Philomela authorities differ. Thucydides, II 29, referring to the story, seems to adopt Gorgias' view, and make Procne the nightingale. Ovid seems to leave the point unsettled, Metaph. VI 667 seq. But tradition in general, and English poetry in particular, have always associated Philomela with the nightingale; e.g. 'Less Philomel will deign a song. Milton's *Penseroso*, 56.

Victorius notices on this passage that Aristotle includes under the designation of metaphor more than is now recognised as belonging to it. The case here, he says, is a mere *hypallage* or change of name. Comp. Cic. Orator c. XXVII 93, 94. *Hanc ὑπαλλαγὴν rhetores, quia quasi summutantur verba pro verbis, μετωνυμίαν grammatici vocant, quod nomina*

1 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ CHAP. IV.
μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα

ὥς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν,

εἰκὼν ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε,” μεταφορά·
διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσε μετε-
2 νέγκας λέοντα τὸν Ἀχιλλέα. χρήσιμον δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν
καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις δέ· ποιητικὸν γάρ. οἷστέαι

transferuntur. Aristoteles autem translationi et haec ipsa subiungit, et abusionem quam κατάχρησιν vocant, ut quum minutum dicimus animum pro parvo, et abutimur verbis propinquis, si opus est, vel quod delectat vel quod decet. Comp. Introd., Appendix on Metaphor, pp. 375 and 376.

CHAP. IV.

From metaphors (c. 2), and the abuse of them (c. 3), we pass on in this chapter to the simile, *εἰκὼν*; which differs from the metaphor only in this, that the latter concentrates, or fuses into one, the two things or notions brought into comparison. The former separates them by the particle of comparison *ὥς*. Thus the simile may be regarded as an expanded metaphor. See further on this in Introd. p. 290, and the references to other authorities.

§ 1. ‘The simile too is a metaphor, the difference between them being slight: for when he (Homer¹) says of (his, or the great) Achilles “and as a lion he rushed on”, it is a simile, but when, “he rushed on, a (very) lion”, a metaphor: for (in the latter) because they are both brave, he transferred to Achilles the appellation of lion’.

§ 2. ‘The simile is useful also in prose, but seldom (to be employed), since it has a poetical character. They must be used like metaphors (the same rules must be observed in the use of them as of metaphors); in fact they *are* metaphors, only with the difference already stated’.

οἷστέαι] *φέρειν* for *λέγειν* or *χρῆσθαι* is commonly applied in Arist.

¹ The words here assigned to Homer do not occur in our present text: but the substance of them is found at the beginning of the famous simile of the lion, Il. xx 164, Πηλεΐδης δ’ ἐτέρωθεν ἐναντίον ὦρτο λεὼν ὥς, κ.τ.λ. followed by a long description of this animal. On the quotations from Homer in Aristotle, see Heitz, *Verl. Schrift. Arist., die homerischen Fragen*, p. 258, seq.: and Paley’s note, with the extract from Wolf’s Proleg. § 11, Introd. (to the ed. of the Iliad) p. xxxvi. The former of course includes this amongst the quotations which differ from Homer’s text, but draws from this the inference that the *text* used by Aristotle (who himself revised it) was here different to our own. I think that nothing more can fairly be inferred from *cases like this* than that Aristotle has misquoted the *words* of our present version: all the substance is there. As we have already so many times had occasion to notice, Ar. has here quoted from memory; and like all other men of very extensive reading and very retentive memory, Bacon for example, and Walter Scott, has trusted too much to his memory, not referred to his author, and consequently misquoted. And I think that is all that can reasonably be said about it.

δὲ ὥσπερ αἱ μεταφοραὶ· μεταφοραὶ γάρ εἰσι· δια-
 3 φέρουσαι τῷ εἰρημένῳ. εἰσὶ δ' εἰκόνες οἷον ἦν Ἀνδρο-
 τίων εἰς Ἰδρίεα, ὅτι ὅμοιος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν κυνι-
 δίοις· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ προσπίπτοντα δάκνει, καὶ Ἰδρίεα
 λυθέντα ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν εἶναι χαλεπὸν. καὶ ὡς
 Θεοδάμας εἵκαζεν Ἀρχίδαμον Εὐξένῳ γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ

to any topic, example, argument, or anything else that is to be 'brought forward'. *Supra* c. 2. 10, 13, *infra* c. 6. 7, also II 22. 16, 17. Top. Θ 1, 153 a 14, et passim. Isocr. Areopag. § 6.

§ 3. 'An example of the simile is' (*lit.* Similes are a thing like that simile which), 'that which Androtion (directed, discharged) against Idrieus, that he was like the curs when they are let loose (untied); for *they* fly at you and bite, and so Idrieus was vicious (or savage) when *he* was freed from his chains'.

Androtion was an Athenian orator, whose name occurs coupled with many opprobrious epithets not only in the speech delivered against him (Or. 22), but also in that against Timocrates in which he is very frequently mentioned. He was sent on an embassy with Melanopus and Glaucetes, Dem. c. Timocr. §§ 12, 13, alibi, to Mausolus prince of Caria 377—351 B.C. Idrieus was his brother, and Androtion may have met him at his court, and there had the encounter with him which ended in the discharge of his simile. The Scholiast on Isocr. p. 4 b 27 (ap. Sauppe, *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.*) tells us that he was a pupil of Isocrates, and the writer of the 'Atthis', "a work on the history of Attica", *Biographical Dictionary*—which settles the question raised in that Dictionary about the identity of the orator and author—and the Scholiast adds that he was also the defendant in Demosthenes' speech *contra Androktionem*.

Idrieus was a prince of Caria who succeeded to the throne on the death of his brother Mausolus in 351 B.C. See Mr Bunbury's Art. in *Biogr. Dict.* He is mentioned by Isocrates, Philippus § 103, as εὐπωρότατον τῶν νῦν περὶ τὴν ἡπειρον. This speech was published in 346 B.C. (Clinton), and therefore subsequent to his accession. It may be presumed that the imprisonment with which Androtion taunts him was due to his brother, and of course prior to his accession to the throne. He is referred to again without his name by Demosth. in the speech de Pace, § 25,—this was also delivered in 346 B.C. (Clinton *F. H.* II 360)—as 'the Carian', who had been permitted to take possession of the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes. [A. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I 351, 440.]

'And Theodamas' comparison of Archidamus to Euxenus—*minus* his geometry, by proportion: for Euxenus also will be Archidamus *plus* geometry' (a geometrical Archidamus). Nothing is known of the three persons here mentioned. Theodamas compares Archidamus to Euxenus without his geometry; and so—by the rule of proportion, i. e. in the same proportion—will Euxenus be to Archidamus with geometry: i. e. *equal*, both being alike rascals. The *proportion* is that of equality. With ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον supply λόγῳ, 'in the ratio, or relation, of *proportion*'.

ἐπισταμένῳ ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Εὐξενος Ἀρχίδαμος γεωμετρικός. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθνεώτας σκυλεύοντες εἰκόασιν τοῖς κυνιδίοις, ἃ τοὺς λίθους δάκνει τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἀπτόμενα. καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὁμοῖος ναυ-

In this we are referred to the 'proportional metaphor', the last and most approved of the four kinds described in Poet. XXI 7—16. Comp. Rhet. III 10. 7, where the proportional met. is illustrated at length. Victorius, who agrees in this explanation, supplies a parallel case from Diogenes Laertius, Polemo, IV 3. 7, ἔλεγεν οὖν τὸν μὲν Ὀμηρον ἐπικὸν εἶναι Σοφοκλέα, τὸν δὲ Σοφοκλέα Ὀμηρον τραγικόν. Theodamas has taken this common mode of comparison and applied it to the *equal worthlessness* of Archidamus and Euxenus. It was probably a standing joke at Athens. The case may have been something of this kind:—Two contemptible fellows, one of them priding himself upon a little knowledge of geometry, are comparing or disputing their respective merits: "you needn't say any more about the matter," says Theodamas, a bystander, who was listening much amused to the discussion, "you are both equal, *Arcades ambo*, a pair of fools, only Euxenus is a geometrical Archidamus, Archidamus an ungeometrical Euxenus."

'And that in Plato's Republic (V 469 D), that "the spoilers of the dead are like *curs* (κυνιδίοις, contemptuous, diminutive: an improvement on *Plato*, who merely says *κυνῶν*), which bite the stones (thrown at them) without attacking, setting upon, the thrower". Aristotle, like Bacon, quoting from memory, and assuming a knowledge of the original in his readers, has left out the explanatory part of the illustration which is supplied by Plato. Victorius cites Pacuvius, ap. Nonium, in *Armorum Iudicio*, *Nam canis, quando est percussa lapide, non tam illum appetit, Qui se icit, quam illum eum lapidem, qui ipsa icta est, petit.*

καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον] This, which originally stood in MSS Q, Y^b, Z^b, and the early editions, καὶ ὡς ὁ Δημοσθένης εἰς τὸν δῆμον, was first corrected by Victorius from MS A^o.

'And that (simile, understand *εἰκὼν*,) (directed) against democracy, that it is like a ship-owner (or ship's captain) strong but slightly deaf'. This again is a mere allusion to or reminder of, 'what every one must surely remember', Plato's celebrated illustration (Rep. VI 488 A) of the evils of democracy by the comparison of it to the undisciplined, untrained, turbulent, anarchical, crew of a ship; each of them, though utterly without qualification for the charge, ready to dispute with the captain the direction and control of the vessel. The passage is referred to by Cicero, de Off. I 25. The words quoted by Ar., few as they are, are not correct: he makes the *ναύκληρος* the representative of the *δῆμος*, the whole state; in Plato the *ναύκληρος*—the ship-owner, who in this case is captain, and steers his own vessel—is the governor, or governors, of the unruly mob of citizens.

'And that (*sc.* *εἰκὼν*, as before) applied to the poet's measures, that they are like the bloom of youth without beauty (actual beauty of features):

κλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκάφῳ δέ. καὶ ἡ εἰς τὰ μέτρα
τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι ἔοικε τοῖς ἀνευ κάλλους ὠραίοις· οἱ
μὲν γὰρ ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα οὐχ ὅμοια
φαίνεται. καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, εἰκέναι P. 1407.
αὐτοὺς τοῖς παιδίοις ἃ τὸν ψῶμον δέχεται μὲν, κλαί-
οντα δέ. καὶ εἰς Βοιωτοὺς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις·

for they, when their bloom has faded (worn off, when they have *lost* it),
and the other (the poet's measures) when they are broken up, seem utterly
unlike (their former selves)'. This also comes from Rep. x 601 B, *ἔοικε*
(τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν) τοῖς τῶν ὠραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μὴ, οἷα γίνεταί ἰδεῖν
ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπη. All poetry is imitation of natural objects,
which are invested with certain 'colours' by the poetical art, in which
the entire interest and beauty of poetry lie. These colours resemble the
bloom on a youthful face, which is merely superficial, when there is
nothing corresponding underneath, no beauty of feature or solid attrac-
tion. The imitation of the objects themselves may be bad and incorrect,
as the face itself may be plain; so that when the bloom, the poetical
colours, the graces and ornaments, and especially the *numbers*, are
removed, there remains only a substratum, which may be worthless, of
the direct imitation. Horace, Sat. I 4.60, has pronounced, as is well-
known, a directly contrary opinion, at least in respect of the better kind of
poetry. After applying to Lucilius' verses much the same criticism as
Plato does to poetry in general, he adds, *Non, ut si solvas 'postquam
discordia tetra Belli ferratos postes portasque refregit,' Invenias etiam
disiecti membra poetæ*: from Ennius. Compare Isocr. Evag. § 11, *ἦν*
γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας
καταλίπη, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδέεστερα τῆς δόξης ἥς
νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. Also Rhet. III 1.9.

With the expression comp. Eth. N. x 4, 1174 b ult. *οἶον τοῖς ἀκαίοις ἡ*
ᾧρα, pleasure is like the bloom on the *ἐνέργεια*, the realized, active energy:
illustrated by Zell's note ad loc., from Valerius Paterculus [II 29.2], of
Pompeius, *forma excellens, non ea qua flos commendatur ætatis, sed*
ex dignitate constanti. Youthful bloom, distinct from, and independent
of, personal beauty.

'And that of Pericles against the Samians, that they are like babies
(παιδίοις, 'little children') which cry whilst they take the morsel (or sop)
offered them'. *ψῶμος* recurs, under the form *ψώμισμα*, in the third simile
following, where it is explained. The comparison made here by Pericles
of the Samians to babies, which take their food, but cry while they take
it, refers to their conduct after the final reduction of the island by Pericles
in 440 B.C., Thuc. I 115—117, after an eight months' contest, *ἐξεπολιρκή-
θησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνί*. The sop, i.e. the nourishment, benefits, favours, they
had received—from the *Athenian* point of view—consisted, thinks Schra-
der, in their freedom, and liberation from the yoke of the Persians and
of the oligarchs. They nevertheless, though they accepted them, most un-
gratefully and unreasonably grumbled. Buhle refers to Diodor. XII 27.

'And (of Pericles again) against the Boeotians; that they are like their

τούς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ' αὐτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένους. καὶ ἡ Δημοσθένους εἰς τὸν δῆμον¹, ὅτι ὁμοίός ἐστι τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυτιῶσιν. καὶ ὡς ὁ Δημοκράτης εἴκασε τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς τίτθαις αἰ τὸ ψῶμισμα καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδιά παραλείφουσιν. καὶ ὡς Ἄντι-

1-1 ὁ Δημοσθένης τὸν δῆμον *vulgata lectio*.

own holm-oaks: for as these are cut down (knocked about or down) by themselves' (dashed one against another by the wind; so Victorius; or 'cut down', split by wedges and mallets made of their own wood, like the "struck eagle" of Aeschylus, Waller, and Byron), 'so are the Boeotians, by their civil (or domestic) contentions'.

'And Demosthenes compared the people' (of the Athenian, or some other, democracy: understand εἴκασεν, which is expressed in the next example) 'to the sea-sick passengers in the vessels at sea'. Their *squeamishness*, fastidiousness, nausea with the existing state of things, constant desire of change, is produced by the perpetual *agitation, fluctuation* of their political condition and circumstances, the tumultuous waves of the stormy sea of civil commotion: they are sick of the present, and long for change. The Demosthenes here mentioned is, by general consent, *not* the Orator; more probably the Athenian general of the Peloponnesian war in Thucydides [*sine causa*, says Spengel].

The very remarkable fact that the *name* of the great Orator is in all probability only once mentioned by Aristotle—II 24. 8, where Demades' condemnation of his policy is quoted—though the pair were living together for many years in the same city—is parallel to a similar silence of Bacon as to *his* great contemporary Shakespeare; but still more remarkable in the former case, from the constant occasion offered to the writer on Rhetoric of illustrating his rules and topics from the practice of the first of speakers. It has been already noticed in the Introduction, pp. 45, 46, and notes, where the cases of supposed mention of or allusion to Demosthenes are collected and examined. And this omission will appear still more remarkable when it is contrasted with the nine closely printed columns of references and citations in Spengel's *Index Auctorum ad Rhetores Graecos* III 312, seq.

'And Democrates' comparison of the "orators" to the nurses who themselves swallow the morsel (which they have previously chewed and softened for the baby), and smear (or slobber over) the babies with the spittle (that they have used in the process)'. This is the case of the lawyer and the oyster in the caricature; the legal practitioner swallows the savoury contents, and presents the rival claimants with a shell apiece; so the public speakers swallow the substantial profit themselves, and besmear the audience with their unctuous flattery. Comp. Ar. Eq. 715, (Κλέων) ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν (τὸν δῆμον, represented as a toothless old man that must be fed like a baby) οἷς ψωμίζεται. ('Ἀλλαντοπώλης) καὶ ὅσπερ αἱ τιτθαὶ γε σιτίζεις κακῶς· μασώμενος γὰρ τῷ μὲν ὀλίγον ἐντίθης, αὐτὸς δ'

σθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῶ εἵκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει. πάσας γὰρ ταύτας καὶ

ἐκείνου τριπλάσιον κατέσπασας. Democrates, the author of this saying, seems, from a passage of Plutarch (in Vict.), Pol. Praec. 803 D, to have been notorious for biting and offensive sayings, τὸ λυποῦν ἀκαίρως τοὺς ἀκούοντας: two of them are quoted. Two persons of this name are mentioned by the Orators. One, son of Sophilus, of the deme of Phlya, in a list of the ambassadors sent to Philip in 347 B.C., after the fall of Olynthus (in the spurious ψήφισμα, Demosth. de Cor. § 29, see Dissen), and again in another questionable ψήφισμα, Dem. de Cor. § 187, purporting to be Demosthenes' decree for the appointment of ambassadors to Thebes and the other Greek states, to negotiate an alliance, and arrest the progress of Philip, June, B.C. 338, Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici, sub anno*. The other, of Aphidna, Isaeus, περὶ τοῦ Φιλοκτήμονος κλήρου, § 22, and Aesch. de F. L. § 17. Nothing more seems to be known of either of them. The two are confounded in the article of Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*, Democrates No. 1; and the saying here quoted is styled "a fragment of one of his orations."

'And Antisthenes' comparison of Cephisodotus the thin (slight, lean) to frankincense, because he gives pleasure by wasting away'. ὁ λεπτός seems to have been a sobriquet of Cephisodotus; and may also indicate a second point of resemblance between him and frankincense, namely his slight, vaporous, unsubstantial nature. Buhle quotes in illustration the German proverb, *die Juden nehmen sich nirgend besser aus als am Galgen*. "Ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει means that that was the *only* enjoyment that was to be got out of him: all the rest of him, his properties, qualities, character, was anything but enjoyable, bad and vicious. On λεπτός contrasted with παχύς, and men distinguished by this personal peculiarity, Athenaeus has three chapters, XII 75—77, p. 551, seq.

Antisthenes is most likely the Cynic philosopher, who outlived the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C., Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici, sub anno* 365, and was therefore contemporary with Cephisodotus. He, like his successor, Diogenes, had a habit of bitter sarcasm, of which the saying here quoted is a fair specimen. It is truly a bitter jest. See the account of him in Cotton's art. in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* Vol. I, p. 208 a. A long list of his sayings is given by Diog. Laert. in his life, VI 1, some of which are caustic enough. Mr. Grote, in his account of Antisthenes, *Plato*, III, p. 504, seq., has not specified this cynical feature in his character. [Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II 304—316.]

Cephisodotus, ἐκ Κεραμέων. Distinguished by Sauppe (*Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* III, p. 77) from the general of that name, mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. §§ 153, 156, 163, 167, as sent (about 359 B.C.) to cooperate with Charidemus in the Hellespont and Chersonese, and elsewhere; by Aesch. c. Ctes. § 51, seq.; by Suidas and Harpocration. Cephis. ἐκ Κεραμέων, the orator, is referred to in Dem. c. Lept. § 146, together with Leodamas, Aristophon, and Deinias, as one of the best speakers of the time; and again, § 150, οὗτός ἐστιν οὐδενὸς ἥττον τῶν λεγόντων δεινὸς εἰπεῖν. The Cephisodotus who was sent (with Callias, see note on III 2. 10) to the congress at Sparta in B.C. 371, Xen. *Hellen.* VI 3. 2, VII 1. 12, seems more

ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν· ὥστε
 ὄσαι ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον
 ὅτι αὐταὶ καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες μετα-
 4 φοραὶ λόγου δεόμεναι. αἰὲ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν
 ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα τῶν
 ὁμογενῶν· οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπὶς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν
 ἀσπίδα ἀρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἄρεος.

1 ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος συντίθεται ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι δ' CHAP. V

likely to have been the orator than the general; and so Schneider pronounces, ad Xen. l. c. Three more *bons mots* of the same are quoted, *infra* III 10. 7. In Mr Elder's art. Cephisodotus No. 2, *Biog. Dict.*, the two are identified. [Arnold Schaefer distinguishes them, *Dem. u. s. Zeit* III 2. 155—6.]

'For all these may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors: and therefore, plainly, all those that are popular when expressed as metaphors, will be also (if required) similes, and similes metaphors without the descriptive details (the detailed explanation)'. "A simile is a metaphor *writ large*, with the details filled in; this is λόγος." Introd. p. 290.

§ 4. 'The *proportional metaphor* should always be reciprocally transferable, and to either of the two congeners; for instance, if the goblet is Dionysius' shield, then also the shield may be appropriately called Ares' goblet. Such then are the elements of which the speech (or discourse in general, or prose) is composed'. This section, and its concluding observation, are fully explained in detail in the Introd. pp. 290—292, to which the reader is referred.

Anaxandrides (Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* III. 201, Anax. Fr. Inc. XXXI.) as well as Antiphanes (Καινεύς, Meineke, *Fragm.* III. 58) quote this metaphor of Timotheus in ridicule. From Athenaeus, XI. 502 B, we learn that the goblets which Anaxandrides calls φιάλας Ἄρεος are τὰς καρνωτάς, 'walnut-shaped'. This tends to confirm Twining's remark, on Poet. XXI. 12, note 185, that there was a resemblance in shape between this kind of cup and a shield, which helped to suggest and justify the metaphor. He refers, as also Buhle ad loc. Poet.—see also Gräfenhan, ad Poet. p. 157—to Hom. Il. XXIII 270, on the shape of the φιάλη, πέμπτω δ' ἀμφίθετον φιάλην ἀπύρωτον ἔθηκε and the notes.

I have followed Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, in his recent ed. [1867], who agree in excluding from the text the superfluous καὶ ἐπὶ, before τῶν ὁμογενῶν,—apparently a mere repetition of the preceding καὶ ἐπὶ before θάτερα.

CHAP. V.

Here commences the second division of λέξις, the treatment of style as it appears in the *combination* of words in *sentences*, and the connexion of the latter in harmonious periods. The ἀρχή, the beginning, basis or

ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἐλληνίζειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν
 2 πέντε, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἃ ἀποδιδῶ τις p. 119.
 ὡς πεφύκασι πρότεροι καὶ ὕστεροι γίγνεσθαι ἀλ-

foundation, of style in this sense, is *purity* of language, τὸ Ἑλληνίζειν, pure and correct Greek, in idiom and choice of words, opposed to barbarism, solecism, and all impropriety in general. The subject of Purity has been already treated in the Introduction, under the head of 'General observations on Style,' p. 279, note 3.

The divisions of the chapter, the five heads to which Purity may be reduced—to which are added in the last section two supplementary topics which belong rather to *perspicuity*, punctuation and μεταξυλογία, or *parenthesis*—are explained and illustrated by references to the works of other rhetoricians, in the analysis, Introd. pp. 292—5.

The classification is, as we shall see, extremely imperfect and deficient; and, moreover, the distinction of *purity* and *perspicuity* is not carefully observed. Most probably Aristotle did not recognise it at all. Nearly all the precepts given in this chapter are referrible to *perspicuity* rather than *purity*.

§ 1. ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως] Cic. Brut. LXXIV. 258, *Solum quidem, et quasi fundamentum oratoris...locutionem emendatam et Latinam.*

τὸ ἐλληνίζειν] Ἑλληνισμός, φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος (Diogenes Laertius, Zeno, VII. 59). τὸ ἐλληνίζειν τριττὸν· ἢ τὸ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν συνῆθειαν διασώζειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ πάντων· οἱ πολλοὶ· ἢ τὸ ἀκριβοῦν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνήν, καὶ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ· οἱ γραμματικοί· ἢ τὴν κυρίτητα τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν κατὰ φύσιν προσήκουσαν τοῖς πράγμασιν· οἱ φιλόσοφοι (Schol. ad Plat. p. 70 ap. Gaisford). This takes quite a different view of the meaning of the word to that of Aristotle; in the one case the 'purity of the Greek' is shewn in the choice of words, in the other in the connexion of sentences by observance of the *idiom* of the language. But in fact both of these belong to 'pure Greek': and purity is a *negative* quality of style, consisting in the avoidance of error (φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος, *emendata locutio*), in the shape of (1) *solecism* (Aristotle's view, idiomatic, grammatical, blunders), (2) *barbarism*; the latter, the use especially of *foreign* words (whence the name), or any similar impropriety. *Atque, ut Latine loquamur, non solum videndum est ut et verba efferamus ea quae nemo iure reprehendat, et ea sic et casibus et temporibus et genere et numero conservemus*, &c. Cic. de Orat. III 11. 40. In the next section he includes *pronunciation*. The examples of *σολοικισμός*, the opposite to Ἑλληνισμός, given in de Soph. El. 32, 182 a 13 and 34, are both of them grammatical errors: one who is guilty of either, οὐκ ἂν δοκοίη ἐλληνίζειν. In the same, c. 3, 165 b 20, *σολοικίζειν* is defined, τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν. [Dem. Or. 45 (κατὰ Στεφάνου α') § 30, ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως αὐτὸν ὑπελήφατε, ὅτι σολοικίζει τῇ φωνῇ, βάρβαρον καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητον εἶναι.]

'(Pure, correct) Greek is the foundation of style: this falls under five heads or divisions'.

§ 2. 'The first of these is (the proper use of) *connective particles*, that is, when they are made to correspond, in such a natural position (relation) of priority or posteriority to one another in the sentence, as some of them

λήλων, οἷον ἔνιοι ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἐγὰ μὲν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δέ καὶ τὸν ὃ δέ. δεῖ δὲ ἕως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μήτε μακρὰν ἀπαρτῶν μήτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ

require; as μὲν and ἐγὼ μὲν require δέ and ὁ δέ (as correlatives)'. That is to say, the connective μὲν (ὁ 'μὲν' σύνδεσμος) requires an answering δέ in the apodosis, the one particle necessarily implying the other; and the same with ἐγὼ μὲν, and ὁ δέ; μὲν with ἐγὼ necessarily implies a *second*, or *other* person, *some one else*, (see note on I 6. 22, and Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, § 154, there cited,) correlative and subsequent or posterior: and therefore in the construction of the sentence μὲν is placed *before* (πρότερον), δέ *after* (ὕστερον).

On σύνδεσμος as a 'part of speech', see *Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III c. 2, p. 371 seq.*; and on its various senses in general, *ib. Appendix D, p. 392*; and again *p. 437*, in the analysis *c. 25 (26) of the Rhet. ad Alex.* The rule here given for the treatment of connectives is derived originally from Isocrates' τέχνη. *Ibid. pp. 437, 8.* The *Rhet. ad Alex.* also has it, *c. 25 (26), 1, μετὰ δὲ συνδέσμοις οὓς ἂν προείπης ἀποδίδου τοῖς ἀκούουσιν*; which is then exemplified by μὲν and δέ, and καὶ, καί.

ἀποδιδόναι] to render, or 'assign, to its proper place', see note on I 1. 7. ἀντ-ἀποδιδόναι (in the following clause) is to do this so that there is a 'reciprocal correspondence' between the two, ἀντ-ἀλλήλοις. 'But this reciprocal correspondence between them should be introduced (by the speaker, δεῖ τὸν λέγοντα) before the audience has had time to forget (ἕως μέμνηται, *sc.* ὁ ἀκροατής, while he still retains in his recollection) the *first* of the two connectives, with its accompanying clause; and the two should neither be too widely separated, nor should (another) conjunction be introduced before that which is absolutely required; for (such a construction) is seldom appropriate. "But I, as soon as he told me—for Cleon came entreating and requiring (*claiming*, demanding)—set out with them in my company." For in examples like this, several clauses with conjunctions are prematurely inserted before that which is to correspond as the correlative'.

The example of this faulty construction here given is one of the very few which Aristotle has manufactured, contrary to his usual rule of citing examples from the sayings or writings of others supplied by memory. This has been noticed as one of the characteristic differences which distinguish *Aristotle's Rhetoric* from the *Rhet. ad Alex.*—see *Introd. p. 414*¹—the author of the latter, almost invariably, illustrating his precepts by examples of his own. The example itself, as appears from the πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι of the ensuing clause, is to be regarded, not as an actual exemplification of the fault, but only as a suggestion of what might be. In itself it is clear enough: but if these parenthetical clauses be *multiplied*—as in fact is very often done in Aristotle's own writings—between protasis and apodosis, the hearer, or reader, is very apt to

¹ Where "the *single* exception, of III 16" requires modification; but the exceptions are extremely rare.

ἀναγκαίου· ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἀρμόττει. “ἐγὼ δ’, ἐπεὶ
 μοι εἶπεν (ἦλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἀξιῶν),
 ἐπορευόμην παραλαβὼν αὐτούς.” ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολ-
 λοι πρό τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδίσμου προεμβέ-
 βληνται σύνδεσμοι· ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται
 3 τοῦ ἐπορευόμην, ἀσαφές. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἐν τοῖς
 συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίῳις ὀνόμασι λέγειν
 4 καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν. τρίτον μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις·
 forget the commencement of the sentence, and the argument becomes
 confused.

‘But if the clauses that intervene (before) ἐπορευόμην (between the
 πρότασις and it) be numerous, it becomes obscure’. μεταξὺ is not
 unfrequently used with only one of the two extremes, between which
 the intermediate lies, expressed: examples are, Arist. Ach. 432, Τηλέφου
 ῥακάματα. κίται δ’ ἄνωθεν τῶν Θυιστείων ῥακίων, μεταξὺ τῶν Ἰνῶς. Aesch.
 Choeph. 55, τὰ δ’ ἐν μεταχρῆμα σκίσσον, for σκίσσον καὶ φέουσ. Others
 in Shilleto’s note on Dem. de F. L. § 181, who compares with the last
 instance, our own *twilight*, i.e. ‘betwixt (darkness and) light’. Add
 Soph. Oed. Col. 583, τὰ ἐν μέσφ. Ib. 291 (with Schneidewin’s note). Eur.
 Hec. 437. [Isocr. Paneg. § 70, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς χώρας, Dem. de Corona
 § 32, τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον τῶν ἔρκων.]

A violation of this rule is pointed out by Arnold, on Thuc. I 32. 1.
 Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 14, 15. The parenthesis, τὸ μεταξὺ, is there called
interiectio. *Interiectione, qua et oratores et historici frequenter utuntur,*
ut medio sermone aliquem inervant sensum, impediri solet intellectus,
nisi quod interponitur breve est; Virg. Georg. III 79—83 being adduced
as an example. This is properly referred by Quint. to peripicuitas.

§ 3. ‘So one point (or head, of merit in style) appears, resides,
 in the due construction of connectives (conjunctions); a second is to
 call things by their own proper (special) names, and not by terms that
 are general (comprehensive; i. e. names of *classes*, abstract terms)’.

τὰ περιέχοντα is explained by Victorius and Schrader, ‘periphrases,
 circumlocutions’, such as the general definition for the particular object
 under it, the λόγος for the ὄνομα; or a description in several words substi-
 tuted for the single ἴδιον ὄνομα, as *Ibericas herbas* for *spartum*, *duratos*
muria pices for *salsamenta*, Quint. VIII 2. 2, 3, and others, quoted by
 Schrader from Cic. de Div. II 64. This is *periphrasis*, a roundabout,
 not direct, expression of your meaning, *circumlocutio, circuitus eloquendi*,
 Quint. VIII 6. 59—61.

I have followed this explanation myself in the paraphrase, Introd.
 p. 293; but I now see that the word cannot bear this meaning, and
 adopt the explanation of Schweighäuser on Athen. VII 309 A (q. v.), who
 understands by it the γένος, the genus or class name, which, being an
 abstract, general term, is of course less *peripicuous* than the direct
 expression of one of the particulars, (ἴδια, of which the class is composed,)
 by the name of the concrete individual; as animal or man than John

ταῦτα δέ, ἂν μὴ τάναντία προαιρῇται. ὃ περ ποι-
οῦσιν ὅταν μὴθὲν μὲν ἔχῃσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ
τι λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἐν ποιήσει λέγουσι ταῦτα,
οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· φενακίζει γὰρ τὸ κίκλῳ πολὺ ὄν,

and Thomas. The genus may be said περιέχειν 'to comprehend, embrace, include', the species, and individuals of which it is made up; and conversely περιέχσθαι of the included object, τὸ ὑποκείμενον, Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 23, 29. Comp. Met. Δ 2, 1013 b 34, τὰ περιέχοντα ὅτιοῦν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. Ib. Θ 2, 1046 b 24, μὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ. Moreover δνόμασι, which must be carried on to περιέχουσιν, can hardly stand for 'descriptions' consisting of many words.

§ 4. 'Thirdly, to avoid ambiguous terms; but that, (viz. to avoid them,) only if the purpose be not the contrary': the contrary, viz. to perspicuity, that is obscurity. If your object is to be obscure, you should then not avoid, but make use of, these equivocal terms, to hide your meaning and mystify your audience.

ἀμφιβόλοις] I 15. 10. ἀμφιβολία is one of the fallacies of language, παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, 'ambiguity' in words connected in a sentence, 'in the proposition'; distinguished from ὁμωνυμία, ambiguity in single words, de Soph. El. c. 4. It is exemplified, l. c. 166 a 6 seq. See above, in preliminary observations to II 24. These two last precepts are most probably taken, like the preceding on σύνδεσμος, from Isocrates' τέχνη; and appear also in Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὀνόμαζε τοῖς οἰκείοις ὀνόμασιν ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς, διαφεύγων τὸ ἀμφίβολον. See in the analysis of this treatise, ch. 25, Introd. p. 437. The qualification, ἂν μὴ τάναντία προαιρῇται, seems to be Aristotle's own. On the various kinds of ἀμφιβολία, *ambiguitas*, in Rhetoric *sunt innumerabiles* (Quint. VII 9). They may be referred to two general heads; in *singulis verbis* (ὁμωνυμία), and *coniunctis* (Aristotle's ἀμφιβολία).

'As is done (ambiguous terms employed, by speakers and writers) whenever, having in fact nothing to say, they make a pretence (affect) of saying something; for such (those who pretend to a meaning when there is none) express this no-meaning in verse (comp. III 1. 9, οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη κ.τ.λ.), Empedocles, for instance: for this (roundabout, circuitous, phraseology) circumlocution cheats (deludes) by the multitude (accumulation) of words, and the listeners are affected (i. e. imposed upon) in the same way as the vulgar in the presence of diviners; that is, when (the latter) pronounce their ambiguous utterance, they express their approval by a nod of assent, "Croesus, if he pass the Halys, shall destroy a mighty realm".'

The oracle leaves it doubtful whether the power or dominion to be destroyed is his own, or some other. Herod. I 53, 91. Oracles are proverbially ambiguous and enigmatical. [*Macbeth*, v 8. 19, *Be these juggling fiends no more believed That palter with us in a double sense; That keep the word of promise to our ear; And break it to our hope.* Cicero, de Divin. II 56. 116 (to Pyrrhus), *Aio te Aecida Romanos vincere posse.*]

Perhaps the two following verses of Empedocles' collected fragments,

καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὃ περ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμπαραινέουσιν.

Κροῖσος Ἄλυν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει.

Karsten, p. 100, lines 106—7, may in some degree illustrate Aristotle's allusion to this writer, and his sound without sense;

Νεῖκός τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἀπάντη,
καὶ Φιλότης μετὰ τοῖσιν ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε.

Karsten's remarks on Empedocles' style, *de Emp. vita et studiis* p. 60, (prefixed to the *Fragm. and Comment.*) well illustrate this passage, to which he refers. He notices the obscurity of his diction, which appears especially in the symbolical terms, such as *Νῆστις*, by which he sometimes designates the elements—see for instance the four lines, *Fragm.* 211—214—and in the ambiguities ascribed to him here by Aristotle, “Nonnunquam vero ad *oraculorum* gravitatem adsurgit, quales sunt versus illi, ἔστιν Ἀιάκης χρῆμα κ.τ.λ. *Fragm. init.* ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον κ.τ.λ. v. 404. Quamobrem minime miramur quod affirmat Theodoretus, seniores fatidicos ex Empedoclis potissimum versibus oracula sua compilasse.”

Aristotle says of him, *Poet.* I 11, οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν. It is curious to contrast this contemptuous judgment of his poetry and the general character and value of his writings, as it may be gathered from the two passages of the *Rhet. and Poet.*, with the glowing eulogium of Lucretius, *de rerum nat.* I 716—733. After describing the wonders and good things of Sicily, his birthplace, he concludes, *Nil tamen hoc habuisse viro praeclarius in se, nec sanctum magis et mirum carumque videtur. Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperia, ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus.* And still more remarkable is Aristotle's contradiction of himself, if Diogenes Laertius' quotation, *VIII* 57, is to be depended upon, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν φησιν ὅτι καὶ Ὀμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν, κ.τ.λ.—comp. the passage of the *Poetics*:—the possible explanation, that what he said in the one refers to the style, and in the other to the contents, of Empedocles' poem, is excluded by the contemptuous remark upon his style in the *Rhetoric*. On the passage of Lucretius, see Munro's note, I 733.

Of the vagabond impostors who hawked about spurious oracles and predictions under the names of μάντις and χρησμολόγοι, prophets or diviners and soothsayers, Aristophanes has given us specimens, Hierocles in the ‘Peace,’ 1252, foll., and the nameless χρησμολόγος in the ‘Birds,’ 959, foll.

‘And by reason of the less liability to mistake in general (by following this course) diviners are accustomed to deliver their predictions in (through the channel, or *medium* of) general terms of the fact (which is prophesied), *fraus latet in generalibus*; for a man is much more likely to make a hit in playing “odd and even” by saying “even” or “odd”, than

καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔλως ἔλαττον εἶναι ἀμάρτημα, διὰ τῶν P. 1407
γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν οἱ μάντεις· τύχοι γὰρ
ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια ἢ περισσὰ
εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἔσται ἢ τὸ
πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε.
ἅπαντα δὴ ταῦτα ὅμοια· ὥστ' ἂν μὴ τοιούτου τινὸς
5 ἔνεκα, φευκτέον. τέταρτον, ὡς Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη
τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη· δεῖ

any particular number that he has in his hand; or "that (the event predicted) *will* be" than "when" (it will be); and this is why the soothsayers never add (to their prediction) the *precise* time (lit. the definition of the 'when'). All these then (circumlocutions, ambiguities, and the like) are alike (in being *faults*) and therefore, unless for some such (reason as was before suggested), to be avoided'.

Of ἀρτιασμός "odd and even", (a child's game, played with ἀστράγαλοι, or knuckle-bones, Plato, *Lysis* 206 E, ἡρτίαζον ἀστραγάλους παμπόλλοις,) an account is given in Becker's *Charicles*, on 'the games', p. 354; and of the corresponding Latin game *par impar* in *Gallus*, p. 504. *Ludere par impar*, Hor. Sat. II 3. 248 (Heindorf's note), Ovid, *Nux Eleg.* line 79, *est etiam, par sit numerus, qui dicat, an impar*. The game might be played with any kind of counters, beans, acorns, coins—in Carion's house, after he had grown rich, Arist. *Plut.* 816, "the servants played at odd and even with golden staters." It is usually described as played by two persons, one of whom held in his closed hand a number of counters, and the other had to guess whether it was odd or even. This was no doubt one way of playing it, but there was also another not quite so simple, as appears from this passage of the *Rhetoric*, and also from the *Schol.* on *Plut.* 1057, in which the guess was made at the *number*, πόσα. In the *Plutus*, I. c., the game is played with 'walnuts', κάρυα, and the Scholiast's comment is, "one grasps a handful of walnuts, and with his hand stretched out asks, how many? and if the other guesses right, he receives all the contents of his hand; if wrong, he *pays* the number found in the other's hand when opened."

οἱ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε] On this intentional indefiniteness and obscurity of would-be prophets, Victorius refers to Aeschines c. Ctes. § 99, who contrasts Demosthenes with other ἀλάζωνες, who ὅταν τι ψεύδωνται, ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσαφῆ πειρῶνται λέγειν, φοβούμενοι τὸν ἔλεγχον: and, to the same effect, of a supposed citation from the Sibylline verses, Cic. de *Divin.* II 54. 110, *Callide enim qui illa composuit perfecit ut, quodcumque accidisset, praedictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublata*.

§ 5. 'Fourthly, to observe Protagoras' division of the classes (classification) of nouns, into *male*, *female*, and *inanimate* (prop. implements): for these also must be correctly assigned, each to its proper place'. This is illustrated by an example of two participles in the feminine following ἤ.

γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς “ ἡ δ’ ἐλθοῦσα καὶ
6 διαλεχθεῖσα ᾤχετο.” πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ
ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν. “ οἱ δ’ ἐλθόντες ἔτυπ-
τόν με.”

ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον
καὶ εὐφραστον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτό. ὁ περ οἱ πολλοὶ

On the import of this, the earliest attempt at Greek grammar, and other similar essays of Protagoras in the same line, see *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. VII. Vol. III. p. 48 seq. in the article on Protagoras. I have there, and subsequently in a note, *Introd.* p. 293, endeavoured by comparison of various passages on the subject to determine its meaning, and I need not here repeat what is there said. At all events it is *not* the now recognised grammatical classification of ‘genders of nouns’, masculine, feminine and neuter. γένη is not here ‘genders’, though the later grammar adopted this name to express it; but simply ‘classes’. This is a genuine precept of ‘Ἑλληνισμός’, ‘purity of language’, as is also the next.

§ 6. ‘Fifthly, in the correct expression (by change of termination) of many, few, and one’, followed by an example of a *plural* participle and verb. This is of course the due expression of the *number* of nouns, and the observation of the *concord*, or agreement of adj. with subst. or pronoun, or verb with nom. case, *in number*. Victorius thinks that ὀλίγα stands for what was afterwards distinguished as the *dual* number. *Comp. Cic. de Orat.* III 11. 40.

‘And, as a general rule, every written composition must be easy to read, or—which is much the same thing—to speak, or deliver’. *Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 17.* Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, § 193 (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 304), γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις (written composition) ἡ εὐανάγνωστος. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ συνηρημένη καὶ οἷον ἡ σφαλισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις, i.e. written composition must be carefully and well constructed, with due regard to the conjunctions, and the connexion of sentences, or syntax in general. This is opposed to declamatory speaking, ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις, ἡ διαλελυμένη, in which the want of exact connexion—particularly asyndeton, the omission of καὶ—often aids the effect: *comp.* § 194.

‘This is wanting (in compositions in which) conjunctions and other connecting particles are numerous, and such as are not easy to *punctuate*, like those of Heraclitus’. This does not contradict what was said before about the necessity of conjunctions, &c., to ensure perspicuity, it only condemns the excessive use of them; a long string of connected clauses is apt to lead to obscurity: the due mean is to be observed, here as elsewhere. With what follows compare Demetrius, u. s. § 192, τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὅλον ἀσαφὲς πᾶν· ἀδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἐκάστου κώλου ἀρχὴ διὰ τὴν λύσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ ‘Ἡρακλείτου’ καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σκοτεινὰ ποιεῖ τὸ πλείστον ἡ λύσις, and Theon, *Progyrn.* περὶ διηγήματος § 187 (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* II 82), παρὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν (ambiguity arising from punctuation) τὰ ‘Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ φιλοσόφου βίβλια σκοτεινὰ γέγονε κατακόρως αὐτῇ χρησαμένου, ἥτοι ἐπίτηδες ἢ καὶ δι’ ἄγνοιαν (the fault had been previously illustrated)

σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ' ἂ μὴ ῥάδιον διαστίζαι,
ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου δια- p. 120.
στίζαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται,

Quintilian, VII 9. 7, classes this as one of the varieties of *amphibolia* (ambiguity), viz. *per collectionem, ubi dubium est quid quo referri oporteat*, exemplifying it from Virgil, Aen. I 477 *lora tenens tamen*. § 8, *unde controversia illa, Testamento quidam iussit poni statuam auream hastam tenentem. Quaeritur, statua hastam tenens aurea esse debeat, an hasta esse aurea in statua alterius materiae?*—σκοτεινὰ, in the above passages of Demetrius and Theon, is of course an allusion to Heraclitus' well-known sobriquet, ὁ σκοτεινός; his 'obscurity' was proverbial. This want of punctuation is not by any means the only, or indeed the principal, source of the obscurity of the mystic enigmatical sayings of the 'dark' philosopher. The remains of these have been collected by Schleiermacher, Bernays [and Bywater] in their respective tracts, and several of the most remarkable quoted by Thompson in his note on Butler's *Lect. on Anc. Phil.* I 313, note 10; see also Diog. Laert. IX 1, *vita Heracliti*.

διαστίζαι] διὰ στίζειν, ('to prick'), is 'to distinguish or duly distribute by pointing or punctuation'. Two examples similar to this are given in de Soph. El. c. 4, 166 a 36, in illustration of the fallacy of *διαίρεσις*.

'For to punctuate Heraclitus' writing is a hard matter (a difficult job, a *business*), owing to the uncertainty as to which of the two (words), the preceding or following, (any particular word) is attached; as for instance, at the commencement of his (αὐτοῦ, masc.) composition, where he says, "Of this reason constant (being) ever (reading τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἀεί) men come into being devoid of understanding"; for this leaves it uncertain to which of the two (ἐόντος or ἀξύνετοι γίνονται) the word *ever* should be attached by the punctuation'. Bekker, who in his first edition reads τοῦ δέοντος, has in the third altered it to τοῦδ' ἔοντος. Spengel retains the former—which is the reading of MS A^c (or A). τοῦδ' ἐόντος, which had been already proposed by Victorius from a passage of Sext. Empir., is undoubtedly right. The words are quoted also by Clemens Alex. *Strom.* V 14, p. 716, by Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* XIII, and by Sextus Empiricus *adv. Math.* VII 132, who extracts several lines, reading τοῦδε ἐόντος, and omitting ἀεί, which are cited and commented on by Schleiermacher in his tract on the fragments of Heraclitus, No. 47, p. 482. Clemens and Eusebius have τοῦ δέοντος (Schleierm.). The λόγος, according to Sextus—and this is confirmed by Heraclitus' context, which he quotes—is the universal reason, ὁ θεῖος λόγος, of which men are unconscious, depending rather upon sense, though it is the true κριτήριον. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ θεῖον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν γινόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. This interpretation of course requires ἔοντος. An additional argument in its favour is suggested by Schleiermacher, that if δέοντος had been the reading in Aristotle's copy of Heraclitus, he would have found no difficulty in the reference of ἀεί. The title of his σύγγραμμα—which is omitted by Diogenes in his life, IX 1, though the σύγγραμμα itself is twice mentioned, §§ 6, 7, and some of its contents quoted in the 7th and follow-

τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἶον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται.” ἄδηλον γὰρ 7 τὸ αἰεὶ, πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ διαστίξαι. ἔτι δὲ ποιεῖ σολοικίζειν τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, εἰ μὴ ἐπιζευγνύης ἀμφοῖν ὁ

ing sections—seems to have been *περὶ φύσεως*; the ordinary title of works upon similar subjects by the earlier cosmical speculators, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, &c.

ἔργον] of something hard, difficult of execution, laborious—in the same sense as *ἐργώδης*, *operosus*, which is derived from it—occurs occasionally in various Greek writers, though it is exemplified by only one instance in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon. It is used sometimes with, sometimes without, *χαλεπὸν*. Arist. Ran. 1100, *χαλεπὸν οὖν ἔργον διαιρεῖν*. A number of instances of *ἔργον* in this sense and *ἐργώδης* are to be found in the fragments of the Comic poets, Menander, Diphilus, Posidippus, Apollodorus; for instance, *ἔργον—ἄνοιαν ἡμέρα μεταστῆσαι μία’ ἔργον ἐστὶ μακρὰν συνήθειαν—λῦσαι’ ἔργον ἐκ λόγου πίστιν λαβεῖν*, κ.τ.λ. See the Ind. to Meineke’s *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* s. v. Xen. Mem. IV 7. 9, *ἔργον εἶναι εὐρεῖν ἱατρόν* κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 187 E, *μέγα ἔργον...καλῶς χρῆσθαι*, Ib. Tim. 28 C, *τὸν ποιητὴν...εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα*, κ.τ.λ. Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. § 34, *ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ὅποιων λόγων—τοῦτ’ ἔργον εὐρεῖν*. It occurs more frequently in Aristotle, and is, I think, almost confined to the later of the classical Greek writers. Arist. Pol. II 7, 1266 b 13, *ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιούς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους*. III 15, 1286 a 35, *ἐκεῖ δ’ ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν*. Eth. Nic. V 13, 1137 a 13, *τοῦτο δὲ πλεόν ἔργον* (a harder task) *ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι*. Ib. c. 3, 1130 a 8. Topic. E c. 4, 133 b 16, c. 5, 134 a 19, Θ 3, 159 a 5, c. 11, 161 b 32, *πλεόνος ἔργου δεομένων*. Hist. Anim. II 6, *ὥστε ἔργον εἶναι ἰδεῖν*. Ib. VI 20. 7, 30. 2, IX 40. 29, *ἔργον δ’ ἐστὶ λαβεῖν*. *ἐργώδης* occurs, Eth. N. I 13, 1102 a 25, IX 2, *sub finem*, c. 7, 1168 a 24, c. 10, 1171 a 5, and Top. Z 1, 13 b 9, *ἐργωδέστερον*. In Latin we have *negotium* similarly employed, and *nullo negotio*; and Virgil has *opus*; *Hoc opus, hic labor est*, Aen. VI 129.

ὁποτέρῳ διαστίξαι. Bekker in margin of 4to. edition “an δεῖ στίξαι?” He (and Spengel) has now returned to the *vulgata lectio* διαστίξαι, *subaudi* δεῖ. Gaisford conjectured δεῖ διαστίξαι.

§ 7. ‘And further a solecism is made if, in combining (two words) in one phrase (and grammatically connected with a third; as two subst. with one verb, or two verbs with a subst.), you fail to assign one which is equally appropriate to them both (*lit.* and again, a solecism is made, by not assigning, that is, if you don’t unite in construction with them, i. e. with the two verbs or nouns, which are not expressed, one which is appropriate to them both: in other words, if you *do* assign to them a third word which is appropriate only to one of them). For instance, *to see* is not common to sound and colour (won’t combine with, is not appropriate to, both) but *to perceive* is’.

σολοικίζειν] See note on σόλοικοι, II 16. 2 [and Dem. Or. 45 § 30, quoted on p. 55].

ἀρμόττει, οἷον ἢ ψόφον ἢ χρῶμα· τὸ μὲν ἰδὼν οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθόμενος κοινόν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ ἂν μὴ προθεῖς εἴπῃς, μέλλων πολλά μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν, οἷον “ἐμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς ἐκείνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὥδε πορεύεσθαι,” ἀλλὰ μὴ “ἐμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς πορεύεσθαι, εἴτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὥδε ἐγένετο.”

I εἰς ὄγκον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε, τὸ CHAP. VI.

ἐπιζευγνύναι, which occurs again c. 6 § 5, and c. 9 § 7, seems to be technical in this grammatical application, of ‘uniting’ as it were ‘under a *vinculum* or bracket’; the *yoke* in the Greek fulfilling a similar function in uniting two animals, as a bracket, in arithmetic or algebra, unites two or more symbols that are placed under it. So that *ἐπιζευγνύναι* is to place the *ζυγόν ὑφόν* the two words, and so bring them together in one construction. This solecism, as Ar. rightly calls it, usually passes under the respectable name of a *figure*, grammatical or rhetorical. It is the figure *ζεῦγμα* or *σύλληψις*, the office of which has been already explained. It is illustrated at length in the note on I 4.6.

ψόφον and χρῶμα are ‘governed’ by ἰδὼν following. Why Aristotle should have chosen to write ἢ the alternative, instead of καὶ the copula, which he clearly means, no one I suppose can guess. I have taken for granted, as Victorius has also done, that he *does* mean *and*, and not *or*, and have so translated it. A bad instance of *ζεῦγμα* is given in note 1, Introd. p. 295, from the immaculate Isocrates, Paneg. § 80 (καὶ σωτήρης ἀλλὰ μὴ λυμεῶνες ἀποκαλείσθαι).

It tends to obscurity too (is an offence against, violation of, *perspicuity*) if you intend to introduce a number (of words or details) in the middle of a sentence, not to complete the sense first (πρό, before you proceed, *lit.* not to put first, that which will remove what would else be the obscurity). For instance, “I intended, after having talked to him about this and that and so and so”—here the details are to be introduced; but these are so long, that before the speaker has come to the end of his sentence the hearers have forgotten the beginning—“to start:” instead of, “I was about to start after my conversation with him, and then (when) this and that and so and so happened.” This is *μεταξυλογία*, *interiectio* (Quint.), or Parenthesis. See Introd. p. 295.

CHAP. VI.

Of ὄγκος (swelling), pomp, grandeur, dignity (Auct. ad Heren. IV 13.18, *dignitas*), of style; most appropriate to *Ἐπὶ* poetry: Poet. xxiv. 9, τὸ γὰρ ἡρώϊκον στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν. Ib. § 6, ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος. See Gräfenhan’s note ad loc. So Dion. Hal. de Dinarch. Iud. c. 7 (Vol. v. 643, Reiske), τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς τὸ μὴ τραγικὸν μὴδὲ ὀγκῶδες ἔχῃ. This is near akin to *σεμνότης*, on which Hermogenes has a chapter, *περὶ ἰδεῶν*, *τομ. α’*. (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* II. 287), and *περὶ σεμνοῦ λόγου*, *περὶ εὐρέσεως*, *τομ. δ’*. c. 11 (Ib. p. 255), and again *περὶ μεγέθους*, in the preceding chap. 10, p. 286. So Demetrius writes *περὶ*

λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντ' ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλ' ἐπίπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον. εἰς δὲ συντομίαν τὸ 2 ἐναντίον, ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου ὄνομα. καὶ ἐὰν αἰσχρόν ἢ ἀπρεπές· ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἢ αἰσχρόν, τοῦνομα μεγαλοπρεποῦς, in his *περὶ ἐρμηνείας*, § 38, seq. (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III. 270 seq.): and Dion. Hal., de Dinarch. Iud. 3. 7, attributes *μεγαλοπρέπεια* to Demosthenes' style. And in these writers ὄγκος, μέγεθος, and ἀξιώμα (dignity) are often associated as characteristics of style. In Top. Θ 1, 155 ὁ 22, ἡ εἰς ὄγκον τοῦ λόγου (one of the four motives for multiplying *προτάσεις*), it means nothing more than a device for swelling out, increasing the bulk of, the discourse or argument.

In the language of Rhetoric we see that ὄγκος implies excellence and is a virtue of style. In the vulgar usage of common life, when it and its derivatives are applied metaphorically, as they often are, it may bear either a favourable or an unfavourable interpretation. In the latter case the 'pomp' of style becomes 'pomposity', and the 'swelling phrases' turgid and inflated *ampullae*. And in a moral sense the same notion of *fastus* is attached to it, and it comes to denote vanity, ostentation, arrogance, as Plat. Meno 90 A, where it is personal, and opposed to κόσμος. In Soph. Oed. Col. 1162, βραχὺν μῦθον οὐκ ὄγκον πλέων is a short conversation without 'bulk', not unnaturally and unreasonably *swelled out* or lengthened. ὀγκωθεὶς χλιδῇ in the same author (Fragm. Inc. ap. Stobaeum, No. 679, Dind.) has the same sense in a moral application. And so ὄγκον αἶρειν, Soph. Aj. 129. τὸ ὀγκηρόν, Ar. Eth. N. IV. 13, *sub finem*, is again 'inflated', of mere bulk without solidity, show without substance; i. e. morally, 'ostentation', a pretentious air and exterior, assumption. See Ernesti, *Lex. Tech. Gr.* s. vv. ὀγκηρόν, ὄγκος, ὀγκοῦν, ὀγκῶδες.

§ 1. 'To dignity, amplification of style, the following things contribute; first, the substitution of definition (or detailed description) for the (direct, proper) name (of the object); to say for example not *circle*, but "a plane figure which is in all points equidistant from the centre"'. One would have supposed that this was an exemplification rather of the unfavourable sense of ὄγκος: it also seems to be opposed to what was said c. 5. 3, τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν: and in fact dignity ought not to interfere with perspicuity. The two precepts, however, do not in reality contradict one another. The use of abstract, general terms, instead of the plain and direct individual names, is a source of obscurity: there is no obscurity, but rather the contrary, in setting forth the definition of it at length. 'For (the purpose of) brevity the contrary (is the rule), the proper name, and *not* the definition'. Both of these precepts appear in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 22 (23) §§ 3 and 5. They are probably taken, like the others mentioned in Intro. pp. 437, 438, from Isocrates' *τέχνη*.

§ 2. 'And if (you have to express) anything ugly or foul' (to the eye or to the mind and moral sense), 'or unbecoming, if the foulness or indecency is in the (conception, explanation, description, i. e.) meaning and associations, use the *word*, if in the word itself, the description'. See on αἰσχρολογία, note on c. 2. 13, and the distinction there laid down.

3 λέγειν, ἐὰν δ' ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, τὸν λόγον. καὶ μεταφοραῖς δηλοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, εὐλαβούμενον τὸ 4 ποιητικόν. καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ ποιεῖν, ὃ περ οἱ ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν· ἐνὸς ὄντος λιμένος ὅμως λέγουσι

λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαιῶν

καὶ

δέλτου μὲν αἶδε πολύθυροι διαπτυχαί.

§ 3. 'And setting forth (representing) things by metaphors and the descriptive and ornamental epithets (epithets proper, and any descriptive addition to a noun), guarding at the same time against giving them a too poetical character'. One of the characteristics of Thucydides is τὸ ποιητικὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων, according to Dionysius, de Thuc. Iud. 24; as likewise of Gorgias and his school, who exaggerated this defect so that their prose made a near approach to dithyrambics.

§ 4. 'And to make one many (to put plural for singular) after the manner of the poets: they say, though all the while there is only *one* harbour, "to Achaean harbours"'. [Victorius refers to the treatise περὶ ὕψους, 23 § 2 (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* I 274), ἔσθ' ὅπου προσπίπτει τὰ πληθυντικά μεγαλορρημονέστερα, καὶ αὐτῷ δοξοκομποῦντα τῷ ὀχλῷ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, which the writer illustrates by quoting Soph. Oed. Rex 1403—7, ὦ γάμοι γάμοι κ.τ.λ.]

λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαιῶν] There are five instances of λιμένες for a single harbour in Euripides, and one in Sophocles, but none of them is 'Achaean harbours'. Victorius says that he has not been able to find the passage.

'And again, "Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablets"', the letter, namely, which Iphigenia was proposing to send by one of the two strangers to Orestes at Argos. Iph. Taur. 727.

πολύθυροι] restored (for πολύθρηνοι) from πολύθηροι found in one MS, describes the many leaves of the tablets: this, which was less usual than the simpler form, with only two leaves, shews that it was a *long letter*.

On δέλτος, comp. Becker's *Charicles*, p. 162 note [Vol. I. p. 285, of unabridged German ed.], Rich's *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant.* s. v. *cera* p. 144. The leaves of the tablets, which were thin slabs or plates of wood coated with wax, were sometimes shaped like doors (a very natural form to give them), whence the name θύρα. Pollux IV 18 (ap. Herm. ad Iph. T. 715), οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ γραμματεῖον δίθυρον καὶ θύρας τὰς πτύχας, ἅχρι δύο' εἶτα πτύχας, καὶ τρίπτυχον καὶ πολύπτυχον. Hesychius, θυρίδας Ἀττικοὶ τὰς τῶν γραμμάτων πτύχας, καὶ δίθυρον λέγουσιν, οὐ τρίθυρον, ἀλλὰ τρίπτυλον [τρίπτυχον?]. Paley, ad loc., well compares the δέλτος with its wooden leaves to 'the modern ivory memorandum-book'. Becker, u. s., observes that 'these wax tablets were only used for *letters*, and matters of no permanent moment'. They could be fastened with a string and sealed, Paley on Iph. Aul. 37.

διαπτυχαί is interpreted by the Lexicons as equivalent to πτυχαί, and meaning 'folds'—not of course, though the difference is not stated, *folded* like a modern letter, of paper, which this explanation sug-

5 καὶ μὴ ἐπιζευγύναι, ἀλλ' ἐκατέρω ἐκάτερον, “τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας.” εἰ δὲ συντόμως, τούναντίον
6 “τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός.” καὶ μετὰ συνδέσμου λέγειν· εἰ δὲ συντόμως, ἄνευ μὲν συνδέσμου, μὴ ἀσύνδετα δέ, οἷον πορευθεὶς καὶ διαλεχθεὶς, πορευθεὶς

gests, but in another sense of *πτυχή* or *πτύξ*, ‘a leaf, layer, slab, or plate’. It is repeated in line 793, *γραμμάτων διαπτυχάς*. The Commentators, who are totally silent on the subject, appear to take the same view. As it seems necessary to assign *some* meaning to the *διά*, we may suppose that it expresses the *division* of the leaves, whether two or more; but in the latter case, derived from the *primary* division into *two*. Hermann and Paley have both noticed, what is sufficiently apparent, that Aristotle here has mistaken Euripides’ meaning. It is quite plain from the epithet *πολίθυροι*, that the *plural* is to be understood literally of the several leaves of the tablets. If Euripides had written *δέλτοι* he would have used the licence ascribed to him by Aristotle.

§ 5. ‘And not to combine (two cases with one article, Victorius: *τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός*), but to assign or attach (*ἀποδιδόναι* or *προστιθέναι*, understand *ἀπὸ κοινού*, or by *ζεύγμα*, from *ἐπιζευγύναι*) each to either (an article in either instance to either case) *τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας*, “that wife of ours”. But if conciseness be the object (if you would express yourself concisely), the contrary, *τῆς ἡμέτερας γυναικός*, ‘our wife.’

§ 6. ‘And to use (as a rule) in speaking (and writing) conjunctions and other connectives; or, for conciseness, to write without connectives, but not without connexion: as either *πορευθεὶς καὶ διαλεχθεὶς*, or *πορευθεὶς διελέχθην*. It is impossible to translate this into *English*, so as to shew the difference in the two Greek phrases, because the approved translation of the second is to convert the participle, which we seldom use in this connexion, into a finite verb connected by a copula with the verb succeeding: so that in our language the two expressions become identical.

ἀσύνδετος λόγος is composition in which the conjunctions and other connecting particles, especially the copula, are omitted; and therefore more or less loose, unconnected, incoherent. Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* p. 45. It is to be observed that as connecting particles occur much more frequently in Greek than in our own language, the want of them, which constitutes *asyndeton*, would be much more disagreeable to the Greeks than to us, and would give the composition the appearance of being both naked and disjointed. Consequently the *general* rule (which is stated here) is to avoid it: but in special cases, where the aim is to give emphasis and vigour, rapidity and conciseness to a narrative, it may often be used with advantage, as the examples will shew. Demetrius *περὶ ἐρμηνείας*, § 192, *τὸ δὲ ἀσύνδετον καὶ διαλελυμένον ὄλον ἀσφές πᾶν*.

ἀσύνδετον is defined alike in several of the later Greek rhetoricians, Hermogenes, *περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος*, 11, Phoebammon, Tiberius, Herodian, Zonaeus and others, as the ‘omission of *σύνδεσμοι*’; and all alike exemplify it by the omission of *καί*, which is no doubt the most frequent

7 διελέχθην. καὶ τὸ Ἀντιμάχου χρήσιμον, ἐξ ᾧ μὴ P. 1408.
ἔχει λέγειν, ὃ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Τευμησοῦ,

ἔστι τις ἡμερόεις ὀλίγος λόφος·

case. Comp. Cic. Orat. XXXIX 135, who speaks of it as one of the *orationis lumina et quodammodo insignia, quum demptis coniunctionibus dissolute plura dicuntur*. Quint. IX 3. 50, *figuram, quae quia coniunctionibus caret dissolutio vocatur; apta quum quid instantius dicimus; nam et singula inculcantur et quasi plura fiunt*, seq. Confer omnino Dem. Phil. Γ 118, § 27, Ibid. p. 130 § 130, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἕλληνας συγκαλεῖν συνάγειν διδάσκειν νοουθετεῖν. The speeches of Lysias against Erasthenes and Andocides both conclude with an asyndeton of this kind. The former ends thus: παύσομαι κατηγορῶν. ἀκρόατε, ἐωράκατε, πεπόνθατε ἔχετε, δικάζετε: which Aristotle quotes Rhet. III 19. 6, at the end of the work; and of course wrongly. See also III 12. 2 and 4, where a similar example is given; not to omit Cicero's, *abiit excessit, evasit, erupit* [in Catilinam II § 1]. Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας, § 194 (Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 304), ὅτι δὲ ὑποκριτικὸν ἢ λύσις παράδειγμα ἐγκρίσθω τόδε· ἐδεξάμην, ἔτικτον, ἔτρεφον, φίλην, κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of § 6 is this. If you wish to add pomp and dignity to your style, as in an ordinary narrative, employ conjunctions—Victorius refers this to the so-called figure ἐν διὰ δυοῖν, hendiadys, *pateris libamus et auro, in brevibus et Syrtis, molemque et montes insuper altos imposuit*, from Virgil's Georg. and Aen.—Or, if you don't employ conjunctions, at any rate don't break the connexion between the parts of the sentence; if on the other hand (as he implies elsewhere) you want to be concise or give vigour and animation to your language, *asyndeton* will often do it.

§ 7. 'And the (practice) of Antimachus is useful (for this purpose), to draw the materials of a description from the attributes, (qualities, virtues, excellences,) which (the thing described) has *not*, as he does in the case of Teumessus, "There is a windy low hill"; for in that way the amplification may be carried to infinity'. This is a quotation from Antimachus' Thebais, the expedition of Adrastus and his six Argive companions against Thebes, the ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας. In this he had occasion to mention Teumessus, "a village of Boeotia in the plain of Thebes, standing upon a low rocky hill of the same name". Launching out, as his manner was, into an episodical encomium of this little hill, he expended many verses upon it διὰ πολλῶν ἐπῶν, "enumerating all the virtues that did *not* belong to it". Strabo, IX. 2, Boeotia, p. 409. Strabo, like Aristotle, only quotes these five words, adding, as a reason for breaking off there, γνώριμα δὲ τὰ ἔπη. This same poem is referred to by Horace, A. P. 146, *Nec reditum Diomedis ab interitu Meleagri*; a narrative of Diomedes' fortune and return seems to have been interwoven with the main subject of the poem. Düntzer, *Epic. Gr. Fragm.* p. 99. (The fragments of Antimachus are collected by Düntzer in this volume, p. 99 seq. and *Nachtrag* pp. 38—43.)

The Scholiast Porphyrius, on the verse of Horace, says, *Antimachus fuit cyclicus poeta: hic adgressus est materiam, quam sic extendit ut*

αὔξεται γὰρ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσι, p. 121.

viginti quattuor volumina (i. e. books) *impleverit antequam septem duces usque ad Thebas perduceret*. On the connexion of the two stories, see Welcker *Ep. Cyclus*, p. 163; also quoted by Orelli ad loc. Antimachus was an elder contemporary of Plato. The occasion of their meeting is related by Plutarch, *Lysand.* 18, and differently by Cicero, *Brutus* 51 § 191, *Antimachum, Clarium poetam, ... qui quum convocatis auditoribus legeret eis magnum illud quod novistis volumen suum* (the Thebais), *et eum legentem omnes praeter Platonem reliquissent, Legam, inquit, nihilominus: Plato enim mihi unus instar est omnium millium*. (Welcker pronounces both forms of the story unworthy of credit.) In *magnum* Cicero no doubt refers not to the merit or celebrity, but to the bulk of the poem. His style is spoken of by Dionysius de Comp. Verb. c. 22 (v. 150, ed. Reiske), together with that of Empedocles, Pindar, Aeschylus, Thucydides and Antiphon, as belonging to the αὐστηρὰ λέξις, already described. To class him with these authors may seem to imply approbation. Quintilian, x 1. 53, in a comparison of the Epic poets, places him next to—though far below—Homer. *Contra in Antimacho vis et gravitas et minime vulgare eloquendi genus* (this agrees with Dionysius) *habet laudem. Sed quamvis ei secundas fere grammaticorum* (of Alexandria) *consensus deferat; et affectibus et iucunditate et dispositione et omnino arte deficitur, ut plane manifesto appareat quanto sit aliud proximum esse, aliud secundum: (so Horace of Jupiter, nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum; proximos illi tamen occupavit Pallas honores).* He is called by some authors Clarian, by others Colophonian. Claros was a small town near Colophon, a colony and dependency of it. Most probably Claros was his birthplace, for which the more important and neighbouring mother-city was substituted. See further on Antimachus in Schrader and Buhle's notes; and on Teumessus, Valken. ad Phoen. 1107.

[ἐξ ὧν μὴ ἔχει. This device of description by a series of negations may be exemplified by Homer's *Odyss.* vi 43, (Olympus) οὐτ' ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται οὔτε ποτ' ὄμβρῳ δέυεται οὔτε χιῶν ἐπιπίλναται (and *Lucr.* iii. 18). There are some striking instances in an expanded Anglo-Saxon paraphrase by Cynewulf of Lactantius' poem *de Phoenice*, *And there nor rain nor snow, nor breath of frost, Nor blast of fire, nor rush of rattling hail, Nor fall of rime nor scorching heat of sun, Nor lasting cold nor drought nor winter-shower...* (This translation is due to the Rev. W. W. Skeat).]

‘This mode of treatment, that the things are not there, (or that the object of praise or censure has them not,) may be applied to things either good or bad (to *bad* things in a panegyric, to *good* as virtues, accomplishments, merits of all kinds, in a censure or invective), in whichever of the two ways it may be serviceable (or, whichever of the two the occasion may require). Hence (from the *absence* of a certain quality or attribute) the poets also derive their epithets (ὄνομα here stands for an adjective: see *Introd.* Appendix A to Bk. III on ὀνόματα and ῥήματα)

τὸ ἄχορδον καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἄλυρον.

such as a *stringless* or *lyreless music*—music, but without the ordinary accompaniment or instrument, the strings of the lyre, or the lyre itself : applied to the sound of the *wind*-instrument, the trumpet—‘for they apply privative epithets ; this being popular when expressed in the metaphors of proportion, as when the (sound or music of the) trumpet is called a lyreless music’.

ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων...ἐπιφέρουσιν] *lit.* they attach epithets borrowed or derived from *privations* : *στέρσις* and *ἔξις* being one of the four forms of opposition : Categ. c. 10, 11 ὁ 17 and 12 a 26 seq.

μεταφοραῖς...ταῖς ἀνάλογον] ἀνάλογον in this combination seems to be used adverbially ; comp. *supra* c. 4 §§ 3, 4, τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον, *infra* c. 7 § 10, τοῖς ἀνάλογον. On the proportional metaphor, the best of all the four kinds, I have already referred (on III 4. 4) to the Introd. pp. 290—292. See also Appendix B Bk. III on Metaphor, where this is fully explained.

Comp. with this section Poet. XXI 15, 16 ἔστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ τῆς μεταφορᾶς (the proportional, to wit) χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσαντα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφῆσαι τῶν οἰκείων τι, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην μὴ Ἄρεως ἀλλ’ ἄϊνον (Victorius’ *emendatio palmaria* for the *vulgata lectio* ἀλλ’ οἶνον).

I transcribe Twining’s excellent note on this passage, which well illustrates our present subject. Note 189, p. 446. “Metaphors from their nature are in danger of being obscure or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose a metaphor may be guarded in various ways. If the simple substitution of the improper for the proper term would be obscure or harsh, the metaphor may be converted into an *image* or *comparison* (referring to Demetrius, *περὶ ἐρμηνείας* § 80) ; it may be used *analogically*, and we may say φιάλη Ἄρεως or φιάλη ἄϊνος ; or if that be not sufficient for perspicuity—that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner or circumstances in which the expression is introduced—we may join these (φιάλη Ἄρεως ἄϊνος), or even add to either of them the *proper* word itself. There is a fine instance of this *negative* mode of explaining a metaphor in Isaiah li. 21, ‘Thou drunken, *but not with wine.*’ The same end is often answered by an epithet *affirming* of the thing *expressed* some quality of the thing *signified* ; thus ships are *floating bulwarks* [Mason’s Ode to the Naval Officers], and the lyre a *chorded shell*, where Dryden [Song for St Cecilia’s Day, line 17, *fugal struck the chorded shell*,] has made the same use of the affirmative epithet *chorded* that Theognis did of the negative ἄχορδος in his metaphorical expression for a bow, φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος (comp. Rhet. III 11. 11, and Demetr. *περὶ ἐρμηνείας* § 85, quoted in Introd. p. 297). Sometimes the explanatory epithet is itself a metaphor ; as in the *περωτοῖς ἄρμασι* (Iph. Aul. 251) of Euripides, ‘winged chariots’. Here we have a double metaphor : *chariot* for *ship*, and *wing* for *sail*.”

1 τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ἡ παθητικὴ τε καὶ CHAP. VII.
2 ἡθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ

He then concludes with four examples of these privative explanatory epithets from the Greek Tragedians, which I have already quoted with some others in the Introduction p. 297, in the note on this passage of the Rhetoric. Add to these Cephisodotus' 'parti-coloured millstones', *μύλωνας ποικίλους*, III 10. 7, by which he meant to represent the 'crushing' properties of the Athenian 'triremes' in devastating the coasts and islands and exacting tribute. These differ from millstones in having their sides gaily painted in various colours. *ἄπτερος φάτις*, Aesch. Agam. 267 (contrasted with *ἔπεα πετροέντα*), *ἄπτερος ὄρνις*, Eur. Iph. Taur. 1095. [Eur. Phoen. 791 (*Ἄρης*) *κῶμον ἀναυλότατον προχορεύεις*, 808 *Σφιγγὸς ἀμουςσοτάταισι σὺν φῶδαις*, Herc. Fur. 879, 891, 892. Similarly the Italian poet, Guarini, called birds 'winged lyres'.]

It remains to notice the *proportion* of the metaphor, which, according to Victorius, is Trumpet : sound of trumpet (anonymous) :: lyre : *μέλος*, the music of the lyre (*properly* so called). To qualify the harshness, throw light on the obscurity, of this improper application of the word *μέλος*, the epithet *ἄλυρον* "not that of the lyre" is added.

One more remark on privative epithet, which has not been pointed out. They have two uses, the one to *qualify*, the other to *contradict*, the substantive they are joined with. In the latter case they are not metaphors at all. This is what is called the figure *oxymoron*, which combines in one expression two contradictory notions of which the one denies the other : *ἐχθρῶν ἄδωρα δῶρα* (Aj. 655), an enemy's gifts are no gifts at all ; *χάρις ἄχαρις* "graceless grace", or "thankless favour" ; *μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ*, Soph. El. 1154 ; *γάμος ἄγαμος*, Oed. T. 1214 ; *δοικὸν εἰσοίκησην*, Phil. 534 ; *ἵπνος ἄἵπνος* Ib. 848 ; *βίος ἀβίωτος* or *ἀβίωτος* (Eur. Hipp. 821, 867), *insaniens sapientia, strenua inertia*.

CHAP. VII.

On the general subject, and the connexion of the several parts of this Chapter on *Propriety*, see the Introduction, pp. 297—303, where they are treated in full.

The passages of Cicero and Quintilian in which the same subject is dealt with are referred to in p. 298 : and p. 299 has a note (1), with various references on *ἥθος* and *πάθος* in *style*.

§ 1. 'Style will have propriety, if it be made to express feeling (the various emotions) and character, and be proportionate to the subject-matter'. The perverse transition from the feminine to the *abstract neuter* ἀνάλογον (sc. *πρᾶγμα*, as in *triste lupus stabulis* et sim.) is characteristic of Aristotle's carelessness in writing. Perhaps, however, it may be used adverbially as in c. 6 § 7 (see note).

§ 2. 'This *proportion* consists in a style of composition (*λέγεται* of speaking and writing) such as is neither off-hand (i. e. careless and slovenly, *αὐτοκάβδαλος* is 'extemporaneous') on a dignified, nor stately on a slight and mean (lit. *cheap*), subject, and has no ornamental epithets (*ἐπὶ* refers to *ἐπίθετα*) attached to mean words ; otherwise, it (the composition) has the appearance of mere comedy (i. e. laughable ; its subject

δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγεται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμωδία φαί-

is τὸ γελοῖον: Poet. v. 1, 2), like Cleophon's poetry (*tragic* poetry: he was a tragedian): for some things that he wrote (said) were like saying (like as though one were to say), "Lady fig", or "august fig".

On propriety in this sense, the adaptation of language to the subject or matter of the speech, spoken or written, comp. Hor. Ars Poet. 86 seq., Cic. de Or. III 55. 212, *ut figuram orationis...ad id quod agemus accomodatam deligamus*, seq. Orator XXI 70, seq. *Quam enim indecorum est de stilicidiis quum apud unum iudicem dicas, amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de maiestate populi Romani summis et subtiliter!* § 72. Quint. VIII 3. 11, *Illud observatione dignius, quod hic ipse honestus ornatus pro materiae genere decet variatus*, et seq. *Clara illa atque sublimia plerumque materiae modo cernenda. Quod alibi magnificum, tumidum alibi. Et quae humilia circa res magnas, apta circa minores videntur.* § 18.

εὐόγκων] here refers to the ὄγκος or dignity of style, as applied in c. 6. 1. Elsewhere, as Meteor. IV 2. 6, it is to be interpreted literally of *bulk* or *size*, "of a good or fair bulk": εὐογκότερον καὶ παχύτερον are there equivalent to a preceding παχύτερα. Similarly Eur. Syleus, Fragm. 2 sq. (Dind.), πρόσχημα σεμνὸς καὶ ταπεινός, οὐδ' ἄγαν εὐογκος (*bulky*): this is said of Hercules, whom Mercury is selling to Syleus, and like an auctioneer, setting forth all his excellences: several more examples are to be found in Rost and Palm's Lex. The ordinary meaning of the word seems to be 'of fair, or reasonable, size'.

αὐτοκαβδάλως] *extempore*, recurs as an adj. αὐτοκάβδαλα III 14. 11 sub fin. cap. It is said to be derived from κάβος (*ill-kneaded meal or dough*, (Hebr. *Kab*, translated κάβος in LXX; Rost and Palm's Lex. s. v. κάβος). The αὐτό is 'self', as in αὐτοποιητός, αὐτόματος, αὐτογνώμων, αὐθαγής, et sim. Comp. αὐτοσχεδιαστί 'extempore', αὐτοσχεδίασμα 'an impromptu', Poet. IV 7, αὐτοσχεδιαστική, of tragedy and comedy in their infancy, whilst still 'extemporaneous', ib. § 14. αὐτοκάβδαλοι—Semus of Delos, ap. Athen. XIV 16, 622 B—*improvisatori*. Rost and Palm's Lex. interprets this *eine art possenreisser aus dem stegreif*, and Liddell and Scott sim. *buffoons, buffo-actors*. But Athenaeus says of them σχέδην ἐπέραινον ῥήσεις, which is exactly equivalent to αὐτοσχεδίαζον. So σχέδια is 'a raft', a vessel *extemporised*, constructed on the spur of the moment to meet a sudden occasion. And the whole family of these words seems to derive the notion of hasty, off-hand, unpremeditated, unartistic, action or composition, which distinguishes them, from ἔχειν (ἔσχον, σχεῖν) or rather ἔχεσθαι, in the sense of seizing or grasping the first materials that come to hand for a sudden and unforeseen emergency.

αὐτοκαβδάλων in Lucian, Lexiph. § 10 (ed. Hemsterh. II 336), is interpreted, *qui farinam ipsi sibi subigunt*: with the note, αὐτοκάβδαλον ἄλευρον, τὸ ὡς ἔτυχε φυραθέν. Spengel reads αὐτοκιβδηλον (apparently a *vox nihili*—at all events a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*, and without meaning here) from MS A^o (A). ["Victorius primus αὐτοκαβδάλως scripsit." Spengel].

νεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἶπειεν [ἄν]¹ “πότνια συκῇ.” παθητικὴ δέ, ἐὰν 3 μὲν ἦ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξις, ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῇ καὶ αἰσχρά, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβουμένου καὶ λέγειν,

¹ ἄν *sine uncinis*.

κόσμος] This is mentioned as one of the kinds (εἶδη) of poetical and ornamental words, with γλῶττα and μεταφορά, Poet. XXII 7, and again § 19, as an ὄνομα, ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ κύριον καὶ μεταφορὰ καὶ κόσμος. It is therefore a *poetical or ornamental word*. ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἡ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον κ.τ.λ., eight in all. Poet. XXI 4. All these are defined *seriatim* except κόσμος. Twining, in his note on § 17, argues from this that Aristotle could not have intentionally omitted this alone, and that the explanation of κόσμος is one of the many *lacunae* which had to be supplied in Aristotle's MSS, one of the διαβρώματα—the moth- and worm-eaten passages, as Strabo calls them in his celebrated account of the transmission of Aristotle's manuscripts (XIII. 1). In the Paris MS, indeed, there is a mark of omission which Buhle and Hermann have indicated in their editions. He understands κόσμος to signify “such an epithet as embellishes or *elevates* the thing to which it is applied.” Though he quotes this passage of the Rhetoric, he does not notice that ἐπὶ here applied to it proves that the kind of *ornament* intended by κόσμος is an ornamental *epithet*. See also Gräfenhan, on Poet. XXI 17, p. 159 and on XXIV 9, p. 189, where τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις is quoted from Dionysius de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene c. 1, (VI 955. 12, ed. Reiske) and again, de Thuc. Iud. c. 23, p. 864. 2.

Κλεοφῶν] Ἀθηναῖος τραγικός. τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ Ἀκταίων, Ἀμφιάραος, Ἀχιλλεύς, Βάκχαι, Δεξαμενός, Ἡριγόνη, Θυέστης, Λεύκιππος, Περσίς, Τήλεφος, Suidas. He is omitted in Wagner's collection, *Fragm. Gr.* vol. III. We learn from Poet. II 5, that his subjects and characters were neither above nor below the level of ordinary, every-day, life and character. To the same effect it is stated in Poet. XXII 1, that his style was low or humble, ταπεινή, and devoid of all poetical ornament. Gräfenhan, ad loc. II 5. Id. ad Poet. XXII 1, “qui humili dictione imitabatur vulgares mores.”

To Suidas's list of 10 tragedies must be added the Μανδρόβουλος, de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 27, οἷον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ, where it is quoted in illustration of a mode of argument.

εἰ εἶπειεν ἄν] That ἄν, which Bekker puts in brackets, may be retained and justified with εἰ and the optative, will be seen by referring to the Appendix (D) on εἰ δύναιτ' ἄν II 20. 5 [Vol. II p. 336].

πότνια] the feminine of πόσις and δεσ-πότης, is a female title of honour, equivalent to δέσποινα, implying reverence and high station, ‘august’. It is best rendered by ‘Lady’. It has two forms, πότνια and πότνα—ὁσία, πότνα θεῶν, Eur. Bacch. 370—and in both the ᾱ is short, and can therefore be elided. There is a good article on the word in Liddell and Scott's Lex. which will supply further information.

§ 3. ‘Emotion is expressed, if insult (wanton outrage) (be what you

ἐὰν δὲ ἐπαινετά, ἀγαμένως, ἐὰν δὲ ἐλεεινά, ταπεινῶς,
4 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοίως. πιθανοὶ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα
καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς

are describing), by the language of one in anger; if impiety or anything foul or base, by that of indignation and reluctance (hesitation) even to name (or mention) it; what is praiseworthy, by that of admiration; what is pitiable, in a low tone and language, and so on for the rest in like manner'. With ἀγαμένως and ταπεινῶς supply λέγοντος. [For ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχρὰ κ.τ.λ., compare Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) § 9, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ βλασφημίαν ἔχει τινὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζειν ὀκνήσαιμ' ἂν ἐν ὑμῖν ἔνια.]

ἀγαμένως] as in Plat. Phaedo 89 A, 'approvingly, admiringly, with admiration', ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο. The word is rare, and the meaning here has been doubted. Victorius, *cum laetitia*, 'with delight or exultation'. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 9, *omnibus perpensis*, inclines to the opinion that in Aristotle (that is, *here*: in Plato, it has the other meaning,) it signifies *admirabiliter, magnifice*, 'admirably, so as to be admired'; which seems to me the least likely of the three.

ταπεινῶς] seems to combine Horace's *dolet sermone pedestri* (A. P. 95) of the *language*, with Cicero's *summissa voce* [Orator § 56] of the *tone of voice*: a *low tone* in expressing pity is appropriate to both.

§ 4. 'This appropriate language (proper or peculiar to the emotion to be represented) also gives a plausible air to the facts (or statements under consideration): for the mind draws a false inference to the truth of the *speaker* (the reality of his emotion, *and* hence to the truth of his statements), because every one under similar circumstances feels the same—so that they (the audience) are led to think, even though the fact is really not so, that the things (the facts of the case, the things under consideration) are as the speaker represents them (αὐτὰ ἔχειν φησί, Buhle), and (besides this) the listener always has a fellow-feeling with one who speaks with emotion, even though what he says is naught (worthless; proves nothing)'.

οἰκεία] comp. *infra* § 7, ὀνόματα οἰκεία τῇ ἔξει.

παραλογίζεται κ.τ.λ.] The fallacy is this. A speaker puts himself into a passion in describing some atrocity imputed to his opponent, assuming the tone of anger or virtuous indignation, which would *naturally* be provoked by the act as described. People always sympathize with the expression of emotion, and the audience, knowing what it is to be angry themselves, and perceiving by reference to their own experience the 'appropriateness' of the language, tone, and gestures, to the true expression of the passion, draw from this the fallacious inference that the speaker must be in earnest, *as they were* when they were similarly affected, and *therefore* that the facts that he states must be true: arguing from the truth of the delineation to the truth of the fact stated.

The logic of the fallacy is explained in de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 δ 1 seq. It proceeds from the false assumption, in antecedent and consequent, that they are reciprocally convertible: that if a consequent always follows an antecedent the converse is likewise true, and that the consequent in-

ἀληθῶς λέγοντας, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστ' οἴονται [εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων] τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνομοιοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων αἰὲ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κὰν μηθὲν λέγῃ. διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες. καὶ ἠθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ ἀρμόττουσα ἐκάστω γένει καὶ ἔξει. λέγω

variably implies the antecedent as well as the antecedent the consequent. Here, the language &c. used is the ordinary sign of the emotion represented, as they themselves know from their own experience; and *does* usually arise in men as a consequence of such facts as those alleged: the antecedent is then falsely inferred 'reciprocally' from the *ordinary*, but not necessary or universal, consequent. This may be otherwise represented as a confusion between the *σημεῖον*, the usual and ordinary, and the *τεκμήριον*, the universal and necessary, accompaniment of something thereby signified. Comp. Poet. XXIV 18, *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός. οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν τοῦδ' ὄντος τοῦδ' ἢ ἢ γινομένου γίνηται, εἰ τὸ ὕστερόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γινεσθαι τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος*. And with the language of our text, *ἡνῆφα παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ*. Twining in his note on the passage of the Poet., at the end of n. 222, p. 488 [II p. 352, ed. 2], has quoted and translated this sentence of the Rhetoric.

§ 5. 'And this is the reason why many (speakers) try to stun (overwhelm, confound) their hearers with the clamour that they raise'. The speaker carries, that is, his *δείνωσις* or exaggeration even to the *excess* of mere empty noise and clamour, thinking thereby to produce a deeper impression upon the audience, who will suppose that the depth and sincerity of his feeling are in proportion to the noise he makes. The *διὸ* is, because the listener always sympathizes with the language and raised tone of passion; the more violent the expression of it, the more he is likely to be affected. Thuc. VII 42 has *κατάπληξις* to describe the 'consternation', *abattement de coeur*, of the Syracusans at the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

§ 6. 'And this mode of proof arising out of (external) signs (exhibited in language, tone, and action) may be invested also with an ethical character, in that (in so far as) that which is appropriate (i. e. the appropriate language, &c.) to each class and moral state (i. e. character, *ἦθος*; the sum of the moral states and habits which characterizes the individual) is attendant upon each of them'. The datives *γένει* and *ἔξει* seem to belong equally to *ἀκολουθεῖ* and *ἀρμόττουσα*. Compare, with what is said here of *ἐξίς* and *ἦθος*, III 16.9.

In the Introduction, p. 108 foll., on *ἦθος*, I have endeavoured to shew (against Spengel) that there are three kinds of *ἦθη* distinguished by Aristotle in the Rhetoric; (1) the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*, the personal character exhibited by the speaker himself, serving as a kind of proof of his sincerity, competency, and good will; (2) the characters of certain

δὲ γένος μὲν καθ' ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἢ ἀνὴρ ἢ γέρον, καὶ
 γυνὴ ἢ ἀνὴρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θετταλός, ἕξεις δέ, καθ'
 ἃς ποῖός τις τῷ βίῳ· οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἅπασαν ἕξιν οἱ βίοι
 7 ποιοῖ τινες. εἰς οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγει
 τῇ ἕξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά οὐδ' ὡσαύτως

ages and classes, with which the speaker must be previously acquainted, in order to accommodate his general tone, and the opinions he expresses, to the tastes and dispositions of his audience, their political sentiments and such like : as for instance an audience of rich and poor, young and old, aristocratic and democratical, must be addressed each in a different tone and with different language, suitable to their several opinions and prejudices ; and (3) what I have called the *dramatic* characters, which are treated only in the third book as belonging to style, and are still more important, and occupy a larger share of attention in poetry (especially dramatic poetry)—and therefore in the Poetics XV—than in the prose of Rhetoric. These consist in the accurate representation of *personal* character, as described by Horace, A. P. 114 seq. See also the instances given in the parallel passage, III 16.9, above referred to. This is what is now called 'keeping', and seems to me to be totally distinct from the second, which refers to *classes*; although the two have some points in common. The principal differences between them are that the latter describes *personal peculiarities*, and is an ingredient of *propriety of style*: and the two are therefore treated in different parts of the work. The dramatic ἦθος, *morata oratio*, does however in some inferior degree assist the *argument*, as Aristotle has just told us, and is a *kind* of *δείξις*; it conveys a favourable impression of the accuracy of the speaker, and the truth of his description.

'By *class* I mean (according to age, different ages) the various ages of life, youth, manhood, old age; and (sexes) woman or man, and (natives of different countries) Lacedaemonian or Thessalian; and by *states* (moral states) those by which the character (or quality) of a man's life is determined: for it is not every kind of *state* that determines the character of men's lives'. Ἔξις, an acquired, developed, permanent, habit, is a general term (opposed to *διάθεσις* an incomplete and progressive state, *Categ.*) and applicable to various states in men and things, *physical* as well as *intellectual* and *moral*. It is only the last two that determine the ἦθος.

§ 7. 'If therefore (the speaker) use the words (language) also appropriate' (οἰκεῖος, *domestic*: hence properly belonging to, things of one's own: hence special, appropriate, &c) 'to the (given) state, he will produce this character (i. e. convey it to his speech): for the clown' (rustic, boor: ἀγροῖκος, *country-bred*, opposed to ἀστεῖος, *city-bred*, polished, as *urbanus* to *rusticus*) 'would not use the same language nor in the same way (*sc.* the same tone, pronunciation, action), as the educated gentleman'. These are the two ἕξεις of εὐτραπέλεια 'easy, well-bred pleasantry' and its opposite ἀγροικία, 'rusticity, boorishness'; the contrasted 'conversational virtue and vice', of Eth. Nic. II 7, and IV 14. Comp. Poet.

ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν. πᾶσχουσιν δέ τι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ᾧ κατακόρως χρῶνται οἱ λογογράφοι, “ τίς δ’ οὐκ οἶδεν; ” “ ἅπαντες ἴσασιν. ” ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχη οὐ περ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

- 8 τὸ δ’ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἅπαν- P. 1408 b.
9 των τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν. ἄκος δ’ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ
θρυλούμενον· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ προσεπιπλήττειν¹. P. 122.

¹ προσεπιπλήττειν

XV 4, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα· ἔστι γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀρμόττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι.

What follows is a *note* suggested by the preceding remarks upon the παθητικὴ λέξις, and not very closely connected with the immediate subject of ‘propriety’.

‘The hearers are affected also in some degree (some impression is also made upon the audience) by what (a trick which) the speech-writers employ to a nauseous excess; (the introduction viz. of such phrases as) “Who doesn’t know?” “Everybody knows.” For the listener is shamed into an admission (of the fact) that he may be supposed to share (what is assumed to be) the feeling of “everybody else”’.

On λογογράφοι, the paid writers of speeches for the use of plaintiff or defendant in the law-courts, a much-despised class, see note on II 11. 7. Victorius supposes, in accordance with his preconceived opinion of a still continued hostility between Aristotle and Isocrates, that the latter is here alluded to; quoting four instances of it from Isocrates and two from Demosth. de Cor. This is hardly enough to sustain the charge. On this subject, see Introd. p. 41, foll.

§ 8. Of propriety in the use of every τόπος and every ornament of style. ‘The seasonable and unseasonable’, fitness in regard to time, place, occasion, ‘is common alike to all the kinds’. This observation is thought by Victorius to be suggested by the ‘nauseous excess’ of the preceding section.

§ 9. ‘A remedy for every excess (exaggeration in style) is the notorious practice of speakers: a speaker, that is, should pronounce censure on himself beforehand (in anticipation of the possible disapprobation of the audience): for (then, the exaggeration) is thought to be sound and right since the speaker himself is quite aware of what he is doing’.

τὸ θρυλούμενον] See note on II 21. 11.

The reading of all MSS is προσεπιπλήττει, which the staunch Bekker and Spengel, the consistent adherent of A or A², both retain. Nevertheless, the emendation προεπιπλήττει makes excellent sense, and its rival is decidedly inferior; and a passage of Quintilian, VIII 3. 37, which seems to have been copied from this of Aristotle and repeats his words, has (in the Greek words) προεπιπλήσσειν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ, and a little above, *prae-muniendum*, which also seems to be a reminiscence of προσεπιπλήττειν; Spalding (ad loc. Quint.) and Gesner approve, and Casaubon had

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὁ ποιεῖ
 10 τὸν λέγοντα. ἔτι τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρή-
 σασθαι· οὔτω γὰρ κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής. λέγω δὲ
 οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ

already suggested this emendation, and Stephens introduced it in his Lexicon. Supported by this evidence, and the common-sense view of the case, I venture to read *προσεπιλήττειν*. The passage of Quintilian above referred to runs thus:—*Et si quid periculosius finxisse videbimur, quibusdam remediis praemuniendum est, ut ita dicam; si licet dicere; quodam modo; permittite mihi sic uti. Quod idem etiam in iis quae licentius translata erunt proderit, quae non tuto dici possunt. In quo non falli iudicium nostrum solitudine ipsa manifestum est. Qua de re Graecum illud elegantissimum est, quo praecipitur, προσεπιλήσσειν (sic) τῇ ὑπερβολῇ.* And again § 50, *sed hoc quoque quum a prudentibus fit* (ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὁ ποιεῖ), of another doubtful use of *μειώσις*. If we keep *προσεπιλήττειν*, it is “to add something in the way of reprehension of oneself”—so Vater;—which certainly gives a fair sense.

ἀληθές is similarly used for ‘sound, substantial, genuine’, *infra* II. 10; comp. also Hor. Ep. I 7. 98, *Metiri se quemque suo modulo et pede verum est.* Ib. Ep. I 12. 23. Liv. II 48, III 40.

§ 10. The greatest care and pains are always requisite to give the speech an *artless*, natural, and unstudied character: the rule *ars est celare artem* is of the utmost importance in effecting the end and object of a speech, persuasion or conviction. See, for instance, III 2. 4, 5; 8. 1. This applies equally to proportion, as an element of propriety. It has been laid down that a certain proportion (or resemblance) of style, tone, and manner to the subject is always to be observed: but this, if carried too far, will defeat its own object; the study will appear, and the suspicions of the hearers will be aroused. For instance, there is a proportion in the tone of voice and manner of delivery, in the expression of features and the action, to the subject of the words delivered: these however should not be all employed at once: if the words have a *harsh* sound—*σκληρὰ ὀνόματα* are exemplified by Hermogenes *περὶ ἰδεῶν*, α’, *περὶ τραχύτητος*, p. 236, II 300 (*Rhet. Gr.* Spengel), by *ἀταρπός, ἔμαρπτεν, ἐγναμψε, &c.*, and again, Ib. β’, (II 359), by a line from Homer in which *ἀγκὰς ἔμαρπτε*, both of them objectionable on this ground, occur together. “The voice and the features and the rest should not be made to assume a harsh expression, else the study becomes apparent—it will give the composition a stiff and studied appearance, make it look affected and overdone: whereas, if one or two of them are made to correspond, and the rest not, the same effect is produced, whilst the *artifice* escapes detection”. *Introd.* pp. 301, 2. Compare on this subject, Cic. de Or. III 57. 216.

‘Further, not to employ all these proportions (or correspondences) together; for by the observance of this precept (following this rule) the listener is deluded (i.e. the art is disguised). I mean, to take an instance if the words used are harsh (in *sound*), not to (extend the harshness) to

τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, φανερόν γίνεται ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστίν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγεται, ἀπίθανον γίγνε-

the tone of voice and the features and the other appropriate (correspondences or proportions)’: (we must supply here either *χρῆσθαι* from *χρήσασθαι* preceding; or, *ad sensum*, from *σκληρὰ ἢ, σκληρότητα προσφέρειν*, or something else similar). ‘Otherwise the true character of each of them (their studied and artificial character, *πέπλασθαι supra* 2. 4) becomes manifest’.

Vahlen, in his observations on the Rhetoric, *Trans. Vienn. Acad.* p. 144 (already referred to), says, that nothing else can be implied in *τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν* than the adaptation of voice and feature to subject, already specified; and therefore proposes to strike out *καὶ* before *τοῖς ἀρμάττουσιν* so that *τοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν* may be connected with, not distinguished from, the two preceding. This seems to me quite unnecessary. Besides the two proportions specified by Aristotle, there is at all events *ὑπόκρισις*, appropriate action or gesticulation, that may be brought into correspondence; and also the mode of delivery may be distinguished—at all events for the nonce—from the other three. And he adds a similar objection to another perfectly innocent *καί*, in I 15. 28, *καὶ ὡς οὗτος κ.τ.λ.*, the sense (as I have explained it in the paraphrase of the Introduction) being at least equally good with, as without, the conjunction.

In the succeeding clause—which guards against a possible misapprehension of the foregoing, as though it were meant that *all* this kind of adaptation should be avoided, and intimates that the *mean* is to be observed here as everywhere else; that we do not rush into the opposite extreme, like those who *dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt*—the connexion of thought might seem to require that *ἐὰν δέ* and *ἐὰν οὖν* should change places. If the two clauses, *ἐὰν δέ*, *ἐὰν οὖν*, are to be connected in sense, we require some kind of opposition, expressed by a restrictive or adversative particle such as *μέντοι*, *δέ*, or *ἀλλά*, to establish this, and not one that conveys an inference or consequence, which does *not* follow from the foregoing.

‘But if (the speaker introduce) one and omit the other (make the adaptation in some cases, in others not), he does the same thing (really has recourse to study and art) and yet escapes detection. So then’, (it results in a general way from all this,) or, ‘well then—as I say—if things soft and mild (for instance, the expression of compassion) be represented by a harsh tone and language, or harsh things in soft tone and language (so Victorius), it (the expression or things expressed) loses all its plausibility (or power of persuasion)’. If *οὖν* be retained, it must be understood (I think) as I have rendered it. There will be no connexion between the clause which it introduces and that which immediately precedes it, and *οὖν* will be a mere continuative, as in the narrative use of *μὲν οὖν*—the *inferential*, as with our *then*, having degenerated into a *temporal* sense, denoting mere continuation or succession. The clause will then be a sort

11 ται. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμηκες

of *general* conclusion from all that has been said in this section on the adaptation of delivery to subject-matter. ἀπίθανον, see III 3. 4.

§ 11. 'Compound words, epithets' (including descriptive additions of *more than one* word) 'more than one (several), and strange (foreign, unusual) words, are most appropriate to the language of emotion: an angry man may be forgiven (excused) for saying a *wrong* heaven-high, or for calling it *colossal*'. I have translated κακόν 'wrong', on the supposition that the speaker is a complainant in a court of justice, and that the 'evil' at which he is so indignant is some *injustice* or *wrong* done to him by the defendant, against whom he is inveighing.

οὐρανόμηκες] is an example of a διπλοῦν ὄνομα, πελώριον of a ξένον. Comp. III 3. 2, where πέλωρος (the alternative form) is cited as an instance of a γλῶττα, an antiquated or barbarous term that requires explanation. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 134, has used the former word quite in cold blood, τὸ δὲ κατορθωθέν οὐρανόμηκες ποιήσουσιν, 'your success they will exalt as high as heaven'. Aristophanes has it as an epithet of φωνή, Nub. 357, and again of κλέος, 459, in a chorus. Herod., II. 138, of excessively tall trees, and so Hom., Od. v. 239, of a pine. Aesch., Agam. 92, of the beacon-light, in the πάροδος of the chorus.

With ὀργιζομένῳ κ.τ.λ. comp. III 11.16, where ὑπερβολαί, the figure hyperbole, or any excess or extravagance, is said to be most used by men in anger, and is illustrated by two quotations from Homer. Also Hermog., περὶ ιδεῶν α'. (*Rhet. Gr.* Spengel, II 302.3) περὶ σφοδρότητος (vehemence), quotes a number of instances of this exaggerated language and long compound words from Demosthenes when he was affecting indignation, ἰαμβειοφάγος, de Cor. § 139, γραμματοκύφων, Ib. 209. "Nearly the whole of the speech against Aristogeiton," he says, "is a specimen of this vehement language": and then proceeds to illustrate it from his other writings: [the speeches against Aristogeiton are, however, undoubtedly spurious.]

'And also (this kind of language may be used) when (the speaker) has fairly' (*lit.* already, by this time, *then* and not till then: on this use of ἤδη, οὐπω, οὐκέτι, see note on I 1.7) 'overmastered (got into his power) his audience, and worked them up into a fit (raised them to the height) of enthusiasm, either by praise or blame or indignation, or love (which he has assumed towards them); as Isocrates also (as well as others, καὶ) does in his Panegyric, at the end: φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη'.

This is, as usual, a misquotation; Isocrates wrote, Paneg. § 186, φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην (Aristotle ought not to have forgotten this, for it is a striking case of ὁμοιοτέλευτον, or rhyming termination, one of the new figures introduced into Rhetoric by Gorgias and his school): φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσσην τινὰ χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοιούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας; It is in fact a finely written sentence.

'And again, οἱ τινες ἔτλησαν κ.τ.λ. (Paneg. § 96, another striking sen-

ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν. καὶ ὅταν ἔχῃ ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάζειν ἢ ἐπαίνοις ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει, “ φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη ” καὶ “ οἱ τινες ἔτλησαν. ” φθέγγονται τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζον-

tence): for men (in general) give utterance to such language in their enthusiasm (the language of inspiration), and therefore (the audience) also being themselves in a similar state of feeling (having been brought thereto by the orator) are plainly ready to accept and approve of it’.

[It is worth noticing that ἔτλησαν, ‘in that they brooked to &c.’, is characteristic of poetic usage, and is rare in Attic prose: though found in Xenophon, *Cyrop.* III 1. 2, οὐκέτι ἔτλη εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν. The corresponding prose form is ἐδόλμυσαν, which indeed is the manuscript reading in Isocrates l.c. and is corrected by the editors from the present passage and Dionysius Halic. de adm. vi dicendi in Dem. c. 40.]

ἐχῇ] Comp. Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s.v. “ τοὺς ἀκροατὰς, auditores occupatos tenere, obsedis oratione. Ar. Rhet. III 7, ubi permutat cum τῷ ἐνθουσιάζειν, extra se rapere.” [Cicero, *Orator* § 210, *id autem* (numerosa oratio) *tum valet cum is qui audit ab oratore iam obsessus est ac tenetur;* and (for ὅταν ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάζειν) compare ib. § 99, *si is non praeferatis auribus inflammare rem coepit; furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinolentus videtur.*]

The careless introduction of the superfluous τε after φθέγγονται, repeated *infra* c. 11.7, τὸ τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., is abundantly illustrated by Shilleto, *Dem. de F. L.*, critical note on § 176, τὴν τε γὰρ εἰρήνην κ.τ.λ., including this passage amongst his instances. [See Bonitz, *Zeitschrift f. Oest. Gymn.* 1867, pp. 672—682, quoted in *Index Aristotelicus* s.v. τε, ad fin., where, amongst other passages, a reference is given to Pol. VII 14 § 6, 1333 a 1, τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναι φασὶ δεῖν πρῶτον.]

‘ This also accounts for the fitness of this kind of language for poetry, because poetry is inspired. It must therefore (be used) either in the way above described, or with irony, as Gorgias did, and (in) the passages of Plato’s *Phaedrus*. The ‘passages’ referred to are 231 D, εἰάν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος...γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, alluding to the exaggerated and enthusiastic expressions with which Socrates had been inspired by the local influence; in particular to the rhapsody at the conclusion of his speech, ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ κ.τ.λ., and 241 E, οὐκ ἦσθου... ὅτι ἦδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; εἰάν δ’ ἐπαίνειν τὸν ἔτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἶει ποιήσῃ; ἀρ’ οἶσθ’ ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν... σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάζω ;

A specimen of Gorgias’ irony is found in Ar. Pol. III 2, 1275 b 26, Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ’ εἰρωνεύόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους’ εἶναι γάρ τινες Λαρισσαίους, so read, with Schneider, for Λαρισσοποιούς retained by Bekker. “Aristotle

τες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δῆλον ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἤρμοσεν· ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις. ἢ δὴ οὕτω δεῖ, ἢ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὅ περ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.

I τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μῆτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι CHAP. VIII
μῆτε ἄρρυθμον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πεπλάσθαι

refers to an ingenious evasion of an awkward question. Whilst Gorgias was in Thessaly, where he seems to have spent a considerable time at Larissa, some Thessalian, who had no doubt heard his boast that he was able and ready to answer any question upon any subject, took him at his word, and asked him what constituted a citizen.—This is the constitutional question which gives occasion to Aristotle's quotation.—Partly in jest, and partly because he was really at a loss, he replied, that citizens were made by citizen-manufacturers: as the vessels made by mortar-manufacturers were mortars, so those made by the Larissaeian-manufacturers were Larissaeian citizens or Larissaeians: for there were such people as *Λαρισσαίοιοι*. *Λάρισσα*, besides the Thessalian city, denotes also some kind of kettle or other cooking-utensil. The reply is much the same as if some one being asked, What makes a citizen of the town of Sandwich? were to answer, 'a cook, for he is a sandwich-maker'; and is no bad specimen of the way in which Gorgias most likely fulfilled his promise of solving any problem whatsoever that was proposed to him. It may be doubted whether, as Schneider supposes, there is also an ambiguity in *δημουργῶν*: the word bears also the sense of a magistrate, as the grammarians tell us, especially in Doric states. Larissa was not a Doric state: but we learn from K. O. Müller, *Dor.* Bk. III ch. 8. 5; from Thuc. v 17, ἐν Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλή...ἐν Ἡλίδι οἱ δημ. καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες, and from a (doubtful) letter of Philip, Dem. de Cor. § 157, Πελοποννησίων τοῖς δημ.; that the use of the term was not confined to these, and Aristotle applies it to 'magistrates' in general, Pol. VI (IV), 4, 1291 a 34. See further on this subject, Müller's *Dorians*, u. s." From a note in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* Vol. III No. VII p. 80, with additions [see also p. 180 of Thompson's edition of the Gorgias].

CHAP. VIII.

On rhythm in Prose.

In the paraphrase of the Introduction I have already given an outline of the contents of this chapter and their connexion, with references and some details, pp. 303—306. And on rhythm in general, and its application to prose, there is an Appendix (C), pp. 379—392; in which is a full account of its original and derived significations in the first part, and of its distinction from μέτρον in the second. The commentary on this chapter will therefore deal principally with the details of the language, allusions, and such particulars as require explanation, which are omitted in the paraphrase.

In the fragments of Isocrates' *τέχνη*, collected by Benseler in the Teubner series, Vol. II p. 276, we have the following, fragm. 4—cited from

γὰρ δοκεῖ) καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐξίστησιν· προσέχειν γὰρ

Maximus Planudes ad Hermog. and Joannes Siceliotēs—ὅλως δὲ ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω· ξηρὸν γάρ· μὴδὲ ἔμμετρος· καταφανὲς γάρ· ἀλλὰ μεμίχθω παντὶ ῥυθμῷ, μάλιστα λαμβικῷ ἢ τροχαϊκῷ. The first of these precepts is in entire agreement with Aristotle, § 1; the disagreement of the second with the statements of § 4 is equally striking. It seems from what is said of Thrasymachus and the pæan in § 4, that the subject of prosaic rhythm was not included in the τέχναι of himself and the succeeding writers on Rhetoric. It does not appear even in the Rhet. ad Alex. Cicero, de Or. III 44. 173, attributes to Isocrates the first introduction of 'numbers' into prose composition.

Dionysius de Comp. Verb. c. 25 (p. 197 R.) refers to this chapter of Aristotle in support of his observations on rhythm in prose. His own opinions on the subject are given, pp. 195, 6.

References are made by Cicero to this chapter (§ 4 et seq.), de Or. I 47. 182, 183, in the course of his dissertation on rhythm, from § 171 foll. The same subject is treated, Orat. c. LXIII 212 seq. The various rhythms heroic, iambic, trochaic, &c. are discussed in c. LXIV, where Aristotle's opinions, as expressed in this chapter, are twice referred to, §§ 215, 218. In § 214 we have, *temeritas ex tribus brevibus et longa est, quem* (sc. pæanem) *Aristoteles ut optimum probat, a quo dissentio.* Cicero is referring to this chapter, from which the other references are taken: and as this is *not* found there, he must be either quoting inexactly, from memory, or perhaps confounding Aristotle's opinion on the point with that of one of the other rhetoricians whom he mentions, § 218. There is likewise an incorrectness in the opinion which he there attributes to Aristotle, that the pæan is, *aptissimus orationi vel orienti vel mediae*: Aristotle says nothing of the 'middle' of the sentence.

Compare also, Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας, περὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, § 38 seq. (Rhet. Gr. Spengel, III 270—273) who also refers thrice to this chapter of the Rhetoric. Quint. IX 4. 45 seq. There are references to this ch. in §§ 87, 88.

On the abuse of rhythm, which degrades and is incompatible with the sublime, there is a short chapter in Dionysius περὶ ὕψους, c. 41.

§ 1. 'The structure (figure, fashion) of the language (i. e. prose composition) should be neither metrical (run into verse)¹ nor entirely without measure or rhythm: for the one has no power of persuasion, because it is thought to be artificial (*supra*, c. 2. 4, *πεπλασμένως*), and at the same time

¹ A remarkable instance of this defect in composition is quoted by Twining on Poet., note 36, p. 209, from Dr Smith's *System of Optics*—where, as he truly says, one would least expect to find such a thing—the beginning of Bk. I c. 2 § 47, Where parallel rays Come contrary ways And fall upon opposite sides. This is decidedly more metrical than a parallel instance in one of Dr Whewell's treatises on Mechanics, Hence no force however great, Can stretch a cord however fine, Into an horizontal line, Which is accurately straight [Whewell's *Mechanics* I p. 44, ed. 1819, *Facetiae Cantabrigienses* p. 162]. Quintilian is particularly indignant at this introduction of a verse into prose writing: *versum in oratione fieri multo foedissimum est, totum; sed etiam in parte deforme*, IX 4. 72. [For iambic verses in the prose of Isocrates, see Paneg. § 170, ἐχρῆν γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰπερ ἦσαν ἄξιοι and Spengel's *Artium Scriptores*, pp. 152—4.]

ποιεῖ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, πότε πάλιν ἤξει. ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνουσι τὰ παιδιά τὸ “τίνα αἰρεῖται 2 ἐπίτροπον ὁ ἀπελευθερούμενος; Κλέωνα.” τὸ δὲ ἄρ-
 ρυθμον ἀπέραντον, δεῖ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μὲν, μὴ μέτρῳ
 also diverts (the hearers' attention, from the main subject or the proof of the fact): for it makes him attend to the recurrence of the similar cadence. And so (the audience anticipate the answering or recurring cadence) just as the children anticipate the answer to the herald's summons, “Whom does the freedman choose for his attorney? and the answer is, Cleon”’.

ἐπίτροπος one who is charged or entrusted with the management of his case, or of any business as deputy for another; procurator, ἐπιτρόποις Καίσαρος, Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. c. 17, 813 E, ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἐπεμελήθη τούτων, ὁ δ' ἐπίτροπος Μιλύας, ‘his man of business, deputy, agent’.

On Cleon's self-assumed functions of public prosecutor and poor man's advocate, see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ch. LIV, Vol. VI. p. 667 seq. An example in Arist. Ran. 569, (one of the tavern-keepers says,) ἴθι δὲ κάλεσον τὸν προστάτην Κλέωνα μοι, (and the other) σὺ δ' ἔμοιγ', ἐάνπερ ἐπιτύχῃς, Ὑπέρβολον, ἢ αὐτὸν ἐπιτρίψωμεν: from which Mr Grote draws his inferences as to the real nature of Cleon's misrepresented policy. The children, in the illustration, are so accustomed to the invariable reply to the herald's proclamation, for an attorney or deputy to plead some freedman's cause—who by law was not allowed to speak for himself in court—that they have learned to say ‘Cleon’ whenever the question is asked. It has not been noticed that this story is told in the *present* tense, as if the children were in the habit of doing this in Aristotle's own time. Can it be meant that the custom had been handed down from generation to generation for a century or so after Cleon's death? If so, it is a very remarkable fact.

With the opening words of the chapter, comp. Cic. Orat. LI 172, *Is (Aristoteles) igitur versus in oratione vetat esse, numerum iubet.* Ib. § 189, of verses unintentionally introduced by the orator in his speech, *Inculcamus per imprudentiam...versus; vitiosum genus, et longa animi provisione fugiendum.* With ἀπίθανον κ.τ.λ., comp. Ib. LXII 209, *Si enim semper utare* (these studied arts and tricks of rhetoric), *quum satietatem adfert tum quale sit etiam ab imperitis agnoscitur. Detrahit praeterea actionis dolorem, aufert humanum sensum actoris, tollit funditus veritatem et fidem...* LXV 220, *Multum interest utrum numerosa sit, id est, similis numerorum an plane e numeris constet oratio. Alterum si fit, intolerabile vitium est; alterum nisi fit, dissipata et inculta et fluens est oratio.*

§ 2. ‘That (composition) which is (entirely) devoid of rhythm (has no *measure*) is indefinite (or, unlimited), but it ought to be limited, only not by metre (like *verse*): for the infinite (indefinite, unlimited) is displeasing and (i. e. because it) cannot be known. But everything is defined (or limited) by number; and the *number* (*numerus* in both its senses) of the structure of the language (prose composition) is rhythm, of which *metres* are so many sections’. Here we pass for a moment into Platonic metaphysics. The doctrine of the formless, vague, indefinite,

δέ· ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον. περαίνεται
 δὲ ἀριθμῷ πάντα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως
 3 ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμὸς ἐστίν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητά. διὸ
 ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μὴ· ποίημα
 γὰρ ἐστίν. ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστίν

unlimited, infinite of more or less, of degree; into which τὸ μέτριον order, harmony, measure, symmetry, law—the mean—are introduced by the limiting πέρας, the *definite* principle; coming originally from the Pythagoreans, is adopted and expounded by Plato in the *Philebus*, 23 E et seq. The principle is applied to the numbers or measures of music and composition, verse and prose, 26 A, ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ (the tones of music) καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἀρ' οὐ ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα (τὸ πέρας καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον) ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπειργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν συμπάσαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο; From him Aristotle undoubtedly borrowed his conception of rhythm, as he did likewise his grand division of ὕλη, the *informis materia*, the potential, unenergized matter, the material cause of all things; and λόγος, the formal cause, that which gives form and substance to the brute matter, energizes or realizes it into complete existence, and is the original design, or conception in the mind of the Creator, the 'what it was to be', τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; and also his doctrine of the 'mean'. With ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον, compare *Anal. Post. A* 24, [86 a 5,] ἔστι δ' ἢ μὲν ἄπειρα οὐκ ἐπιστητά, ἢ δὲ πεπεράνται ἐπιστητά. *Metaph. B* 4, 999 a 27, τῶν ἀπείρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην; κ.τ.λ.

On τὸ ἄρρυθμον ἀπέραντον, compare *Cic. Orator, LXVIII* 228, *Hanc igitur, sive compositionem sive perfectionem sive numerum vocari placet, adhibere necesse est, si ornate velis dicere, non solum, quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio*, seq. On ῥυθμὸς, μέτρον, 'measure of time', *Ib. § 227, sonantium omnium quae metiri auribus possumus*.

περαίνεται...ἀριθμῷ πάντα] This axiom is doubtless derived ultimately from the Pythagoreans, who traced the laws of the universe in numbers and mathematical symbols. Καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὴν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι, οὗ γὰρ οἷον τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἀνευ τούτω, ap. *Stobaeum, Böckh, Philolaos*, p. 58. "The finite in number is the calculable, that which the mind can grasp, and handle; the infinite is the incalculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself to law, and hence remains unknowable." *Grant, Essay on Ar. Ethics*, p. 202 (1st ed. [p. 252, 3rd ed.]). *Probl XIX* 38, ῥυθμῷ δὲ χαίρομεν διὰ τὸ γινώριμον καὶ τεταγμένον ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν, καὶ κινεῖν ἡμᾶς τεταγμένους· οἰκειότερα γὰρ ἢ τεταγμένη κίνησις φύσει τῆς ἀτάκτου, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον. This illustrates ἀηδὲς...τὸ ἄπειρον. With ῥυθμὸς...οὗ τὰ μέτρα τμητά, comp. *Poet. IV* 7, τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστί, φανερόν· i.e. metres, verses or systems of verses, are definite lengths or sections, into which the indefinite matter of rhythm is as it were cut. Similarly it is said, *III* 9. 3, that the period and all metres are *measured* by number.

§ 3. 'From this it may be inferred that the speech (i.e. prose composition) should have rhythm, but not metre; otherwise it will be a poem

4 εὐὰν μέχρι του ἦ. τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρώως σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἱαμβος αὐτή

(verse-composition). Its rhythm however should not be exactly and nicely finished': (i.e. with exact and systematic accuracy so as to be continuous, and pervade the whole structure of the writing. The description of prose rhythm by Hermogenes, *περὶ ἰδεῶν* α', Introd. p. 391, Appendix on ῥυθμός, will serve as a commentary on this and μέχρι τοῦ): 'and this will be effected if it be only carried up to a certain point (and there stop short; left incomplete and irregular; not finished and systematic, like verse)'.

§ 4. 'Of (the three) rhythms, the heroic (hexameter, epic) is (too) stately (or solemn), and deficient in conversational harmony'. By using the word 'harmony', I have left it open whether we are to understand by ἀρμονία 'harmony' in its ordinary musical sense—in which case the meaning will be 'that particular kind of harmony which is adapted to ordinary conversation', the language of common life, and *inferior* to that of the heroic rhythm—a somewhat non-natural interpretation; or in the primary, more general sense of the word, 'an adaptation or fitting of parts into an organized whole', which with λεκτικῆς will signify 'deficient in conversational structure', in an adaptation of parts fitted for conversation (Dionysius uses ἀρμονία as equivalent to λέξις, for style of *composition*); the iambic is the very language of the vulgar, and therefore of all measures the iambic is most frequently uttered in common speech (or conversation); but it wants (the acquisition of, γενέσθαι) solemnity and dignity and the power (or faculty) of *striking*. The trochaic is too farcical (has too much of the comic dance about it; reminds one of its indecency and buffoonery¹: is totally devoid of all dignity and sobriety, too light and lively): this is shown by the trochaic tetrameters, for the tetrameter is a tripping (running, rolling) measure².

ὁ...ἡρώως] The 'heroic' measure, also called 'dactylic', 'hexameter', 'epic', including the spondaic and anapaestic, is one of the three kinds of rhythm, its *basis*, βάσις—corresponding to the 'feet' in metre—expressing the ratio of equality 1 : 1. See further on the doctrine and ratios of rhythm, in the Appendix on that subject, Introd. p. 387, foll. where the statements of the following sections are illustrated. The epithet σεμνός has been already applied to it in III 3.3; Dionysius, de Isocr. Iud. c. 11 (p. 557. 3, Reiske), designates it by the similar epithet μεγαλοπρεπές. Comp. Poet. XXII 9, τὸ ἡρωϊκὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων.

σεμνός καὶ λεκτικός καὶ ἀρμονίας δεόμενος is the *vulgata lectio*. But to say that the heroic or hexameter measure—Homer's verses for instance—are deficient in harmony is absurd in itself, and contradictory to the evidence of our own ears, and all ancient authority: at all events Dionysius was not

¹ This may *possibly* be included in the meaning of the word *here*: but if so, it is quite subordinate. In the references from other authors it is predominant.

² τροχερός ῥυθμός. There are some bars in the overture to Auber's *Bronze Horse*, which, to those who are acquainted with it, will perfectly represent the measure of trochaic tetrameter, and illustrate the epithet here used, implying a light, tripping, metre.

ἐστὶν ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μάλιστα πάντων
τῶν μέτρων ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεῖ δὲ p. 123.
σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος
κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἐστὶ γὰρ P. 1409.

of that opinion, who says, de Comp. Verb. c. 18 (p. 109, Reiske), the exact opposite; δακτυλικὸς πᾶν ἐστὶ σεμνὸς καὶ εἰς κάλλος ἀρμονίας ἀξιολογώτατος. Victorius, from Demetrius, περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 42, read ὁ μὲν ἥρως σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λογικός, which leaves ἀρμονίας δεόμενος to explain itself as it best may. I have adopted with Tyrwhitt on Poet. IV 19, ἐξάμετρα ὀλιγάκις (λέγομεν) καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας, the reading suggested by that passage, which had been already proposed by Vincentius Madius, ad loc., and since approved by Spalding ad Quint. IX 4. 76, and finally adopted by Bekker and Spengel, each in his latest ed.

ἱαμβος.. ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν] This has been already noticed, III I. 9, and twice in Poet. XXII. 19. The Latin rhetoricians make the same remark upon their own language. Cic. de Or. III 47. 182, Orat. LVI 189, *magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio*, LVII 192. Quint. IX 4. 76, *Illi (trimetri) minus sunt notabiles, quia hoc genus sermoni proximum est*.

ἐκστῆσαι] is used here in a much milder sense than its ordinary one, to strike, excite, *mettre hors de soi*, to displace or remove a man out of his ordinary state of feeling, to a higher one of excitement: whereas in this metaphorical application, it usually implies a much more violent emotion than mere admiration or amusement, as Demosth. c. Mid. 537 ult., ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτα ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους αὐτῶν, 'drives men besides themselves, drives them mad'. Eur. Bacch. 850, πρῶτα δ' ἐκστησον φρενῶν ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν, equivalent to ἔξω δ' ἐλαύνων τοῦ φρονεῖν, in line 853.

τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος] Cic. Orat. LVII 193, *Trochaicum autem, qui est eodem spatio quo choreus, cordacem appellat (Aristoteles), quia contractio et brevis dignitatem non habeat*. Quint. IX 4. 88, *herous, qui est idem dactylus, Aristoteli amplior, iambus humanior* (too like the language of vulgar humanity) *videatur: trochaicum ut nimis currentem (τροχερόν) damnet, eique cordacis nomen imponat*. Harpocr. κορδακισμός· ὁ κόρδαξ κωμικῆς ὀρχήσεως εἶδος ἐστίν, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἀριστόξενος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς τραγικῆς ὀρχήσεως. Suidas κορδακίζει· αἰσχροῦ ὀρχεῖται (the rest as Harpocr.). The characteristics of the κόρδαξ, a kind of Comic dance, may be gathered from notices in Theophr. Char. 6, περὶ ἀπονοίας, 'desperate recklessness', where it is a mark of this character to dance the cordax sober and without a mask: in Aristophanes, who takes credit to himself, Nub. 540, for never introducing it into his comedies: in Athenaeus, XIV 28, ult. 630 E, who calls it παιγνιώδης, 'sportive'. Dem. Olynth. II § 18 (of Philip's mode of life), εἰ δὲ τις σώφρων ἢ δίκαιος ἄλλως, τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν ἀκρασίαν τοῦ βίου καὶ μέθην καὶ κορδακισμοὺς οὐ δυνάμενος φέρειν κ.τ.λ. It seems therefore to have been accompanied by the grossest indecencies, so that no respectable person could allow himself even to look on the performance of it. See further in Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* XXVII 7.

This however is not the point of the reference here. But the κόρδαξ

τροχερός ῥυθμός τὰ τετράμετρα. λείπεται δὲ παιάν,
 ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι, οὐκ
 εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν. ἔστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παιάν,
 καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύο ἐστίν,
 ἐκείνων δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐν πρὸς ἓν, ὁ δὲ δύο πρὸς ἓν. ἔχεται
 δὲ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ
 5 παιάν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι,
 καὶ διότι μετρικοί· ὁ δὲ παιάν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου

was accompanied by verses in the trochaic tetrameter, and these are identified; and all that is implied here by the term is the lightness, the want of gravity and dignity, and the *dancing* tripping measure, afterwards expressed by *τροχερός*; as we see also in the passages of Cic. and Quint. This character always belonged to the tetrameter; and hence we are told that the dithyrambs, from which Tragedy took its rise, were originally written in this measure, which was afterwards exchanged for the iambic, the metre nearest to the language of ordinary conversation, when the *dialogue* had been introduced, and Tragedy assumed a regular form. Τό τε μέτρον (of Tragedy) ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἱαμβεῖον ἐγένετο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποιήσιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὑρεν· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱαμβεῖον ἐστίν (Poet. IV 19). Comp. Rhet. III 1. 9.

These rhythms being set aside, (they are in fact reducible to two, the proportions 1 : 1, and 2 : 1, iambus and trochee, -- and -- respectively) the third 'the paeon remains, the use of which began with Thrasymachus, though he and his followers couldn't tell what it was (did not know how to define it). The paeon¹ is the third (of the rhythms) and closely connected with the preceding: for it has the ratio of three to two ($\frac{3}{2}$: 1, three short, and one long syllable equal to two short), whilst the others have that of one to one (dactyl, spondee, anapaest), and two to one (iambus and trochee), severally. And one and a half ($\frac{3}{2}$: 1, the ratio of the paeon) is connected with these (two) ratios ['next to' both ratios, i. e. the mean between the two extremes, 1 : 1 and 2 : 1], and that is the paeon'. On this see Intro. Appendix on ῥυθμός, pp. 387, 8. The paeonic ratio includes also the bacchius and cretic. These three ratios are the βάσεις of the three measures.

§ 5. 'Now all the rest (of the ῥυθμοί) are to be discarded, not only for the reasons already mentioned, but also because they are metrical (too suggestive of the cadence of regular verse): but the paeon is to be adopted: for it is the only one of the rhythms named which cannot be made into a regular verse, and therefore (the use of it) is most likely to escape detection'. ἀπὸ μόνου γὰρ κ.τ.λ., that is, it is an element of rhythm, not metre. Hermann, *Elem. doctr. metr.* II 19, de vers. Cret. (near the beginning of the chapter), has a criticism of this passage which

¹ Aristotle writes παιάν: Cicero, *paeon* in the Orator, and *paeon* in the de Oratore: Quintilian, *paeon*.

γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι μέτρον τῶν ῥηθέντων ῥυθμῶν, ὥστε
 μάλιστα λανθάνειν. νῦν μὲν οὖν χρῶνται τῷ ἐνὶ
 παιᾶνι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι <καὶ τελευτῶντες¹>, δεῖ δὲ διαφέ-
 6 ρειν τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἔστι δὲ παιᾶνος δύο

¹ *addidit Bekker, ed. III.*

he quotes, attributing to the author a misconception of the nature of the paeonic measure, which has caused him to fall into the error of denying it to be a metre¹. See Cic. Orator, § 194, *paeon autem minime est aptus ad versum*; and the whole section. Also § 218, *numerus a quibusdam* (Aristotle, no doubt), *non pes habetur*. 'At present the one (form of) paeon is employed (at the end) as well as at the beginning (of the sentence), but the end ought to be different to the beginning'. Vater proposed to supply *τελευτῶντες* before *καὶ ἀρχόμενοι*: but in a writer like Aristotle the supplement or opposite may be very well supposed to be implied in the *καί*.

§ 6. 'There are two kinds of paeon opposed to one another, of which the one is suitable at the beginning (of the sentence or period), as in fact it is employed: and this is the one which begins with the long (syllable), and ends with three short. *Δαλογενὲς εἴτε Λυκίαν*, "O Delos-born, or if perchance Lycia" (were thy birthplace). The poet, whose alternative is cut short by the inexorable brevity of the quotation, was doubtless going on, as the manner of the ancient poets is, to offer the deity whom he was addressing the choice of the various titles under which he was known and worshipped, expressive of place of birth, special character or office: which was done to avoid the possibility of giving offence by omitting any title of honour of which he might be specially proud. The following specimens of a very frequent custom will suffice to illustrate it. Hor. Carm. Sec. line 14, *Lenis Ilithya... sive tu Lucina probas vocari seu Genitalis*. Sat. II 6. 20, *Matutine pater, seu Iane libentius audis*. [We may also compare Horace's enumeration of the favourite haunts of Apollo, *qui rore puro Castaliae lavit crines solutos, qui Lyciae tenet dumeta natalemque silvam Delius et Patareus Apollo*. Od. III 4. 61.] Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἔστιν, εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένω, τοῦτό νιν προσενέπω. Agam. 147. The author of the paeon was apparently about to add after *Λυκίαν*, *νέμων* or some such word, offering the god the alternative birthplace of Lycia, if he happened to prefer it. The Homeric epithet *Λυκηγενής*, Il. Δ 101, 119, is usually supposed to denote his Lycian birthplace, Patara, though Müller, *Dor.* II 6. 8, would "rather understand" by it 'born of light'. On the epithet *Λύκειος*, frequently applied to Apollo by the Tragedians, as Aesch. Suppl. 668 (with Paley's note), Sept. c. Theb. 133, Agam. 1228, Soph. Oed. R. 203 (Schneidewin), Electr. 6, &c. &c., see Müller's *Dorians*, II 6. 8, where the various significations of Apollo's titles are discussed at length; and Donaldson's *New Cratylus* § 269, on the connexion of *λύκος* with

¹ Though I cannot see much force in Hermann's argument against Aristotle, yet it must be owned that it is odd to deny that to be metrical, which derived its very name from the hymns to Apollo which were principally written in that measure, as may be seen from the two specimens here quoted.

εἴδῃ ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀρμόττει, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶνται· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν οὗ ἄρχει μὲν ἡ μακρά, τελευτῶσι δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαι,

Δαλογενὲς εἴτε Λυκίαν

καὶ

χρυσεοκόμα Ἑκατε παῖ Διός.

ἕτερος δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας, οὗ βραχεῖαι ἄρχουσι τρεῖς, ἡ δὲ μακρά τελευταία·

μετὰ δὲ γὰν ὕδατα τ' ὠκεανὸν ἠφάνισε νύξ.

οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ· ἡ γὰρ βραχεῖα διὰ τὸ

λευκός and -λύκη. [In G. Curtius' *Greek Etymology*, § 88 λευκός and ἀμφι-λύκη, and § 89 λύκος, no such connexion is suggested.]

Brandis' 'Anonymus' [*Philologus* IV. 1] reads "Δαλογενές", εἴτα, "Λύκιε ἐκάεργε".

Victorius has noted that this and the following quotation are both commencements of paeans to Apollo, from which the name of the metre is derived : and each of them exemplifies the 'paeon at the beginning'.

"Golden-haired Archer son of Zeus". The other, the opposite to this, in which three short syllables form the beginning, and the long one comes at the end. "After earth and its waters, night obscured (blotted out) ocean". In the Greek line there are four pure paeans, all of this construction --- : but Ar. appears to quote it as an exemplification only of this form of paeon in the last place of the verse, or rhythm.

ἐξ ἐναντίας] = ἐναντίως, or ἐναντίον, *ex opposito*. Polit. VIII (V) 11, 1314 a 31, ὁ δ' ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. Herod. VII 225, οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἐπισπόμενοι. Thucyd. IV 33, ἐξ ἐναντίας οὗτοι καθεστήκεσαν, 'opposite', opposed to ἐκ πλαγίου. Ep. ad Titum ii. 8, ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας. ἐξ ἐναντίου is the more usual form. The ellipse to be supplied is according to Bos, *Ellips.* p. 325 (562, ed. Schäfer), χώρας, corrected to ἀρχῆς by Schäfer ad loc., q. v., where several instances of the omission of that word are produced. But the ellipse of ὁδός, in one or other of its cases, is very much more common than that of χώρα or ἀρχή, in the formation of adverbs and quasi-adverbs in the feminine, genitive, dative and accusative; such as ἡ τῇ ταύτῃ τῇδε ἐκείνῃ ἄλλῃ et sim.—a large number of instances of these three varieties of the ellipse of ὁδός is collected under that head in the work referred to, pp. 188—192; and at p. 192 init. ἐπ' ἐναντίας φέρεσθαι is rightly inserted among them by Leisner (one of the earlier editors).

'And this makes a (true and proper) end: for' (γὰρ: the reason of this, that the long syllable *is* required for the end, may be inferred from the consideration that follows of the incompleteness, &c. of the *short* syllable) 'the short syllable by reason of its incompleteness makes (the rhythm appear) mutilated (cut prematurely short)'. Cic. Orator, §§ 214, 215, 218, u. s.

ἀτελὴς εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβόν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι καὶ δὴλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτήν, μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ῥυθμόν.

- 7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὐρυθμον δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὐρυθμον ποιοῦσι ῥυθμοὶ καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εῖρηται· τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ εἰρο- CHAP. IX.

κολοβόν] *truncus*, de Soph. El. 17, 176 a 40, ὅσα μὴ σαφῶς ἀλλὰ κολοβῶς ἐρωτᾶται, παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει ὁ ἔλεγχος. Poste, 'elliptical.' For other examples see the Lexicons.

'But the (sentence or period) should be broken off (brought *abruptly* to a close) and the end marked by the long syllable—not (however) by the scribe (or copyist), nor by a marginal annotation (marking the end of the sentence), but by the measure itself'. διὰ with the accusative, which indicates the cause or motive, (not the medium, channel or means, which is διὰ with genitive,) here implies that the indication of the end of the sentence should not be *due* to the scribe or his marks, stops, or what not, but solely to the rhythm: that the end should appear by the abrupt close of *that*.

παραγραφὴ, a by-writing, or marginal annotation. That these were occasionally *stops* appears from our use of the word 'paragraph': just as the words that we use for *stops*, comma, colon, period, originally represented members of the period or the whole period itself. Victorius aptly quotes, Cic. Orat. c. LXVIII § 228 (already referred to), *quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio, quae non aut spiritu pronunciantis aut interductu librarii, sed numero coacta debet insistere*. And to the same effect de Orat. III 44. 173, where the *librariorum notae* are again mentioned. Victorius also cites Isocr. Antid. § 59—to the clerk of the supposed court—ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς παραγραφῆς ἀναγνῶθι κ.τ.λ. Ernesti *Lex. Tech. Gr.* s. v. [In the papyrus of the Funeral Oration of Hyperides, preserved in the British Museum, and edited in *fac-simile* by Professor Churchill Babington, the approach of the end of a sentence is indicated by a short interlinear dash below the first word of the line in which the sentence is about to close.]

§ 7. 'So this subject, that the composition should be rhythmical, and not altogether without rhythm, and what rhythms, and how constructed, make style rhythmical, is finished and done with'.

CHAP. IX.

We now come to another kind of ἀρμονία, the adaptation of the several parts of the sentence to one another in order to its fit composition (*apta compositio*, Cic. [de Orat. III 52. 200]), shewn in the arrangement of its words and subordinate clauses. The subject of the chapter is accordingly the period and its construction; and some of its leading figures—those originally introduced by Gorgias and his school—are illustrated by several examples from Isocrates' Panegyricus.

μένην καὶ τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν τοῖς
 διθυράμβοις ἀναβολαί, ἢ κατεστραμμένην καὶ ὁμοίαν
 2 ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστρόφοις. ἡ μὲν
 οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν. “Ἡροδότου
 Θουρίου ἡδ’ ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις.” ταύτη γὰρ πρό- p. 124.

Of the two principal varieties of style, the *εἰρομένη* and *κατεστραμμένη* λέξις, the latter more usually called *περιοδική*, the style of Demosthenes, Isocrates, and the more finished rhetoricians, there is a detailed account in the Introduction, in the analysis of this chapter, p. 306 seq. So that we may at once pass on to the translation, and the particular points of interest and difficulty that the text offers. On Dionysius’ distinction of three varieties of style, see p. 306, note 4. On the *εἰρομένη* λέξις, the earlier style of Hecataeus, Herodotus and the *λογογράφοι*, see p. 307, and 306, note 5; and on *ἀναβολαί*, to which this style of prose is compared, p. 307 note 1. The opposite style, *ἡ κατεστραμμένη*, is described at length, pp. 308—310. See Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v. *συστρέφειν*. For a good description of both, following Aristotle, see Demetr. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 12.

§ 1. ‘The style must be either *loose and concatenated*’ (the sentences loosely strung together, connected solely by connecting particles, as *δέ*, *καί*, like onions on a string) ‘and one only by the connecting particle, like the preludes in the dithyrambs, or *close and compact* (i. e. periodic) and resembling the (regular) antistrophes of the old lyric poets’, Pindar Arion, Stesichorus, and the like. The last of the three is said to have owed his new name of Stesichorus—his original name was Tisias—to his having been the first to bring the chorus to a stand, make it stationary, for a time at least; and give it order, regularity, symmetry, and dignity. This is also attributed to Arion.

§ 2. ‘Now the loose style is the ancient (original) one. “This is the setting forth of the researches of Herodotus of Thurii.” This style which was formerly universal is now confined to a few. By *loose* I mean that which has no end in itself except the completion of the subject under discussion. And it is displeasing by reason of its endlessness (or *indefinite* length or character, *supra* c. 8. 2); for every one desires to have the end distinctly in view’. Quintilian, VIII 5. 27, thus describes the *εἰρομένη* λέξις, *soluta fere oratio, et e singulis non membris sed frustis collata, structura caret*. Cicero, Or. LV 186, notices the want of ‘numbers’ in Herodotus and his predecessors: which may possibly include the periodic structure of sentences; as Aristotle does, *infra* § 3, *ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἢ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις*.

[Ἡροδότου Θουρίου] This appears to be the reading of all mss, except that A^c has *θυρίον*. Herodotus did actually join the colony established at Thurium in 443 (Clinton, *F. H.* sub anno 443, col. 3), and was thence sometimes called a Thurian from this his second birthplace. So Strabo, XIV c. 2, (Caria,) p. 657, of Halicarnassus; *ἄνδρες δὲ γεγόνασιν ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἡρόδοτός τε ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὃν ὕστερον Θούριον ἐκάλεσαν, διὰ τὸ κοινωνῆσαι τῆς εἰς Θουρίους ἀποικίας*. Plut. de

τερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται. λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὐτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὲς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν. διό περ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται

exilio, c. 13, τὸ δέ, “Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσεῶς ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις ἦδε,” πολλοὶ μεταγράφουσι, “Ἡροδότου Θουρίου.” μετώκησε γὰρ εἰς Θουρίου, καὶ τῆς ἀποικίας ἐκείνης μέτεσχε. Id. de Herodoti malignitate c. 35, καὶ ταῦτα, Θούριον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων νομιζόμενον, αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀλικαρνασσεῶν περιεχόμενον. The second of these passages may be interpreted to mean, that the reading in Plutarch's time was often found altered *in the copies of Herodotus' history*, from Ἀλικαρνασσεῶς to Θουρίου; and if so, no doubt Aristotle's copy *may* have had that reading, which he transferred to his Rhetoric. But on the other hand, Demetrius, *περὶ ἐρμηνείας*, § 17 (*περὶ περιόδου*), in quoting the same passage, follows the reading of all our MSS Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσεῶς ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις ἦδε. Which, together with two other inaccuracies of quotation (in the Rhet.), the transposition of ἦδε, and the writing ἀπόδειξις for ἀπόδειξις—Demetr. preserves the correct form—leads me rather to conclude that the variation from our text is due here, as we have already seen in so many other instances, to our author's carelessness in quoting from memory, without referring to the original. Aristotle was a book-collector, and no doubt *possessed* a copy of Herodotus. Victorius thinks that the reading here is sufficiently justified by the fact that Herodotus did actually become a citizen of Thurii, and was so called. But the point here to be decided is not whether he was ever so called by others, or even by himself at odd times; but whether he did, or did not, write himself a Thurian at the commencement of his own history: which I deny, and attribute the implied assertion of that fact as a mere misquotation to our author himself.

‘And this is why it is only at the goal that (the runners) pant (or gasp) and become faint, because whilst they are looking forward to the limit of the race they don't flag before that (i.e. before they have reached the goal)’. This, as I have said in *Introd.* p. 311, note, seems the explanation of the illustration which is required by the application of it and by the context. The sight of the goal before them, the term of their labour, keeps up the racers' spirits and stimulates their exertions, so that they neither faint nor fail till they reach it: *then* ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται, they breathe hard, and their exertions being over, their sinews are relaxed, they slacken and grow languid. This interpretation, which is opposed to that of Victorius (see note u.s.), makes the καμπτήρ, which is properly the *turning-point* of the δίαυλος—whence its name—*here* the goal of the στάδιον or single race, in a straight line: the καμπτήρ of the δίαυλος being in fact the πέρασ of the στάδιον. If the καμπτήρ were intended here for the turning-point, the statement made of it could not be true, for in that case the runners would not come in sight of the goal until they had *passed* the καμπτήρ. So in *Eth. N.* v. 1. 2, 1095 ὁ 1, an illustration is borrowed from the *single foot-race*, the στάδιον; ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ

3 προορώντες γὰρ τὸ πέρασ οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον. ἡ

σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀβλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν (to illustrate the Platonic ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς). And similarly the Tragic poets express reaching the term or end of life by κάμπειν, which seems to imply the necessity of this explanation. Soph. Oed. Col. 91, ἐνταῦθα κάμψειν τὸν ταλαίπωρον βίον. Eur. Hel. 1666, ὅταν δὲ κάμψῃς καὶ τελευτήσῃς βίον. Electr. 956, πρὶν ἂν τέλος γραμμῆς ἴκηται καὶ πέρασ κάμψῃ βίον. Hippol. 87, τέλος δὲ κάμψαιμ' ὥσπερ ἡρξάμεν βίον. This single course is also called δρόμος ἀκαμπτος, or ἀπλοῦς, or εὐθύς, Pollux et Hesychius ap. Stallbaum ad Phaedo 72 B. The καμπτήρ, or στήλη, with the inscription κάμψον, was called τέρμα, βατήρ, τέλος and νύσσα. Comp. Krause *Gymn. u. Agon. der Hell.* I 140.

ἐκλύονται] Comp. Isocr. Paneg. § 150, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλελυμένους (slack, remiss). Ib. ἀντίδ. § 59, ἵν' οὖν μὴ παντάπασιν ἐκλυθῶ (be exhausted) πολλῶν ἔτι μοι λεκτέων ὄντων. Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 6, πλοῖα ἐκλελυμένα, of crazy vessels. Ib. Hist. Anim. IX 1. 32, ἕως ἂν ἐκλύσωσιν (of taming elephants). Xen. de Ven. 5. 5, dogs lose their keen smell in the summer διὰ τὸ ἐκλελύσθαι τὰ σώματα. Ar. Probl. xxx 1. 6, λίαν πολὺς (οἶνος) ἐκλύει, de Gen. Anim. I 18. 51, ἔκλυσις, relaxation, weakness. Ib. V 7. 21, ἡ ἀρχὴ ἣ κινουσα τὴν φωνὴν ἐκλύεται.

§ 3. 'Such then is the loose ('jointed' Mure, *H. G. L.*) kind of style; the compact, condensed, concentrated, kind is the periodic, that which is constructed in periods: by *period* I mean a sentence (*lit.* kind of style or composition) having a beginning and end in itself, and a magnitude such as can be readily taken in at one view'. The other style is ἀπειρος, *perpetua*, indefinite, continuous, running on without end, and without proper divisions; and therefore *can't* be comprehended in one view. εὐσύνοπτον, comp. Pol. IV (VII) 4, ult. ἡ μεγίστη ὑπερβολὴ πλήθους...εὐσύνοπτος, (for purposes of supervision). So of a tragedy, Poet. VII 10. 74, ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι. On the construction ἡ εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως, for ἡ εἰρομένη λέξις, see the examples in Matthiae's *Gr. Gr.* 442. 2. Add this, and Isocr. Paneg. § 132, τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς, ib. § 148, τὴν ἀοίκητον τῆς χώρας. Plat. Protag. 329 A, δόλιχον τοῦ λόγου. Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1312 b 20, πολλὰ τῶν καταλύσεων.

'A style of this kind is agreeable, and easy to be learnt' (εὐμαθής, passive; see Aesch. Eum. 442, Soph. Aj. 15, Trach. 611, where 'easy to be learnt' means 'readily intelligible'); 'agreeable, because it is the contrary of the endless, indefinite, and also because the listener is constantly thinking by reason of this constant definite conclusion (or limitation of each sentence) that he has got hold of something (got something in his grasp—in the way of a conclusion) for himself (αὐτῷ, retained by Bekker and Spengel; *quaere* αὐτῷ?); whereas, to have nothing to look forward to (no conclusion to anticipate) either to be, or to be finished (ἀνύειν, ὥστε τινὰ ἀνύειν), either fact, or effect, is disagreeable'. It occurred to me that εἶναι, which seems superfluous, might have arisen from a repetition of the εἶν in προνοεῖν. The translation will then be, 'nothing to look forward to nor to finish (get done, effect)': ἀνύειν identifying the hearer with the speaker, as if he himself had to come to the conclusion. Comp. § 6, ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω, καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὗ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ὄρον, ἀντιστοισθῇ παυσμαμένου.

μέν οὖν εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστὶν ἡδε, κατεστραμ-
 μένη δὲ ἢ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν
 ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ
 μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἡδεῖα δ' ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής, P. 1409 b.
 ἡδεῖα μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι
 αἰεὶ τι οἶεται ἔχειν ὁ ἀκροατὴς τῷ αἰεὶ πεπεράνθαι τι
 αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ μηδὲν προνοεῖν εἶναι μηδὲ ἀνύειν ἀηδές.
 εὐμαθὴς δὲ ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος. τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι ἀριθμὸν
 ἔχει ἢ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις, ὃ πάντων εὐμνημονευτό-
 τατον. διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μνημονεύουσι μάλ-
 λον τῶν χύδην· ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει ᾧ μετρεῖται.
 4 δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι, καὶ

‘And easy to be learnt because easily recollected : and this because the periodic style can be *numbered*, and number is of all things the most easily recollected’. The proportions, or relations of the several parts or members of the period to the whole, and to one another—its symmetrical structure—can be expressed in numbers, like the numerical relations of rhythm, c. 8. This gives the periodic structure a hold upon the memory, by its definite proportions, which is entirely wanting to the continuous and indefinite succession of the other.

‘And this is why every one recollects metres (verses) better than (disorderly) irregular prose; because it has number which serves to measure it’.

τῶν χύδην] is the *soluta oratio* (Cic. Orat. § 228, alibi), the *διαλελυμένη* or *διεῤῥιμένη* λέξις (Demetrius): the incoherent style, words poured out at random, in confused mass, one after another, without order or discrimination. Thus, in distinguishing the symmetrical structure of verse from the comparative confusion and disorder of prose, Plato, Legg. VII 811 D, writes λόγων, οὓς ἐν ποιήμασιν ἢ χύδην οὕτως εἰρημένους (where οὕτως is, *Platonice*, ‘just as they are’, ‘just as it happens’, ‘indiscriminately’, ‘without order or regularity’; or ‘without consideration’, ‘just as it may be’. Heindorf Gorg. § 127 and Ast’s Lex. Plat. s. v.); Phaedr. 264 B, οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλήσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου (helter-skelter, like rubbish shot out of a cart; Thompson). Rep. VII 537 C, τὰ τε χύδην μαθήματα...γενόμενα (taught promiscuously). Isocr. Panath. § 24, ὁμοίως ἂν εἶναι δόξαιμι τοῖς εἰκὴ καὶ φορτικῶς καὶ χύδην ὅτι ἂν ἐπέλθῃ λέγουσιν (who utter at random, promiscuously anything that comes into their head). Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 2, 1324 b 5, τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὥς εἰπεῖν κειμένων (shot out in a heap, indiscriminately, at random, without order or system), de part. An. IV 5. 27, ᾧ δὲ διασπαρμένα χύδην. The passage of Plato, Legg. u.s., is referred to by Dionysius, Ars Rhet. x 6 (v 381 ed. Reiske), οὐ χύδην, ὥς ζυγὸν βεβλήσθαι τὰ ἐνθυμήματα.

§ 4. ‘The period must also be completed (or brought to a conclusion)

μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἰαμβεῖα,

Καλυδὼν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπέας χθονός·

τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι τῆς
Πελοποννήσου.

by the sense (*καί*, as well as by the structure and rhythm) and not broken off abruptly (without completing the sense: *διακόπτειν* 'to cut in two'), like Sophocles' iambics, "Calydon is this land of the Pelopian soil—": for the contrary supposition (to this real fact) arises from (*lit.* is caused *by*; *dativus instrumenti*) this (wrong) division (in general), as *also* in the instance given, that Calydon belongs to the Peloponnesus'.

We learn from the Anonymous Scholiast on this passage (see Brandis' tract [*Philologus* IV i] pp. 46, 7), and more precisely from the Schol. on Ar. Ran. 1269, that this verse comes not from Sophocles, but from Eur. Meleager, of which it is the commencement. See Wagner, *Fragm. Eur. Mel.* I (*Fr. Tr. Gr.* II 270). The second verse, which completes the author's meaning, is supplied by Lucian, Conv. c. 25 (Hemsterh. III. 436), and Demetr. *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* § 58 (*Rhet. Gr.* Spengel III 275), *ἐν ἀντιπύρθοις πέδι' ἔχουσ' εὐδαίμονα*: and the three following by Wagner, u.s. This makes it clear that this misstatement was not due to Euripides. As to the substitution of Sophocles for Euripides as the author, I have no doubt, from the abundant evidence we have already had, that it is due solely to a lapse of memory on Ar.'s part, and that no alteration of the text, as suggested by Vater and Buhle, is required.

The *stop*, or *pause*, which the speaker or reader makes, when introduced in the wrong place, may make a complete alteration in the meaning: as here, if the verse be read as an entire sentence with the pause at *χθονός*, it conveys the meaning that Calydon is situated in the Peloponnesus, which is contrary to the fact: but if it be read continuously without a pause with the ensuing line, the true sense becomes clear. *διαίρεσθαι* here is equivalent to *διαστίξαι* III 5. 6, comp. Anon. ap. Brandis, p. 47, *οἳ εἰσι κατὰ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα μὲν διαστίξαντες ἄλλην διάνοιαν ἀπαρτίσομεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ διαστίξαντες ἄλλην*. This is in fact the 'fallacy of division', de Soph. El. 4, 166 a 33, *παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν*, where two verses are quoted in illustration.

Demetrius u.s. quotes the two verses in illustration of a different kind of fault; the interpolation of a *σύνδεσμος*—in which he includes *interjections*—by actors, as an *expletive*. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναπληροῦντες, φησί, τὸν σύνδεσμον εἰκάσι τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς τοῖς τὸ καὶ τὸ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἔπος λέγουσιν, οἷον εἴ τις ὦδε λέγοι, Καλυδὼν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπέας χθονός, φεῦ, ἐν ἀντιπύρθοις πέδι' ἔχουσ' εὐδαίμονα, αἰ αἰ. ὥς γὰρ παρέλκει τὸ αἰ αἰ καὶ τὸ φεῦ ἐνθάδε, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πανταχοῦ μάτην ἐμβαλλόμενος σύνδεσμος.

The MSS, with the exception of A*, have *Πελοπέας*, which is found also in Demetrius and retained by Bekker and Spengel; MS A*, Lucian, the Schol. on Aristophanes, Dindorf (*Eur. Fragm. Mel.* 2), and Wagner, read the more usual form *Πελοπίας*. The text of Euripides, who alone of the

5 περίοδος δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν κώλοις ἢ δ' ἀφελής. ἔστι δ' ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἢ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διηρημένη καὶ εὐανάπνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει ὥσπερ ἡ εἰρημένη περίοδος, ἀλλ' ὅλη. κῶλον δ' ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον three Tragedians uses the word, has Περίοδος in five places, including the line of the Meleager (Beck's Index).

§ 5. 'A period may be either divided into clauses, or simple (confined to one)'. Ar. himself defines what he means here by ἀφελής, viz. μονόκωλος, a sentence consisting of a single member, without the complication, or elaborate construction of the period. ἀφελής properly denotes smooth and level, without inequalities or irregularities, as Arist. Eq. 527, διὰ τῶν ἀφελῶν πεδίων ἔρρει. It is therefore 'plain' as opposed to 'mountainous', literally and metaphorically, level, easy to be traversed, simple, *plain*; whereas the mountain is suggestive of difficulty. It is applied by Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene [c. 2], to Lysias' style, which is said to be λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής, 'smooth and plain or simple'. Lysias' style is in fact a medium between the εἰρομένη λέξις of Hecataeus and Herodotus, and the complex periods of Isocrates and Demosthenes: and a comparison of the sentences of Lysias with those of Demosthenes will clearly shew the difference between the ἀφελής and ἡ ἐν κώλοις περίοδος. Quint. IX 4. 124, 12. 5. *Genera eius (periodi) duo sunt: alterum simplex, quum sensus unus longiore ambitu circumducitur; alterum, quod constat membris (ἐν κώλοις) et incisus, quae plures sensus habent. Habet periodus membra minimum duo: medius numerus videntur quatuor* (so Cic. Orat. § 221), *sed recipit frequenter et plura.*

'The period in clauses or divisions must be complete in itself, duly divided (its members distinct and definite), and such as can be easily delivered without stopping to draw breath' (*lit.* easily breathed, well adapted to the limits of the breath).

εὐανάπνευστος] Cic. de Or. III 44. 175, *Rudis orator incondite fundit... spiritu non arte determinat.* Orat. § 228, *Non spiritu pronunciantis... debet insistere.*

'Not however (μὴ, if, provided, it be not) by the mere (arbitrary) division (as if the speaker might pause for breath, *wherever he pleases*), as (in) the period already cited (Καλυδὼν μὲν ἦδε...), but as a whole. A member or clause is one of the two parts of this. By *simple* I mean a period of a single member'. It appears from this that a period, according to Ar., is a sentence that includes a *complete sense*¹, and is thereby distinguished from a κῶλον or member of it: which *is* a member or part of a whole, and therefore incomplete until the whole has been expressed. The period therefore is twofold, simple, μονόκωλος, and compound, ἐν κώλοις. The phrase τὸ ἕτερον μόριον divides the compound period primarily or essentially into *two* parts, which stands for, and may be extended to, division in general. Cicero, as Vater

¹ So Hermog. περὶ εὐρέσεως τομ. δ', περὶ περιόδου (II 241 *Rh. Gr.* Spengel), of the κῶλον. The period may consist of one, two, three or four, colons. κῶλον δὲ ἔστιν ἀπηρτισμένη διάνοια, a complete sense. Aristotle admits this *only* of the μονόκωλος περίοδος.

6 μόριον ταύτης. ἀφελῇ δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μούρους εἶναι

observes, acknowledges the compound alone to be a true period. Τὸ δὲ κῶλον Ἀριστοτέλης οὕτως ὀρίζεται, "κῶλόν ἐστι τὸ ἕτερον μέρος περιόδου" εἴτα ἐπιφέρει, "γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀπλῇ περιόδος." οὕτως ὀρισάμενος "τὸ ἕτερον μέρος" δίκωλον ἐβούλετο εἶναι τὴν περίοδον δηλονότι. ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος συλλαβῶν τὸν ὅρον τοῦ Ἀρ., καὶ τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον τῷ ὄρω σαφέστερον καὶ τελεώτερον οὕτως ὠρίσαστο, "κῶλόν ἐστιν ἥτοι ἀπλῇ περιόδος, ἣ συνθέτου περιόδου μέρος" [Demetrius p. ἐρμηνείας, § 34]. On κῶλα and κόμματα in general, see Introd. pp. 312, 3, note 1.

μονόκωλος appears in a totally different sense, Pol. IV (VII) 7, 1327 ὁ 35, τὰ μὲν γὰρ (ἔθνη) ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, one-sided, ill-balanced, like a man with one arm or leg; opposed to the Athenian, *in se totus teres atque rotundus*.

§ 6. 'The members or clauses and the periods themselves should be neither truncated (cut prematurely short), nor too long'. *Constat ille ambitus et plena comprehensio ex quattuor fere partibus, quae membra dicimus, ut et aures impleat et ne brevior sit quam satis sit neque longior*. Cic. Orat. § 221.

μούρους] This word is variously written *μν-* and *μεί-ουρος*, and so here the MSS. The Lexicons, including Stephens', regard them as two different words: Stephens only distinguishing the *sense*, *μείουρος*, *κολήβουρος*, bob-tailed, with a stunted tail; *μούρους*, sharp-tailed, like a mouse: while Liddell and Scott, and Rost and Palm, deriving *μούρους* from a mouse's tail, set the facts of the case at defiance by defining it nevertheless 'curtailed', '*abgestutzt oder abgestumpft*'. This at all events is no doubt the meaning of it. It seems to me rather that the word is the same, and the variety only in the spelling. The meaning of it is always the same; bob-tailed, curtailed, originally; and thence blunted, truncated, docked, maimed, cut *short* where you would naturally expect a prolongation. Comp. Poet. c. XXVI 13, *ἐὰν μὲν ἓνα τὸν μῦθον ποιῶσιν ἀνάγκη ἢ βραχέα δεικνύμενον μούρου φαίνεσθαι*, unnaturally, unduly, curtailed. See Twining's note, p. 557. He refers to Hephaest. *μείουρος* *στίχος*, ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἑλλείπων χρόνος, opposed to *δολίχουρος*, 'long-tailed', ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος πλεονάζων συλλαβῇ. Comp. de part. Anim. III 1. 13, of blunt-nosed, as opposed to sharp-nosed, fishes: *οἱ σαρκοφάγοι*, fishes of prey, like the shark, are sharp-nosed, *οἱ δὲ μὴ σαρκοφάγοι μούροι* (a bulldog's nose is particularly *μούρους*). And again IV 13. 22, the same remark is repeated. Pausanias, X 16. 1, describing one of Croesus' offerings at Delphi, *σχῆμα δὲ τοῦ ὑποθήματος κατὰ πύργον μάλιστα ἐς μούρου αἰόντα ἀπὸ εὐρυτέρου τοῦ κάτω*, of a truncated cone or pyramid. Athenaeus (XIV 632 D, E, *ter.*) of three kinds of defective verses; *ἀκέφαλοι*, at the beginning, as a verse beginning with *ἐπειδή*; *λαγαροί*, prop. spider-shaped, contracted or weak in the flanks; hence of verses, faulty in the middle (*claudicant in medio* Schweighäuser ad loc.), where a short syllable occurs for a long one in the middle of the verse: illustrated by Il. B [11] 731, and another hexameter which Schweighäuser can't find, and to him is inexplicable; and thirdly *μείουροι*, *οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκβολῆς*, at the end of the verse; of which three specimens are given, Il. M [XII] 208, another which

μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίνειν πολ-
λάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν· ἀνάγκη γάρ, ὅταν ἔτι
ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ
ὄρον, ἀντισπασθῇ πανσαμένου, οἷον προσπταίνειν
γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολεί-
πεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ
τέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπερι-

is misquoted from Il. Θ [VIII] 305, and a third from Od. ι' [IX] 212. This passage of Athenaeus is quoted at length by Hermann, *El. doct. metr.* II 26.20. Athenaeus writes μέλουρος. Ernesti *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v. μείουρος.

‘For that (sc. the κῶλον) which is too short often makes the listener stumble (*balks* him by bringing him up short and abruptly); because if, whilst he is still hurrying (eager) to get on (forward), and to the (end or completion of the) measure (rhythm), of which he has already a definition (i.e. a definite and preconceived notion) in himself, he be suddenly pulled up (checked, *lit.* pulled against) by a pause (a premature cessation on the part of the speaker), there must necessarily follow (arise γίγνεσθαι) a sort of stumble by reason of the check’.

προσπταίνειν] must be regarded as a subst. in the accusative before γίγνεσθαι, equivalent to τὸ προσπταίνειν. The metaphor is, from driving: a sudden and unexpected check, or pulling against him, will often cause a horse to stumble, or bring him on his knees. The abrupt cessation of the onward motion, in the listener's mind, as in the horse's career, produces analogous effects—whence the metaphor—in the two cases.

‘Those again which are too long produce a feeling of being left behind, like those who (in a measured walk, as in the colonnade of a gymnasium) turn back only after passing (not till they have passed) the limit; for they too—like the speaker that uses too long periods—leave behind their companions in the walk’.

The notion is that of a party walking backwards and forwards in the portico of a gymnasium, the walk, like the period, being properly limited, though the limit is capable of being passed. If one of the party—suppose Aristotle himself—in his daily περίπατοι in the Lyceum—chanced to have thus outstripped his companions, the latter would be left in the lurch, and be no longer able to hear him. Similarly the speaker who makes his periods of undue length, leaves *his* hearers in the lurch: they stop short, as it were, and lose the thread of his discourse. ἀποκάμπειν is here not in its usual sense, but ‘to turn away’ in the sense of ‘turning back’, as ἀποδιδόναι, ἀπονέμειν, ἀπατεῖν.

On this subject comp. Cic. Orat. LIII 178, *itaque et longiora et breviora iudicat et perfecta ac moderata semper expectat; mutila sentit quaedam et quasi decurtata, quibus tanquam debito fraudetur offenditur, productiora alia et quasi immoderatus excurrentia, quae magis etiam aspernantur aures, et seq.*

πατοῦντας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὔσαι p. 125.
 λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολῇ ὅμοιον. ὥστε γίνεται ὃ
 ἔσκωψε Δημόκριτος ὁ Χίος εἰς Μελανιππίδην ποιή-
 σαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστροφῶν ἀναβολάς,

οἱ τ' αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων,

ἡ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη·

ἀρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς μακροκόλους

‘And in like manner also the periods that are too long become so many speeches, and like a dithyrambic prelude; that is, rambling and incoherent, without unity or system.

αἱ περίοδοι...λόγος γίνεται] verb attracted from the plural to the singular, as the nearer of the two: so *infra*, αἱ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίνονται. For ὅμοιον cf. *triste lupus stabulis*, et sim. On ἀναβολή, see note 1, *Intro.* p. 307.

‘And therefore what Democritus of Chios quoted to taunt Melanippides for writing (long, rambling) dithyrambic preludes instead of the (compact and regular) stanzas, is realized (in these overgrown periods). “A man works mischief to himself in working mischief to another, and the long dithyrambic prelude is most mischievous to its composer” (substituted for ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλή τῷ βουλευσάντι κακίστη, of the original, Hesiod. *Op. et D.* 263): for a taunt of the same kind may also be appropriately applied to the long-membered gentry, (the dealers in long-membered periods)’. *The makers of the periods* are themselves called here μακρόκωλοι. To scan the second verse of the quotation μακρᾶναβολή must be read as a crasis. “Democritus Chius Musicus, Abderitae aequalis teste Diogene Laertio, IX 49 (γεγόνασι δὲ Δημόκριτοι ἕξ· πρῶτος αὐτὸς οὗτος, δεύτερος Χίος μουσικὸς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον). Meminerunt eius Suidas s. v. χιάζειν, Pollux, IV 9. 4, Arist. *Rhet.* III 9. De hoc omnium optime egit Coraes ἐν Χιακῆς ‘*Ἀρχαιολογίας* ‘Υλη ‘*Ἀτακτ.* III p. 192, seq.” Müllach, ad *Democr. Fragm.* p. 91.

In the note on ἀναβολαί, *Intro.* p. 307, already referred to, may be found some account of the two kinds of dithyramb here alluded to; the earlier antistrophic form of that of Arion, Stesichorus, Pindar, and the novel, relaxed, often incoherent, extravagances, of Melanippides and his followers. Nevertheless, Melanippides is selected by Aristodemus, in answer to Socrates’ question, *Xen. Mem.* I 4 3, as the most distinguished representative of dithyrambic poetry, as Homer of epic, Sophocles of tragedy, Polyclethus of sculpture, and Zeuxis of painting. This represents the popular judgment, as opposed to that of the critics. On this subject, I have referred to Bode, *Gesch. der Hell. Dichtk.* Vol. II Pt. II p. 111 seq. and 293 seq. and to Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. xxx. See also Arist. *Probl.* XIX 15. Of Melanippides of Melos, there is a life in *Smith’s Biogr. Dict.* [E. Curtius, *Greek Hist.* Vol. IV p. 102 of Ward’s tr.]

‘Those which have their members too short make no period at all: and so it (i. e. the period made up of these short κῶλα) drags the hearer with it headlong’. The audience is *carried away* by them, as by a

λέγειν. αἶ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίγνεται·
προπετὴ οὖν ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατὴν.

- 7 τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἢ μὲν διηρημένη ἐστὶν ἢ δὲ
ἀντικειμένη, διηρημένη μὲν οἶον “πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα
τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνι-
κοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων,” ἀντικειμένη δέ, ἐν ἡ
ἐκατέρῳ τῷ κώλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται
ἢ ταὐτὸ ἐπέξευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἶον “ἀμφοτέρους P. 1412.
δ’ ὤνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθή-
σαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείῳ τῆς οἴκοι προσεκτή-
σαντο, τοῖς δὲ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον.” ἐναντία
ὑπομονή ἀκολούθησις, ἱκανόν πλείον. “ὥστε καὶ τοῖς

horse, at a headlong, break-neck, pace. Specimens of this style are given in Introd. p. 314, note 1.

§ 7. ‘The periodic style has two divisions, of which the one has its clauses (simply) divided, the other opposed to one another; an instance of simple division is, “I have often wondered that those who first assembled these universal gatherings and established the athletic contests...”’ διηρημένη λέξις, “in qua membra periodi copula a se invicem distinguuntur.” Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* διαίρειν. This is the opening of Isocrates’ Panegyric Speech, supposed or intended to be delivered at the ‘General Assembly’ of the great Olympic games—whence the name. It is remarkable, and shews that Ar. could not have looked at the passage he was quoting, that the very next words to those at which his quotation stops, long before the end of the sentence, contain a regular antithesis or opposition of members, and the ‘simple division’ is absolutely confined to the words cited. I should suppose that he could not have been aware of this.

‘(An instance) of the antithetic period, wherein in each of the two clauses contrary by contrary are brought together, or (the same word is imposed as a yoke, i.e. bracket, or *vinculum*, on both contraries) the two contraries are coupled together by one and the same word, is “Both they served, them that remained, and them that followed; for the one they acquired more land than they had at home in addition, and to the others they left behind sufficient in what they had at home.” ὑπομονή, (staying behind) is contrary to ἀκολούθησις (following), ἱκανόν το πλείον’.

It is unnecessary to say that the passage is quoted wrong: it runs in the original, Paneg. § 35, 6, ἀμφ. δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀκολ. καὶ τοὺς ὑπομ. ἔσωσαν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι χώραν κατέλιπον, τοῖς δὲ πλείῳ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐπόρισαν. The first clause is an exemplification of ἐπίξευξις, on which see note *μήτρα* c. 5 § 7; the second, of the antithesis of contraries in two clauses balanced and opposed to one another.

In the quotation that follows, Paneg. § 41, the original is, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς

χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις.” ἀπόλαυσις κτήσῃ ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι “συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν.” “εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἡξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον.” “πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἡπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ’ Ἀθω διορύξας.” “καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι.” “οἱ μὲν γὰρ

χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμφοτέροις ἀρμόττειν. Ar. in his alteration has adorned Isocrates' text with an additional rhetorical figure, the ὁμοιοτέλετον or rhyming terminations of δεομένοις and βουλομένοις. 'ἀπόλαυσις, (sensual) enjoyment, is opposed to κτήσῃ, acquisition', as the text has it. As these two can hardly be considered antithetical, and nothing corresponding to κτήσῃ occurs in Isocr., are we to suppose that Ar., meaning to write ἐνδεία, carelessly substituted κτήσῃ? or rather, that κτήσῃ is a mistake of a copyist for δεήσῃ, which occurs twice in the sense of 'want' II 7. 3 and 4: and also, in the same sense, Pseudo-Plato, Eryxias, 405 E *dis*.

Then follows a string of quotations from the same speech of Isocrates, illustrative of antithesis; § 48 (wrong), § 72 (right), § 89 (right again), § 105 (wrong), § 149 (right), § 181 (wrong), § 186 (wrong, ἄξειν for ἔξειν).

The passage τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον κ.τ.λ. occurs likewise in the funeral oration attributed to Lysias, § 29. This speech is marked as spurious by Baiter and Sauppe in their ed. of the *Or. Att.* If this be so, the figure is probably due to Isocrates, which is all the more likely as Lysias' style, λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής, is usually free from these rhetorical artifices. Victorius refers to an imitation of this, Cic. de Fin. II 34. 112, *Ut si Xerxes... Hellesponto iuncto, Athone perfosso, maria ambulavisset terramque navigasset.* And Lucr. III 1042 (1029, Munro), *ille quoque ipse (Xerxes) viam quī quondam per mare magnum stravīt, et seq.*

'And what some one (some advocate, in accusation, whose name Ar. either had never heard, or didn't recollect) said against Peitholaus and Lycophron in the law-court (at *some* trial: *quaere*, theirs?), "And these fellows (οὔτοι, apparently 'the accused' or 'opponents' as usual) who used to sell you when they were at home, now that they have come to you here, have bought you". Peitholaus and Lycophron were brothers of Thebe, the wife of Alexander of Pherae. At her instigation they murdered their brother-in-law and succeeded him in the dynasty. They maintained themselves long against the attacks of Philip by the aid of Onomarchus the Phocian commander, but at last were defeated, 353—352 B. C., and Onomarchus slain; upon which they "retired with their mercenaries, 2000 in number, into Phokis." Grote, *Hist. Gr.* from Diodorus, Vol. XI ch. LXXXVII pp. 366, 408, 9, 11, where Lycophron alone is mentioned as 'the despot of Pherae': in p. 412,

αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ' αἰσχροῦς ἐσώθησαν.”
 “ἰδίᾳ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ
 πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας.” “ἢ
 ζῶντας ἄξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν.” καὶ ὁ
 εἰς Πειθόλαόν τις εἶπε καὶ Λυκόφρονα ἐν τῷ δικα-
 στηρίῳ, “οὔτοι δ' ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν,
 ἐλθόντες δ' ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώνηνται.” ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα
 8 ποιεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις,

Peitholaus and Lycophron are named together for the first time as joint commanders.

As the time, place, and circumstances, as well as the speaker, of what is here related, are alike utterly unknown, any attempt at interpreting it must be a mere guess. My conjecture is, (1) that the scene is a court of justice—*where*, no one can say; I will assume at Athens—(2) that οὔτοι are Peitholaus and Lycophron, as accused or defendants—this is suggested by εἰς Π. τις εἶπε and the use of οὔτοι—and if so, this must have been *after* their downfall: and (3) that, to give the remark a point, ἐώνηνται must have a double sense. ‘These fellows, says *some one* to the judges, used when they were at home, at Pherae, to *sell you* (as slaves)—*ὑμᾶς* maliciously identifies the Athenian judges with their fellow-countrymen, captives in Thessaly—*now* that they are come to you, the tables are turned, and they have to *buy you*’ (i. e. to bribe the judges). Victorius, but utterly without point, *Videtur contumeliosa vox in eos iacta, qui pecunia, quam comparassent in suis civibus hostibus emancipandis, eadem postea uterentur in illis ab iisdem emendis, atque in servitudinem sibi adiudicandis.*

‘For all these (passages) do what has been mentioned’, i. e. give an antithetical structure to the several sentences.

§ 8. ‘This kind of style is agreeable because contraries are best known (in themselves and by reason of their opposition), and still better when placed side by side (in juxtaposition, for the purpose of contrast and comparison); and also because it resembles a syllogism; for the ἔλεγχος (the refutative syllogism) is a bringing together (for the same purpose) of the two opposites (the two contradictory conclusions)’.

This opposition of contraries in the antithesis, also reminds us of the ἔλεγχος, the conclusion of opposites, refutation by an opposite conclusion; this resemblance makes the former look like a proof, which is a source of pleasure.

Aristotle is constantly telling us—see Bonitz ad Metaph. B 2, 996 a 18—that contraries, which are the two extremes of things under the same genus, are also subject to the same science, τῶν ἐναντία μία, or ἡ αὐτή, ἐπιστήμη. And accordingly, inferences may be drawn from one contrary to another, Eth. N. V 1, 1129 a 14 seq. This appears to be the foundation of what is here said, that contraries are best known to us; they can be studied together, and one throws light upon the other. Comp. III 11. 9,

ὅτι τὰναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ' ἄλληλα μᾶλλον p. 126.
γνώριμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικε συλλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος
συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν.

- 9 ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστίν, παρίσσωσις
δ' εἰάν ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δ' εἰάν ὅμοια τὰ
ἔσχατα ἔχη ἐκάτερον τὸ κῶλον. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν
ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἔχειν. καὶ ἀρχὴ μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ

ὅσφ' ἂν...ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ τοσούτῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ
μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον...γίνεται. II 23. 30 and III 17. 13, on
ἔλεγχος, and the *conclusion* (implying learning) *from opposites*. In Probl.
XIX 5, ἡδὺ τὸ μαθάνειν is assigned, as an acknowledged truth, in ex-
planation of a musical fact. 'Best known' seems to mean that contraries,
being under the same genus, are better known than any other things that
have no such relation, or no relation at all, to one another.

On the pleasure derived from learning, which is here assumed to be
the explanation of the agreeableness of this periodic style, see the notes
on I 11. 21, 23; particularly the latter, in which it is fully illustrated from
Aristotle's writings. I will repeat here that the *Metaphysics* opens with
a statement that all men have a natural longing for (strive after) know-
ledge, πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει: and this of course
implies pleasure in learning, which is the satisfaction of this natural
appetite. The natural love of imitation or copying, which gives rise to
all the imitative arts, is based in the same way upon the desire and plea-
sure of learning. And contrariwise therefore (this is additional), as we
saw in c. 8. 2, ἀηδὲς καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον, the infinite, or indefinite, is
displeasing to us because it is unknowable. Comp. *infra* c. 10. 2, τὸ γὰρ
μαθάνειν ῥαδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστι: the *words* that convey the most
instruction to us are the most pleasing; hence the pleasure derived from
metaphors, which is explained: γλῶτται on the contrary, which teach us
nothing, are therefore disagreeable.

παρ' ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα] juxtaposition makes things more intelligible
is a fact already more than once appealed to, as II 23. 30; compare
the parallel passage, III 17. 13; III 2. 9; and again III 11. 9.

On the ἔλεγχος and its opposite conclusions, συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως
see *Intro.* on II 22, and note 1, p. 262, and again, on II 25, p. 268.

§ 9. 'Such then is antithesis; the equality of the members (or
clauses) is παρίσσωσις; παρομοίωσις is when each of the two members (the
supposition that the period consists of only *two* clauses is still carried on)
has its extremities similar (i. e. in the letters, so that the terminations
rhyme to one another). (The clauses) must have this either at the
beginning or at the end. And when they (the similar sounding letters)
are at the beginning (the figure is) always (expressed in) whole words (*lit.*
the words, entire words, always are a beginning), but at the end (it
admits of) either the (similarity of the) last syllables, or the same word
with a changed termination (declension, adverbial, adjectival, termina-
tion, &c), or the same word. Similar sound (παρομοίωσις) at the com-

ὀνόματα, ἡ δὲ τελευτὴ τὰς ἐσχάτας συλλαβὰς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα. ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα “ἀργὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ,”

δωρητοὶ τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν· ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δὲ “ὥθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέσαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγενέσθαι,” “ἐν πλείεσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν.” πτώσεις δὲ ταύτου “ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὦν χαλκοῦ.” ταῦτ’ οὖν ὄνομα “σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς.” ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δὲ “τί ἂν

mencement (may be illustrated by) such examples as this; ἀργὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν (fallow, uncultivated) παρ’ αὐτοῦ. Victorius quotes a parallel example from Xen. Cyrop. VIII 3. 15, οὐ δυνάμενος τρέφειν ἀργὸν εἰς ἀργὸν ἀπαγαγὼν ἐκέλευσεν ἐργάζεσθαι. The ‘rhyme at the beginning’ of clauses is properly called ὁμοιοκάταρκτον; at the end ὁμοιοτέλετον and, δωρητοὶ τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν. II. I [IX] 526. ‘At the end, ὥθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέσαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγενέσθαι (in this there appears to be neither rhyme nor reason [the assonance, or correspondence of vowel sounds, is however clearly marked in the two clauses]; it is most likely corrupt, says Buhle). ἐν πλείεσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν’.

‘And an inflexion (declension, change of termination from a root: see note on I 7. 27) of the same word (i. e. root) ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὦν χαλκοῦ, “worthy to be set up in brass (have a bronze statue erected in his honour, Dem. de F. L. § 296, Φίλιππον θαυμάζουσι καὶ χαλκοῦν ἰστάσι... Ib. § 378, ἔστιν ὄντιν’ ὑμεῖς...χαλκοῦν στήσαιτ’ ἂν ἐν ἀγορᾷ; as a public benefactor), not being worth a brass farthing”’. (Supposed to deserve a brass statue—*bronze* in reality—when he doesn’t deserve a brass farthing. This is in fact more in the nature of a *παρονομασία*, or play upon words, than of an ὁμοιοτέλετον. Ar. however seems to class both under his *παρομοίωσις*).

‘And the same word (repeated) ἔλεγες κακῶς...γράφεις κακῶς’. Demetrius, who repeats all this, following Arist. very closely, and sometimes borrowing his examples, supplies in his version a word which is wanting in our text, both to the sense and to the due balance of the sentence: σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς, καὶ νῦν θανόντα γράφεις κακῶς. Demetr. περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 26. Compare the three chapters, π. περιόδου, π. παρομοίων κώλων, π. ὁμοιοτελείου, *Rhet. Gr.* III 262—268, ed. Spengel. This sentence was applied by some rival orator to one who, after slandering some one all his life, after his death wrote a panegyric on him—which, the speaker says, was just as bad as his slander¹.

¹ This reminds us of Lord Lyndhurst’s saying of Campbell’s *Lives of the*

ἐπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ' εἶδες ἀργόν;" ἔστι δὲ ἅμα

'And (a rhyming termination arising) from a single syllable : δειν-όν... ἀργ-όν. And the same clause may have all three at once, and the antithesis and balance of clauses, and similar termination may be the same' (included or exemplified in one or the same clause). An instance of this is given by Victorius from a saying of Gorgias preserved by Plutarch, Cimon. c. 10, τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο. Gorg. Fragm. Sauppe, *Or. Att.* III p. 131, Fr. Inc. 6. This is not only antithesis and the rest, but a false antithesis to boot. Demetr., u. s. § 23, has supplied a much more elaborate example from Isocr. Helen. § 17. τῷ (τοῦ Isocr.) μὲν ἐπίπονον καὶ φιλοκίνδυνον τὸν βίον κατέστησε (Dem. has ἐποίησε), τῆς δὲ περιβλεπτον καὶ περιμάχητον τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησεν (Dem. κατέστησεν). 'The commencements of periods (in this view of the artificial structure of the sentence) have been enumerated with tolerable (σχεδόν 'pretty nearly') completeness (ἐξ—'out', 'to the end or full') in the Theodectea. There are also false antitheses, as Epicharmus, besides others, (καί) wrote, τόκα μὲν κ.τ.λ.' This line of Epicharmus is also given by Demetr. u. s. § 24. He speaks of it as 'said in jest', πεπαιγμένον—τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον—to make fun of the rhetoricians, σκώπτων τοὺς ῥήτορας, viz. Gorgias and his school, the inventors of antithesis and the rest of these rhetorical novelties.

For further details on the subject of these rhetorical figures introduced by Gorgias and his school, who carried them to a vicious excess, a style to which the term Γοργιάζειν was afterwards applied; which was thought to have attained its highest perfection in the measured and laboured, empty and monotonous, periods of Isocrates;—see the paper on Gorgias, *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.*, No. VII, Vol. III. p. 69 seq. where they are classified and arranged under three heads, representing parallelism in *sense*, *structure*, and *sound*, which is in fact Aristotle's division. Illustrative extracts from Gorgias' speeches are given at p. 67 : and a collection of his fragments in Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* (appended to the *Or. Att.* Vol. III) p. 129 seq. [Compare Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I pp. 60—62, and Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, Appendix, *On the Fragments of Gorgias.*]

Perhaps the most complete specimen of Isocrates' style in his Panegyric, from which I will select one or two illustrations, is § 76, οὐ γὰρ ὀλιγώρου τῶν κοινῶν, οὐδ' ἀπέλαυνον μὲν ὡς ἰδίων, ἡμέλουν δὲ ὡς ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλ' ἐκήδοντο μὲν ὡς οἰκίαν, ἀπείχοντο δ' ὥσπερ χρὴ τῶν μηδὲν προσηκόντων and so on, in the same measured strain. Of παρομοίωσις, we have an example § 45, ἔτι δ' ἀγῶνας ἰδεῖν μὴ μόνον τάχους καὶ ῥώμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων καὶ γνώμης, κ.τ.λ. The rhyming terminations pervade §§ 185, 186, culminating in a sentence, in which for once the echo is really effective, φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσῃν τίνα χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἔξιν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας; (Aesch. c. Ctes. p. 65 § 78, at the close of a paragraph, οὐ γὰρ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸν τόπον μόνον μετήλλαξεν. Ennius, ap. Cic. *Orat.* XXVII 23, *Arce et urbe orba sum.*) No better illustration could be found of the importance of

Chancellors: that the prospect of having his life written by him added a new terror to death.

πάντα ἔχειν ταυτό, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι ταυτό καὶ P. 1410 b.
 πάρισον καὶ ὁμοιοτέλετον. αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περίο-
 10 δων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται. εἰσὶ
 δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει,
 τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγῶν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοισ
 ἐγῶν.

1 ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ CHAP. X.
 ἀστεία καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν
 ἐστὶ τοῦ εὐφροῦς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς
 the precept so much insisted upon by Aristotle, that the art employed in
 composition should be carefully concealed, than the striking difference
 in point of interest between the studied, monotonous, wearisome periods
 of Isocrates, and the animated, vigorous, natural, yet rhythmical pe-
 riods of Demosthenes, on which though at least as much pains and
 labour had been bestowed by the one as by the other—the critics said
 ‘they smelt of the lamp’—in the one the study entirely escapes notice, in
 the other it is most painfully apparent.

On antithesis and the rest, there are also remarks in *Introd.* pp. 314, 5,
 and the note: and on the divisions of the period, *κόμμα* and *κῶλον*, of
 which the last two are *not* distinguished by Ar., p. 312, note 1.

The meaning and authorship of the Theodectea has been already
 discussed at length, p. 55, seq. The conclusion arrived at is, that the
 work here referred to was an earlier treatise on Rhetoric by Aristotle, the
 result of his rhetorical *teaching*, which confined itself to the subjects
 dealt with in the extant third book. αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων, which is
 confined by the *expression* to the *ὁμοιοκάταρκτον*, may perhaps, as Vic-
 torius supposed, be intended to include by inference all the other figures
 described in this chapter.

CHAP. X.

This chapter offers a remarkable exception, at all events in the first six
 sections, to Aristotle's ordinary manner of writing; in that the thoughts
 are in some degree written out and the meaning fairly represented by the
 language: instead of being left, as usual, to the sagacity of the reader
 to fill up and interpret as best he can.

§ 1. ‘Having discussed and settled the preceding subject we have
 next to describe the sources of lively, pointed, sprightly, witty, facetious,
 clever, and popular (εὐδοκιμοῦντα) sayings. Now to make them is the
 result either of natural ability (cleverness) or of long practice (exercise);
 the exhibition (or explanation) of them is the province of this study (or
 treatise). εὐφρῆς, note on I 6.15. The *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 22 (23) treats
 of ἀστέιον in style, apparently with much the same meaning as that of
 Aristotle. See the analysis of the chap. in *Introd.* p. 434. Brevity is at all
 events an element of τὸ ἀστέιον. Aristotle's τὸ ἀστέιον seems to correspond
 to Campbell's ‘vivacity’ of style, which is treated in the first three chap-
 ters of his third book.

2 μεθόδου ταύτης. εἴπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα·
 ἀρχὴ δ' ἔστω ἡμῖν αὕτη. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως
 ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι,
 ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα.
 αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνώτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν, ἡ
 δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἴπη
 τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησε μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ
 3 τοῦ γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα. ποιοῦσι μὲν
 οὖν καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτό· διό περ ἂν
 εὔ, ἀστεῖον φαίνεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εἰκὼν, καθάπερ
 εἴρηται πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προθέσει· p. 117.

§ 2. 'Let us then describe it by a complete (thorough or detailed) enumeration, and let this be our starting-point. Learning namely with ease (without trouble or labour) is naturally agreeable to every one, and names (nouns) are significant; and therefore all nouns or words from which we learn anything are most agreeable'. On this see note on c. 9 § 8, add c. 11. 9, and I 11. 21, 23.

'Now words strange, foreign, archaic, are not known at all (and can therefore convey no information), and the proper, ordinary, names of things, we know already. It is the metaphor (the only remaining kind of single word) that does this in the highest degree: for when (the poet, Homer Od. ξ' [XIV] 214) calls old age a (dry, withered) stalk or stubble, he conveys learning and knowledge through the medium of the *genus*, because both are withered', 'are fallen into the *sere and yellow leaf*'. διὰ τοῦ γένους, because the metaphor brings remote members (*species*) of the same *genus* into a novel comparison, which teaches us something new of one or the other.

§ 3. 'Now the poets' similes produce the same effect (give point, vivacity, or liveliness, to the narrative of an epic poem, in which they usually appear): and therefore if the simile be well (selected or executed, or both), it gives an air of liveliness, point, vividness to the composition. For the simile, as has been said before' (not literally what is said here, but the substance of it, III 4.1), 'is a metaphor, differing from it merely by the manner of setting forth (mode of statement): and therefore it is less agreeable because longer (μακροτέρως, λεγομένη or πεποιημένη, *lit.* written in a longer form, at greater length), and (because) it does not say directly that (of the two things compared) one *is* the other; and accordingly (as the speaker's *tongue* does not say this, so) neither does the (hearer's) mind look out for it'—and so loses the opportunity of *learning*.

μακροτέρως] On this termination of the adv. comparative, see Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 141.3, Donaldson's *Gr. Gr.* § 282 b, [Kühner, *Gr. Gr.* § 158, 2]. Matthiae has omitted it.

The meaning of προθέσει, by which the simile is said here to differ from

διὸ ἦττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς
τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο· οὐκουν οὐδὲ ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἢ ψυχή.
4 ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταῦτ' εἶναι
ἀστέια, ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχεῖαν. διὸ οὔτε
τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια
γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ
ζητῆσαι), οὔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοούμενα ἐστίν, ἀλλ'
ὅσων ἢ ἅμα λεγομένων ἢ γινώσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ
πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ μικρὸν ὑστερίζει ἢ διάνοια·
γίγνεται γὰρ οἷον μάθησις, ἐκείως δὲ οὐδέτερον.

the metaphor, may be inferred from the previous passage referred to, III 4. 1, but is not there directly expressed. It means the 'mode of setting forth', of describing or stating the comparison which both of them make; just as in c. 13. 2, 3 (in Ar.'s division of the speech), and Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30) §§ 2, 21; 35 (36) § 1, *πρόθεσις* and *προεκτίθεναι* are put for 'the statement of the case' or exposition of the facts. There are two distinguishable points in which the simile differs from the metaphor; the length, and (consequent) dilution of the force of its impression. The metaphor is concise, generally expressed in a single word, which *suggests* the comparison, and *identifies* the two things compared, λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο; so that the comparison is forced directly upon the hearer's mind, who thereby learns something: whereas the simile goes into detail, often to a considerable length, so that it loses the pointed brevity of the metaphor; and instead of identifying the two objects compared, like the other, by the introduction of the *particle of comparison* ὡς, so weakens its force that the hearer is apt to lose the lesson and the pleasure that should be derived from it.

§ 4. 'Accordingly in style and enthymemes, all those' (ταῦτα, agreeing only with ἐνθυμήματα, stands for ταύτην καὶ ταῦτα; including the former of the two) 'are pointed and lively, which convey to us instruction rapidly'. Then follows a *note* on the preceding. 'And this is the reason why neither superficial enthymemes are popular—by superficial (γάρ, *videlicet*) I mean those that (lie on the surface, and) are (therefore) plain to everybody (so that he who runs may read) and require no research or investigation—nor those which when stated are unintelligible (to a popular audience); but all those of which the knowledge is acquired at the moment of delivery—even though it did not exist previously—or (in which) the understanding is only a little in the rear (of the speaker). For in the one case knowledge as it were is acquired; in the other, neither the one nor the other', i. e. in either of these two ways there is a sort of learning, either immediate or nearly so: in the other case, that of superficial and unintelligible enthymemes or style in general, neither immediate nor quasi-immediate knowledge is attainable. Compare with this the second clause of II 23. 30.

5 κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῖ λεγομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα
 εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ
 μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται, οἷον “καὶ
 τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς
 αὐτῶν ἰδίους πόλεμον.” ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ.¹
 6 τοῖς δ’ ὀνόμασιν, ἐὰν ἔχη μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην
 μήτ’ ἀλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν, μήτ’ ἐπι-

¹ colon.

§ 5. ‘Such is the approved (popular) kind of enthymemes in respect of the sense or meaning (in their intellectual aspect). In that of style or language, so far as regards the *figure* (i. e. the *structure* of the period and its clauses), the popularity is attained by the antithetical expression of them (the balance of opposite *clauses* or *members*), as in the example, (Isocr. Phil. § 73), καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν πόλεμον τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίους (their own private interests) εἶναι νομιζόντων’—as it stands in Isocrates’ text, Aristotle having altered the arrangement, as usual;—‘war is antithetical to peace’:—

§ 6. ‘and in the single words, by the metaphors they contain, and these neither foreign and strange’, (compare III 11. 5, ἀπ’ οἰκείων, where reference is made to this place; so that ἀπ’ οἰκείων may be regarded as an interpretation of μὴ ἀλλοτρίαν here: and this coincides with III 2. 9, metaphors should be ‘appropriate’, ἀρμοστούσας, or ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ‘derived from a proportional or *kindred* subject’: and ibid. § 12, metaphors should not be ‘far-fetched’, οὐ πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν,) ‘for such it is difficult to take in at a glance; nor superficial, for these produce no impression. Further, (words are popular) if they vividly represent (things that they describe); for things should be *seen* (in the orator’s description of them) as if they were actually being done (going on, transacted, before the hearer’s eyes) rather than as future. This is in fact the ‘historic present’, applied to future, instead of past, events. On πρὸ ὀμμάτων, see note on II 8. 13. ἀλλοτρίαν “alienam, ductam a rebus parum propinquis et affinis,” Victorius; who also, as a parallel case, refers to Cic. de Or. II 59. 241, *est autem haec huius generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut mores eius de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimantur, ut iis qui audiunt tum geri illa fierique videantur.*

‘These three things then are to be aimed at (in the attempt to give vivacity and pungency to style), metaphor, antithesis, and vivid representation’.

The meaning of ἐνέργεια is clearly shewn by a comparison with the statements of c. 11. It is there identified with πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, § 2, and is principally shewn in *animation*, literally and metaphorically, in a vivid, vivacious, style, and in animating, vivifying, inanimate objects; investing them with life, motion, and personality¹;

¹ I may observe that this is one of the principal arts by which Mr Dickens attracts his readers, to which the remarkable vivacity of his writings is due.

πόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἔτι εἰ πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας.

7 τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εὐδοκιμοῦσι P. 1411.

§§ 2, 3, 4. κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις (Eth. N. x 4, 1175 a 12). This sense is borrowed from the metaphysical use of the term, to express 'realization', as opposed to δύναμις, the mere capacity or potentiality of life and action. I may add that ἐνέργεια is used in two distinct senses, representing two different forms of development, which may be distinguished as the metaphysical and moral applications of it; as will appear from a comparison of the form it assumes in the Nicom. Ethics, and the biology of the de Anima. It is sometimes identifiable with ἐντελέχεια, expressing the actuality or actual realization of *existence* out of a mere undeveloped capacity of life: in the moral view, it is the realization of *action*, a realized activity, from the dormant capacity—implying existence—to the active exercise or energy of the bodily and mental functions. So happiness is an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, pleasure τελειοί (completes and crowns) τὴν ἐνέργειαν, Eth. N. x 4, sub init. and again c. 4, ult. c. 5, sub init.: and the def. of pleasure in the seventh (Eudemean) book, ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος. Sometimes three stages are distinguished (as frequently in the de Anima), illustrated by three degrees of knowledge in man: (1) the latent capacity, (2) knowledge acquired but not exercised, and (3) the active exercise of thought and knowledge by θεωρία, philosophical contemplation and speculation¹.

Quintilian on ἐνέργεια, VIII 3. 89, ἐνέργεια *confinis his (est enim ab agendo dicta) et cuius propria virtus, non esse quae dicuntur, otiosa*. Ib. 6. 11, *Præcipueque ex his oritur sublimitas quae audaci et proxime periculum translatione tolluntur, quum rebus sensu carentibus actum quandam et animos damus; qualis est, pontem indignatus Araxes*. From ἐνέργεια another quality of style is to be distinguished (in Quint.) viz. ἐνάργεια, 'clear, lively, graphic, narration,' (*evidentia*), though near akin to the other. It is mentioned IV 2. 63, and distinguished from *perspicuitas*, VIII 3. 61. ἐνάργεια, *quae a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere: et affectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur* [id. VI 2. 32]. See Ern. *Lex. Tech. Gr. s. v. et ἐνέργεια*.

§ 7. 'Of the four kinds of metaphors, the proportional are the most popular'. On metaphor in general, and the proportional metaphor in particular, see Appendix B to Bk. III, Introd. p. 374.

Here follows a string of pointed, striking, sayings, exemplifying

¹ At the conclusion of Mr Mill's *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Phil.* p. 359, we find the following remark. "In Aristotle's case the assertion (of Sir W. H.) rests on a mistake of the meaning of the Aristotelian word ἐνέργεια, which did not signify energy, but fact as opposed to possibility, *actus* to *potentia*." Had Mr Mill turned to the first two sentences of Aristotle's Ethics, or to the chapters on Pleasure, x. 4, 5, he would have seen reason to alter this statement. By 'energy' I suppose active, vigorous, exercise to be intended.

μάλιστα αἱ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλοι. καὶ Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἔαν περιυδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας

τὸ ἀστεῖον in style; all of them metaphors, and most of these conveyed in single words. They do really, I think, deserve the character attributed to them. The passage, τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν—πειράσθαι δοῦναι, is transcribed by Dionysius, Ep. I ad Amm. c. 8, in his enquiry into the date of the Rhetoric. The most important variation from the text of Ar. is the omission of the example from Leptines "by all the MSS" (Spengel's *Tract on Rhet.* Munich 1851 p. 47), though it has been supplied in the printed copies; he begins the quotation with κατὰ λέξιν οὕτω γράφων. The only other difference of any importance is ἀγαγόντα for ἔχοντα, and διδόναι οὕτως for δοῦναι.

'As Pericles said, that the youth that had perished in the war had vanished out of the city, as though one were to take the spring out of the year'. On this saying, and Pericles' claim to it, see note on I 7.34.

'And Leptines of the Lacedaemonians, (to the Athenian assembly,) that he would not let them look on whilst Greece became one-eyed (lost one of her eyes—the other being of course Athens; *Athens, the eye of Greece*, Milton, *P. R.* IV 240). Victorius has produced similar expressions from Cic. pro leg. Manil. c. 5 § 11, de Nat. Deor. III 38, *Hi duos illos oculos orae maritimae effoderunt*. "Similiter Cimon Atheniensibus suasis, μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἐτερόζυγα περιυδεῖν γεγεννημένην, Plut. Cim. 489 C, ὡς ὁ εἰπὼν, μὴ ποιήσῃτε ἐτερόφθαλμον τὴν Ἑλλάδα (Plut. Polit. Praecept. 803 A)," Victorius. The Leptines here mentioned is no doubt the proposer of the law περὶ τῆς ἀτελείας against which Demosthenes delivered the speech c. Leptin. in B.C. 355. He may possibly be the same as the Leptines mentioned by Demosth. c. Androt. § 60, ὁ ἐκ Κοίλης. Wolf, *Proleg. ad Dem. Leptin.* p. 45, note 12 (Schäfer, *Appar. ad Dem.* p. 8), supposes that the author of this saying and the opponent of Demosthenes are the same person. The occasion on which Leptines produced his metaphor was the embassy sent by the Lacedaemonians to Athens in their extremity, after the defeat of Leuctra (371 B.C.), during the invasion of their country by the Thebans, B.C. 369; see Xen. Hellen. VI 5. 34, 35, Isocr. Archia § 64, seq. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. x [ch. LXXVIII] p. 320 seq. Thirlw. *Hist. Gr.* ch. XXXIX (Vol. v. p. 106, 1st ed.). Isocrates, Areop. § 69, alludes to the same event, ὥστε Λακεδαιμονίους, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ' ἐκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν προστάτοντας ἡμῖν (see the fragm. of Lysias, Or. 34, quoted in note on II 23. 19, on this Lacedaemonian 'dictation', 404 B.C.) ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας (369 B.C.) ἱκετεύοντας καὶ δεησομένους μὴ περιυδεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀναστατοῦς γενομένους. [A. Schaefer's *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, I p. 75, note.]

'And the saying of Cephisodotus, in his indignation at Chares' eager-

δοῦναι περὶ τὸν Ὀλυνθιακὸν πόλεμον ἡγανάκτει, φάσκων εἰς πνίγμα τὸν δῆμον ἔχοντα¹ τὰς εὐθύνας πειράσθαι δοῦναι². καὶ παρακαλῶν ποτὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰς Εὐβοίαν ἐπισιτισαμένους³ ἔφη δεῖν ἐξιέναι τὸ

¹ ἀγαγόντα *cum* Dionysio. ² διδόναι οὕτως *cum* Dionysio. ³ ἐπισιτισομένους
ness for the scrutiny of the accounts (of his charge) in the conduct of the Olynthian war, "that he drove the people into a fit of choking by his (pertinacity in the) attempt to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way." He wanted to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them in the attempt. I have followed Dionysius' version of this extract, which is plainly preferable to the text of Aristotle. ἄγειν εἰς πνίγμα is Greek and sense; ἔχειν εἰς πνίγμα neither one nor the other; and διδόναι οὕτως, at the end, has far more meaning than the simple δοῦναι of our text. With the vulgar reading, ἔχοντα must be taken with τὰς εὐθύνας, "with his accounts in his hands"—which is so far graphic, as it indicates the eagerness with which he was trying to force them upon the people—but then δοῦναι τὸν δῆμον εἰς πνίγμα, for 'to drive them into a choking-fit', is surely indefensible.

Cephisodotus, ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων, has been already quoted; see III 4.3 note (near the end of the section [p. 53]), where some account is given. Two more of his pungent sayings are quoted further on. Chares, with his mercenaries, was sent to take the command in the Olynthian war in 349 B.C. (Clinton, *F. H.*). Olynthus was taken by Philip, 347. This notice is cited by Max Schmidt in his tract *On the date of Ar.'s Rhetoric*, p. 15, as a piece of evidence on that question; but the limit of the period of publication can be brought much lower down. See *Introd. On the date of the Rhetoric*, p. 36 seq.

πνίγμα or πνιγμός, and its congeners, is a medical term, used by Hippocrates, expressive of choking, stifling, suffocation.

'And the same (Cephisodotus) once in an exhortation to the Athenians said that they must march out (at once) to Euboea (to the aid of the Euboeans), and *there* provide themselves with provisions' (read by all means ἐπισιτισομένους, the future, with Spengel; Bekker retains the *vulgata lectio* ἐπισιτισαμένους, which spoils the point), 'like Miltiades' decree' (with all the unhesitating haste prescribed by Miltiades' decree at the time of the first Median invasion). They were *therefore* not to lose any time in making provision *at home*, but to get to Euboea with all speed and *there* provide themselves: the future is necessary: Victorius, though he reads the aorist, translates it as the future. This hurried expedition to Euboea occurred in 358 B.C., Clinton, *F. H.*, sub anno, Dem. c. Androt. § 14, ἴσθ' ὅτι πρῶην Εὐβοεῦσιν ἡμερῶν τριῶν ἐβοηθήσατε κ.τ.λ. and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 85. It was made to assist the Euboeans against the Theban invaders; and in the archonship of Cephisodotus himself.

τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα] is explained by the Scholiast, quoted by Vater, τὸ μὴ βουλευσασθαι Μιλτιάδης μὴ βουλευσάμενος ἐξῆλθεν κατὰ τοῦ Ξέρξου: and more at length by Ulpian in Shilleto's note to Dem. de F. L. § 346, ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων, ἐξαρχῆς καὶ ὁ Μιλτιάδης δραμεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Μαραθῶνα ἐψηφίσαστο καὶ μὴ ἀναμένειν ἕως συλλεγῶσιν οἱ συμμαχῆσοντες. As to the grammatical construction of the accusative, it seems to be a substitution

Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἰφικράτης σπεισαμένων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἐπίδανρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἡγανάκτει, φάσκων αὐτοὺς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρηρῆσθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος τὴν παράλον ῥόπαλον τοῦ

of τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα for the proper cognate accusative *ἐξοδον*, to make an expedition, such as, on the principle of, Miltiades' decree, with all haste, and without deliberation.

‘And Iphicrates, indignant at the truce that the Athenians had made with Epidaurus and the neighbouring coasts, said of them that “they had stript themselves of their provisions (not ‘for the *way*’, but) for the war”. *ἐφόδια* are *viatica*, provisions for a journey; which in the absence of inns the traveller had to carry with him: here, provisions for the support and maintenance of war and its expeditions. Hdt. writes *ἐπόδια*, Xen. *ἐφόδιον* (sing.). Arist., Pol. II 5, 1263 a 37, uses it of provisions for hunting expeditions in Lacedaemon.

The small independent state of Epidaurus, bounded by the territories of Corinth, Argolis, Troezen, and the Saronic gulf, was at this time in alliance with Sparta, to which it supplied troops, in the great contest with the confederate Greeks, allied for the reduction of the Lacedaemonian power, terminating in the battle of Corinth, 394 B.C., see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. IX [ch. LXXIV] p. 422, 425; and Xenophon's description of the battle, Helen. IV 2.9—23. It appears from this passage that the Athenians had made a truce with Epidaurus. Cephisodotus' indignation was aroused at the folly of making a truce with people who had a sea-board, which the Athenians with their naval superiority could have plundered with impunity, and so have supported the war.

‘And Peitholaus (called) the Paralian (trireme) “the people's cudgel”, and Sestos “the corn-stall of the Piraeus”. Whether this Peitholaus is the same as the one already mentioned III 9. 7, as associated with Lycophron in the government of Pherae, we have no means of precisely determining. The probability is that he is. For even Aristotle's carelessness could hardly have carried him so far as to neglect to mention the distinction between two persons named so nearly together, if there were any. This being so, it appears again, as from the former passage, that he lived at Athens after his downfall.

τὴν παράλον] This vessel and its companion the *Σαλαμινία* were two picked vessels, fast sailers, and with carefully chosen and highly paid crews, kept in reserve at the Piraeus for state purposes; such as sacred embassies, *θεωρία*, to carry the admiral of the fleet in a naval expedition, for ordinary embassies, ‘for the transport of money and persons’ (Böckh, *Publ. Econ.*, Bk. II. c. 16, Lewis' Transl. p. 240), and for the pursuit and conveyance to Athens of state offenders who had made their escape; as Alcibiades after the mutilation of the Hermae, Thuc. VI 53, 61 *δύς*, of the Salaminia. As illustrating the use of the Paralus as a ῥόπαλον, Demosth. *περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρόνησφ*, § 29 is still more in point; ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, οὓς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν ὑπὸ τοῖς νόμοις, καὶ στρατιώτας τρέφειν καὶ τριῆρεις ἐκπέμπειν καὶ χρήματα εἰσφέρειν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἐπὶ δ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ψήφισμα, εἰσαγγελία, Πάραλος, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, i. e. the special decree,

δήμου, Σηστόν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ Πειραιῶς. καὶ Περι-^{p. 128.}
κλῆς τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε τὴν λήμην τοῦ

impeachment, and the Paralus, were the three principal *instruments of punishment* of offenders amongst the Athenian citizens. The Πάραλος therefore is here compared to a *ρόπαλον* or cudgel, because it is the instrument with which the state deals her heaviest blows, not only upon those that have escaped her justice, but upon all those who offend her. Πάραλος· μία τῶν παρ' Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὰς δημοσίας χρείας διαπεμπομένων τριήρων, Harpocr. s. v. He adds that the crews of the two vessels received four obols a day, and stayed at home the greater part of the year. Photius has four articles on the word, one of them borrowed from Harpocr., almost in the same words. The first of the four identifies the Salaminian and Paralian. There is an article upon this in Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* (s. v. *Salaminia*).

Sestos, on the Hellespont, seems from this passage to have been one of the emporia for the corn which was imported from the coasts of the Black Sea and the adjacent regions. It is mentioned with others by Isocr. *ἀντιδ.* § 107, as an important and well-situated town. Strabo, in writing of Troas, makes no mention of the corn-stores of Sestos. [Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb*, pp. 421—430 (on the corn-trade between Greece and the Euxine). The present passage, which he does not quote, suggests a modification of his statement on p. 426 that Sestos and Abydos were less important emporia than Lampsacus.]

This corn-store or warehouse is compared to the 'shopboard' or 'stall' τηλία, the tray on which corn was exposed for sale in the shops. The word was used for a 'stand' or 'stage' of various kinds. A passage which illustrates the use of it referred to here (which does *not* appear in the Lexicons) is Arist. Hist. An. vi 24. 3, where there is an account of a wonderful mule, that lived to the age of 80; after it had been released from labour by reason of its age, it used to walk by the side of the teams which were dragging the stone for the building of the temple (doubtless the Parthenon), and not only urged them on to their work, but helped them itself to drag the load up the hill (how this was done by the animal is not explained); ὥστ' ἐψηφίσαντο μὴ ἀπελαύνειν αὐτὸν τοὺς σιτοπώλους ἀπὸ τῶν τηλιῶν. This clearly explains the particular sense of τηλία in this passage. The τηλία is the tray or stand at the corn-dealer's door, in which the corn is exposed for sale. In Aristoph. Plut. 1038, it means 'a sieve', κοσκίνου κύκλος σίβε περιφέρεια, Schol. ad loc., Etym., Suidas and Hesychius.

'And Pericles bade (his countrymen) get Aegina out of the way (get rid of it, as a plague or obstacle to their enjoyment or happiness) "the eyesore of the Piræus"'. This saying is quoted by Plutarch, Pol. Praec. 803 A, amongst the πολιτικὰ παραγγέλματα: and also μὴ ποιήσῃτε ἑτερο-όφθαλμον τὴν Ἑλλάδα, without the author's name. It is attributed to Demades by Athen. III 99 D, Δημάδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔλεγε τὴν μὲν Αἶγιναν λήμην εἶναι τοῦ Πειραιῶς. Comp. Plut. Apophth. Reg. et Duc. 186 C, and Wyttenbach note β' ad loc. It suggested to Casaubon an emendation of an apparently unmeaning word in Strabo IX p. 395, of the islet of Psyttaea,

Πειραιέως. καὶ Μοιροκλῆς οὐθὲν ἔφη πονηρότερος εἶναι, ὀνομάσας τινὰ τῶν ἐπεικῶν· ἐκείνον μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρίττων τόκων πονηρεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιδεκάτων. καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου ἱαμβεῖον ὑπὲρ τῶν θυγατέρων πρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐγχρονίζουσῶν,

ὑπερήμεροί μοι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι.

between Salamis and the mainland, νήσιον ἔρμον πετρώδες (δύσορμος Aesch. Pers. 450) ὃ τινες εἶπον λιμένα (*lege* λήμην) τοῦ Πειραιῶς.

λήμη and λημᾶν seem (from the Lexx.) to be almost confined to Aristophanes amongst the earlier writers. Arist. Lysistr. 301, with a pun upon λήμνιον πῦρ (on which see Schneidewin on Soph. Philoct. 799); Plut. 581, Κρονικαῖς λήμαις (old-fashioned prejudices, dimnesses of sight) ὄντως λημῶντες τὰς φρένας ἄμφω. Nub. 327, λημᾶν κολοκύνταις. (They occur however as medical terms in Hippocrates.) They are not found, where they were to be most expected, in the Fragments of the other Comic writers. No instance of either is to be found in the very complete Index to Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.*

‘And Moerocles said that he was in no respect a greater knave than—one of the respectable (upper) classes that he named: for the other played the knave at the rate of 33 per cent., he (himself) only at ten’. The degree of knavery is compared to the rate of interest or profit which is made upon each: “a very respectable person indeed!” says Moerocles “and a very respectable interest he makes upon his respectability (or, rightly *interpreted*, roguery): why! I only get a third of that for mine.” Of Moerocles an account is given in Smith’s *Biogr. Dict.* s. v. Μοιροκλῆς, Σαλαμίνιος τῶν παρ’ Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἀφανῶς πολιτευσαμένων. Harpocr. He was a contemporary of Demosthenes, who mentions him four times, see Sauppe’s *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* III 99, and an anti-Macedonian orator. He seems from the allusion, de F. L. § 293 (§ 335) to have been a greedy fellow, and inclined to exaction in money-matters. On the rates of interest at Athens, and the modes of computing it, see Böckh, *Publ. Econ. Bk.* I. c. 22, Lewis’ Tr. p. 130.

‘And Anaxandrides’ iambic verse about (not ‘on behalf of’, of which there is no evidence *in the text*) the daughters’ (so in the Scriptures, ‘daughters of Jerusalem’, &c) ‘who were over long about marrying, “I find (μοί) the young ladies have passed the day for their marriage.”’ [“My daughters’ marriage-bonds have passed their date.”]

ὑπερήμερος, here metaphorically used by Anaxandrides, is properly a technical term of Attic law, signifying one who has failed to pay a fine, or to comply with any judgment or verdict imposed by the court on the day appointed: one who has passed the prescribed term or the day fixed. It takes the genit. here, as if it were ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡμέραν τῶν γάμων, like ἄχαλκος ἀσπίδων, ἀπειλος φαρέων, ἀψόφητος κωκυμάτων, &c. Anaxandrides was a poet of the Middle Comedy, Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Att.* Vol. I. p. 367 seq. The line here quoted is *Fragm. Inc.* XVII, Meineke III 200. Anaxandrides is quoted again, c. 11. 8, an equally uncertain fragment, No. XVIII, and probably again, 11. 10, also 12. 3, and Eth. N. VII 11.

καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικόν τινα Σπεύσιππον, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν πεντεσυρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος τὰς

‘And that of Polyeuctus to one Speusippus who was paralysed, “that he could not keep still (was as restless as ever), though bound (fettered, confined) by fate (or accident) in a pillory- (or stocks-) complaint” [“bound in a perfect pillory of pain”].

Polyeuctus, probably of (the Ath. deme) Sphettus, an Attic orator, contemporary with Demosth. and of the same political party, viz. anti-Macedonian. See Plut. Vit. Demosth. 846 C, which connects him with Demosthenes. Also, Vit. Parallel. Demosth. c. 10, ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς φιλόσοφος (Ariston of Chios) Πολύευκτον ἱστορεῖ τὸν Σφήττιον, ἕνα τῶν τότε πολιτευομένων Ἀθήνησιν, ἀποφαίνεσθαι μέγιστον μὲν εἶναι ῥήτορα Δημοσθένη κ.τ.λ. A short account of him is to be found in Smith’s *Biogr. Dict.* s. v. No. 2, (the writer says that “the *orations* (!) of P.” are here referred to). There are six of the name mentioned in the Orators—Sauppe *Index Nominum* (ad Or. Att.) III 117.—It is uncertain whether the P. who appears in Dem. c. Mid. § 139 is the same as he of Sphettus. Sauppe distinguishes them: Buttmann, ad loc. Mid. 560. 2, has this note: “Orator temporis illius, praeter hanc Midiae defensionem, cum Demosthene coniunctissimus, si credimus Ruhnkenio, qui eundem putat ac Sphettium. Augerus non item;” nor, apparently, Sauppe [nor Arnold Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, II. p. 100, who elsewhere quotes Dem. Phil. III. § 72, Πολύευκτος ὁ βέλτιστος οὐτοσί (of the Sphettian)]. The speaker quoted by Ar. was doubtless the best known of them, the Sphettian. See the reff. in Westermann, *Gesch. der Bereds.* § 53, 5, 6.

ἀποπληκτικός, ἀπόπληκτος, one who has received a shock or *stroke* (as of palsy), which has driven him away from (ἀπό) himself and his normal condition, and so disabled, paralysed, him: of an ‘apoplectic stroke’, but not here; also, like ἐκπλήττεσθαι, to be startled out of one’s wits, or driven mad, *attonitus*. I have followed Victorius in the interpretation of the saying; that Speusippus, though his body was now paralysed, and motionless as if he had been fastened in the stocks or pillory—or worse, in an instrument that confined his head, hands, and feet—had his mind as restless and excitable as ever.

πεντεσύριγγος is a transfer from a wooden instrument with five ‘pipes’ or holes, kept in the prison for the punishment of refractory prisoners, which confined at once the head, hands, and feet, to a disorder which paralyses and deprives of motion. Arist. Eq. 1049, δῆσαι σ’ ἐκέλευε πεντεσυρίγγῳ ξύλῳ. “πέντε ὅπας ἔχοντι, δι’ ὧν οἱ τε πόδες καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ ὁ τράχηλος ἀνεβάλλετο.” Schol. ad loc. πεντεσυρίγγῳ ξύλῳ, τῷ ποδοκάκῃ πέντε γὰρ ὅπας ἔχει, δι’ ὧν... (as before) ἐμβάλλονται (Suidas). Comp. Ib. s. v. ποδοκάκῃ (a later form of ποδοκάκη), Δημοσθένης κατὰ Τιμοκράτους (in a law, § 105), τὸ ξύλον τὸ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ οὕτως ἐκαλεῖτο κ.τ.λ. To which Harpocr. adds, s. v. ποδοκάκῃ, Δυσίας δ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Θεομνήστου, εἰ γνήσιος, ἐξηγείται τοῦνομα φησὶ γάρ ἡ ποδοκάκῃ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ὃ νῦν καλεῖται ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ δεδέσθαι (Lys. c. Theomn. α’ § 16. q. v.). On this, and the various other punishments in use at Athens, see Becker’s *Charicles*,

τριήρεις ἐκάλει μύλωνας ποικίλους, ὁ Κύνων δὲ τὰ καπηλεία τὰ Ἀττικά φιδίτια. Αἰσίωιν δέ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν· τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ “ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα.”

pp. 369, 370. He says “Suidas is wrong in taking this (π. ξ) to be synonymous with the ποδοκάκη:” but does not tell us why, or upon what authority (probably on account of the name, ποδο-κάκη).

‘And Cephisodotus called the triremes parti-coloured (gaily-painted) (mills i. e.) millstones’ from their crushing and grinding (exactions and oppressions) the Athenian tributaries and others. Comp. on this expression III 6. 1, as an instance of a “privative epithet”, the note on that section, near the end. On ποικίλους, Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. IV 289, *pictis phaselis* [cf. St John’s *Hellenes* III 302]. On Cephisodotus, ὁ λεπτός, ὁ ἐκ Κεραμείων, see note on III 4. 4.

‘And “the Dog” (Diogenes the Cynic) called the taverns (or wine-shops) “the Attic messes”’.

Of Diogenes, ὁ Κύνων¹, see Grote’s *Plato* III p. 507, seq. ch. 38. “Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under this title. Aristotle (l. c.) cites from him a witty comparison under that designation.” u. s. p. 509. He receives this name from the little boys or the bystanders in several of Diogenes’ (Laert.) stories about him. A long list of his sayings, often witty, but usually bitter and sarcastic, is to be found in Diogenes Laertius’ Life. This does not appear amongst them.

τὰ καπηλεία] retail shops (καπήλων), cook-shops, wine-shops and taverns. Comp. Isocr. Areop. § 49; speaking of the change of habits and manners in Athens in the author’s time: ἐν καπηλείῳ δὲ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ ἂν οἰκετὶς ἐπεικὴς ἐτόλμησεν· σεμνύνεσθαι γὰρ ἐμελέτων ἀλλ’ οὐ βωμολοχέεσθαι². These scenes of riot, drunkenness, and licentiousness, says the satirical Diogenes, are what the Athenians call *their* συσσίτια; this is *their* substitute for (or representative of) the sober and orderly Spartan φιδίτια. See the description in Grote, *H. G.* II 513 [chap. VI], Müller, *Dor.* IV 3, on the meals of the Dorians. φιδίτια, or as it is usually written φειδίτια, is the name given by the Spartans to what the Athenians and others called συσσίτια, the public tables or messes at which all the citizens dined in common. Müller, u. s. § 3, II 294 (Lewis’ Transl.), remarks, note 2, “It is very probable that this φειδίτια,

¹ One Aristogeiton, an Athenian orator, also received this nickname, ἐπεκαλεῖτο κύων διὰ τὴν ἀναίδειαν αὐτοῦ. Suidas.

² This passage of Isocr. Areopag. is cited by Athen. XIII 21, 566 F, on tavern-haunting, ὅς ἐν τοῖς καπηλείοις καὶ τοῖς πανδοκείοις ἀεὶ διατῆται, καίτοι Ἰσοκράτους τοῦ ῥήτορος ἐν τῷ Ἀρεοπαγαιτικῷ εἰρηκότος—here follow the words quoted in this text. Athenaeus continues Ἐπερίδης δὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Πατροκλέους... τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας φησὶν ἀριστήσαντά τινα ἐν καπηλείῳ κωλύσαι ἀνιέναι εἰς Ἀρειὸν πάγον. σὺ δέ, ὦ σοφιστά, ἐν τοῖς καπηλείοις συναναφύρη οὐ μεθ’ ἐταίρων, ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐταίρων κ.τ.λ. Plut. Vit. x Orat. Demosth. 847 F, Διογένης δὲ ὁ κύων θεασάμενος αὐτόν (Demosth.) ποτε ἐν καπηλείῳ ἀσχυρόμενον καὶ ὑποχωροῦντα, εἶπεν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὑποχωρεῖς τοσοῦτ’ μᾶλλον ἐν καπηλείῳ ἔσῃ. These extracts descriptive of the character of these taverns will throw some light upon Diogenes’ pleasantry.

καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων.
καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευε μὴ
πολλὰς ποιήσωσι τὰς συνδρομὰς ἐκκλησίας. καὶ

(*spare or scanty meals*) was a ludicrous distortion of an ancient Spartan name φιλίτια, i.e. *love-feasts*." This is made still more probable by the fact that Ar. in his *Politics* always writes the word φιδίτια—τὰ συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια, II 9, 1271 a 27, Ib. 10, 1272 a 2, c. 11, 1272 b 34—and the constant interchange of *d* and *l* (δάκρυ, *lacrima*; Ὀδυσσεύς, *Ulysses*). They were originally called ἀνδρεία, *men's meals*, both by Cretans and Spartans, the institution being common to both peoples, the Spartan being in this, as in other particulars, borrowed from the Cretan. Pol. II 10, 1272 a 2, καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέρους ἐστίν· καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλ' ἀνδρία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκέϊθεν ἐλήλυθεν. And of the Carthaginian constitution, Ib. c. 11, 1272 b 34, ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακ. πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἐταυριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις κ.τ.λ.

'And Aesion, that (the Athenians) had emptied (or drained) their entire city into Sicily'. Meaning, that the Athenian forces sent over for the invasion of Sicily in 415—413 B.C. were so enormous in proportion to the population of Athens, that they might be said to have completely drained it. 'For this is a metaphor, and sets the thing before our eyes'.

Aesion's name occurs, but only as the father of Euctemon, in Demosth. Mid. § 165. Also in a citation from Hermippus, in Plut. Vit. Demosth. (Vit. Parall.) c. 11, in which he compares Demosthenes' speeches, especially for *reading*, advantageously with those of his predecessors. The only other notice of him that I have been able to find is Suidas s. v. Δημοσθένης : which is merely that he (Dem.) συνεφιλόλογησε Αἰσίωνι τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ ; which implies community of studies. He was therefore an Athenian orator, contemporary with Demosthenes.

'And'—Aesion again—"so that Greece cried aloud": this again is in some sense a metaphor, and a vivid expression'. A metaphor no doubt (though Victorius says it is a mere *hypallage*), since it *transfers* the voice from an individual to a collective people, or country. It is πρὸ ὀμμάτων in that it animates an inanimate object, or abstraction; c. 11. 2, 3. Demosthenes has used this twice, de F. L. § 92, ἡ γὰρ ἀλήθεια καὶ τὰ πεπραγμένα αὐτὰ βοᾷ, and § 129, ταῦτ' οὐχὶ βοᾷ καὶ λέγει ὅτι χρήματ' εἰληφεν Αἰσχίνης : and a very near approach to it, Olynth. α' § 2, ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρός...μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφ'ἑῖς ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Aesch. Agam. 1106 (Dind.), πάσα γὰρ πόλις βοᾷ. Eur. Hippol. 877, βοᾷ βοᾷ δέλτος ἄλαστα.

'And as Cephisodotus bade (the Athenians) take care not to convert many of their mobs into assemblies' (*i.e.* their mobs, in any numbers). Cephisodotus we have had three times already as the author of pointed sayings, III 4. 3, and 10. 6, *bis*. The point of this saying seems to lie in the word συνδρομὰς, which is substituted for συγκλήτους ἐκκλησίας. It implies that most of their ordinary assemblies are mere mobs, tumultuary gatherings, riotous and unruly, instead of σύγκλητοι, regularly convoked for special occasions in due form and order. It would certainly be

Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ οἶον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρῦσαι συγκαταθαπτομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὁμμάτων, τὸ δὲ “τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ἐλευθερίας” P. 14

better without ἐκκλησίας, as Wolf proposes. It would then mean “not to hold their—mobs too frequently.” Both Bekker and Spengel retain the *vulgata lectio*: the latter with a comma between συνδρομας and ἐκκλησίας.

‘And Isocrates, “to those that flock together promiscuously (scramble, as it were) in the general festivals”’. This is an expression of precisely the same import as the preceding. It occurs in Isocr. Phil. § 12, and runs thus, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ.

‘And the example in the Funeral Oration, that “Greece might well have her hair cut off (go into mourning) over the tomb of those that died at Salamis, for her freedom and their valour were buried in the same grave”: for had he only said “that she might well weep for the virtue that lay buried with them”, it would have been a metaphor and a graphic touch, but the (addition of) “freedom with the virtue” carries with it a kind of antithesis’. This really affecting passage, which Aristotle has partially spoiled by omission and alteration, runs thus in the original—the funeral oration attributed to Lysias¹, Or. 2, in Baiter and Sauppe’s *Or. Att.* I 68, § 60: “and therefore Greece might well that day cut off her hair over yonder tomb (the orator is on the spot, and points to it) and mourn for those that lie buried here, seeing that her own (the text has αὐτῶν, *their* own, the collective Ἑλλάς being resolved into its component members) freedom and their valour are laid together in one grave”. Aristotle has very much marred the simple beauty of the sentence (which if it be not Lysias’, is at all events quite worthy of him) by his alterations;

¹ This speech is condemned as spurious by [Dobree and] Baiter and Sauppe [and also by Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I p. 431, and Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I p. 208. It contains some close parallels to the Panegyric of Isocrates and would appear to have been written by one of the pupils of that rhetorician, from whom Ar. (it will be observed) takes the quotation just preceding the present passage]. Let us hear on the other side Mr Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vol. VI [chap. XLVIII] p. 191, note, “Of (the funeral orations) ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though upon far less grounds (than that attributed to Demosth.).... but this harangue of Lysias, a *very fine composition*, may well be his, and may perhaps have been really delivered—though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen.” In this judgment I entirely agree; and it seems to derive some authority from the citation of this extract here, as a specimen of pointed style, which shews that it was at all events well known to Aristotle and the Athenian public, and well remembered, though the author’s name is not given; perhaps for this very reason, that the authorship of it *was* so well known.

ἀντίθεσίν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης εἶπεν “ ἡ γὰρ ὁδός μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν Χάρητι πεπραγμένων ἐστίν.” μεταφορὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὸ διὰ μέσου πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὁμμά-

especially the substitution of the frigid, explanatory, τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι, for the graphic τῷδε and τότε of the original (I here follow Victorius). [The context of the original passage shews that the substitution is really a blunder, as the reference is not to the Athenians who fought at Salamis but to those who died at Aegospotami and elsewhere towards the close of the Peloponnesian war.]

The metaphor lies of course in the word κείρασθαι, by which Greece is personified and compared to a woman who, according to the national custom, cuts off her hair as a sign of mourning—on this custom see Becker's *Charicles*, p. 398; comp. Eur. *Troad.* 141, *Orest.* 458, *Alc.* 515, *Suppl.* 97, 974, *Hel.* 1060, *πένθιμος*, *πενθήρης*, *κουρά*, *κουραί*. Aesch. *Choeph.* 6 (Paley's note ad loc.), *Hom. Il.* XXI. 142, &c. The last two passages shew that this custom was not absolutely confined to women, though it was especially characteristic of them. In Lysias the personification, which is most tastelessly interrupted by the plural αὐτῶν, is resumed in the next clause, ὡς δυστυχῆς μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν ὀρφανὴ γενομένη κ.τ.λ. Here Greece becomes a bereaved mother.

‘And as Iphicrates said, “the course of my argument cuts right through the middle of Chares’ acts”: a proportional metaphor; and the “right through the middle” sets the thing vividly before our eyes’. This was said by Iphicrates in the same case as that which is noticed in II 23.7 (see note), the prosecution, namely, of him and his colleagues Menestheus and Timotheus, together with Chares, who were all brought to trial by Aristophon the Azenian in 355 B.C. on the scrutiny of their accounts, for misconduct in their command during the Social war. Sauppe u. s. p. 191, commenting on this passage, says “Iphicrates se et collegas accusatos defendens exponit quam male Chares rem gesserit. Hoc facturus dixit, iter orationes suae ferre per medias Charetis res gestas, *quasi de itinere per hostium fines faciundo diceret.*” The *proportion* of the metaphor is this: As a road is carried, or an army or expedition marched, right into the heart of an enemy's country, so Iphicrates in his defence carried hostility and destruction (exposure and censure) into Chares' conduct during their joint command.

‘And the saying, “to invite dangers to the help (rescue, remedy) of dangers” is a vivid metaphor’. The author, and occasion, of this sentence are alike unknown. I have followed Schrader in the translation. To rid yourself of one danger another must often be invoked or invited, as a man saves himself from a shipwrecked vessel by throwing himself overboard and clinging to a plank. He also quotes Florus, I. 17, *Fabius Maximus periculosissimum bellum bello explicavit*. The metaphor lies in παρακαλεῖν and βοηθήσοντας, which are transferred from men to dangers, which are thereby ‘animated’; τὸ ἄψυχον becomes ἐμψυχον.

των μεταφορά. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου “οὐδὲ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῇν.” μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεί, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὁμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱκετεύει ἢ εἰκῶν, τὸ ἄψυχον δὴ ἔμψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα

¹ fortasse δὲ

‘And (what) Lycoleon (said) in his defence of Chabrias, “not even awed by that symbol of his supplication, the bronze image (yonder)”’. Of Lycoleon nothing seems to be known, beyond what may be gathered from this passage, that he was an Athenian orator, and defended Chabrias in his trial B.C. 366.

The circumstances referred to are briefly these. In 366 B.C. Chabrias was brought to trial with Callistratus, the orator, on a charge of misconduct leading to the loss of Oropus. See *ante*, note ad I 7.13. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* x [chap. LXXIX] pp. 392, 3, and note 3¹. Chabrias had greatly distinguished himself on a former occasion, described in Grote, *Hist. Gr.* x [chap. LXXVII] pp. 172, 3, in an action near Thebes fought against Agesilaus and the Lacedaemonians, 378 B.C. Agesilaus “was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the knee, and their spears protruded” (Diodorus, xv. 33, Cornelius Nepos, Chabr. c. 1, *obnixo genu scuto*). “The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue in his honour, he made choice of this attitude for the design.” Ib. 173, note 1. This is also referred to, the details being passed over, in Dem. c. Lept., in a long enumeration of all Chabrias’ services to his country, §§ 75—78; πρὸς ἅπαντας Πελοποννησίους παρετάξαι ἐν Θήβαις, § 76. See also Wolf, ad loc. p. 479.25 (Schäfer, *Arpar. ad Dem.* III 168). Lycoleon in his speech points to this statue which stood in the ἀγορά in sight of the court, and taking advantage of the posture of it, which he interprets as that of a suppliant, appeals from it to the feelings of the judges, at the same time reminding them of the merits of the original. The effect no doubt must have been very striking. The *metaphor* resides in ἱκετηρίαν, which is transferred from the suppliant’s olive-branch (ἐλαίαν) to a suppliant attitude in general, implied in the posture of the kneeling figure. On the accusative of the object of awe with αἰσχύνεσθαι, see note on II 2.22.

‘For it was a metaphor at the moment (whilst Lycoleon was speaking and Chabrias was in actual danger), but not for ever (i.e. so long, and no longer; not permanently), but yet perpetually (repeat αἰεί, Schrader) before the eyes (vivid and graphic): for it is only while he (Chabrias) is in danger that the image seems to supplicate, but the inanimate is ever animated—“the monument of his deeds for the city”’.

This very obscure sentence seems intended as an explanatory com-

¹ Diog. Laert., III 3. 24, says that Plato also was engaged in the defence of Chabrias, no one else daring to undertake it. See Grote’s *Plato*, I 128, note i.

τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ “πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες.” τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὖξειν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τῶν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ p. 129.
 ψυχῇ· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι. “οὐ γὰρ διαλνόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα.” ἄμφω γὰρ ἐστὶ μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ

mentary on the preceding extract. It is truly *obscurum per obscurius*, a masterpiece of Aristotelian brevity, and a complete illustration of the Horatian *brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio*. I follow Schrader and Victorius in the interpretation. First he says that there is a metaphor; this of course is in the word *ικετηρίαν*, as above explained. But the metaphorical application of it only continues during the danger of the person represented; when that is over, and the suppliant out of danger, the statue loses indeed the suppliant character with which it was invested for the time by the application of Lycoleon, but retains the posture and its associations as “the memorial of his services to the state.” (I agree with Victorius in supposing that this is a continuation of the extract, and τὸ ὑπόμνημα therefore in apposition with τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῇν. He ingeniously suggests an alternative, that it may be a second extract from the same speech, *alibi in eadem causa*, and another example of a pointed and graphic saying.) *κινδυνεύοντος γάρ... ἡ εἰκὼν* is the explanation of ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ, and τὸ ἄψυχον ἔμφυχον of πρὸ ὁμμάτων. Comp. c. 11. 2, 3, a vivid representation gives *animation* to *inanimate* objects. If this explanation be correct we must read δέ for δῆ: by which the explanation of ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ is *contrasted* with that of πρὸ ὁμμάτων. δῆ is retained by all the Edd., but I cannot discover any sense in which it is here applicable. It seems also that ὑπέρ has dropt out in the phrase τὸ ὑπόμν. τῶν (ὑπέρ) τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. ὑπόμνημα occurs in the same sense, Isocr. Paneg. § 156, and de Pace § 124.

‘And, “in every way practising (or studying) meanness of spirit”, for *studying* is a kind of *increasing* or *promoting*.’ μελετᾶν being a ‘kind’, εἶδος, of αὖξειν, the metaphor is one ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ γένος, Poet. XXI 7, one of the four kinds of metaphor. ‘To study’ therefore, which is one kind of the genus ‘promoting’, is here put metaphorically for the general term ‘to promote’. And the *point* of the metaphor lies in the unusual application of ‘study’: a man usually studies or takes pains to promote some worthy object, to cultivate some virtue: here the object is an unworthy one, a vice or defect. This is taken from Isocr. Paneg. § 151, in a note on which passage Coraes ingeniously proposed to read ἀσκέειν for αὖξειν in Aristotle’s comment on μελετᾶν.

‘And “that God kindled (lit up) reason as a light in the soul”: for both of them shew something (make things clear and visible)’. This is a proportional metaphor. As light to material, so reason to intellectual objects. *Cuius haec verba sunt nondum repperi*, says Victorius, and no subsequent commentator has supplied the deficiency.

‘(The peaces that we make are nugatory) for we do not put an end to

τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον
 πῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ
 μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὗται δ' ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ
 πολέμου· ἄμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις
 τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν·
 ἢ γὰρ εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν.

wars (do away with them altogether), but merely postpone them'. This also comes from Isocr. Paneg. § 172. 'For both of them look to the future (to future results), both actual postponement (in its proper sense and application) and a peace of that kind'. This therefore is a metaphor from εἶδος to εἶδος, from one kind of postponement, to another, analogous, kind.

'And to say "that the treaty is a far fairer trophy than those which are obtained in wars: for the one is for the sake of (to commemorate) a trifling success and a single chance, but *this* for (on behalf of, marking the issue of,) the entire war": for both of them are signs of victory'. Isocr. Paneg. § 180, quoted by Aristotle, as Mr Sandys says in his note, *memoriter*. μιᾶς τύχης is explained by Isocr. Antid. § 128. It is 'a single stroke of fortune', a mere lucky accident, as opposed to a *series of successes*, which prove design, skill, and knowledge. (ὅτι, the mark of quotation). 'Again, "Cities pay a heavy reckoning (render a terrible account, for their misdeeds) to (or by?) the censure of mankind." For the "account" or "reckoning" is a legal damage or punishment'. The explanation shews, first, (as Bernays also remarks, *Dialog. des Arist.* p. 16,) that εὐθυνα here expresses not merely the account itself that is rendered, but the penalty consequent upon it, if unsatisfactory: and secondly, that the metaphor is a transfer from the legal and particular scrutiny or account rendered by the officer on laying down his command, and extended from this to an account or scrutiny *in general*, the penalty paid by whole cities to the judgment and censure of mankind and posterity: consequently it is a metaphor from εἶδος to γένος, from species to genus. The passage referred to in Bernays' treatise will furnish a commentary on the use and signification of εὐθύνας and λόγον or λόγους διδόναι, pp. 15, 16.

εὐθυνα] This, according to some authorities, as Böckh and L. Dindorf, is the only true Attic form of the word, εὐθύνη belonging to the later Greek. G. Dindorf writes εὐθύναι, Dem. Olynth. a. 17. 15, and Böckh, *Publ. Econ.* Bk. II, ch. 8, note 177, εὐθυνα, εὐθυναί (p. 190 Lewis' Transl.), Schäfer (*Arch. Crit.* p. 229) note on the passage of Dem. Shilieto on Dem. de F. L. § 19, not. crit., acknowledges both plurals, εὐθυναί and εὐθύναι: "εὐθύναι, quod nihili est..." The Zurich Editors have εὐθυναί. In Lysias κατὰ Θεομνήστου β' § 9, εὐθυναν is found without various reading. The parallel form *ämunna, ultio*, is cited by Phrynichus p. 23 (Lobeck) as forbidden; also by Moeris and Thomas Magister. It is however approved by Timaeus (p. 26 Ruhnken). Ruhnken in his note indignantly denies the use of the word in Plato, and refers it to the later Greek.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνάλογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται.
 1 λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιούσι CHAP. XI.
 2 γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει. οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια,

‘And so we have despatched the subject of the pointed sayings that are derived from the proportional metaphor and by the vivid graphic language that sets things described before your eyes (presents them vividly to your mind’s eye, as it were to the actual sense)’.

εἴρηται] is done, and over, and enough of it. Note on I 11. 29.

CHAP. XI.

This chapter is in continuation of the subject of the preceding, τὸ ἀστεῖον; first as it is exemplified in τὸ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, and next in jokes, puns, plays upon words, and verbal pleasantries of all kinds, metaphors and similes; and lastly hyperboles, which are also a kind of metaphor. All these may be employed in imparting ‘vivacity’ to style. Whately, *Rhet.* c. 3, on Style, following Aristotle, calls τὸ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, ‘energy’. His remarks on this, partly from Aristotle, are worth comparing.

§ 1. ‘We must now state what we mean by πρὸ ὀμμάτων, and what must be done in order to give rise to this.’

§ 2. ‘I mean then that things are *set before our eyes* by all expressions that indicate realized activity. For instance; to say that a good man is ‘square’ (i. e. complete) is a metaphor; for both are complete, but still don’t signify a state of realized action (or activity). On the other hand, the phrase “with his vigour and prime in full bloom” (Isocr. Phil. § 10) does convey the notion of life and activity, as is also, “but thee, free to roam at large” (Ib. § 127); and again, in the verse, “so thereupon the Greeks (with a rush) darting forward with the spear” (δορί, Eur. Iph. Aul. 80: I believe the otiose ποσὶ to be a mere misquotation of Ar.), ‘the word ‘darting forward’ is at once life-like and metaphorical’.

ἐνεργοῦντα...ἐνέργειαν] See *ante*, note on c. 10. 5. Comp. the explanation of πρὸ ὀμμάτων there given, ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλονται; the representation must be *life-like*, the action must seem to be actually carried on before us. Poet. XVII 1. Cic. de Or. III 53. 202. Auct. ad Heren. IV 55. 68. *Demonstratio, quum ita verbis res exprimitur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur*: with examples. Cic. de Inv. I 54. 104, 55. 107; II 26. 78. Quint. VIII 3. 81. ἐνέργεια, Ib. § 89. *Infra* § 3, ἐμφυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα. φαίνεται, § 4, κινούμενα καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ. See Whately’s *Rhetoric* above referred to. This ‘energy’ includes *Prosopoeia* or Personification: illustrated in Whately’s note ‡. Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας §§ 81, 82, quotes ἔφριξεν δὲ μάχη. Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.*, has a section; III 1. 4, on “Things animate for things lifeless.”

τετράγωνος comes from Simonides—or rather from the Pythagoreans, who by a square number or figure symbolized (or, as Aristotle tells us, Met. A, actually identified it with) completeness, and perfect equality in

ἀλλ' οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· ἀλλὰ τὸ “ἀνθούσαν ἔχοντας τὴν ἀκμήν” ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ “σέ δ' ὥσπερ ἄφετον” ἐνέργεια, καὶ

τοῦντεῦθεν οἷν “Ἕλληνες ἄξαντες ποσὶν
3 τὸ ἄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά. καὶ ὡς κέχρηται
Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ τῷ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα λέγειν διὰ
τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐ-
δοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε,

αἵτις ἐπὶ δ' ἀπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής,

the shape of justice. It was their type of perfection. Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.* p. 747 [p. 869, ed. 2], Simon. Fr. 5, ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν...χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον. Plat. Protag. 339 B. Arist. Eth. N. I 11, 1100b 21, ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου. Comp. Hor. Sat. II vii. 86, *in se ipso totus teres atque rotundus.*

The second extract quoted from Isocr. Phil. § 127 requires the context to justify its selection as an example of animated style; with that, it becomes very striking. The orator is contrasting the entire freedom of view which Philip's commanding position allows him, as compared with the narrow patriotism enforced upon those who are 'fast bound' in the constitution and laws of their native cities; which he expresses by σέ δ' ὥσπερ ἄφετον γεγενημένον ἅπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν κ.τ.λ.—a flight quite beyond Isocrates' ordinary range of imagination. The metaphor is of course derived from the sacred cattle which were devoted to the worship of some god, and left free from the ordinary labours of the plough and cart, to roam and graze at large in the sacred precincts, the τέμενος of his temple. See Plat. Protag. 320 A, Rep. VI 498 C, and the notes of the Comm.: Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 666, 684 (Paley) and the note there (also Blomfield's Glossary, 687), Eur. Ion 822, ὁ δ' ἐν θεοῦ δόμοισιν ἄφετος, ὡς λάθοι, παιδεύεται.

The difference between the mere metaphor τετράγωνος, and the metaphor which also vivifies and animates, is this: in a square there is neither life nor action; in 'blooming' we have the life of a plant, in ἄφετον of an animal, in ἄξαντες the vigour and impetuosity of living human beings.

§ 3. 'And Homer's frequent employment of the figure which invests inanimate objects with life and motion by the medium of the metaphor. But in all of them it is by representing (objects) as animated—setting them as it were in *action*—that he distinguishes himself (acquires his popularity, secures our approbation): in the following for instance: “again (this belongs to the preceding sentence: αὐθις· ἔπειτα πέδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής is the reading of Homer, Od. XI 598): then to the plain rolled the ruthless (remorseless) stone” [“Downward anon to the valley the boulder remorselessly bounded”]. The animating metaphor is of course in ἀναιδής, which attributes not only life, but also shamelessness, recklessness, remorselessness, want of mercy and proper feeling, to the stone. Whately, u.s., ingeniously, but not correctly: 'provoking', mocking Sisyphus' efforts, ἀναιδῆ, in the same sense, ruthless, pitiless, Soph.

καὶ

ἔπτατ' οἰστός,

καὶ

ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων,

καὶ

ἐν γαίῃ ἴσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι,

P. 1412.

καὶ

αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώσα.

ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμφυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τᾶλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὥς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ p. 130.

Oed. Col. 516. αἰδώς, *clementia, misericordia*, opposed to *θρασύς, crudelis*, Elmsl. ad Med. 461. This line has always been quoted as an example of "the sound an echo to the sense."

'And, "the arrow flew"—like a bird'—Hom. Il. N [XIII] 587.

'And, "raging or yearning to fly to its mark"'. Il. Δ [IV] 126. This attributes human feelings and passions to the arrow, *οἰστός*. He might have added *ἄλτο* in line 125.

'And, (sc. τὰ δοῦρα θρασειῶν ἀπὸ χειρῶν) "longing to taste blood" (more lit. 'to take their fill of flesh')'. Il. Δ [XI] 574, Paley ad loc.

'And "the spear-point panting, quivering in its eagerness, rushed through his breast"'.
 On these extracts, Whately, *Rhet. u. s.*, note, well observes, "that there is a peculiar aptitude in some of these expressions: an arrow or dart from it flying with a spinning motion quivers violently when it is fixed; thus suggesting the idea of one quivering with eagerness". This is particularly applicable to the two last extracts. In the third, *ἴσταντο* may help to convey this. The darts which fell short of their aim, struck, were fixed, in the ground, and there stood quivering. "And winged the shaft that quivered in his heart". Byron (of Kirke White), in *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*. Gaisford, in *Variorum not.* p. 426, adds Od. ε' 175, *νῆες, ἀγαλλόμεναι* (exulting) *Διὸς οὔρω*. Eustath. ad loc. καὶ ὁρᾷ τὸ ἀγαλλόμεναι, ὥς ἐπὶ ἔμφυχων τῶν νεῶν λεχθέν. Soph. Aj. 581, πρὸς τομῶντι πῆματι, and this Schol., *τομῆς ἐπιθυμείν, ὥσπερ εἰ αἰσθησιν εἶχεν*. Plut. on Pyth. 398 A. See also in Heitz, *Verl. Schrift. Arist.* pp. 278, 9, some passages from the Schol. to Homer, and that of Plutarch, on this peculiarity of Homer.

'For in all these by reason of the living character (with which they are invested) they appear to be in action: for "shameless conduct", and "quivering with eagerness" and the rest, all express forms of activity (implying life). But these he has applied to them through the medium of the proportional metaphor, for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless actor to him who is shamelessly treated'.

4 ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταῦτα·

κυρτά, φαληριόωντα· πρὸ μὲν τ' ἄλλ', αὐτὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλα· κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια κίνησις.

5 δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ

I am sorry to be obliged to differ from our author in the view he here takes of the meaning of ἀναιδής. The notion of "reckless impudence", conveyed by his equivalent ἀναίσχυντος, seems to me altogether alien from the Homeric conception of it. I can't think that "reckless impudence", ἀναισχυντία, is what *Homer* meant to attribute to the stone when he called it ἀναιδής, but 'unmerciful treatment'. At all events it is better than Pope's "huge round stone."

§ 4. 'In his most approved similes too (as well as metaphors) he deals thus (employs this treatment) with inanimate things (ἐπὶ 'in the case of' upon, applying to): "(Waves) arched, foam-crested, some in front, others (tumbling) after them"; for he draws (depicts) them all as living and moving, and living activity is a kind of motion'. II. N [XIII] 799, ['the waves of the bellowing ocean; Bending their heads foam-crested, they sweep on, billow on billow']. The following verse will shew where the ἐνέργεια lies; ὡς Τρῶες πρὸ μὲν ἄλλοι ἀρηρότες, αὐτὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλοι, χαλκῷ μαρμαίροντες ἄμ' ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποντο.

I have followed Bekker (Ed. 3) and Spengel in reading κίνησις for μίμησις, from a conjecture of Bekker in his first ed. μίμησις will however make good sense.

§ 5. 'Metaphors should be drawn, as has been stated before, (III 2. 12, and 10. 5, also 11. 10; οἰκείων in the former, μὴ φανερῶν implied in the words μὴτ' ἐπιπόλαιον, in the latter), from objects closely related, but not obvious to every one at first sight' (i. e. not so related, so clearly resembling one another, that no one can fail to see the resemblance at once: such metaphors do not pique the curiosity, and set people thinking; and from them you *learn* nothing, that you did not know before); 'just as in philosophy also, to observe the resemblances in widely distant things is characteristic of a sagacious penetrating intellect: like Archytas' saying, that arbitrator and altar were the same thing; because both are the refuge of the injured or wronged' (thing or person, animal or man, expressed by the *neuter*).

οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] Poet. XXII 17, μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλον ἐστὶ λαβεῖν εὐφύας τε σημείον ἐστίν (this is equivalent to εὐστόχου, 'requires quick wit, penetration, natural sagacity'). τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν. Rhet. II 20. 7, of fables, used as arguments, ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἃν τις δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὀρᾶν, ὅπερ ῥᾶόν

ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχον, ὥσπερ Ἀρχύτας ἔφη ταῦτόν εἶναι διαιτητὴν καὶ βωμόν· ἐπ' ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ ἀδικούμενον καταφεύγει. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρεμάθραν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἄμφω γὰρ ταυτό τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῷ ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι

ἐστὶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, see the note, and references there given. On the use of resemblances and differences in defining, distinguishing, and the formation of concepts, see Trendelenburg, *ad Categ.* § 59 p. 137, and Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Logic*, Vol. I p. 102, Lect. vi. This is the kind of 'philosophy' here referred to. Diotima's account, *Pl. Symp.* 211, of the formation of general conceptions or ideas will serve as an illustration.

On Archytas, the Pythagorean philosopher and mathematician of Tarentum, see *Diog. Laert.* VIII 4. 79—83.

'Or if one were to say that an anchor and a hook were the same: for they are both the same kind of thing, but differ in position' (*lit.* 'the above and below').

κρεμάθρα is defined by the Schol. on *Ar. Nub.* 218, and by *Suidas*, as a basket for remnants, εἰς ὃ τὰ περιττεύοντα ὄψα (the leavings of the dinner-table) εἰώθαμεν ἀποτίθεσθαι. This was usually 'hung up', κρεμάθρα δὲ εἶρηται διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κρεμαμένην μετέωρον εἶναι (*Suidas*). Hence the use of it for *Socrates* in the *Clouds*, u. s. But it is plain that that cannot be the meaning of it here, for it does not answer to the subsequent description of it, in respect either of the resemblance or the difference stated. *Rost* and *Palm* in their *Lexicon* translate it 'ankertau', the cable that holds the anchor; but this is open to precisely the same objection. It must be something in the nature of a hook, from which things may be suspended; and is literally 'a suspending instrument'. The resemblance to the anchor lies in its hooked form, and also in the intention or design of them both, which is to keep things where they are, preservation or security. The difference is that the anchor is applied to keep the vessel safe and steady at the bottom, the hook is above, and from it the thing suspended hangs. *Liddell* and *Scott* have κρεμάστρα (the reading of three inferior MSS) with this reference, and identify it with κρεμάθρα in the *Nubes*.

'And the re-equalisation of cities (in the respect of property, and powers, i. e. state offices, privileges, &c.) when the same principle is applied to (is the same for) things standing wide apart (very dissimilar, viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices, prerogatives &c.)).' The widely dissimilar things which are here brought together for comparison, are the areas of properties, and the state offices and privileges, &c., which are to be alike equalised. The Scholiast quoted by *Vater*, explains the word and its application in the same way of the equalisation of the properties, fortunes or conditions, duties and rights of the citizens of a state. *Victorius* quotes *Isocr. Phil.* § 40, οἶδα γὰρ ἀπάσας ἀμαλισμένας ὑπὸ τῶν

ταυτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον.

- 6 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δηλον ὅτι ἔμαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικε λέγειν ἢ ψυχὴ “ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δ' ἤμαρτον.” καὶ

συμφορῶν, all the Greek cities have been alike levelled to one condition by their misfortunes.

Vahlen has again applied his perverted ingenuity to the emendation of this passage. The passage wants none: it is clear in sense and construction, and the reading of the text is retained by Bekker and Spengel. In the first place, *αν* in the compound verb is not *α* privative with *ν* inserted, as *ἀνώνυμος*, *ἀνόδυνος*, &c., but *ἀνά* is *re*, of *breaking up* (*ἀναλύειν*, &c.) for redistribution, restoring to an original equality: so *ἀναδίδοναι* ‘to distribute’ (*ψήφους*), *ἀναδάσασθαι* ‘to redistribute’ Thuc. v 4, *ἀνάδαστος*, *ἀναδασμός*, *de agro ex integro aequis partibus dividendo* (Herod., Plat., see Ruhnken’s *Timaeus* p. 33), *ἀνανέμειν*, et sim. *ἀνωμαλίσθαι* therefore does not denote *inequality*, but *re-equalisation*. What the signification of the word is, appears from two passages of the *Polit.* II 7, 1266 b 3 and c. 12, 1274 b 9. In the first of these the word is *ὀμαλίσθαι*, in the second, *ἀνομάλωσις*, from verbs in *-ίζειν* and *-οῦν* respectively. They both refer to the same thing, viz. Phaleas of Chalcedon’s scheme for the equalisation or re-equalisation of properties, and plainly, except perhaps so far as the *ἀνά* is concerned, have precisely the same signification: and this is perfectly applicable here. Vahlen proposes καὶ “ὀμαλίσθῃναι τὰς πόλεις” ἐν πολλὴν διέχρυσαι ταυτό. His objection to *ἀνωμαλίσθαι* seems to me to be entirely unfounded, and I can see no reason whatever for altering the text. There is another slight alteration proposed, which is not worth mentioning.

ἐπιφάνεια is a surface, here area; and in Euclid, a plane figure, which has only length and breadth, a superficies.

§ 6. This introduces a new topic of *ἀστεῖα*, things pointed and lively, in the sense of witticisms, things amusing and laughable, such as jokes *παρ' ὑπόνουαν*, or *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*, repartees, puns, plays upon words, and the like.

‘Though it is true in general that most of these ‘vivacities’ are conveyed by (*διὰ*) metaphor, yet they are also derived from (a temporary, momentary) delusion (leading to a pleasing *surprise* at the unexpected supplement): for it becomes clearer (to the listener) that he has learnt something from (the conclusion of the sentence) being contrary’ to his expectation—or, as Victorius, from *his own* contrary, i. e. changed, state of mind, which has arisen between the beginning and end of the sentence—‘and the soul seems to say to herself, “Really, so it is; and I missed it (never found it out till now)”’. (This explanation of the pleasure derived from the *unexpected* surprise,—that the previous deception heightens the pleasure of the acquired knowledge—is due, I think, rather to the theory which had become habitual with Ar., that all intellectual pleasure is due to the natural desire of learning, than to

τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων δὲ τὰ ἀστεϊά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅ φησι λέγειν, οἷον τὸ τοῦ Στησιχόρου, ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες ἑαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ἄσονται. καὶ τὰ εὖ ἡγιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα· μάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορά. καὶ ὃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ ὅταν παράδοξον ᾗ, καὶ μὴ, ὡς ἐκείνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν

his sober judgment exercised upon this particular application of it.) Schrader has supplied two capital instances of this form of pleasantry: the first is from Cic. de Or. II 281, *Quid huic abest—nisi res et virtus?* Here the listener is misled by the opening of the sentence to expect a very good character of somebody, when unexpectedly, after a pause, two words are added as exceptions, which convert the expected eulogium into beggary and worthlessness: but is it the *learning*, the becoming acquainted with that fact, however unexpectedly, that constitutes the pleasure or amusement that the listener derives from his surprise? A still better from Quint. of a dandy advocate, *illud Afri* “*homo in agendis causis optime—vestitus*,” for the expected *versatus*¹, Quint. VI 3. 24 and 84. This topic he calls, *decipiendi opinionem*. He returns to it again in VIII 5. 15 under the name of *ex inopinato*: and gives two examples. Cic. de Or. II 63. 255; 70. 284, *locus praeter expectationem*. I have quoted two or three English ones in the note to Introd. p. 319, note 3.

‘And the apophthegms that have point and vivacity derive this character from the *indirect* statement of the meaning (from the speaker’s not directly expressing the intended meaning), as that of Stesichorus “that their cicalas will have to sing to themselves from the ground” all the trees being cut down and the land devastated; which is the real, direct, meaning: and ἑαυτοῖς, that there will be no one else to listen to them. On ἀποφθέγματα, see II 21. 8, where this is also quoted, Stesichorus’ apophthegm also appears in Demetr. π. ἔρμ. § 99 where it is attributed to Dionysius (the tyrant; as a threat); and § 243, as an example of βραχυλογία in the chapter on δεινότης. This is a *riddle* in the shape of an apophthegm: the next topic brings us to aenigmas proper. The pleasure derived from these is traced, as usual, to that of learning: and against that explanation in the *present* instance I have no objection to make.

‘And for the same reason, riddles well wrapped up give pleasure: for not only is this (viz. the solution of them) a kind of *learning*, but they are also expressed in metaphor. And what Theodorus calls “novel phrases, expressions.” This is effected (this *novelty*, this *surprise*) when (the sequel) is unexpected, and not, to use his own words, “according to previous opinion or expectation”; but, as is the custom of humorous,

¹ What is learnt here is only that the man whom you expected (at the beginning of the sentence) to be an accomplished lawyer, turns out to be an empty coxcomb. It may be doubted again whether the knowledge of *that* fact would give much pleasure.

τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα. ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώματα· ἔξαπατᾷ γάρ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν·

ἔστειχε δ' ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα.

ὁ δ' ᾤετο πέδιλα ἐρεῖν. τούτου δ' ἅμα λεγομένου δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὁ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὁ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου

jocular writers, who alter the letters of words to make jokes'. I have given a free transl. of the last clause; with οἱ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις understand ὄντες or διατρίβοντες; and with τὰ παραπεποιημένα, ποιούσιν, or the like.

παραποιεῖν¹ is, as I have pointed out in *Intro.* p. 320, the general name for all *falsification* (παρά) or (illicit) changes of the letters of words, for the purpose of a jest, παρονομασία, τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώματα, *perversion*, *misapplication*, of a word: all jokes that depend upon verbal or literal changes. Compare παρώνυμος and its congeners, in logic and grammar (*Categ. init.*), applied to πτώσεις or changes of termination. See further, *Intro.*, u. s., note 1.

On Theodorus of Byzantium, see note on II 23. 28, ult. and the references there given.

'Which is the effect also of *literal* jokes (founded upon the letters and the changes of them); for these also cheat (the expectation, and so far mislead). (This kind of joke is not confined to prose: it appears) also in verses. For (the conclusion) is not as the hearer (the *listener* to the recitation of a rhapsodist) supposed: "and he trod with his—chilblains under his feet" (statelyly stepped he along, and under his feet were his—chilblains)—whereas the other thought he was going to say "sandals". This παρὰ γράμμα σκώμα, which must be taken from some burlesque hexameter poem—author unknown—has its counterpart in Arist. *Vesp.* 1167, κακοδαίμων ἐγώ· ὅστις γ' ἐπὶ γῆρᾳ χίμετλον οὐδὲν λήψομαι. The Schol. ad h. l. (in Gaisford's *Not. Var.*) refers, as another instance, to Alcibiades' τραυλισμός, Arist. *Vesp.* 45, ὁλᾷς Θέωλος τὴν κεφαλὴν κίλακος ἔχει. παρ' ἐν γράμμα, ἥτοι παρὰ τὸ ῥ ἐστὶ τὸ σκώμα. Hermogenes, περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος, c. 34 (*Rh. Gr.* II 453, Spengel) in a chap. περὶ τοῦ κωμικῶς λέγειν, has illustrated this topic, which he calls παρῳδία, by the same verse of Aristoph.; and also this and τὸ παρὰ προσδοκίαν from Dem. de Cor.

'Pleasantries arising from changes of letters (plays on words) are produced, not by a mere enunciation of a word in its direct meaning, but by something (a change) which gives a different *turn* to it, (converts or twists it into a different sense); as that of Theodorus (of Byzantium, the rhetorician: *supra*, II 23. 28), against Nicon the harper, θράττει: he pretends namely to say "it confounds you" (you are confounded), and cheats; for he means something else: and therefore it is amusing only after one has become acquainted with the meaning (or circumstances);

¹ Διδυμός φησι τὴν περὶ ὄνου σκιάς παροιμίαν παραπεποιῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥήτορος λέγοντος περὶ τῆς ἐν Δέλφοις σκιάς...[Harpocration].

εἰς Νίκωνα τὸν κιθαρωδὸν “θράττει σε¹.” προσποι-
 εῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ “θράττει σε” καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ·
 ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει· διὸ μαθόντι ἡδύ, ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπο-
 λαμβάνει Θράκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον εἶναι. καὶ
 7 τὸ “βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι.” δεῖ δὲ ἀμφότερα προσ-
^{1 om.}

for if (the hearer) doesn't know that he is a Thracian, he will see no point in it at all'. Victorius and Schrader have both missed the meaning of this pun. But in order to arrive at it, we must first remove from the text the first *σε* after *θράττει* which has been introduced from the second (where it is required) and spoils the pun. Nicon, it appears from the explanation, is, or is supposed to be, of foreign extraction; and not only that, but a Thracian, the most barbarous of all nations. The Thracian women were habitually slaves, in Athenian families: Arist. Thesm. 279, 280, 284, 293, Pac. 1138, Vesp. 828. This person is addressed by Theodorus with the word *θράττει*, which means *apparently*, “You are confounded”; this appears from the interpretation that follows, (τι) *θράττει σε*, which is of course convertible in meaning with the passive *θράττει* (and it follows also that the first *σε* must be an error of the transcriber, for *θράττει σε* would be no interpretation of *θράττει σε*; nor in that form would there be any pun). It *really* means, however, *Θράττ' εἰ*, “You are a Thracian maid-servant”, not only an out-and-out barbarian, but effeminate to boot, and a menial. Schrader's explanation is “*Θράττη (sic) σε*, hoc est, *Thracia mulier te*, intellige *peperit*.” at once impossible in respect of the Greek, and pointless. Victorius, to much the same effect.

The amusement derived from a pun is thus explained by Cicero, de Or. II 62. 254, *Ambiguum* (double-entendre) *per se ipsum probatur id quidem, ut ante dixi, vel maxime; ingeniosi enim videtur vim verbi in aliud atque ceteri accipiant posse ducere; sed admirationem magis quam risum movet, nisi si quando incidit in aliud genus ridiculi.*

βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι] No satisfactory explanation has hitherto been given of this pun. The point of the joke has been always supposed to lie in *πέρσαι*. Francesco dei Medici, a friend of Vettori, suggested to him a solution which he quotes at length, that the Persae a poem of Timotheus is referred to, and that we should read *Πέρσαις*. But as Buhle justly remarks, “non video quidnam in hoc sit *faceti*.” Majoragi' explanation, who supposes that there was a verb *Πέρσειν*, of the same meaning as *Μηδίζειν*, *Persis favere*, is equally out of the question. I have looked (for once) into Spengel's commentary, and find that he has suggested an analogy with Horace's *vin tu curtis Iudaeis oppedere*, Sat. I 9.70. The same thought once occurred to me, but I abandoned it, in consideration of the *form* of the word, *πέρσαι*; which, though a possible aorist, is entirely without authority. *πέρδομαι* is a dep. and has *παρδήσσομαι* for its future, *ἐπαρδον* for the aorist. The solution I have finally arrived at is that the alteration of letters which makes the pun, resides in *βούλει*. This would probably be pronounced nearly, if not quite, like *βουλή*, and the word could be rendered ‘will you?’ or ‘the Council’: in the

ηκόντως λεχθῆναι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεία, οἷον τὸ φάναι Ἀθηναίους τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾤηθη τις ἐρεῖν, τοῦτ' εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι ἀληθές· τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐθὲν σοφόν· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλ' ἄλλως, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὃ εἶπεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως.

latter sense the words would mean 'may the council destroy him.' *Sed de his nugis iam satis est.*

§ 7. 'But both of them' (either the two last examples of *παρὰ γράμμα*; or that topic itself and the preceding, *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*: they all require the same precaution) 'must be properly pronounced' (or delivered—attention must be called to the *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*, by a slight pause, and to the double-entendre by heightening the tone or some similar expedient). The following words, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεία, sadly want the end of the sentence to enable us to determine their meaning. Victorius understands it, "tanquam in σκώμμασιν et iocis amarioribus, ita in urbanis hisce sermonibus": but Ar. makes no such distinction: all the jokes *παρὰ γράμμα* are alike *ἀστεία*. Vater fills it up thus; οὕτω δὲ καὶ (ταῦτὸ δύναται ταῦτα) τὰ ἀστεία (διὰ ὁμωνυμίας): ταῦτα being the before-mentioned *ἀμφοτέρα*; so that this is to be referred to the *ὁμωνυμία* which follows, and begins a new topic: a most unnatural interpretation as it seems to me. In default of any thing better I propose the following:—

'And so likewise witticisms, pointed sayings *in general* (as distinguished from the two special varieties, or two particular instances preceding), (require the same attention to *pronunciation*), as to say that "to the Athenians the *command* of the sea was not the *beginning* (both expressed by the same word, *ἀρχήν*) of their misfortunes"; for they derived benefit from it' (it was the *source* not of evil, but of good). Or, as Isocrates puts it, that "the command was to the city the beginning (or source) of her calamities." This, or something like it, occurs three times in Isocrates. The two similar places, one a mere repetition of the other, Phil. § 61, and de Pace § 101, are probably what Ar. had (very imperfectly) in his recollection: the third is, Paneg. § 119, which differs more widely from the quotation.

'For in both (these cases, or examples) that is said which one would not suppose likely to be said by any one, (*lit.* which one would not suppose that any one, *τινά*, would say) and (yet, at the same time) is recognised as true (sound, in accordance with facts, Victorius, see III 7. 9, *infra* § 10): for though it is true that there is nothing particularly clever in calling the *command* a *beginning*, (in calling *ἀρχή ἀρχή*, though in different senses), still he uses the term not in the same, but in different senses, (in the *second* example, Vahlen), and does not contradict (or deny) the use of *ἀρχή* (in the *first* example), only in a different sense'. The second example, from Isocrates, may seem at first sight to

8 ἐν ᾗπασι δὲ τούτοις, εἰς ἀνὰ προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ ὁμωνυμία ἢ μεταφορά, τότε τὸ εὔ. οἶον “Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνάσχετος.” ὁμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν, ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἀληθές. καὶ

οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ ξένος [ξένος]¹.
ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ, τὸ αὐτό. καὶ “οὐ δεῖ τὸν ξένον ξένον αἰεῖ εἶναι.” ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ

¹ ἢ [σε δεῖ] ξένος ξένος

contradict the first, what is affirmed in the one being denied in the other. But if allowance be made for the double sense of ἀρχή, the apparent discrepancy between the two statements will disappear.

§ 8. ‘But in all these cases, the merit (τὸ εὔ) consists in the proper application of the term (i. e. the *appropriateness* of it to the thing described), whether by (expressed in) ambiguity (the play on words) or metaphor’. ἐνέγκῃ, sc. ὁ λέγων : and comp. III 4. 2, οἰστέαι... αἱ μεταφοραί.

‘For instance “Intolerable Tolerable”—the contradiction lies only in the ambiguity ; but this is appropriate if the owner of the name is a bore (or nuisance)’. Read with Bekker and Spengel Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνάσχετος [not ἄσχετος, with Bekker’s Oxford ed. of 1837]. The first is a proper name ; as ‘Tolerable’ must be supposed to be in the English version. ὁμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν ‘the speaker contradicts the ambiguous word only’ ; not the *thing* itself : the application, not the fact. These contradictory, or privative, epithets of proper names—comp. the privative epithets of metaphors, III 6. 7 and note—may be exemplified in our own language by *ruthless Ruth*, *helpless Helps*, *fearless Phear*, *inconstant Constance*, *unpleasant Pleasance*, *ignoble Noble*, *Hotspur cold-spur*, and the like. Significant Greek names are to be found in II 23. 29, III 15. 8 ; Latin in Quint. VI 3. 55. Others are Ἀνεκτος (which is precisely parallel to Ἀνάσχετος in our text) and Νικήτης, Eustath. ad Hom. II. A p. 156—but in fact most Greek proper names are significant in themselves, though they may have lost the appropriateness of their personal application.

‘And, “never make thyself as a stranger, more of a stranger than is required of thee”, “not more than thou art bound to do” ; the same thing (in different words)’. As the words are *not* different, but the same, Vahlen¹ very reasonably proposes to omit σε δεῖ in the Iambic verse, οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ ξένος ξένος ‘more strange than a stranger’ ; so that οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ is now differently expressed, and becomes what it is said to be, an explanation ; or the expression of the same thing in different words. Victorius thinks that one of the two may mean ‘host’ or ‘guest’ ; but as ξένος is not repeated in the alternative, Vahlen’s explanation seems more probable. ‘And, (in a third way) “a stranger must not be always a stranger” (or, strange) : for that too is again of

¹ Vahlen, in *Trans. Vien. Acad.*, u. s. pp. 146, 7. He also would connect the sentence thus, which is a more doubtful improvement, ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ σε δεῖ. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ “οὐ δεῖ” κ.τ.λ.

αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον,
καλὸν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον·
ταῦτόν γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ
ὄντα ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν [ἢ ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανά-
9 του ἄξιον ὄντα] ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια. τὸ
μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλ' ὅσω
ἀν' ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσούτω εὐδο-
κιμῇ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ
ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ θᾶπτον
10 γίνεται. δεῖ δ' αἰεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται
ἢ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ
ἐπιπόλαιον· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἔχειν, οἷον “ἀπο-
a different kind, or form”, (foreign, alien, to the two others: ἀλλότριον
belonging to something or somebody else; opposed to οἰκείον).

‘Of the same kind is also that so highly praised verse of Anaxandrides, “A noble thing it is to die ere doing aught worthy of death”: for this is the same as saying, “It is worthy to die when one is not worthy to die”, or “it is a worthy thing to die when one does not deserve death”, or “doing nothing worthy of death”’. Anaxandrides is quoted III 10. 7 (see note) and *infra* 12. 3.

§ 9. ‘Now of all these the kind of expression (language) is the same: but the more briefly (ἐλάττονι, τῇ λέξει) and antithetically’, (repeat μᾶλλον from the compar. ἐλάττονι: I have represented the similar ellipse which our own language makes in the like case), ‘so much the more are they popular (approved, applauded). The reason of this is, that to the antithesis is due the increase, and by the brevity (in a short time, χρόνῳ, or space, compass, τόπῳ,) the more rapid growth (or acquisition) of the learning (that arises from them)’. Comp. notes on I 11. 21, 23, and III 9. 8, also 10. 2.

§ 10. ‘(To make a phrase ἀστεῖον) it should always have (attached to it, προσεῖναι) some special personal application (τό τινα εἶναι πρὸς ὃν λέγεται), or propriety in the expression if what is said (is to) be true and not superficial’ (*supra* c. 10.5).

ἀληθές] i.e. sound, solid, substantial, genuine, comp. III 7. 9, *sententiam gravem et honestam*, Victorius. *Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est*. Hor. Ep. I. 7, ult. also I 12. 23, “et saepe ap. Livium.” Orelli ad loc. These two, the ἀληθές and the μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον, do not always go together: when they are separated, the sentence loses its point and attraction. This separation is illustrated by two examples: the first, as a *sentiment*, has *truth*, weight, and solidity; the second is well enough written, as far as the style goes; but neither of them is particularly attractive.

‘Because these two may be separated in a sentence: for instance, “a man should die free from all offence”—but there is no point

θήσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἀμαρτάνοντα·” ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστέιον.
 “τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον.” ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστέιον.
 ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἅμα ἄμφω ἔχη· “ἄξιον γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ
 ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν.” ὅσῳ δ’ ἂν πλείω ἔχη,
 τοσοῦτῳ ἀστειότερον φαίνεται, οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνό-
 ματα μεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ καὶ ἀντί-
 θεσις καὶ παρίσσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.

11 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς p. 132.

ἄνω, ἀεὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί· ἀεὶ
 γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά.
 οἷον ἡ ἀσπίς φασὲν εἶναι φιάλη Ἄρεος, καὶ τόξον

in that: “the worthy man should marry the worthy woman¹”—but there is no point in *that* (this is *superficial*): but if they are both combined in the sentence (then only the sentence becomes pointed). “It is a worthy thing (or worth while) for a man to die when unworthy of death (when he has done nothing to deserve death).” Here we have the grave, sound, true doctrine, and the antithesis, which gives it point, and redeems it from superficiality. ‘But the greater the proportion of these qualities, the more pointed and attractive it appears; if, for instance, the (individual) words also were to convey (εἶη) a metaphor, and a metaphor of a particular kind (the *proportional* met. for example), and antithesis, and balanced clauses, and to carry with them vividness and *animation*’. On *ἐνέργεια*, see above § 1.

§ 11. ‘Similes too, as has been already said in the preceding (chapter, c. 4), are always in a certain sense popular metaphors. For they are always composed of (or, expressed in) two terms, just like the proportional metaphor; as for instance, the shield, we say, is Ares’ goblet’, (the shape of the *φιάλη* is in reality more like an elongated saucer, or shield—whence the comparison), ‘and a bow a stringless harp. When thus expressed, the phrase is not single (or simple; it has *both* terms expressed, the two terms viz. that are brought into comparison; and is therefore a simile); whereas to call the bow a harp or the shield a goblet is single’ (and therefore only a metaphor). [*ἀεὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι. “in æt̄ fortasse latet aī.”* Spengel.]

The meaning seems to be this. The difference between a simile and a metaphor is—besides the greater detail of the former, the simile being a metaphor *writ large*—that it always *distinctly expresses* the two terms that are compared, bringing them into *apparent* contrast: the metaphor on the other hand, *substituting by transfer* the one notion for the other of the two compared, identifies them as it were in one image, and expresses both in a *single* word, leaving the comparison between

¹ This comes most likely from Anaxandrides again (note on § 8). The verse ran thus τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον. Spengel, *Artium Scriptores* p. 20, adds δέ. Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.* III 201.

φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἀπ- P. 1413.
 λούν, τὸ δ' εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα
 12 φιάλην ἀπλούν. καὶ εἰκάζουσι δὲ οὕτως, οἷον πιθήκῳ
 αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ [εἰς] μύωπα· ἄμφω γὰρ

the object illustrated, and the analogous notion which throws a new light upon it, to suggest itself from the manifest correspondence to the hearer.

On the φιάλη *Ἀρεος, see note on III 4.4, and Introd. pp. 220—292, there referred to. This was due to Timotheus the dithyrambic poet. The φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος for τόξον—the point of resemblance which brings the two together seems to be the common twang of the bowstring and harp-string produced in each case by the vibration of the string. The bow may therefore be called a stringless harp, as wanting the *many* strings of the musical instrument, or, in other words, an unmusical harp. On these privative epithets with metaphors, comp. III 6.7. The author of this last bit of ἀσπειότης is a tragic poet named Theognis, mentioned with contempt and ridicule three times by Aristophanes, Acharn. 11, and 138, and Thesm. 168. He is said to have received the nickname of χιών from his excessive ψυχρότης. Of all his writings only this one phrase has survived, preserved by Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας, π. μεταφορᾶς, § 85. He gives the author's name, and cites this as a specimen of a κινδυνώδης μεταφορά, ὡς ὁ Θεόγνις παρατίθεται το (τόξον) φόρμιγγα ἄχορδον ἐπὶ τοῦ τῷ τόξῳ βάλλοντος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φόρμιγξ κινδυνώδης ἐπὶ τοῦ τόξου, τῷ δὲ ἀχόρδῳ ἡσφάλισται. Out of this Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.* III 100, and the writer of the article Theognis No. 11 in *Biog. Dict.*, have made what they print as a verse, παρατίθεται τὸ τόξον, φόρμιγγ' ἄχορδον.

§ 12. 'The simile is made in this way, by comparing for instance a flute-player to an ape'—*Simia quam similis, turpissima bestia nobis* [Ennius, ap. Cic. de Nat. Deor. I § 97]: besides this general resemblance of the two natures, there is also a special resemblance between the two, thus described by Victorius, "quod tibicines quoque ut simiae contracto corpore, manibusque ad os apposis, cum tibias inflant, ut bestia illa sedent." The resemblance is quite sufficient to justify the *simile*.

In the next example we must (with Bekker and Spengel) read, after MS A^o, λύχνῳ [not λύκῳ], and omit εἰς.

'And a short-sighted man to a lamp with water dropping upon it'. The involuntary contraction, the convulsive winking, of the half-closed eyes of the short-sighted man is compared to the fizzing, spirting, and sputtering of the lamp when water is dropped on it: 'because both are contracted'. μύωψ (μύειν) is one that keeps his eyes half shut, Probl. XXXI 16, διὰ τί οἱ μύωπες βλέφαρα συναγόντες ὀρώσιν; Arist. makes the point of the comparison lie in the *contraction* of both, the eyelids and the flame. ψακάς or ψεκάς 'a drop'; ψακάζειν 'to drop, fall in drops', Ar. Nub. 580 of the clouds, ἢ ψακαζόμεν, 'we drizzle'; ψακάζεσθαι (pass.) 'to be sprinkled with drops.' Xen. Symp. II 26, ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πικνὰ ἐπιψεκάζουσιν: opposed to ἄθροον πίνειν, to drink all at

13 συνάγεται. τὸ δὲ εὖ ἐστὶν ὅταν μεταφρὰ ἧ' ἔστι γὰρ εἰκάσαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλῃ Ἄρεος καὶ τὸ ἐρείπιον ῥάκει οἰκίας, καὶ τὸν Νικήρατον φάσαι Φιλοκτῆτην εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος, ὥσπερ εἶκασε Θρασύμαχος ἰδὼν τὸν Νικήρατον ἡττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ῥαψωδοῦντα, κομῶντα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι. ἐν οἷς

once, in *large* measures. The other is to distribute your potations in 'drops', as it were, in very small glasses; and so to make up for what you lose in the magnitude of the draught by the frequent repetition of the little one.

§ 13. 'Excellence is attained in them when they contain (involve) metaphor (comp. c. 10 § 3): for the shield may be compared to "Ares' goblet", and a ruin to the "rag of a house"; [conversely we have rags described as *ερείπια χλανιδίων*, Soph. *Fragm.* (Niobe) 400, comp. Eur. *Troad.* 1025.]

'And Niceratus may be said to be "a Niceratus stung by Pratys"—according to Thrasymachus' simile, when he saw Niceratus after his defeat by Pratys in the rhapsodical contest, and still all dishevelled and dirty (squalid)'; with the marks of the long and laborious struggle still fresh upon him; before he had had time to shave and dress. *κομῶν* is here used in the unusual sense of long hair as a sign of neglect, *incomtis capillis*, uncombed, unkempt: in the ordinary acceptation long hair is a sign of foppery, or the distinctive mark of a young man of fashion, Arist. *Eq.* 580, except at Sparta, *Rhet.* I 9. 26, where it was a national distinction, ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομῶν καλόν: as it was likewise in the Homeric ages, when the Achaeans were *καρηκομῶντες*.

Of the many Niceratuses whose names appear in Sauppe's *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* p. 102, there are two better known to us than the rest, (1) the son of the distinguished Athenian general, who appears as one of the guests in Xenophon's banquet, in Lysias, &c., and was put to death by the Thirty tyrants. If the Thrasymachus who made the remark upon him be—as he doubtless is—the famous Sophist, this must be the Niceratus who is here meant. The second, mentioned in *Dem. c. Mid.* § 165, and afterwards in a list of witnesses with the name of his deme Ἀχερδούσιος, § 168, was probably the grandson of the other; for the names of Nicias and Niceratus seem to have alternated in successive generations in this family, as they did in that of Callias and Hipponicus. These two are habitually confounded by Taylor, Reiske (see his *Ind. ad Dem.*) and others; and the confusion still exists in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*, although Buttmann proved their diversity (in *Exc. VIII ad Dem. c. Mid.*). Sauppe likewise, in his *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* p. 102, distinguishes them. Several other Nicias and Niceratuses appear in Sauppe's *Index*, u. s.

Niceratus had engaged in a contest with one Pratys, a professional rhapsodist, and, being in all probability an amateur, had been defeated. In this state, and still bearing all the marks of it on his person, he is

μάλιστα ἐκπίπτουσιν οἱ ποιηταί, ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. λέγω δ' ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν,

ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ,

ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντ' εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δ' εἰκόνες ὅτι μεταφοραί, εἴρηται πολλάκις.

encountered by Thrasymachus, who thereupon compares him to "a Philoctetes bitten or stung by Pratyss." Schneider on Xen. Sympos. III 5 supposes that "the subject of the recitation in which Niceratus was beaten was the account in Lesches' 'little Iliad' of the story of Philoctetes in which was related the calamity arising from the serpent's bite; alluded to by Homer, Il. B 721"; and by Soph. Phil. 267, πληγέντ' ἐχίδνης ἀγρίῳ χαράγματι, and 632.

'Wherein the poets are most condemned when they fail, and applauded when they succeed'. ἐκπίπτειν is properly said of an actor who is hissed off the stage, and hence of condemnation, disapprobation, in general. Poet. XVIII 15, ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀγάθων ἐξέπεσεν ἐν τοῦτ' ὀνῳ, Dem. de Cor. § 265, ἐξέπιπτες (Aeschines) ἐγὼ δ' ἐσύριπτον. Metaphorically, Plat. Gorg. 517 A, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον (ἐκπίπτειν omnino dicuntur ea quae reiiciuntur et repudiantur; Stallbaum). *explodi, exactus*, Ter. Prol. (2) Hec. 4 et 7. The opposite of the agent is ἐκβάλλειν 'to hiss off the stage'; Dem. de F. L. § 389 (of Aeschines again, as acting Thyestes), ἐξεβάλλετε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξεσύριττετε ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων.

'I mean when they make (the two members) correspond (bring into comparison, note on ἀποδιδόναί I 1. 7). "He wears his legs as curly as parsley." (οὖλος, Buttman Lexil. No. 44 and 88). "Like Philammon, at close quarters with the sack". Philammon, a famous Athenian athlete, gained the prize at the Olympian games, Dem. de Cor. § 319.

Harpocr. Φ. τὸν Ἀθηναῖον πύκτην. Eustath. ad Hom. Il. ψ p. 1324, quoted in Dissen's note on Dem. l. c.

[ζυγομαχεῖν] of a close struggle, desperate encounter, prop. of two oxen under the yoke, or of any yoke-fellows. Ruhnken ad Tim. s. v.

τῷ κωρύκῳ] κώρυκος, θύλακος. Suidas. θυλάκιον. ἔστι δὲ δερμάτινον ἀγγεῖον, ὅμοιον ἀσκῷ. Hesychius. 'A sack filled with bran and olive husks for the young, and sand for the more robust, and then suspended at a certain height, and swung backwards and forwards by the players.' *Dict. Ant.* art. 'Baths,' p. 144 b. It is evident that this describes only *one* use of it, namely for amusement or exercise at the baths: this game was called κωρυκομαχία. The other purpose for which it was employed was plainly from this passage that of boxers, who *practised* upon it. [Compare Plautus, Rudens 722, *follem pugilatorium faciam et pendentem incursabo pugnīs*, and see K. F. Hermann's *Privatalterthümer*, § 37. 17.]

These two iambic lines, from unknown authors, are clearly selected not for the *failure*, but the success, of the poet or poets who composed them.

'(These) and the like are all similes. That all similes are (a kind of, or involve) metaphors, has been stated already many times'.

14 καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι μεταφοραὶ ἀπ' εἶδους ἐπ' εἶδος
εἰσὶν· οἷον ἂν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγά-
γῃται, εἶτα βλαβῇ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιος φησι τὸν λαγῶ·
ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν.

ἔθεν μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα λέγεται καὶ διότι, σχεδὸν
15 εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι ὑπερβολαὶ

§ 14. 'Proverbs too are metaphors from species to species: as for instance, if a man has of his own accord invited the aid of (*lit.* called in to help him) another in the expectation of deriving benefit (from his assistance), and then incurs harm and loss instead, as the Carpathian says of the hare: for each of them is a case of the accident (or result) above mentioned'.

Carpathus, an island lying between Crete and Rhodes, from which the neighbouring sea took the name of Carpathian (Hor. Carm. I 35. 8): now called Skarpanto. The proverb is thus explained by Buhle. "Cum Carpathi incolae leporibus carerent, unus eorum par leporum introduxit" (rabbits, doubtless), "unde tanta eorum multitudo propter faecunditatem exorsa est, ut omnes fructus absumerentur." Erasmus, *Adag. Chil.* II Cent. I 81, p. 1250.

A similar result follows from similar conduct in Stesichorus' fable of the stag, the horse, and the man, II 20. 5. These are both *species* of the same *genus* of disappointed expectation, or disastrous result: and the proverb is a *transfer*, a *tralatia* of the one to the other. On the four kinds of metaphor, see Poet. XXI 7.

'So the sources of witticisms and pointed, pungent, vivid things in general, and the *reason why* (they are such; their *raison d'être*), have been pretty well explained'. I have omitted τὸ αἴτιον as a mere tautological repetition of διότι. On the three senses of διότι see note on I 1.11. Here the sense of "why" is proved by the explanatory τὸ αἴτιον.

§ 15. 'All *approved* hyperboles are also metaphors', i. e. a *mere* hyperbola, without metaphor, will *not* be approved. On the *hyperbole*, Auct. ad Heren. IV 33. 44, *superlatio est oratio superans veritatem aliquius augendi minuendive causa*, et seq. Cic. Topic. c. x § 45, *aut aliquid quod fieri nullo modo possit augendae rei gratia dicatur, aut minuendae, quae hyperbole dicitur*. Quint. VIII 6. 67—76, *Hyperbolam audacioris ornatus summo loco posui. Est haec decens veri superiectio. Virtus eius ex diverso par augendi atque minuendi*. Then follow the description and illustration of its several varieties. In Ernesti, *Lex. Techn.* (both Greek and Latin), hyperbole is omitted. ὑπερβολή is in fact 'exaggeration'. 'For instance (what was said) to (or *against*, for the purpose of exaggeration, making the most of it) the man with the black eye, "you'd have taken him for a basket of mulberries". For the black eye¹ is something red' (and so is the mulberry; the colour is similar; and

¹ τὸ ὑπὸ πῶπιον, which stands here for 'a black eye', is originally nothing but the seat of that, the part that is under the eye. It is thence transferred to the signification of the discoloured surface that results from a blow under the eye (ὑπὸ πῶ-

μεταφοραί, οἷον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον “ᾤθητε δ' ἂν αὐτὸν εἶναι συκαμίνων κάλαθον.” ἐρυθρὸν γάρ τι τὸ ὑπᾶπιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ σφόδρα. τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ καὶ τὸ ὑπερβολὴ τῇ λέξει διαφέρουσα.

ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.
ᾤθης δ' ἂν αὐτὸν Φιλάμμωνα εἶναι μαχόμενον τῷ κωρύκῳ.

ὥσπερ σέλινον οὔλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖν.

ᾤθης δ' ἂν οὐ σκέλη ἀλλὰ σέλινά ἔχειν οὕτως οὔλα.

16 εἰσὶ δὲ ὑπερβολαὶ μεираκιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γὰρ p. 133.

therefore so far it is a metaphor from one red thing—purple is nearer to the true colour—to another, εἶδος πρὸς εἶδος); ‘but the hyperbole or exaggeration’ (σφόδρα, which distinguishes it from metaphor) ‘lies in the excessive quantity’, (i. e. in the absurdly exaggerated number of black spots represented by a whole basket of mulberries. Victorius). According to Theophrastus, de Caus. Plant. VI 6. 4, there are two kinds of mulberries, red and white, ἐρυθρὸν καὶ λευκόν. This is an instance of Quintilian’s *first* variety of hyperbole; *quum plus facto dicimus*, *direct* exaggeration; of which two examples are given. Victorius refers to the saying of an Athenian wag about Sulla, συκαμίνον ἔσθ' ὁ Σύλλας ἀλφίτῳ πεπασμένον, “Sulla (i. e. his face) is like a mulberry powdered with flour”, in Plutarch [*Sulla*, c. 2, p. 451 F].

‘And another (kind of phrase) like so and so’ (comp. τὰ καὶ τά, *infra* c. 17. 11; this seems to mean the two preceding examples, which are here repeated, and *others like them*) ‘is a hyperbole, differing from it merely by the form of the expression (it becomes a hyperbole by dropping the particle of comparison, ὥσπερ). Thus “like Philammon at close quarters with the sack”, (may be thrown into the form of a hyperbole, thus,) “you would have taken him for Philammon fighting the sack”. Again, “to wear his legs curly like parsley”, becomes “you’d have thought his legs not legs, but parsley, so crooked are they”. This is Quintilian’s *second* variety of hyperbole, u. s. § 68, *superiectio per similitudinem, aut per comparisonem*: illustrated by *Credas innare revulsas Cycladas*, Virg. Aen. VIII 691.

§ 16. ‘The hyperbole has a *juvenile* character, signifying vehemence: and therefore they are most used by people when they are angry; “No, not if he were to offer me gifts as the sand or dust for multitude” (or gifts in number like the sand or dust). “And the daughter of Agamemnon

πιασμός)—the special for the general—ὑπωπιάζειν being to ‘strike, or inflict a blow under the eye’, and ὑπωπιασμένον here ‘one so struck’, including the resulting discolouration. See for exemplifications of all three, Arist. Pax 541, Acharn. 551, Vesp. 1386. Fragn. Apollonoph. 1. Vol. II 880, Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.*, κύαθον (a cupping-glass) τοῖς ὑπωπίοις, Antiph. 13. 5, Vol. III 139. Ib., στάσιν στάσει, μάχην μάχην ὑπωπίοις δὲ πύκτην (ἐξελαύνειν). Eubul. Semele s. Dionysus. Fr. 1. 8, ἐκτὸς ἤ (κρατῆρ) κώμων· ἔβδμομος δ' ὑπωπίων. Meineke u. s. 14. Vol. II. 29.

δηλοῦσιν. διὸ ὀργιζόμενοι λέγουσι μάλιστα·
οὐδ' εἴ μοι τόσα δοίῃ ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε.
κούρην δ' οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνωνος Ἀτρεΐδαο,
οὐδ' εἴ χρυσεῖη Ἀφροδίτῃ κάλλος ἐρίζοι,
ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίῃ.

χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες. διὸ P. 1413b
πρεσβυτέρῳ λέγειν ἀπρεπές.

I δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἐκάστω γίνεται ἀρ- CHAP. XII.
μόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγω-
νιστικὴ, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ καὶ δικανικὴ. ἄμφω δὲ

son of Atreus will I *not* wed, no, not though she vied in beauty with golden Aphrodite, and in accomplishments [deftness of handiwork] with Athene", comp. III 7. 11. II. I [IX] 385 (the angry Achilles indignantly refusing Agamemnon's offered presents). *μεираκιώδεις* is here meant to convey the fire, vigour, spirit, impetuosity, proneness to passion and excitement; or in general 'vehemence', as he tells us; which are characteristic of early youth. It is used by Plato [Rep. 466 B, and 498 B] in the sense of 'puerile'. The latter usually represents this by *νεανικός*, which he uses in two opposite senses; of the good and bad qualities of youth; either gallant, spirited, generous, noble, splendid and such like, or rash, wanton, insolent: also *νεανίας* and *νεανιεύσθαι*.

'This figure is an especial favourite with the Attic orators'.

'And this is why the use of it is unbecoming to an elderly man'—not because, as might be supposed from the arrangement of the sentences, it was such a favourite with the Attic orators but—because it is a *juvenile* trait of character, and as such must be inappropriate to the *opposite*.

[It may be doubted whether the awkward remark, *χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες*, which is a parenthetical note immediately succeeding another parenthesis and breaking the connexion between the beginning and the end of the section, was really written by Aristotle at all. The phrase *οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες*, which is not found elsewhere in Aristotle (though we have *οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες*, *infra* 17 § 10), is peculiarly open to suspicion, and may perhaps be ascribed to the pen of some Alexandrine critic familiar with the canon of the Ten 'Attic Orators'.]

CHAP. XII.

We now return for the last time to the subject of propriety of style, on which in this chapter we have some concluding observations. Rhetorical propriety must shew itself in the due adaptation of style to matter; and consequently the three branches of Rhetoric must be treated each in its appropriate style. We therefore distinguish two kinds of speeches, and two styles appropriate to them; (1) 'debate', speaking in the actual strife or contest of the assembly and the law-court, ἀγω-

ἀνάγκη εἶδέναι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν, ἂν τι

νιστικὴ λέξις, and (2) γραφικὴ, written compositions, which are confined to the third or epideictic branch : and the first is again subdivided into (a) public speaking, popular harangues addressed to the assembly, and (b) forensic. This is only true in theory : in practice speeches were often written by the orators, as Demosthenes and Isocrates, for the use of those who were incompetent or unwilling to write and plead for themselves.

Under the head of γραφικὴ λέξις are included all compositions which are intended to be read, and consequently the whole range of literature, with the exception of speeches which are intended to be *delivered* or *acted*, deliberative and forensic, *public* and *private* orations—such as those of Demosthenes. Thus the third branch of Rhetoric, the ἐπειδεικτική, is made to embrace all poetry, philosophy, history, and indeed any *writing* on any subject whatsoever. The distinction coincides with that of Hermogenes, περὶ ἰδεῶν τομ. β'. περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου (see *Rhet. Gr.* II. p. 401 seq. Spengel), who divides composition into λόγοι συμβουλευτικοί, δικανικοί, and πανηγυρικοί, the last including the works of Homer and Plato, the most distinguished of poets and prose writers.

The declamations delivered at the Olympian Games and other great public festivals or assemblies πανηγύρεις, whence the name πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι—such as Isocrates' Panegyric¹ and Panathenaic orations, and Lysias' celebrated Ὀλυμπιακός, of which a short fragment is preserved, (Or. 33, Baïter et Sauppe, *Or. Att.* I 146)—were intermediate between the public or agonistic and the epideictic or graphic speeches, partaking of the character of both ; being declaimed in public and sometimes with a political object (as Lysias' speech, and some of Isocrates'), but that object was subordinate, the main consideration being always the display. Isocrates is always anxious to impress his readers with the conviction that his speeches are not mere empty declamations, ἐπιδείξεις, but genuine πολιτικοὶ λόγοι—are indeed a branch of Philosophy, which with him is pretty nearly convertible with Rhetoric, see κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν §§ 1, 11, 21, and Mr Sandys' note on Paneg. § 10. [Isocrates means by "Philosophy" a combination of the accomplishments of the ῥήτωρ and the πολιτικός'. Thompson's *Phaedrus*, p. 172.]

Isocrates, writing from his point of view, ἀντίθ. §§ 46—50, contrasts himself and his own declamations, which he calls Ἑλληνικοὺς καὶ πολιτικούς καὶ πανηγυρικούς, with δικανικοὶ λόγοι, forensic pleading and plead-ers, whom, probably in consequence of his own failure in that branch of Rhetoric, he attacks and vituperates upon intellectual, social, and moral grounds. Writing before the establishment of Aristotle's three-fold division of the art, he evidently recognises only two branches, public or political speaking, in which national interests are concerned—and at the head of these he places his own πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι, the true philosophy (§ 50)—and judicial or forensic, in which private interests

¹ See on this, Mr Sandys' Introduction to *Isocratis Panegyricus*, p. xl seq.

βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὃ περ πάσχουσιν
2 οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν. ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ

between man and man are debated and decided. In respect of style, he of course gives the preference to his own kind of composition, §§ 46, 7.

On this adaptation of style to the different kinds of oratory, see Quint. VIII 3. 11—14. The opening observation, at all events, looks like a reference to this chapter, though Spalding in his note is silent on the subject.

Whately also, in his *Rhet.* c. IV 'on Elocution', (*Encycl. Metrop.* p. 299 b, 300 a, 301 b,) has some good observations, partly derived from Aristotle, upon the contrast of the *agonistic* and *graphic* styles. On the contrast of the two, see by all means Isocr. Phil. §§ 25, 26: all the main points of interest in public and forensic, or agonistic, speeches are there enumerated, and the comparatively lifeless speeches *to be read*, forcibly contrasted with them. [Comp. also Alcidas, *περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτῶν λόγων γραφόντων*, (against Isocrates).]

§ 1. 'It must not be forgotten (lost sight of) that a different kind of language is appropriate to each different kind (of Rhetoric). For the same style is not suitable to *written* composition (that which is intended *to be read*) and that which is used in *debate* (in the *contests*, the actual struggle, of real life; nor again in (the two divisions of the latter) public and forensic speaking. The orator must be acquainted with both: for the one (debate) implies the knowledge and power of clear expression in pure Greek, and the other freedom from the necessity (*lit.* the not being obliged to) of suppressing in silence (*κατά*, keeping *down*) anything that one may want to communicate to the rest of the world; which is the case with those who have no knowledge (or skill) of writing (i.e. composition)'. Comp. III 1. 7. Cicero, de Or. II 82. 337, gives a brief description of the 'grand' and dignified style appropriate to the exalted subjects of public speaking.

The meaning of this seems to be—the orator must be acquainted with the written as well as the debating style; the latter implies and requires only the correct use of one's native language, so that one may be able to make oneself clearly intelligible: *this* (debate alone) does not require the minute accuracy of studied composition, which can be examined at leisure and criticized: but since one who can only speak, and not write, is incapable of communicating his opinions to the rest of the world (*τοῖς ἄλλοις*, all others besides the members of the assembly or law-court that he is actually addressing), it is necessary for a statesman to acquire the power of writing well, and therefore to study in some degree the art of exact composition. Victorius, who renders τὸ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι—τοῖς ἄλλοις of actual writing, that is of *letters* to absent friends, seems to narrow the meaning of 'writing' in such a way as to produce a somewhat ridiculous result. Surely *any* educated man, whether he be an orator and statesman or not, requires and possesses the knowledge of *writing* in that sense. On τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, Thuc. II 60, 5—6 may serve as a commentary; Pericles, in his defence, describing his qualifications for a statesman, says οὐδενὸς οἶμαι ἥσσαν εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα

μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἶδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡθικὴ ἡ δὲ παθητικὴ. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. βαστάζονται καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα...ὁ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθῃ.

§ 2. 'The written style is the most exact' (or finished: on ἀκριβεία and its various senses, see Grant ad Eth. Nic. I 7. 18, and the references in Introd. ad h. l. p. 334, note 4), 'that of debate lends itself most to acting' (or delivery: is the 'most capable of being acted'). Comp. III 1. 4. The reason of this as far as *declamation* is concerned, viz. why the *graphic* style admits of more ornament and artificial arrangement than the other, is thus stated by Cicero, Orat. LXI 208. After the invention of the period, &c., he says, *nemo qui aliquo esset in numero scripsit orationem generis eius, quod esset ad delectationem comparatum remotumque a iudiciiis forensique certamine, quin redigeret omnes fere in quadrum numerumque sententias. Nam quum is est auditor, qui non vereatur ne compositae orationis insidiis sua fides attemptatur, gratiam quoque habet oratori voluptati aurium servienti.*

'Of this (ἀγωνιστικὴ) there are two kinds; one that (includes, conveys,) represents *character*, the other *emotion* (in the speech)'. That is, not that ἀγωνιστικὴ is a *genus*, containing two *species* under it, moral and emotional: for this is not the fact, and also *any* speech may have *both*: but that these two elements belong specially, not exclusively, to the two debating branches of Rhetoric, of which they are very prominent ingredients: the reality of the interests at stake giving more room for the play of passion and the assumption of character than the cold unimpassioned, deliberate *written* compositions. The ethical part is of two kinds, the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*, I 2. 4, II 1. 4, and the *characters* ἦθη of the several ages and conditions, II 12. 17. The emotional is of course that which is partially described I 2. 5, and treated at length in II 2. 16. Of these 'appeals to the feelings', δέινωσις and ἔλεος, the earlier rhetorical treatises were full, I 1. 3, of which Thrasymachus' ἔλεοι (III 1. 7) described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C, was a well-known specimen. Quint. III 8. 12, (In concionibus deliberatio) *affectus, ut quae maxima, postulat, seq. Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas* (this is principally due to ἦθος) *plurimum, seq.* See III 7. 1, 3, 6, where the two are described. The ἦθος is there confined to those of age, nation, station, &c. Compare with all this, Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας § 193, ἐναγώνιος μὲν οὖν ἴσως μᾶλλον ἢ διαλελυμένη λέξις, αὕτη καὶ ὑποκριτικὴ καλεῖται· κινεῖ γὰρ ὑπόκρισιν ἢ λύσις. γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις ἡ εὐανάγνωστος. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ συνηρημένη καὶ οἶον ἡσφαλισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Μένανδρον ὑποκρίνονται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, Φιλήμονα δὲ ἀναγνώσκουσιν.

'And this is why actors also (as well as debaters) hunt after (διώκουσι) plays of this kind (that is, plays of which the subjects give scope for the exhibitions of passion and character), and the poets after persons (whether *actors* to represent the πάθη, or characters in the dramas *to be represented with them*) of the same kind. At the same time, the poets

δὲ οἱ ἀναγνωστικοί, οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβὴς γὰρ ὥσπερ λογογράφος) καὶ Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων

that can be read (that write to be read as well as acted or rhapsodised) become pocket-companions, or favourites'.

βαστάζεσθαι is said of anything that is carried about in the hand or arms, fondled, cherished, fondly and familiarly treated, like a baby or pet lapdog; and hence when applied to a book naturally means one that people are fond of, and carry about with them in their pockets. There are several instances in Sophocles—see Ellendt's Lex.—that illustrate this sense of βαστάζεσθαι, as Philoct. 655 of the *favourite* bow and 657, (Neopt.) ἔστιν ὥστε...καὶ βαστάσαι με (be allowed to *nurse* it), προσκύσαι θ' ὥσπερ θεόν; Aesch. Agam. 34, εὐφιλῇ χέρα ἄνακτος τῇδε βαστάσαι (to press and caress) χέρι (Blomfield's Glos. ad loc.). Quint. VIII 3. 12, of any striking sentiment or expression, *intuendum* (to be narrowly looked into) *et faene pertractandum*.

'Chaeremon for instance who is as exact (highly finished) as a professional speech-writer (such as Isocrates), and Licymnius amongst the dithyrambic poets'. On Chaeremon, see note II 23. 29, ult. [The ἀκρίβεια of Chaeremon may be illustrated by his partiality for minute details, such as enumerating the flowers of a garland, e.g. Athenaeus XV p. 679 F, κίσσῳ τε ναρκίσσῳ τε τριέλικας κύκλῳ στεφάνων ἐλκτῶν.] On λογογράφος, see II 11. 7; Shilleto on Dem. de F. L. § 274. Licymnius is mentioned above, III 2. 13, where reference is made to *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7, for an account of what is known of him; and again III 13. 5.

'And upon comparison the (speeches, λόγοι) of the *writers* when delivered in actual contests have a narrow, confined, contracted (i.e. poor, mean, paltry) appearance, whilst those of the orators (meaning particularly the *public* speakers, in the assembly), which by their skilful delivery succeed or pass muster' (none of this is *expressed* but 'well delivered'¹), 'when taken in the hands (to read) look like the work of mere bunglers or novices'. στενός is the Latin *tenuis*, and the English *slight* and *slender*, in a contemptuous and depreciatory sense. In its primary sense of *narrow* it stands in opposition, in respect of style, to the wider range, and the broader, *larger*, freer, bolder, tone required by the loftier and more comprehensive subjects, and also by the larger audiences, of public speakers; the high finish and minute artifices of structure, as well as the subtler and finer shades of intonation and expression, are lost in a crowd and in the open air. So Whately, *Rhet.* ch. IV (*Encycl. Metrop.* p. 301 a), describes the *agonistic* style, as "a style somewhat more blunt (than the *graphic*) and homely, more simple and, apparently, unstudied in its structure, and at the same time more daringly energetic." στενοὶ then

¹ [So in Introd. p. 325, after Victorius and Majoragius, but compare Mr Cope's second thoughts as given in the *note* on the same page: "εὖ λεχθέντες can mean nothing but 'well spoken of', ῥήτορες being understood."]

εὖ λεχθέντες ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἀρμόττει· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τὰ τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ

represents the comparative *narrowness* or confined character of the graphic style, with its studied artificial graces, careful composition, and other such 'paltrinesses', 'things mean and trifling'—a sense in which it occurs in a parallel passage of Pl. Gorg. 497 C, where *σμικρὰ καὶ στενὰ* are contemptuously applied by Callicles to Socrates' dialectics. This is actually said of *Isocrates*, in the passage of Dionysius, de Isocr. Iud. c. 13, by Hieronymus, the philosopher of Rhodes; ἀναγνῶναι μὲν ἂν τινα δυνηθῆναι τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ (Isocr.) καλῶς, δημηγορῆσαι δὲ τήν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸν τόνον ἐπάραντα, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ κατασκευῇ μετὰ τῆς ἀρμοττοῦσης ὑποκρίσεως εἰπεῖν, οὐ παντελῶς.

ἰδιωτικοί] such as have only the *capacity* (-κός) of unprofessional persons, or *laymen* in art, &c. as opposed to *clerks*, when all science and learning were in the hands of the clergy. ἰδιώτης is opposed to *δημιουργός*, a practitioner of *any* art, science, profession, or pursuit: and especially to philosophy and its professors, as in the adage, ἰδιώτης ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος ἐν ἰδιώταις.

Spengel follows MS A^c (or A) in reading ἡ τῶν λεχθέντων for εὖ λεχθέντες. But I confess that I do not see who could be intended by τῶν λεχθέντων besides the orators. Certainly not the preceding ἀναγνωστικοί.

ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν] This must have been the case with Cicero's rival, Hortensius. Quintilian [XI 3. 8], after telling us that Hortensius was, during his lifetime, first thought to be chief of all orators, secondly Cicero's rival, and thirdly second to him alone, adds, *ut appareat placuisse aliquid eo dicente quod legentes non invenimus* (the same may be said of many sermons). Isocrates' Phil. §§ 25, 26, an excellent commentary on this, is unfortunately too long to quote.

'The reason is that their appropriate place is in an actual contest or debate' (with ἀρμόττει supply, if you please, ταῦτα as the nomin.—it means at all events the subject of the immediately preceding clause): 'and this also is why things (speeches) intended to be *acted* or delivered (*lit.* proper to be, or capable of being, -κός), when the delivery is withdrawn don't produce their own proper effect (or perform their *special function*, ἔργον), and so appear silly: for instance *asyndeta*, and the reiteration of the same word in the written, *graphic* style'—with which the agonistic divested of its acting or delivery is now (surreptitiously) associated—are rightly disapproved; whereas in debating the orators *do* employ them, because they are proper for acting'. Aquila c. 30 (ap. Gaisford, *Not. Var.*), *Ideoque et Aristoteli et iteratio ipsa verborum ac nominum et repetitio frequentior, et omnis huius modi motus actioni magis et certamini quam stilo videtur convenire.*

3 ὑποκριτικά. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας· ὃ περ ὡς προοδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι. “οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐξαπατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἔσχατον προδοῦναι ἐπιχειρήσας.” οἷον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐποίει ἐν τε τῇ Ἀναξανδρίδου γεροντομανίᾳ, ὅτε λέγει Ῥαδάμανθος καὶ Παλαμήδης, καὶ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν τὸ ἐγὼ· ἐὰν γάρ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίγνεται ὁ

§ 3. What follows is a *note*, a passing observation suggested by the subject, but not immediately connected with it. ‘In this repetition of the same thing, some change must be made in the mode of expression of each member of it’: (the repetition should be made in different words, to avoid monotony. See on the interpretation of this, and the figure μεταβολή, to which μεταβάλλειν points, a full explanation, Introd. p. 326, and note 1:) ‘which paves the way as it were for the delivery’ (on προοδοποιεῖ, see note on I 1. 2). “This is he that *stole* from you, this is he that *cheated* you, this is he that last of all attempted to *betray* you”’. (From an unknown rhetorician; most probably not the author’s own.) ‘And again, as another instance, what Philemon the actor (not to be confounded with the Comic poet) used to do in Anaxandrides’ *Old men’s madness*, where (lit. *when*, ὅτε) he says (uses the words in playing his part) “Rhadamanthys and Palamedes,” and also, in the prologue of the *Devotees*, the word ἐγώ: for if such things (phrases, sentences, or words) as these be not (varied) in the delivery, they become like “*the* man that carries the beam,” in the proverb (τήν), i.e. stiff and awkward, like one that has ‘swallowed a poker’, as *our* proverb has it.

Anaxandrides, quoted before, III 10. 7. The first citation from his comedy, the γεροντομανία, has the rest of the verse supplied in Athen. XIV 614 C, καὶ τοι πολὺ γέ πονοῦμεν. τὸν ἀσύμβολον εὖρε γελοία λέγειν Ῥαδάμανθος καὶ Παλαμήδης. On the passage of Aristotle, which he quotes, Meineke, *Fr. Comic. Gr.* III 166, has the following remark: “Philemon autem quid fecerit in recitandis verbis P. καὶ Π., non satis apparet.” I don’t suppose the repetition to have been confined to these words; all that Aristotle means to say seems to be, when Philemon had come to that point, thereabouts, the repetition took place. “Num forte eadem verba in pluribus deinceps versibus recitabantur et alio atque alio vocis flexu et sono ab histrione recitabantur? (This follows Victorius’ interpretation of μεταβάλλειν.) Ita sane videtur, neque alia alterius loci fuerit ratio, in quo identidem repetebatur pronomen ἐγώ.” At all events, these were two notorious and well-remembered *points* made by Philemon in this *varied* repetition in acting the character which he sustained in these two comedies. There is, or was, a similar tradition (which I heard from Dr Butler, the late Bp of Lichfield, and Master of Shrewsbury School) of the effect produced by Garrick’s rendering of *Pray you undo this button*:—*thank you, sir*,—of Lear, choking in his agony, at the point of death [v. III. 309].

4 τὴν δοκὸν φέρων. καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὡσαύτως. “ἦλθον, p. 134
ἀπὴντησα, ἐδεόμην.” ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ
ὡς ἐν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἦθι καὶ τόνῳ εἰπεῖν. ἔτι
ἔχει ἰδιὸν τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα. ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ
δοκεῖ εἰρησθαι. ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλὰ,
ὥστ' ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τούναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἐν
πολλὰ. ἔχει οὖν αὐξησιν. “ἦλθον, διελέχθην, ἐκέ-
τευσα.” πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπεν. τοῦτο δὲ P. 1414.
βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ Ὀμηρος ἐν τῷ

§ 4. ‘And of *asyndeta* the same may be said, “I came, I met, I implored”. I have translated this upon the supposition that there is no intention of distinguishing here the aorist and imperfect: ‘for (here again) delivery (i.e. intonation) must come into play, and it must not be spoken as if it were all one, with the same *character* and accent’. Of *ἀσύνδετον* or *λύσις*, the disconnected style, in which σύνδεσμοι ‘connecting particles’ are absent, comp. Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας § 194, ὅτι δὲ ὑποκριτικὸν ἢ λύσις παράδειγμα ἐγκείσθω τόδε, ἐδεξάμην, ἔτικτον, ἐκτρέφω, φίλε (Menander, *Fr. Inc.* 230, Meineke, u.s. IV 284). οὕτως γὰρ λελυμένος ἀναγκάσει καὶ τὸν μὴ θέλοντα ὑποκρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν λύσιν· εἰ δὲ συνδήσας εἴποις, ἐδεξάμην καὶ ἔτικτον καὶ ἐκτρέφω, πολλὴν ἀπάθειαν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἐμβαλεῖς. Of *asyndeton* two examples are given from Demosthenes by Hermogenes π. μεθόδου δεινότητος, § 11, *Rhet. Gr.* II 435, Spengel.

A good example of *asyndeton*, illustrating the rapidity and vivacity which it imparts to style, is supplied by Victorius from Demosth. c. Androt. § 68, ὁμοῦ μετοίκους, Ἀθηναίους, δέων, ἀπάγων, βοῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος. Add Cicero's *abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit*.

The vivacity imparted to style by *asyndeton* and the opposite (the employment of connecting particles) is admirably explained and illustrated by Campbell, *Phil. of Rhet.* Bk. III sect. 2, near the end (2nd ed. Vol. II pp. 287—293.)

‘Further *asyndeta* have a certain special property; that (by their aid) many things seem to be said in the same time’ (as *one* thing would be, if they had been employed); ‘because the connecting particle (or connexion) converts several things into one, (Harris, *Hermes*, II 2, p. 240,) and therefore if it be withdrawn (extracted), plainly the contrary will take place; one will become many. Accordingly (the *asyndeton*) exaggerates (or amplifies: or multiplies, increases the number)¹: “I came, I conversed, I supplicated”: (the hearer or reader) seems to overlook or survey a number of things that he (the speaker) said’. (I have followed Bekker, Ed. 3, πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπεριδεῖν ὅσα εἶπεν. Spengel has, πολλὰ δοκεῖ,

¹ The opposite of this, the employment of σύνδεσμοι, sometimes tends to produce the same effect. Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας, § 54, ὡς παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ (II. B 497), τῶν Βοιωτικῶν πολέων τὰ ὀνόματα εὐτελεῖ ὄντα καὶ μικρὰ ὄγκον τινὰ ἔχει καὶ μέγεθος διὰ τοὺς συνδέσμους κ.τ.λ., and again, § 63.

Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν,
Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης,
Νιρεὺς ὃς κάλλιστος.

περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴρηται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις
εἴρησθαι· εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὥστε
ἠϋξήσεν ἅπαξ μνησθεὶς διὰ τὸν παραλογισμόν, καὶ
μνήμην πεποιήκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον
ποιησάμενος.

5 ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικε τῇ

ὑπερίδεν ὅσα εἶπον, which does *not* agree with MS A^c, and is also ob-
scure. Bekker, Ed. 1, has πολλὰ δοκεῖ δὲ ὑπερίδειν ὅσα εἶπον, ὅσα φημί).

‘And this is *Homer’s* intention also in writing Nireus at the com-
mencement of three lines running’. Il. II 671. On this Demetrius, π. ἐρ-
μηνείας §§ 61, 62, τὸν δὲ Νιρέα, αὐτὸν τε ὄντα μικρὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτοῦ
μικρότερα—all this is raised to magnitude and importance by ἐπαναφορά,
repetition, and διάλυσις, *asyndeton*. He then quotes the three lines; and,
§ 62, continues, καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαξ τοῦ Νιρέως ὀνομασθέντος ἐν τῷ δράματι (dra-
matic poetry) μεμνήμεθα οὐδὲν ἦγον ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως, καίτοι
κατ’ ἔπος ἕκαστον καλουμένων σχεδὸν κ.τ.λ. concluding with an ingenious
simile; ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐστιάσεσι τὰ ὀλίγα διαταχθέντα πως (a few meats
by a certain disposition or arrangement) πολλὰ φαίνεται, οὕτω κὰν τοῖς λόγοις.
Comp. also Hermogenes, περὶ ἐπαναληψέως, de repetitione, π. μεθόδου
δεινότητος, § 9 (*Rhet. Gr.* II 433, Spengel), who gives this example of
Nireus, with others from Homer, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. Illus-
trations of this emphatic repetition, and especially of that of the pro-
noun αὐτός, occur in a fragm. of Aeschyl., Fragm. Inc. 266, quoted at
length in Plat. Rep. II 383 B, the most forcible of them all: κἀγὼ (Thetis)
τὸ Φοῖβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνη. ὁ δ’
αὐτὸς ὕμνων, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών, αὐτὸς τὰδ’ εἰπών, αὐτὸς ἐστίν ὁ κτανὼν τὸν
παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν. After this it will be unnecessary to quote inferior speci-
mens; such as Xen. Anab. III 2. 4, Aesch. Eumen. 765, with Paley’s
note, and Blomfield’s note on 745, in Linwood’s ed. p. 188, where several
references are given.

‘For a person (or thing) of which many things are said must neces-
sarily be often mentioned; and therefore (this is a fallacy) they think it
follows (καί, that it is *also* true) that if the name is often repeated, there
must be a great deal to say about its owner: so that by this fallacy (the
poet) magnifies (Nireus) by mentioning him only once (i. e. in one place),
and makes him famous though he nowhere afterwards speaks of him
again’. This is the fallacy of illicit conversion of antecedent and conse-
quent, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 1, ὁ δὲ παρεπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι
ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολουθήσιν κ.τ.λ. and Rhet. I 7. 5. Analogous to this is
the fallacy exposed in III 7. 4.

§ 5. It seems as if in the following section Aristotle had, probably
unconsciously misled by the ambiguous term, used ἀκριβής and its πτώ-

σκιαγραφία· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ἢ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρωτέρῳ ἢ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περιέργα καὶ χεῖρω φαί-

seis in two distinct senses: exactness and high finish in *style* and *reasoning*. The general subject and connexion of the chapter will oblige us to refer the first clause, with its comparison of public speaking to a rough sketch in black and white, without details, and producing no effect on close inspection, to the *style* of the speech—which indeed is the subject of the whole book as well as this chapter—though it may possibly include also minute details of reasoning. The same thing may be said of ἡ δίκη ἀκριβέστερον: in this the *style* and the argument may be minuter, exacter and more detailed in proportion to the diminished size of the audience, and the increased probability of their paying attention to such things (see note ad loc.). But when we come to the third degree, the single judge, it seems to be false and absurd to say that exactness and high finish of *style* is *more* suited to speeches addressed to him: no man would endeavour to attract or impose upon an *arbitrator* by such artifices. The exactness in this case seems therefore to be confined to exactness of reasoning and minute detail, as of evidence and the like. A single judge—as in our own courts—would always be more patient, more inclined to listen to, and more influenced by, exact reasoning and circumstantial evidence than either of the two preceding: the mob of the assembly would not hear them, nor follow them, nor listen to them at all: the large body of dicasts would be more ready to do so: but most of all the single judge. The last clause of the section brings us back to the point from which it started, viz. differences of style, and *seems* to apply this exclusively to what has been said of ἀκρίβεια in forensic pleading.

‘Now the style of public-speaking is exactly like scene-painting; for the greater the crowd, the more distant the point of view, and consequently’ (in these crowded assemblies; held too in the open air—which should be added in respect of the style required, though this does not *distinguish* it from forensic rhetoric,) ‘all exactness, minute and delicate touches, and high finish in general appear to be superfluous and for the worse (deviating from the true standard of *public* speaking) in both’. Compare with this Whately’s remarks, partly borrowed from Ar., *Rhet.* c. IV (*Encycl. Metrop.* p. 299), on the “*bolder*, as well as less accurate, kind of language allowable and advisable in speaking to a considerable number”: he quotes Ar.’s comparison of scene-painting, and then proceeds “to account for these phenomena”—which Ar. has omitted to do. His explanation is derived from the various sympathies which are especially awakened in a great crowd.

σκιαγραφία is a painting in outline and *chiaroscuro*, or light and shade, without colour, and intended to produce its effect only at a *distance*—herein lies the analogy to public speaking—consequently rough and unfinished, because *from the distance* all niceties and refinements in style and finish would be entirely thrown away (περίεργα). This point is well brought out in a parallel passage of Plat. Theaet. 208 E, νῦν δὴ τα, ὦ Θ., παντάσῃ γε ἔγωγε ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνήμῃ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν· ἕως ἀφελστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαίνετό μοι τι λέγεσθαι

νεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ¹ ἀκριβεστέρα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν ῥητορικοῖς· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκείον τοῦ πράγ-

¹ *Correxist Tyrwhitt; secutus est Bekker³ et Spengel.* MSS δίκη ἀκριβέστερον.

(Heindorf, note ad loc.): "as long as he was at a distance he seemed to understand the meaning of what was said; on a nearer approach all the apparent clearness vanished, and it became confused and indistinct." In *Phaedo*, 69 B, *σκιαγραφία* is a mere rough sketch or outline; a daub, without any distinct features (see Wytttenbach ad loc.). *Parmen.* 165 C, οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα, ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα, ... προσελθόντι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα. *Rep.* x 602 D. *Ib.* II 365 C, where it has the same sense as in the *Phaedo*. *Ast* ad loc. *Comm.* p. 410. And in several other passages of *Plato*. As the point of comparison here is solely the difference between the near and distant effects, I have translated it 'scene-painting' (as also Whately) which represents this better to us: the proper and literal meaning of the word is "the outline of a shadow", the supposed origin of painting. See further in Mr Wornum's art. on 'painting', in *Dict. Ant.* p. 680 ὅ. With *πορρωτέρω ἢ θέα*, comp. de *Soph. El.* I 164 ὅ 27, where the 'appearance' as opposed to the 'reality', is compared to this distant view, φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἀπειρίαν· οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι ὥσπερ ἂν ἀπέχοντες πόρῳθεν θεωροῦσιν.

ἡ δὲ δίκη ἀκριβέστερον] 'Whereas justice (forensic pleading) admits of more exactness and finish'. The audience is less numerous, and *nearer*, literally and metaphorically, to the speaker; they are *nearer* to him locally, so they can *hear* better what he says, and also *nearer* to him in respect of the knowledge of persons and circumstances, which permits him to enter into more minute detail. Also they are not personally interested in the dispute, and can afford to bestow more attention upon *minutiae* of style, action, intonation, and such like, and being comparatively unoccupied are more likely to notice and criticize such things. All these are reasons why ἡ δίκη is ἀκριβέστερον in various senses. See *Quint.* III 8.62 seq. After speaking of the declamatory style, he continues, *Alia veris consilii ratio est; ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omni affectatione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem: secutus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui; quanquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet. Namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam, proximamque ab ea iudiciale[m] putavit et seq.*

And still further (in respect of the reduction of the number of hearers, and the consequent admissibility of accuracy and finish in the speech) that (*subaudi* δίκη, the pleading) before a single judge: for he is least of all subject to (liable to be imposed on by) rhetorical artifices (appeals to the feelings and the like): for he takes a more comprehensive view of what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it (this seems to define the kind of ἀκρίβεια that is here intended) and the *contest* is absent (there is no room for partisanship and prejudice) and his judgment clear or pure (i.e. free and unbiassed; *sincrum*, pure of all alloy, such as the preceding). And this is why the

ματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν ἄπεστιν, ὥστε καθαρά ἢ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εὐδοκιμοῦσι ῥήτορες· ἀλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως, ἐνταῦθα ἡκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἐνι. τοῦτο δέ, ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης.

6 ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις· δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανικὴ. τὸ δὲ

same orators don't succeed (become popular, distinguish themselves) in all these (at once): but where action or delivery is most required, *there* is least of exact finish to be found'. [With ὁ ἀγὼν ἄπεστιν comp. Cic. ad Att. I 16. 8 *remoto illo studio contentionis quem ἀγῶνα vos ἀρ-
pellatis*.]

With μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως something must be supplied: whether we should understand *δεῖ* or the like; or simply *ἐστί*, 'when it (the speech, or the thing in general,) *belongs to*, is concerned with, when it is a question of, delivery'. 'And this where voice is required, and especially loud voice' (to reach a *larger* assembly).

φωνή, *voice* in general, means the various qualities of voice, flexibility, sweetness, power, &c.; out of which a *powerful* voice is especially distinguished as the most important. It seems that Aeschines was very proud of his sonorous voice. Demosth. alludes to this, de F. L. § 388, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄλλως ἐνταῦθ' ἐπαρεῖ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ πεφωνασκηκῶς ἔσται. And § 389, καὶ τοι καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἴσως εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη· πάνν γὰρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αὐτὸν ἀκούω. And elsewhere.

§ 6. 'So now, as I was saying, the demonstrative, declamatory, branch of Rhetoric is the best adapted for writing; for its special function (the purpose which it was *made* to serve, its *ἔργον*¹) is reading: and in the second degree the dicastic branch' (and its pleadings). Comp. *supra* III 1.4 and 7. Cic. Orat. LXI 208 (already referred to). Quint. u. s. (III 8.63) referring to this place, *Namque Ar. idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam, proximamque ab ea iudicalem putavit: videlicet quoniam prior illa tota esset ostentationis; haec secunda egeret artis, vel ad fallendum, si ita poposcisset utilitas; consilia fide prudentiaque constarent*. It is very manifest, and had already been pointed out by Victorius and Spalding, ad loc. Arist. et Quint., that this is not Aristotle's meaning.

'To make the further distinction, that the language must be sweet and magnificent is superfluous'—the author of this 'distinction' is Theodectes, in his 'Art.' Quint. IV 2.63, *Theodectes...non magnificam modo vult esse, verum etiam iucundam expositionem*—'for why *that* more

¹ The *ἔργον* of a thing is always directed to its *τέλος*. If the end of a knife and of a horse be respectively to cut and to run, their *ἔργον* will be fulfilled in sharpness and fleetness. So here the end of one of these compositions is to be read, its *ἔργον* or appropriate function is exercised in reading, fulfilled in being pleasant to read.

προσδιδαιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῇ, περιέργον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ σῶφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη ἥθους ἀρετή; τὸ γὰρ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ὠρίσται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δεῖ σαφῇ καὶ μὴ ταπεινῇ εἶναι ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν; ἂν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχή, οὐ σαφής, οὐδὲ ἂν σύντομος. ἀλλὰ ^{p. 135.} δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἀρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικόν, καὶ ὁ ρυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἴρηται, καὶ κοινῇ περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ

than continent (or perhaps *discreet*) and liberal, or any other virtue of character (the moral virtues, of which μεγαλοπρέπεια is one. Eth. Nic. II and IV)?' For προσδιδαιρεῖσθαι, Brandis' *Anonymus*, quoted in Schneidewin's *Philologus* [IV. i.] p. 45, has προσδιορίζεσθαι.

'For plainly the *sweetness* will be produced by all that has been enumerated (purity, propriety, rhythm, vivacity, and the rest) if we have rightly defined what the excellence of the language consists in: for why (else, *subaudi* ἄλλου) must it be (as we have described it) clear, and not low (mean and common-place), but appropriate (ch. 2 § 2, μὴ ταπεινῇ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην, σεμνοτέραν, § 3 ξένην)? For if it be verbose, it is not clear; nor if it be too concise (brief)'. *Brevitas esse laboro, obscurus fio.* ἀδολεσχεῖν, said of idle chatter: here of verbosity, vain repetition, tautology. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 ὁ 15, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχεῖν τὸν προδιαλεγόμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι (by the opponent) ταῦτό λέγειν. Comp. *supra* c. 3. 3, τὸ ἀσαφές διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχείαν, and II 21.3, where it is applied to unnecessary accumulation of steps of proof in reasoning, or drawing inferences.

'But (on the contrary) it is quite plain (of itself, and without rule or precept) that *the mean* is the appropriate style'. Of this the preceding example is an illustration: clearness or perspicuity is the mean between the excess of garrulity, verbosity, and the defect of overconciseness, in the *amount of words*. 'Also the rules (ingredients) already stated will produce sweetness of language if they be well mixed, viz. the familiar (these are the *ὀνόματα κύρια*, the customary), and the foreign (γλῶτται, ἐξηλλαγμένα, ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον, c. 2 § 3, c. 3 § 3, sub init. ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν), and the rhythm, and the plausibility that arises out of (the due observation of) propriety' (*supra* c. 7).

'We have now finished our remarks upon style or language, of all (the three branches of Rhetoric) in common (cc. 2—11), and of each kind individually (c. 12): it now remains to speak of the order (division and arrangement) of the parts of the speech'.

Ι τάξεως εἰπεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγ-
καῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τότ'
ἀποδείξαι. διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδείξαι ἢ ἀποδείξαι μὴ
προειπόντα ἀδύνατον· ὃ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀπο-
δείκνυσι, καὶ ὃ προλέγων ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀποδείξαι προ-

CHAP. X.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the two divisions of this third book, proposed at the conclusion of Bk. II, and the opening of Bk. III, *περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως, πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου*, the first having been dispatched in the preceding chapters 2—12, we now proceed to the second, on the arrangement of the parts of the speech: this will include a criticism of the anterior, and the current, divisions, with a new classification in c. 13: and an explanation and discussion of the proper contents of each. A full account of the various divisions which prevailed before and after Aristotle has been already given in the *Introd.* p. 331, 332, and the notes, and need not be here repeated. It will be sufficient to say that Aristotle in this chapter takes the fourfold division, adopted by Isocrates, and accepted by his followers, as the author of the *Rhet. ad Alex.*, viz. *προοίμιον, διηγήσεις, πίστεις, ἐπιλογος*, criticizes it, and reduces it to two, *πρόθεσις* and *πίστις*, as the only two parts *necessary* to the speech; adding notices of some superfluous distinctions introduced by Theodorus (of Byzantium) and Licymnius. [See Rössler's pamphlet, *Rhetorum antiquorum de dispositione doctrina*, pp. 30, Budissin, 1866; and Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 38.]

On the importance attached to the arrangement of the topics of these divisions, and especially to the order of the *proofs*, Whately has some good remarks, *Rhet.* c. 1 (*Encycl. Metrop.* p. 256). This is illustrated by the contest between Demosthenes and Aeschines. "Aeschines strongly urged the judges (in the celebrated contest for the Crown) to confine his adversary to the same order in his reply to the charges brought which he himself had observed in bringing them forward. Demosthenes however was far too skilful to be thus entrapped; and so much importance does he attach to the point, that he opens his speech with a most solemn appeal to the judges for an impartial hearing; which implies, he says, not only a rejection of prejudice, but no less also a permission for each speaker to adopt whatever *arrangement* he should think fit. And accordingly he proceeds to adopt one very different from that which his antagonist had laid down; for he was no less sensible than his rival that the same arrangement which is the most favourable to one side, is likely to be least favourable to the other."

§ 1. 'Of the speech there are (only) two parts: for it is only necessary first to state the subject, and then to prove (your side of) it. It follows from this necessary relation between them (*διό*), that it is impossible (if the speech is to be complete) either to state your case without going on to prove it, or to prove it without having first stated it', (the *impossibility* lies in the absurdity of the supposition: it is a *moral*

2 λέγει. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσις ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ πίστις,
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα τὸ δὲ
3 ἀπόδειξις. νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις γάρ
που τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν, ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ
καὶ δημηγορικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἷαν

impossibility): 'for proving implies *something* to prove, and a preliminary statement is made in order to be proved'. All this implies that the speaker has some object in view, some case to make out. It would not apply to all declamations; though it is true that, as a general rule, even they try to prove *something*, however absurd it may be.

§ 2. 'Of these the one is the statement of the case (the *setting forth* of all its circumstances, as a foundation for judgment and argument), the other the (rhetorical) arguments in support of it, just as if the division were (the dialectical one) the problem (alternative *question* proposed or stated) and its demonstration'. πρόθεσις, *propositio*: Rhet. ad Al. c. 29 (30). 2, προεκτιθέμαι τὸ πρᾶγμα. Ib. § 21, τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐκθήσομεν. c. 35 (36). 1, φρομισαστέον...πρῶτον προθεμένους τὰς προθέσεις: *πίστις confirmatio*. "πρόβλημα διαλεκτικὸν θεωρήμα, Top. A II, 104 b 1, quod in disputando quaestione bipartita efferri solebat, ex. gr. voluptas estne expetenda, annon? mundus estne aeternus, annon?" Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Ar.* § 42, p. 118.

§ 3. 'The present' (current, Isocrates) 'division is absurd; for surely *narrative* (διήγησις *narratio*, the detailed description of the circumstances of the case) belongs only to the forensic speech, but in a demonstrative or public speech how can there be a *narrative* such as they describe, or a *reply to the opponent*; or an epilogue (peroration) in argumentative or demonstrative speeches?' On this Quint. says, III 9. 5, *Tamen nec iis assentior qui detrahunt refutationem* (sc. τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον) *tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat. Hoc quoque idem aliquatenus novat, quod prooemio non narrationem subiungit, sed propositionem*. (This is one of Quintilian's ordinary misrepresentations of writers whom he quotes. Ar. says nothing here of the *prooemium*, theoretically disallowing it: though in compliance with the received custom he afterwards gives an account of it and its contents). *Verum id facit quia propositio genus, narratio species videtur: et hac non semper, illa semper et ubique credit opus esse*. The last clause very well explains Ar.'s substitution of πρόθεσις for (προόμιον and) διήγησις.

In Introd. p. 333, I have given at length from Cic. de Inv. I 19. 27, the distinction of διήγησις in its ordinary sense and πρόθεσις. It is here said that the *narrative* or statement of the case, strictly speaking, belongs (he means *necessarily* belongs) only to the forensic branch of Rhetoric: *there* there is always a case to state: in the declamatory, panegyric branch, not a *regular* systematic narrative or detailed statement as of a case; in this the διήγησις is dispersed over the whole speech, *infra* 16. 1: and, in δημηγορία equally, there is not universally or necessarily, as in the law-speech, a διήγησις, because

λέγουσιν, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν P. 1414
ἀποδεικτικῶν; προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ
ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντι-
λογία ᾖ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολ-

its *time* is the future, and a narrative of things future is impossible: when it is used, it is to recall the memory of *past facts* for the purpose of comparison—which is a very different thing from the forensic δῆγσις. Comp. c. 16. 11. The author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 30 (31) includes δῆγσις in the deliberative branch, δημηγορικὸν γένος; no doubt following Isocrates. On δῆγσις see Dionysius Hal., Ars Rhet. c. x § 14.

The same argument applies to the *refutatio*, τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, and with more force than to the preceding, for in the epideictic branch there is no adversary, and therefore can be no refutation of his arguments, at least such as those who lay down this division intend: though it is true that a panegyrist *may* have to meet adverse statements or imputations on the object of his panegyric, real or supposed. In fact, it is only in the forensic branch that there is *necessarily* an opponent. On this division, see III 17. 14, 15.

ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν] This is understood by Victorius, Majoragius, and Schrader of the *demonstrativum genus*, ἀποδ. being supposed to be put here for ἐπιδεικτικῶν. This in Aristotle I hold to be impossible. Nor have I found any example of it elsewhere, though Victorius says that Isocrates uses ἀποδεικνύει for ἐπιδεικνύει more than once in the Panath. speech. I have supposed (in note on p. 335 Introd.) that his text of Isocrates *may* have exhibited this interchange from the uncorrected carelessness of transcribers. What is true is, that Isocrates, twice in the Paneg. §§ 18 and 65, does use ἐπιδεικνύει in a sense nearly approaching, if not absolutely identical with, that of ἀποδεικνύει. The words can only mean, as I have translated them, that there may be some speeches which consist entirely of proof or arguments, and that a summary of these would not correspond to the ἐπίλογος in its ordinary sense—described c. 19. 1—of which only a small part is a recapitulation.

‘And again προοίμιον (preface, opening or introduction), and comparison (setting over against one another side by side) of opposing (views, statements, arguments), and review, are found in public speeches *then* only when there is a dispute (between *two opponents*):’ as in Demosthenes’ Speech for the Crown, of which the προοίμιον has been before referred to. ἐπάνοδος, ‘a going over again’ = ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, *summary* recapitulation of the foregoing topics of the speech, appears also in Plato Phaedr. 267 D, τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινὲς μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα. The ἄλλο ὄνομα may be ἐπίλογος or ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, or παλιλλογία (Rhet. ad Alex. c. 20 (21). 1). It is properly a subdivision of the ἐπίλογος, and as such is here condemned as superfluous.

ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ] “The object of the *prooemium* is to conciliate the audience, and invite their attention, and briefly intimate the subject of the ensuing speech. In recommending this or that measure to the assembly, unless there is an adversary who has poisoned the hearers’

λάκεις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ¹ συμβουλή. ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπίλογος.² ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός, οἶον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐννημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις.
4 ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα προοίμιον πρό-
θεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον
τῶν πίστεων ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὔξησης τῶν

¹ ἡ

² *delenda distinctio.*

minds against it and its author, or some other special reason, there is no occasion for this: and also, the audience is usually well acquainted with the subject. See further on this, c. 14. 11. Comparison of argument, and review, can only be required when there is an opposition." *Intro.* pp. 335, 6. The *Rhet. ad Alex.* expressly tells us, c. 28 (29) ult., that the *προοίμιον* is "common to all the seven species, and will be appropriate to every kind of (rhetorical) business."

The following argument καὶ γὰρ—πολλάκις is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the preceding. You say that *προοίμιον*, *ἀντιπαραβολή* and *ἐπάνοδος* are essential parts of the public speech—"Why at that rate (is the reply) so are accusation and defence, for they *are* frequently there"—this involves the absurdity of introducing the *whole contents* of the forensic genus into the *δημηγορικὸν γένος* as a mere *part* of the latter—"but not *qua* deliberation": not in the sense or character of deliberation, which is *essential* to the deliberative branch, but as mere accidents.

There can be no question that we should read ἡ for ἡ συμβουλή. So Victorius, Schrader, Buhle, Spengel. Bekker alone retains ἡ. The following clause requires an alteration of punctuation to make it intelligible; suggested long ago by Victorius, Majoragius, Vater, and adopted by Spengel; *not* so by Bekker. Spengel also rejects ἔτι [*delendum aut in ἐστὶν mutandum*]. With the altered reading, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ κ.τ.λ. it is certainly out of place. I am by no means persuaded of the certainty of this alteration—perhaps Bekker had the same reason for withholding his consent to the two alterations—I think it quite as likely that a word or two has dropt out after ἐπίλογος.

'But further' (if ἔτι be *retained*) 'neither does the peroration belong to every forensic speech; as for instance if it be short, or the matter of it easy to recollect; for what happens (in an ordinary epilogue) is a subtraction from the length'—not the brevity, of a speech: i.e. an epilogue is appropriate to a long speech, not a short one. This is Victorius' explanation, and no doubt right (that which I gave in the *Intro.* is wrong, and also *not* Victorius', as stated in the note).

'Consequently the (only) necessary parts are the statement of the case, and the proof'.

§ 4. 'Now these two are peculiar to, and characteristic of, speeches in general'.

It is possible that ἴδιον here may be the *proprium* of logic, one of the predicables: that which characterizes a thing, without being absolutely

αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων· ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ
 τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδ' ὁ ἐπί-
 5 λογος, ἀλλ' ἀναμνήσκει. ἔσται οὖν, ἂν τις τὰ
 τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὃ περ ἐποίουν ὃ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διή-
 γησις ἕτερον καὶ ἐπιδήγησις καὶ προδήγησις καὶ
 ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδος τι λέγοντα

essential to it, as the *genus* and *differentia* are. The *proprium* is a necessary accident or property, though it is not of the essence itself: "but flowing from, or a consequence of, the essence, is inseparably attached to the species" (J. S. Mill, *Logic*, 1 p. 148). All this would apply very well to these two *parts*. They are not of the essence of the speech, and do not enter into the definition: the speech could exist without them. At the same time they are immediate consequences of that essence, and inseparably attached to all species of speeches, according to the view put forward here.

We might therefore be satisfied with these. 'If we add more' (following the authorities on the subject), 'they must be at the most, preface, statement of case, confirmatory arguments, conclusion: for the refutation of the adversary belongs to the proofs' (Quint. u.s. III 9. 5, *Tamen nec iis assentior qui detrahunt refutationem, tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat*), 'and counter-comparison, (a comparative statement of your own views and arguments placed in juxtaposition with them to bring them into contrast,) which, being as it is a magnifying (making the most) of one's own case, must be a part of the confirmatory arguments, or general proof: for one who does this proves something: but not so the prologue; nor the epilogue, which merely recalls to mind'.

§ 5. 'Such divisions, if any one choose to make them, will be pretty much the same as the inventions of Theodorus and his school, that is, to distinguish narration from after-narration and fore-narration, and refutation and per-re-refutation'. In this compound word ἐπί 'in addition' is represented by *re*, and ἐξ, 'out and out', 'outright', 'thoroughly', 'completely' by *per*. διὰ and *per* in composition are the more usual and direct exponents of 'thoroughness' or 'complete carrying through', of a thing. On ἐπιδήγησις, *repetita narratio*, see Quint. IV 2. 128, *res declamatoria magis quam forensis*. He accepts it as a division, but thinks it should be rarely used. Plato, *Phaedr.* 266 D seq., in speaking of these same superfluous divisions of Theodorus, leaves out ἐπι- and προ-δήγησις, and introduces πίστωσησιν καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν in their place. These plainly correspond to the other pair ἔλεγχος and ἐπεξέλεγχος, the one being confirmatory, the other refutatory arguments. See *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. Vol. III p. 285, and Thompson's notes on the *Phaedrus*.

The general drift of the last clause is this; if you introduce such divisions at all, you may go on dividing and subdividing for ever, as Theodorus does in his τέχνη. This is followed by the statement of the true

καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρώδες, οἶον Δικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους.

I τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὃ περ ἐν CHAP. XIV.
p. 136.

principle of division: the foundation of *my own* twofold division, hints Ar. 'But a name (like one of these, the class-name, or, as here, the name of a division) should be given to mark a kind and a specific difference'. It is the genus *plus* the specific (εἰδοποιός, species-making) difference that constitutes the distinct species or *kind*. Now these *names*, though supposed to mark distinct kinds, *have* no specific differences which thus distinguish them. A special name demands a real distinction of kinds. Waitz ad Categ. I b 17. Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Ar.* § 59.

'Otherwise they become empty and frivolous, such as Licymnius' inventions in his art, the names which he coins, ἐπούρωσις, ἀποπλάνησις and ὄζοι'. On Licymnius and his productions, see Heindorf ad Phaedr. u. s. p. 242, and *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7; where an attempt is made to explain these three obscure names. Licymnius was a dithyrambic poet, *supra* III 12. 2, as well as a rhetorician, and his prose style seems to have participated in the dithyrambic character. ἐπούρωσις I take to be a word coined by Licymnius for his own purposes: it is a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*. It seems to be formed from ἐπουροῦν, a synonym of ἐπουρίζειν, 'to speed onward by a fair gale', also συνεπουρίζειν, Hist. Anim. VIII 13. 9, de Caelo, III 2. 17: Polybius has ἐπουροῦν II 10. 6, and κατουροῦν, I 44. 3, 61. 7, both as neut. The Schol. quoted by Spengel, *Artium Scribtores* p. 89, defines ἐπόρουσις (ἐπούρωσις) τὰ συνεπουρίζοντα καὶ βοηθοῦντα τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὅσα λέγονται βοηθοῦντα τῇ ἀποδείξει. All which seems to favour the notion that the figurative rhetorician represented 'subsidiary' or 'confirmatory arguments', Theodorus' πίστωσις and ἐπιπίστωσις, under the image of 'a fair wind astern'. ἀποπλάνησις is no doubt, as in Plato Polit. 263 C, 'a digression', *wandering off* from the main subject, Schol. τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος; and ὄζοι, 'branches', most likely means places in which the discourse 'branches off' in different directions, 'ramifications': unless the same Scholiast's explanation be preferred, τὰ ἄκρα, ἥτοι τὰ προοίμια καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλόγους. This would mean the 'branches' opposed to the stock or trunk, as something extraneous, or at all events non-essential. (I think this *is* preferable.)

CHAP. XIV.

Having considered the divisions of the speech in general we now come to the details, to the enumeration and examination of the ordinary contents of each of the four. These in each case are discussed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric. The treatment of the προοίμιον occupies the 14th chapter, to which is appended a second, c. xv, which analyses the topics of διαβολή, the art of 'setting a man against his neighbour', infusing suspicion and hostile feeling against him in the minds of others, raising a prejudice against him—especially of course in the minds of judges against your opponent. One would be sorry to be

ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ' εἰσὶ, καὶ οἷον ὁδοποιήσις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ὅμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίῳ· καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταί, ὅ τι ἂν εὖ ἔχωσιν αὐλῆσαι, τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσί-

obliged to call this 'calumniating'. Διήγησις is treated in c. xvi, πίστεις in xvii: to which is attached in xviii a digression on ἐρώτησις, the mode of putting questions—this includes the 'answer', repartee: and the 19th chapter, appropriately enough, concludes the work with the conclusion (ἐπίλογος, peroration) of the speech.

The *prooemium* is thus defined by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 29 (30). 1, ἀκροατῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐν κεφαλῇ μὴ εἰδόσι δῆλωσις, ἵνα γινώσκωσι περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος παρακολουθῶσί τε τῇ ὑποθέσει, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ προσέχειν παρακαλέσαι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸν εὖ νουσι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι. These rules seem to be chiefly derived from the actual practice of the Orators. Some of the arts to which public speakers had recourse in the topics of their *prooemium* are mentioned by Isocrates, Paneg. § 13. Compare Cic. de Orat. II 19. 80; de Invent. I 15. 20; where it is defined: it has two parts, *principium* (the object of this is to make the hearer *benevolum aut docilem aut attentum*,) and *insinuatio, oratio quadam dissimulatione et circuitione obscura subiens auditoris animum*. Quint. IV. c. 1, seq. *principium exordium*. He agrees with the preceding; see § 5. On the *προοίμιον* as a *hymn*, see Stallbaum ad Phaed. 60 D. On the *prooemium* in Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. II 78, 79, *principia dicendi*. [See also Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen ü. Römer* § 12, *die Einleitung*.]

§ 1. 'Now the *prooemium* is the beginning of a speech and stands in the place of the prologue in poetry (i. e. tragedy, and specially of Euripides' tragedy), and of the prelude in flute music'.

προαύλιον] an introduction, ornamental, and preparatory to, not an essential part of, the theme or subject of the composition; for all these are *beginnings*, and as it were a paving of the way (preparation, pioneering of the road) for what follows (ὁδοποιήσις, note on I 1. 2).

'Now the flute-prelude is like the *prooemium* of the epideictic branch: that is to say, as the flute-players first open their performance with whatever they can play best (in order to gain attention and favour of the audience) which they then join on to the ἐνδόσιμον (the actual opening, preliminary notes, of the subject which gives the tone, or cue, to the rest), so in the epideictic speeches the writing (of the *προοίμιον*) ought to be of this kind: for (in these the speaker) may say first (εἰπόντα) anything he pleases, and then should at once sound the note of preparation, and join on (the rest)'.

This represents the epideictic *prooemium*, like the flute-prelude, as hardly at all connected with what follows; it is a preliminary flourish, anything that he knows to be likely to be most successful, as already observed, to conciliate the audience and put them in good humour. "For here, as there is no real interest at stake, the author is allowed a much greater liberty in his choice of topics for amusing (and gaining

μῶ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτω γράφειν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ εἰπόντα ἐνδύναι καὶ συνάψαι. ὅ περ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰκείον

over) an audience; a license which would be intolerable in a case of life and death, or in the suggestion of a course of action which may involve the safety or ruin of the state. Here the audience are too eager to come to the point to admit of any trifling with their anxiety." Introduct. pp. 337, 8. Cic. de Or. II 80. 325, *Connexum autem ita sit principium consequenti orationi, ut non tanquam citharoedi prooemium affectum aliquod, sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur* (Victorius). Quint. II 8. 8, *in demonstrativis* (Arist.) *prooemia esse maxime libera existimant*.

The ἐνδόσιμον (*subaudi* ἄσμα or κροῦσμα, Bos, *Ellips.* s. v.) occurs again Pol. v (VIII) 5 *init.* apparently in the same sense as here, 'introduction'; also Pseudo-Arist. de Mundo, c. 6 § 20, where we have κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαῖον προσαγορευθέντος κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστρο κ.τ.λ. 'for according to the law above, by him who might be rightly called leader of the chorus, the stars are set in motion, &c.' I have given this in full because it throws some light upon the meaning of ἐνδόσιμον, and explains its metaphorical application, God is here represented as the leader of a chorus who gives the time, the key-note, and the mode or tune, to the rest, and thus acts as a guide to be followed, or (in a similar sense) as an introduction, or preparatory transition to something else. It thus has the effect of the 'key-note', and takes the secondary sense of a 'guide', 'preparation for', 'introduction to', anything. So Plut. de disc. adul. ab amico, c. 55, 73 B, ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον ἔξει πρὸς τὰ μείζονα τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ubi Wytttenbach, *occasio, incitamentum*; similarly Ib. c. 30, 70 B, καὶ ψόγος...ἢ ἔπανος ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον εἰς παρρησίαν ἐστιν, 'gives the tone, the cue, i. e. the occasion or incitement, to freedom (taking liberties).' See other passages from Plutarch and others in Wytttenbach's note on 73 B. Gaisford and Wytttenbach refer to Gataker ad Anton. XI 20, p. 336 (G), XI 26 (W), "ἐνδ. usurpatur pro modulationis exordio, quo praecentor sive chori praefectus cantandi reliquis auspicium facit. Hesychius, ἐνδόσιμον, τὸ πρὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς καθάρισμα." ap. Gaisford *Not. Var.* Wytttenbach describes ἐνδόσιμον as "signum et adhortatio in certaminibus et musicis et gymniciis: tum ad alias res translatum." Lastly Athen. XIII 2, 556 A, of certain authors, οἷς τὸ ἐνδόσιμον Ἀριστοτέλης ἔδωκεν ἱστορῶν τοῦτο ἐν τῷ περὶ εὐγενείας, 'gave the tone, i. e. hint', furnished the occasion for their statement. Schweighäuser, ad loc. says, "Dalecampius vertit quos ad id scribendum provocavit Ar. Dicitur autem proprie praecentus praeludium, exordium melodiae quod praecit chorodidascalus cui dein accinere oportet chorum. H. Stephanus' *Thesaurus*. Budaeus in *Comm. Gr. Ling.* p. 874 sq. ἐνδόσιμον διδόναι or παρέχειν is expressed in one word ἐνδιδόναι XII 520 D," as it is here by Aristotle.

'And this is done by all. An example is the *prooemium* of Isocrates' Helen: for there is nothing in common between the disputatious dia-

ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένη. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ, ἀρμόττει μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῇ εἶναι.
 2 λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου· οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ “ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες” ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας· Ἴσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς

lecticians, and Helen'. The *prooemium*, which occupies the first thirteen sections of the speech, includes many other subjects besides the *ἐριστικοί*, and is certainly an excellent illustration of the want of connexion between proem and the rest in an epideictic speech. Quint. III 8. 8, *In demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat* (Ar.). *Nam et longe a materia duci hoc, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit; et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari.*

‘And at the same time also (it has this further recommendation) that if (the speaker thus) migrate into a foreign region, there is this propriety in it, that the entire speech is not of the same kind’ (it removes the wearisome monotony which is characteristic of this branch of Rhetoric).

ἐκτοπίζειν is to ‘change one’s residence’, and applied especially to migratory birds and animals. It is always neuter in Aristotle. Hist. Anim. VIII 12. 3 and 8, IX 10. 1, IV 8. 23, ἐκτοπισμοὺς ποιοῦνται, VIII 13. 14, ἐκτοπιστικά ζῷα, I 1. 26. In the primary sense of absence from one’s proper or ordinary place, Pol. VIII (v) 11, 1314 b 9, τοῖς ἐκτοπίζουσιν τυράννοισ ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας, and so ἔκτοπος, ἐκτόπιος, ἄτοπος ‘out of their proper place’.

§ 2. ‘The introductions in the epideictic branch are derived from praise and blame (naturally: see I 3 §§ 3, 4); as, for instance, Gorgias’ opening of his Olympic oration (a πανηγυρικός λόγος, delivered at the Olympic games), “By many” (or ὑπέρ, ‘for many things’; which seems more in accordance with what followed) ‘are ye worthy to be admired, O men of Hellas’: that is to say (γὰρ *videlicet*) he praises those who first brought together the general assemblies’. Comp. Quint. III 8. 9, (continuation of the preceding quotation) *et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos qui primi tales instituerunt conventus* (translated from Ar.). Another short fragment of this oration is preserved by Philostr. Vit. Soph. I 9. ‘Ὁ δὲ Ὀλυμπικός λόγος, says Philostratus, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτῷ (Gorgiae) ἐπολιτεύθη) στασιάζουσιν γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὁρῶν ὁμοιοῖας ξύμβουλος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τρέπων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πείθων ἄθλα ποιεῖσθαι τῶν σπλῶν μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν. The rest of his fragments, genuine and spurious, are collected by Sauppe *Or. Att.* III 129, seq. [See also Appendix to Thompson’s ed. of the Gorgias.] Hieronymus adv. Iovin. (quoted by Wytttenbach on Plut. 144 B), “Gorgias rhetor librum pulcerrimum de concordia, Graecis tunc inter se dissidentibus, recitavit Olympiae.” Isocr., Panegy. § 3, after stating the nature of the contents of his own speech, adds, in allusion to this,

δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν, τοῖς δ' εὖ φρονουῦσιν οὐθὲν ἄθλον
 3 ἐποίησαν. καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς, οἶον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς
 ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἢ
 τοὺς τοιοῦτους οἳ μήτε εὐδοκιμοῦσι μήτε φαῦλοι,
 ἀλλ' ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἄδηλοι, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ
 4 Πριάμου· οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει. ἔτι δ' ἐκ τῶν P. 1415.
 δικανικῶν προοιμίων· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν

with others, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἐπὶ
 τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὤρμησαν.

'But Isocrates blames them for that bodily excellences they rewarded with gifts, whilst to intellectual excellence they awarded no prize'. This is the *substance* of the two first sections of Isocr. Paneg. Mr Sandys, in his note *ad locum*, gives a summary of the whole exordium §§ 1—14. Victorius points out this as one of the places in which Aristotle's hostility to Isocrates appears! The *problem* here proposed by Isocr.—the omission of the institution of prizes for intellectual competition—is solved by Arist., Probl. xxx 11.

§ 3. '(A second topic for an epideictic *prooemium*) is derived from *advice* (the deliberative branch); for instance "men are bound to pay honour to the good", and therefore he, the speaker, himself is going to praise Aristides' (αὐτός is *obliqua oratio*: the *directa oratio* would have been ἐγώ: it is a sort of semi-quotation: where it comes from no one seems to know); 'or, to all such as though not distinguished are yet not bad, only their merits are buried in obscurity, as Alexander (Paris), Priam's son. For one who speaks thus offers advice'. The *encomium Alexandri* here referred is doubtless the same as that which has been already mentioned in II 23. 5, 8, 12 and II 27. 7, 9; the author is unknown.

§ 4. 'Further (a third kind) they may be borrowed from the forensic introductions; that is to say, from the appeals to the audience, or as an apology to them, (comp. *infra* § 7)—when the subject of the speech happens to be either paradoxical (contrary to ordinary opinion or expectation, and therefore *incredible*), or painful¹, or trite and worn-out, and therefore tiresome (τεθρυλημένου that which is in everyone's mouth, *decantatum*, note on II 21. 11)—for the purpose of obtaining indulgence (with an apologetic object); as Choerilus says, for instance, "But now

¹ χαλεποῦ, Victorius, Majoragius, *ardua*; Vet. Transl. et Riccobon *difficilis*. Is it 'hard to do' or 'hard to bear'? χαλεπός has both senses. If the former, it *may* mean, either, difficult, to the speaker to handle, or to the hearer to understand, or the recommendation of some scheme, undertaking, or policy, *difficult* to encounter or execute, (but this belongs to the *deliberative* rather than the epideictic branch); if the latter—which seems equally probable—it is simply painful, *unpleasant*. So Pind. Fragm. 96 (Böckh, *Fragm.* P. II p. 621) v. 9, *τερπνῶν ἐφέρπουσαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν*. Pl. Protag. 344 D, *χαλεπὴ ὥρα* 'a hard season'. Legg. [744 D] *χαλεπὴ πενία*. Et passim ap. Hom. et cet. So in Latin *durus*.

ἀκροατήν, εἰ περὶ παραδόξου λόγος ἢ περὶ χαλεποῦ
ἢ περὶ τεθρυλημένου πολλοῖς, ὥστε συγγνώμην ἔχειν,
οἶον Χοίριλος

νῦν δ' ὅτε πάντα δέδασται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ
τούτων, ἐξ ἐπαίνου, ἐκ ψόγου, ἐκ προτροπῆς, ἐξ

when all is spent" (*lit.* has been distributed *sc.* amongst others; and nothing is left for me). [Compare Virgil's *omnia iam vulgata* in the Exordium of the third Georgic.]

Of the four Choeriluses distinguished by Näke, this is the Epic poet of Samos, born, according to Näke, in B.C. 470. His principal work, from which this fragment is taken, was a poetical narrative of the Persian wars with Greece under Darius and Xerxes—"all that was left him" by his predecessors—very much applauded, as Suidas tell us, and "decreed to be read with Homer." Aristotle (*Top.* Θ 1, ult. *παραδείγματα...οἷα* "Ὁμηρος, μὴ οἷα Χοίριλος) thinks less favourably of it; and it was afterwards excluded from the Alexandrian Canon in favour of the poem of Antimachus. An earlier Choerilus was the Athenian tragic poet, contemporary with Phrynichus, Pratinas, and Aeschylus in early life; the third a slave of the Comic poet Ecphantides, whom he is said to have assisted in the composition of his plays; and the fourth, Horace's Choerilus, Ep. II 1. 232, *Ars Poet.* 357, a later and contemptible epic poet who attended Alexander on his expedition, and according to Horace, *incultis qui versibus et male natis rettulit acceptos, regale nomisma, Philippos*. Suidas tells this story of the Samian Choerilus, an evident mistake. The fragments of the Choerilus of our text are all collected and commented on by Näke in his volume on Choerilus. This fragm. is given on p. 104. See also Düntzer *Epic. Gr. Fragm.* p. 96 seq. where five lines of the poem, from which our extract is made are given: and the four articles in *Biogr. Dict.* The context is supplied by the Schol. on this passage—see in Spengel's ed., *Scholia Graeca*¹, p. 160: printed also in Näke and Düntzer—and runs thus: ἃ μάκαρ, ὅστις ἔην κείνον χρόνον Ἰδρις αἰοιδῆς, Μουσάων θεράπων ὅτ' ἀκήρατος ἦν ἔτι λειμών' νῦν δ' ὅτε πάντα δέδασται, ἔχουσι δὲ πείρατα τέχναι, ὕστατοι ὥστε δρόμον καταλειπόμεθ', οὐδέ πη ἐστὶ πάντη παπταίνοντα νεοζυγὲς ἄρμα πελάσσαι. καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς². Which are certainly pretty lines enough: perhaps the rest was not equal to them. Compare with *λειμών Μουσάων*, and the whole passage, *Lucr.* I 925 seq. *avia Pieridum peragro loca, nullius ante trita solo*, et seq., which might possibly have been suggested by this of Choerilus. An apology of the same kind is introduced by Isocrates in the *middle* of his Panegy. § 74; and another in his *ἀντίδοσις*, § 55. In the latter the word *διατεθρυλημένος* occurs.

¹ On these Scholia, see Spengel, *Praef. ad Rhet.*, p. viii.

² Näke, *Choerilus* p. 105, thinks that this, and not the second fragm. in § 6—*as Buhle, Wolf, Vater*, agree in supposing—was the opening of the poem. This is rendered probable by the *λόγον ἀλλοῦ* in v. 1, of the other.

ἀποτροπῆς, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· δεῖ δὲ ἢ ξένα
5 ἢ οἰκεῖα εἶναι τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ. τὰ δὲ τοῦ δικα-
νικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταῦτ' ὀφείνεται ὁ περ
τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια·
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν διθυράμβων ὅμοια τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς·

διὰ σὲ καὶ τεὰ δῶρα εἴτε σκῦλα.

6 ἐν δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔπεισι δεῖγμά ἐστι τοῦ λόγου, p. 137.
ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ ἧν ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμῃται ἢ

‘So the introductions of the epideictic speeches are derived from the following topics ; from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer : and these “introductions” (see the note on § 1 : ἐνδόσιμα is used here for προοίμια in general, instead of the more limited sense of the preceding passage) ‘must be either foreign or closely connected with the speeches (to which they are prefixed)’.

ξένος, a stranger or foreigner, is properly opposed to οἰκεῖος, domesticus, one of one's own household. This last clause, δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. is, as Vater remarks, introduced as a transition to the next topic, the forensic *prooemia*.

§ 5. ‘The introduction of the forensic speech must be understood as having the same force (or value, or signification) as the prologue of a drama (τοῦ, the drama to which it belongs), or the introduction to an epic poem: for to the epideictic *exordia* the preludes (introductions, ἀναβολαί) of the dithyrambs bear resemblance, “for thee and thy gifts, or spoils”. On the ἀναβολαί, the openings or introductions of dithyrambs, and their loose, incoherent, flighty character, see note on III 9. 1. Introd. p. 307, note 1. It is this which makes them comparable to the epideictic *exordia*, as above described.

The dramatic, i. e. tragic, prologue, and the introduction of the epic, are compared to the exordium of the dicastic speech, in that all three contain ‘statements of the case’; the last, literally; the tragic and epic, virtually. The prologue of Euripides (who of the three extant tragedians can be the only one whose prologues are referred to) actually states all the preceding circumstances of the story of the drama, which it is necessary that the spectator should be acquainted with in order to enter into the plot. The introduction of the Epic poem is neither so long nor so regular. That of the Iliad occupies only seven lines, and states the subject very simply and in few words. That of the Odyssey is concluded in ten, and little or nothing of the story told. The Aeneid, and Pharsalia have seven apiece.

§ 6. Having hinted at the points of resemblance between the dithyrambic ἀναβολαί and the epideictic *prooemia*, he now proceeds to explain further the resemblance of the dicastic proem to the prologue of tragedy and prelude of the Epic poem.

‘In the prose speeches as well as the poetry’ (Victorius understands

διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ· ὁ δὺς οὖν ὥσπερ
εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ
λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά.

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε μούσα.

ἡγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὅπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης

ἦλθεν εἰς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.

καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δρᾶμα, καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς
ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που [δη-
λοῖ], ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς

ἐμοὶ πατήρ ἦν Πόλυβος.

τ. λόγοις¹, *fabulae poetarum*, meaning the *dramas* as contrasted with the Epics: the other contrast of *prose* and *verse* is more natural as well as more suitable here) 'these *prooemia* are (present, offer) a specimen or sample of the subject (of the speech or poem) in order that they may have some previous acquaintance with the intention of it' (if ἦν, 'about what it was to be', as in τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; the object, purpose, or design), 'and the mind not be kept in suspense; for all that is vague and indefinite keeps the mind wandering (in doubt and uncertainty): accordingly, (the speaker or writer) that puts the beginning into his hand supplies him with a clue, as it were, by which he may hold, so as to enable him to follow the story (or argument). This is why (Homer in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, *began* the two poems with the lines quoted; and Choerilus—if Näke u. s. is right about the order of the two fragments in our text—did not *begin* his poem with ἡγεό μοι κ.τ.λ., but introduced it in his *exordium*)'—here the quotations from the three poems are introduced, and the sentence remains unfinished.

'Similarly the tragic poets explain the subject of their play, if not immediately at the opening, as Euripides, at any rate somewhere or other the poet explains it in his prologue or introduction), as *even* Sophocles (who does not *usually* employ it; in the *Oedip.* Tyr. 774 seq.) "Polybus of Corinth was my father, &c.", and the following.'

"The Commentators object to *πρόλογος* here because the passage that it indicates occurs not at the beginning, but in the middle of the play. But, it seems that Aristotle has here used *πρόλογος* in a more compre-

¹ Spengel puts λόγοις καὶ ἦν in brackets, as spurious or doubtful: Bekker retains ἦν. MS A^c has ἦν. By rejecting the words Spengel seems to shew that he thinks that λόγοι alone cannot mean 'stories' in the sense of *dramas*. I think it is doubtful. Otherwise, this interpretation is certainly more suitable to the general connexion and what follows. On the other hand, our author here seems to be rather digressive, and *not* to observe any very regular order of succession in his remarks. So that perhaps upon the whole, we may let the other consideration have its due weight in deciding the point.

καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία ὡσαύτως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο, δηλῶσαι τί ἐστι τὸ τέλος οὗ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος· διόπερ ἂν δηλὸν ἦ καὶ 7 μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐ χρηστέον προοιμίῳ. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα εἶδη οἷς χρῶνται, ἱατρεύματα καὶ κοινά. λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἕκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου, ὅσα περὶ διαβολὴν λῦσαι καὶ

hensive sense than that which it usually bears, for an 'explanatory introduction' in general, wherever it may occur: and that it has much the same relation here to its *ordinary* signification, as *πρόθεσις* has to *διήγησις* in c. 13. Also the analogous *προοίμιον* is applied twice in § 10 *infra* to introductory speeches *anywhere* in a play." Introd. p. 339 note.

'And comedy in like manner': that is, wherever an introductory explanation is required, there it is introduced. Victorius notes that this appears in Terence, the Latin representative of the New Comedy, and Plautus. Simo in the *Andria*, Menedemus in the *Heautontimorumenos*, Micio in the *Adelphi*, perform this office. And similarly, Strepsiades in Aristoph. *Nubes*, Demosthenes in the *Equites* 40 seq., Dionysius in the *Ranae*—Victorius says "tum maxime cum *Servo* narrat, &c.," but the conversation referred to is with Hercules, not Xanthias, lines 64 seq. There is another explanatory introduction, preparatory to the dramatic contest between Aeacus and Xanthias, 759 seq.

'So then (to resume) the most necessary function of the *prooemium*, and *that* peculiar to it, is to make it clear what is the end and object of the speech or story' (the former is the *λόγος* in *Rhetoric*, the latter in the Epic and the drama). Compare Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 1, def. of *προοίμιον*. 'And therefore if the subject (the thing, the matter in hand) be already clear and short (or, of trifling importance) the *prooemium* is not to be employed'. Comp. Cic. de Or. II 79. 320, *in parvis atque infrequentibus causis ab ipsa re est exordiri saepe commodius*: Victorius, who writes *frequentibus*: repeated in Gaisford, *Not. Var.*

§ 7. 'The other kinds (of *prooemia*) which are employed are mere cures (remedies [specifics] for the infirmities or defects of the hearers—*διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν*, III 1. 5—such as inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like), and common', to all parts of the speech. *κοινά* is opposed to the *special* office, peculiar to the *προοίμιον*, καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο *supra*: all these *other* kinds *may* be introduced in the exordium—and also anywhere else, wherever they are required.

'These may be derived from the speaker himself, from the hearer, the subject, and the adversary' ('the opposite'). Cic. de Or. II 79. 321, seq. *Sed quum erit utendum principio, quod plerumque erit, aut ex reo, aut ex adversario, aut ex re, aut ex eis apud quos agitur* (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ), *sententias duci licebit. Ex reo*—*reos appello, quorum res est*—*quae significant bonum virum* seq. followed by the illustration of

ποιῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως· ἀπολογουμένῳ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν, κατηγοροῦντι δ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ. δι' ὃ δέ, οὐκ ἄδηλον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὐτόν¹, ἀναγκαῖον ἀνελεῖν τὰ κωλύοντα, ὥστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολήν· τῷ δὲ διαβάλλοντι ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ διαβλητέον, ἵνα μνημονεύσωσι μᾶλλον. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν

¹ αὐτόν

the remaining three. Cicero, who is certainly following Arist., seems here to translate τοῦ λέγοντος by *reus*, in the sense which he explains, of *both parties* in the case. Quintilian, IV 1. 6, seems to charge Aristotle— if he includes him in the *plerique* who have been guilty of the omission— with having neglected to include the '*auctor causae*' amongst the sources of topics for *prooemia*. Victorius defends him against this, by pointing out, as Cicero, that ὁ λέγων includes *both parties* in a suit or prosecution, *actor* as well as *reus* (in its ordinary sense). See the passage of Quint., with Spalding's note.

'The topics derivable from the speaker himself and the opponent, are all such as relate to allaying (*lit.* 'refuting') and exciting prejudice and ill-feeling (after ποιῆσαι understand αὐτήν): but with this difference: that in defending oneself all that relates to διαβολή (i. e. the removal of prejudice and ill-will from ourselves, and exciting them against the opponent) must be put first (*subaudi* λεκτέον, viz. in the *exordium*), but in the accusation of another reserved for the peroration. The reason of this is not difficult to see; that is, that the defendant, when he is about to introduce his own case, must necessarily begin by doing away with all hindrances (*sc.* to the establishment of it; all prepossessions against him on the part of the judge); and therefore must make the removal or refutation of all calumnies or prejudices against him his first point; whereas the accuser (the speaker whose office it is to 'set' the defendant 'against' the judges, conciliate their ill-will to him) must reserve all that tends to prejudice his antagonist for the epilogue (peroration, conclusion), that they may better remember it' (that his accusations may 'leave their sting behind them' in the judges' minds). Both Spengel and Bekker write αὐτόν after εἰκάζειν for the *vulgata lectio* αὐτόν; which as far as appears to the contrary is the reading of all MSS. I think αὐτόν for 'his own case', *lit.* himself, is defensible. We often say 'him' for 'himself', leaving the reflexive part to be understood, in our own language. See note on I 7. 35, and Waitz on Organ. 54 a 14, Vol. I. p. 486, there referred to.

'The topics of the προοίμιον which are addressed to the hearer (i. e. in the dicastic branch now undeῖ consideration, the judges,) are derived from (*subaudi* γίγνεται, or as before, λέγεται) the conciliation of his good will (towards ourselves) and irritating him (exciting his indignation against the adversary, δεινωσις), and *sometimes* too (δέ), (but only when it is required,) from engaging his attention or the reverse: for it is not always

ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὖνουν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τούναντιον· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικόν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα πειρῶνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ

expedient to make him attentive, and this is why many (speakers) try to move or provoke him to laughter'. Προάγειν εἰς γέλωτα, to move, or provoke to'. Herod. II 121. 4, σκῶψαί μιν καὶ ἐς γέλωτα προαγαγέσθαι. Rhet. I 1. 5, εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον, I 2. 5, εἰς πάθος, et sim. 'to carry forward, i. e. stimulate, excite, provoke'.

εὖνουν ποιῆσαι] "The three requisites in the disposition of the audience, according to the later writers on the subject, are that they should be *benevoli, dociles, attenti*. Cic. de Inv. I 15. 20, Quint. IV 1. 5: and frequently elsewhere. Ar. includes the two latter under one head *προσεκτικοί*: and in fact if a man is inclined to *attend*, he shews that he is already inclined to or desirous of learning. The two are closely connected, Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23." Introd. p. 340, note 1.

Causa principii nulla est alia, quam ut auditorem, quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodatior, praeparemus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus, inter auctores plurimos constat si benevolum, attentum, docilem fecerimus; non quia ista non per totam actionem sint custodienda, sed quia initiis praecipue necessaria, per quae in animum iudicis, ut procedere ultra possimus, admittimur. (Quint. IV 1. 5).

οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ συμφέρει κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Or. II 79. 323. He begins by saying that neither of these topics is to be confined to the *prooemium* § 322, *nam et attentum monent Graeci ut principio faciamus iudicem et docilem* (this is included in *προσεκτικοί*); *quae sunt utilia, sed non principii magis propria quam reliquarum partium; faciliora etiam in principiiis, quod et attenti tum maxime sunt, quum omnia exspectant, et dociles magis initiis esse possunt.* Quint., IV 1. 37, 38, criticizes Aristotle's remark on this point: *Nec me quanguam magni auctores in hoc duxerint ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim: non quia nesciam, id quod ab illis dicitur, esse pro mala causa qualis ea sit non intelligi: verum quia istud non negligentia iudicis contingit, sed errore. Dixit enim adversarius, et fortasse persuasit: nobis opus est eius diversa opinione: quae mutari non potest nisi illum fecerimus ad ea quae dicemus docilem et attentum,* seq. That is, the judge's inattention often arises not from negligence, but from a mistaken supposition that the adversary is right and we are wrong: in order to set him right we must rouse his attention. The supposition implied here in explanation of οὐκ αἰεὶ συμφ. κ.τ.λ., which Quint. refers to and criticizes, is that inattention on the judge's part is sometimes expedient when our cause is bad. Quint.'s reply is, it is not his *inattention* that would be of use to us in such a case, but his *attention* to the arguments which we are about to use in order to convince him to the contrary. Another disadvantage that may arise from over-attention on the judge's part, occurs when we want to slur over an unfavourable point in our case. In illustration of the following διὸ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Gaisford very appositely quotes Arist. Vesp. 564, Οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν μῦθους ἡμῖν, οἱ δ' Αἰσώπου τι γελοῖον· οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ', ἵν'

εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάξει, ἐάν τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικῇ φαίνεσθαι· προσέχουσι γὰρ μᾶλλον τούτοις. προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἰδίοις, τοῖς θαν- P. 1415 A
μαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν· διὸ δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ὡς περὶ τοιού-
των ὁ λόγος. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ προσεκτικούς, ὅτι μικρόν,

ἐγὼ γελάσω, καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καταθῶμαι. [Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) §§ 13, 20, γελάσαντες ἀφήσετε, and Or. 23 § 206.]

The Scholiast on this place (see in Spengel's Ed. p. 158), tells, *apropos* of this, the story from Demosth. de Cor. §§ 51, 52, with additions. The Scholiast, Ulpian on the passage of Dem., and a scholiast on Ar. Anal. Pr. I 24 b 20 (in Brandis' collection, Arist. Op. Bekker's 4to. vol. IV. p. 147 b 43 of Bekker's quarto ed. of Aristotle), all agree that Demosthenes' *joke* consisted in an intentional mispronunciation of the word *μισθωτός*, which he applied to Aeschines, pronouncing it *μισθωτος*, in order to divert the attention of the audience: he appealed to them to say whether the word was not well applied: they burst into a roar of laughter, accepted the application, and shouted *Αἰσχίνης μισθωτός, Αἰσχίνης μισθωτός*, with the pronunciation corrected. I entirely agree with Dissen that this is a foolish and improbable story, absurd in itself, and receiving no countenance from the *text of Demosthenes*. All that he *did* say is found in the existing text, viz. that he interpreted Aeschines' *ξενίαν* 'Ἀλεξάνδρου—which Aesch. claimed—as meaning that he was not a *ξένος*, a guest and friend, but a *μισθωτός* (a hireling) 'Ἀλεξάνδρου and nothing more, and that the people accepted this version. See Dissen's note on § 52.

(*εὐμάθεια*, *docilitas*, need not be made a *separate* topic, because) 'any speaker may refer to this (carry back, i. e. apply) any thing he pleases (any of the topics of the *προοίμιον*), even the appearance of worth and respectability; for to these (*τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι*) the audience is always more inclined to attend'. (This is in fact the *ἀρετή* which the speaker must always assume *by his speech*, in order that his hearers may have confidence in him, that he may have weight and *authority* with them; one of the three ingredients in the *ῆθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*, II 1. 5. Introd. on *ῆθος*, p. 108 seq.) In short, *εὐμάθεια* need not be made a *separate* topic, provided only the speaker treats the other topics of the *προοίμιον* with the view of making the audience *dociles*, that is, ready to receive the information which he is prepared to communicate to them.

'The things to which the audience is most *inclined* to listen are things great (momentous, important), things of special interest (to the hearers themselves), things wonderful (surprising), and things pleasant (to hear; either in themselves, or in their associations); and therefore the speaker should always try to produce the impression (*ἐν* in his hearers' minds) that things of such kinds are his subject. If he wish to make them inattentive (he must try to convey the impression, *ἐὰν μὴ, subaudi ποιεῖν ἐθέλη τις—προσεκτικούς*) that his subject is trifling, has no reference to *them* and their interests (that is, is unimportant in general, or to them in particular: the opposite of the *τὰ ἴδια* in this preceding topic) or that it is unpleasant'.

8 ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ὅτι λυπηρόν. δεῖ δὲ μὴ^{p. 138.}
 λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα·
 πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγμα-
 τος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ
 9 προοιμίον, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιω-
 τικὸς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν, εἰάν δέη·

On interesting and uninteresting topics, see the parallel passages in Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 3, where those of Aristotle are subdivided: Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23: Cic., Orat. Part. c. 8, expresses Ar.'s ἰδία, *Coniuncta cum ipsis apud quos agetur*.

§ 8. 'However it must not be forgotten that all such things as these (all these ordinary contents of the προοίμια) are foreign to (outside; *extra*, not *secundum*, *artem*) the speech (and its real object, which is the *proof* of the case, and that alone, αἱ δὲ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκαι, I 1. 3): it is only because the audience is bad, and ready to listen to things beside the real question, (that these are addressed to them); for if he be not such, there is no occasion for an exordium (to flatter him into a good humour, and the rest), except just so far as to state the case in a summary way, that, like a body, it may have a head on it'. There is probably a reference in this to σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, as the enthymemes, or direct logical proofs, are called I 1. 3.

φαῦλος, as applied to the audience or judges, means here not morally bad, but only defective in intellect and patience, too ignorant and frivolous to attend long to sound and serious reasoning: they require to be relieved and *diverted* occasionally. So Schrader. Comp. what is said of the 'single judge' in 12. 5. Of the *summary* προοίμιον, the Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 2, gives two examples.

ἵνα—κεφαλὴν] Comp. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 a 19, of σοφία; νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων. Plat. Gorg. 505 D, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιῖῃ. Phaedr. 264 C, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συν-εστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον μήτε ἄπουν, κ.τ.λ. Phileb. 66 D. Polit. 277 C. Legg. VI 752 A. Stallbaum and Heindorf ad loc. Gorg. Thompson ad loc. Phaedri [et Gorg.]. The notion conveyed in all these places is the same, a headless animal is *incomplete*. See note in Introd. p. 341, on the book, which, without a preface, looks like a man going out into the street without his hat. This gives the same notion of want of finish and completeness. Quint. IV 1. 72, *Haec de prooemio, quoties erit eius usus: non semper autem est; nam et supervacuum aliquando est, si sit praeparatus satis etiam sine hoc iudex, aut si res praeparatione non eget. Aristoteles quidem in totum id necessarium apud bonos iudices negat; seq. Comp. XII 10. 52, Quod si mihi des concilium iudicum sapientum...Neque enim affectus omnino movendi sunt, nec aures delectatione mulcendae, quum etiam prooemia supervacua esse apud tales Aristoteles existimet.*

§ 9. 'Besides, this making the hearers disposed to listen (keep up

πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιάσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμενοι. διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται. ὥστε ὅπου ἂν ᾖ ἡ καιρός, λεκτέον “καί μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἢ ὑμέτερον” καὶ

ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν οἶον οὐδεπώποτε
ἀκηκόατε δεινόν,

ἢ οὕτω θανμαστόν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρίδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν
10 τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν οὐχ ἡπερ ὁ¹ ἀκροατής, δηλὸν· πάντες γὰρ ἢ

¹ οὐχ ἢ

their attention), is common to all the parts of the speech alike, wherever it is required: for they are more inclined to relax it anywhere rather than at the opening. It is absurd therefore to fix its place ('post' it) at the beginning, a time when everybody listens with the greatest attention'. Cic. de Or. II 79. 323 quoted on § 7, οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ συμφέρει. Also Quint. IV. 1. 73, who follows Arist. in quoting Prodicus' artifice. 'And therefore, (not only at the beginning, but) wherever there is occasion, such phrases as this must be used, "And now attend to what I say, for it is no more my affair than yours"; or, "I'll tell such a strange thing—or a thing so marvellous—as you have never yet heard before." And this is like what Prodicus said, "whenever his audience were inclined to be drowsy, he would slip them in a taste of the fifty drachm", παρεμβάλλειν, throw them in by the side of the rest, on the sly, (παρὰδηγεῖσθαι, *infra* 16. 5). The 'fifty drachm' was Prodicus' most famous, and interesting, and expensive lecture. Plat. Crat. 384 B, Σωκρ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἀκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεύσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυέ σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δε οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν.

§ 10. 'But (that all this is beside the point, and *extra artem*;) that it is not addressed to the hearer as a hearer (read by all means ἢ ἀκροατής sc. ἐστι: i. e., that it is addressed to him as a hearer and something more, as a man liable to all the defects and infirmities and feelings above mentioned) 'is plain: for speakers invariably employ their exordia either in prejudicing (the audience against the adversary), or in the endeavour to remove similar apprehensions (of the like suspicions and prejudices) from themselves'. If the audience were mere impartial listeners, met there to hear and judge the case, and *nothing more*; there would be no occasion for all this accusation and defence with which the orators always fill their *prooemia*.

The first example referred to, the excuse of the φύλαξ for his lack of speed and his unwelcome message, Soph. Antig. 223 seq., is a case

διαβάλλουσιν ἢ φόβους ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις.

ἄναξ, ἐρῶ μὲν οὐχ ὅπως σπουδῆς ὑπο.
τί φροιμάζῃ;

καὶ οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἢ δοκοῦντες·
πανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἢ ἐν τῷ πράγματι.
διὸ οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ
11 κύκλῳ, καὶ προοιμάζονται. πόθεν δ' εὖνους δεῖ ποι-
εῖν, εἶρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων.
ἐπεὶ δ' εὖ λέγεται

δός μ' ἐς Φαίηκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἢδ' ἐλεεινόν,

of ἀπολογεῖσθαι φόβους, 'to remove the threatened danger, or postpone it as long as he can, by a defence': and the application is, that if he had not been *afraid* of Creon, if he had been quite sure that Creon was an altogether impartial hearer, he would not have indulged in such a long preface. The second is an example of the same kind from Eur. Iph. Taur. 1162, Thoas to Iphigenia, τί φροιμάζει νεοχμόν; ἐξαῦθα σαφῶς. The actual defence is confined to one line (1161), but Thoas suspects her of entering upon a long apology. Buhle, who could not have looked at the passage, says "Iphig. longo exordio utentem." The Scholiast (Spengel's Ed. p. 161) here gives a long paraphrase of the watchman's speech. After this, incredible as it may appear, he adds τὸ δὲ τί φροιμάζῃ τοῦ Κρέοντός ἐστι λέγοντος, as if this had been a continuation of the line from the Antigone.

'And those who have, or suppose themselves to have, a bad case (*lit.* their case bad) are apt to indulge in long prooemia: for it is better for them to dwell upon anything rather than upon their case'.—This also is illustrated by the speech of the φύλαξ in the Antigone: and perhaps was suggested by it; for it is not very consecutive—'And this is why slaves (when charged with a fault, and excusing themselves to their masters) never answer the questions directly, but (state) the attending (*surrounding*) circumstances, and make a long (roundabout) preface (before they come to the point)'. On τὰ κύκλῳ see 19. 33. Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. 11 45, *Non hic te carmine ficto Atque per ambages et longa exorsa tenebo*.

§ 11. 'The topics for conciliating good will have been already stated' (φιλία II 4, ἔλεος II 8, especially, from the quotation following. II 1. 7, περὶ δ' εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον νῦν. Cic. de Inv. I 16. 22, *benevolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur*, seq.) 'as well as (for exciting) any feeling of the same kind in general (any of the πάθη in Bk. II 2—11). And since the saying is true, seeing that it is well said "Grant that I may come to the Phaeacians an object of love and pity"—Hom. Od. η' [VII] 327,—it follows that these two (to make ourselves loveable and pitiable) are what we ought to aim at (for this purpose)'.

τούτων δεῖ δύο στοχάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς οἶεσθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν συνεπαινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ γένος ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ἀμῶς γέ πως· ὁ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις.

12 τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικανικοῦ λόγου ἐστίν, φύσει δ' ἥκιστα ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οὗ ἴσασι, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα προσιμίον, ἀλλ' ἢ δι' αὐτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ἡλίκον βούλει

δύο] here is indeclinable, like ἀμῶς sometimes. As only the first four numerals in Greek (and Sanskrit; the first three in Latin) are declinable; δύο occasionally follows the *general* rule of indeclinability. In Homer this is the usual form (see Damm's Lex. s. v.); in later and Attic writers not so frequent. Several examples are to be found in Ellendt's Lex. Soph., Sturz, Lex. Xen. See Schweighäuser, Lex. Herod. for instances with fem. plur. Analogous to this of Arist. is δύο νέων ἀνειλκυσμένων, Thuc. III 89. Aristoph. δύο μυριάδες τῶν δημοτικῶν. Plat. Gorg. 464 B, δύο λέγω τέχνας. Eur. Bacch. 916, δύο ἡλίους. Orest. 1401, λέοντες δύο, Phoen. 55, &c.

'In the epideictic *prooemia* the hearer must be made to suppose that he is a sharer in the praise, either personally, or by his family, or his studies and pursuits, or at any rate somehow or other: for what Socrates (i. e. Plato, Menex. 235 D, *supra* I 9. 30) says in his funeral oration is quite true, that it is easy enough to praise Athenians at (friendly) Athens; the difficulty lies in doing it at Sparta (amongst rivals and enemies)'. The old adj. ἀμός, 'some', survives in several forms found in most Greek authors; ἀμῶς (γέ πως) and ἀμῇ (γέ πῃ), sc. ὁδῶ, ἀμοῦ, ἀμόθεν, and the compounds οὐδαμός, οὐδαμῶς, οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδαμῇ (or μῇ), οὐδαμόθεν, οὐδαμόσε, and the same with μή.

§ 12. 'The *exordia* of the public oration are borrowed from those of the forensic speech, but are naturally very rare in it: for in fact the subject of it is one with which they are already well acquainted, and therefore the facts of the case require no preface (no preparatory explanation) except—if at all—on his own account or that of the adversary (δι' αὐτόν to put himself right with the audience, the ἥθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι; ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας to meet the adversary's charges, combat the prejudices the other has raised against him: both of these therefore are *accidental*), or in case the subject (this is *essential*) is not considered by them of the precise degree of importance which you wish, but rated either too high or too low.' As to τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, we had been told before, c. 13. 3, προσιμίον δὲ...ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ: as in Demosth. de Corona, and de Falsa Legatione. Comp. Quint. III 8. 8, who borrows this from Aristotle, *Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et*

ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον. διὸ ἢ^{p. 139.}
 διαβάλλειν ἢ ἀπολύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἢ αὐξῆσαι ἢ
 μειῶσαι. τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα προοιμίου δεῖται, ἢ κίσμου
 χάριν, ὥς αὐτοκάβδαλα φαίνεται, εἰ μὴ ἔχη. τοι-^{P. 1416.}
 οὔτον γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείου· οὐδὲν
 γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθὺς ἄρχε-
 ται “Ἡλις πόλις εὐδαίμων.”

*a nostra, et ab eius qui dissentiet persona, duci frequenter in consiliis
 exordium, quasi mutuantibus hoc nobis a iudiciali genere; nonnunquam
 etiam ut minor res maiore videatur: in demonstrativis vero prooemia
 esse maxime libera existimat.*

‘And hence the necessity of either raising or doing away with preju-
 dice (διὸ, because when there *is* an adversary, as there always is in
 dicastic practice, the same treatment in deliberative speaking is *neces-
 sarily* required) and (the topics) of amplification and diminution (to meet
 the other requirement, εἰ μὴ ἡλικὸν βούλει, ὑπολοιπόν, κ.τ.λ.)’

On the κοινὸς τόπος (or τόποι) αὐξήσις and μειώσεις, see II 26. 1. Ib.
 18. 4.

‘These are the circumstances in which a preface is required (δεῖται,
 ὁ λόγος, or ὁ λέγων); either these, or for mere ornament’s sake, because,
 without it, the speech has an off-hand, slovenly (impromptu, extempora-
 neous) air (note on III 7. 1). For such is Gorgias’ encomium on the
 Eleans; without any preliminary sparring (flourish) or preparatory stir-
 ring up he starts abruptly (rushes *at once, in medias res*; *without* any
 previous warning or preparation) with “Elis, blessed city.”

τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλ.] Sauppe, *Or. Att. Fragm.*, *Fragm. Gorg.*
 No. IV. Nothing more is known of the speech.

προεξαγκωνίσας] is a metaphor from *boxing*, and denotes a preliminary
exercise of the boxer, a swinging, and thrusting to and fro of the arms
 (*lit.* elbows), as a preparation for the actual blow, “ex athletarum
 disciplina ... qui bracciis sublati et vibrati pugnae proludunt (I
 think this is not quite exact: the exercise is not so much to prepare
 for the *encounter with the antagonist*, though this of course may be
 included, as to give weight and impetus to the actual *blow*). Hinc ab
 Ar. ad oratorem tractatum, qui prooemio quodam utitur priusquam ad
 rem ipsam deveniat.” Spanheim ad Callim. Hymn. Del. line 322. This
 word is a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον.

προανακινεῖν expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor;
 the rousing, stirring *up*, excitement of emotion or interest, as a *prepa-
 ration* (πρό) for what is to follow. This is illustrated by Plato, Legg.
 IV 722 D, λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνῇ κεκοινώνηκε προοίμιά τ’ ἔστι καὶ
 σχεδὸν οἷον τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαι τινα ἔντεχρον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον
 πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαίνεσθαι. Ib. VII 789 C, of the inspiring, animating,
 exciting process—‘quo validiores atque animosiores ad certamina fierent,’
 Stallbaum *ad locum*—which is the object of the training of fighting
 cocks and quails, (πόνους) ἐν οἷς αὐτὰ ἀνακινούσι γυμνάζοντες. Meno, 85 C,

1 περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις ὑπόληψιν CHAP. XV.
 δυσχερῇ ἀπολύσαιτο· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἶτε εἰπόν-

ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐται. Comp. Plut. Cato Mai. c. 26, ἥδη δὲ καὶ προανακινέσθαι τοῖς Νομαδικοῖς (*Numidae*) τοὺς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγῶνας, here literally, in the primary sense, the Numidians were already making preparations to stir up, &c. Ib. π. τοῦ πρώτου ψυχροῦ, c. 9, 948 C, τὰ αἰσθητὰ ταυτὶ προανακινήσαι, to stir up, by a preparatory examination or study, these sensible elements (of Empedocles &c.)—from all which it seems to me certain that Victorius is incorrect in interpreting this in the same way as the preceding metaphor, “brachia manusque commovere et concutere.” Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v.*, *procludere prooemio quodam*, throws no light upon the matter.

CHAP. XV.

The following chapter is a continuation of the preceding on the ordinary contents of the προοίμιον, two of which, as we have seen c. 14 § 12, are διαβάλλειν and ἀπολύεσθαι: and on these two the orator is supplied with topics.

The same subject is treated in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 29 (30), at even greater length than by Aristotle: and a summary of its contents, with some remarks on its moral character, and its connexion with Isocrates, may be found in *Introd.* pp. 441—443. A comparison of this with Aristotle's treatment of the subject is altogether in favour of the latter. He had already told us that he disapproves of the προοίμιον, as distinct from the πρόθεσις, altogether: but he is obliged, by the practice of his predecessors, and the evident importance of the subject, which in spite of its unscientific character cannot be altogether passed over in a complete treatise on Rhetoric, to give it a place in his system; but it will be observed that in dealing with it he occupies at least three-fourths of the chapter with the topics of the *defensive* use of it, confining his observations on the aggressive side to two topics in a single section. See also especially § 10, τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικότατοι κ.τ.λ. The reckless and unscrupulous precepts of the other treatise present διαβολή in its very worst character: it is truly here the ‘devil's art’, ἡ τοῦ διαβόλου τέχνη, the art of insinuating by whatever means prejudice and ill-will against your opponent—merely because he happens to be such, and for no other reason—and so *prejudicing his case*. There is something further on this in c. 36 (37). 46, 47. There is an invective against διαβολή in Isocr. *ἀντιδ.* § 18. “διαβάλλειν is ‘to set at variance’, ‘to make hostile’; and so to inspire ill-will, insinuate suspicions, or prejudice a person against another. It applies as a technical term to all insinuations and accusations by which one of the parties in a case endeavours to raise a prejudice against the other, which are to be reflected upon, but do not directly help to prove, the main charge or point at issue; and are therefore *extra artem*, ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος. See III 15. 9; and comp. the example, *infra* § 3. ἀπολύεσθαι is to clear oneself of such insinuated charges, to remove evil suspicions. Aristotle begins with this, because, as he told us before (c. 14. 7), it is *more* appropriate to the exordium, as the opposite (in accusation) is to the peroration.” *Introd.* p. 344.

2 τος τινὸς εἶτε μὴ, ὥστε τοῦτο καθόλου. ἄλλος τρόπος ὥστε πρὸς τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἀπαντᾶν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ βλαβερόν, ἢ οὐ τούτω, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικούτον ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον ἢ οὐ μέγα ἢ οὐκ αἰσχροὺν ἢ οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· περὶ γὰρ τοιούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, ὥσπερ

§ 1. 'With respect to *διαβολή*, (intentional and malicious) calumny or (accidental, undesigned) prejudice, one (the first) topic is *anything* from which arguments may be derived for removing offensive (unpleasant, injurious) *suspcion*: for it makes no difference whether (the charge or insinuation) has been actually spoken (expressed, in the shape of a direct *personal calumny*) or not' (i.e. has merely been conceived, not openly stated; *ὑπόληψις* as a mere conception or supposition—against us by inference, from our words, actions, or manners, or altogether accidentally, when people have a *bad opinion* of us: in either case the prejudice requires to be removed); 'and therefore this is a general rule'; includes everything, every kind of argument which tends to remove any bad opinion or prejudice which for whatever reason may be entertained against us: and this, whether the charge we have to meet be a direct statement, or merely an uncertified suspicion. This is illustrated by Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 8, 9.

In Benseler's Isocrates, II 276, a ref. is given upon *διαβολή* to Isocr. τέχνη, Fragm. τέχνη. No. 2 (from Anon. et Maxim. Planud. v 551. 10, Waitz), which runs thus: ἐν γὰρ ταῖς καταστάσεσι τὰ τε οἰκεία συνιστῶμεν (establish) καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων διαβάλλομεν πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον συμφέρον ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς καταστάσεις, ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἐδίδαξεν.

§ 2. 'Another way (of clearing oneself) is to meet the charge on any of these *issues*' (στάσεις or ἀμφισβητήσεις, *status*, the turning-point of the case, on which issue is joined: on these see Appendix E to Book III in Introd. p. 397 seq. where the various classifications of them are given;) 'either by denying the fact (τὸ ὄν, *status coniecturalis*); or admitting that, and asserting that the alleged act was not injurious (*ab utili*, Victorius); or at any rate not to *him* (the complainant); or that the amount of injury is overstated; or that it was either no wrong at all (not *unjust*: not a legal crime), or a slight one; or, (taking the other view of morality, supposing it to be strictly speaking unjust, at any rate) not disgraceful, or a mere trifle, of no importance at all'. οὐ μέγα differs in this from οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος: the former qualifies merely the *wrong* of the ἄδικον, the latter is "no great matter"; of *greatness*, in the sense of magnitude or importance in general. 'For these are the points upon which the issue (of a case) turns, as in that between Iphicrates and Nausicrates: for he admitted the *fact* and the *injury*, but said it was no *wrong*'. Nausicrates or (always in the Latin Rhetoricians) Naucrates, is mentioned by Cicero, Orat. L 172, de Orat. II 23. 94, and III 44. 173, as a pupil of Isocrates. Quint., III 6. 3, stating the same fact, tells us also that some attributed to him the first systematic division of these στάσεις or *status*. See Art. in *Biogr. Dict.* s. v. Westermann's *Gesch. der Gr. u. Röm. Beredsamkeit*, 50. 5, comp. 83. 10.

Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ναυσικράτην· ἔφη γὰρ ποιῆσαι ὁ ἔλεγε καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀδικεῖν. ἢ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι ἀδικοῦντα, εἰ βλαβερὸν ἀλλὰ καλόν, εἰ
 3 λυπηρὸν ἀλλ' ἀφέλιμον ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ἄλλος τρόπος ὡς ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα ἢ αὐτόχημα ἢ ἀναγκυῖον,

Spalding, on Quint. III 6. 60, retains the *vulgate lectio* τοῦτο (instead of τούτω) in the sense of ὁρική στάσις or *finitiō*.

On the redundant ὥστε in τρόπος ὥστε ἀπαντᾶν, add to the examples from the Tragic poets collected by Monk ad Eur. Hippol. 1323, Κύπρις γὰρ ἦθελ' ὥστε γίνεσθαι τάδε, Thuc. I 28, ἐτοίμοι εἶναι ὥστε (provided δέ be retained), Ib. c. 119, δεηθέντες ὥστε ψηφίσασθαι, VIII 45, ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε, Ib. c. 79, δόξαν ὥστε διαναυμαχεῖν, Ib. 86, ὥστε...πάνυ ἐπαίνειν. Pind. Nem. V 64, κατένευσεν ὥστε πράξαι. Herod. I 74, συνήνευκε ὥστε...νύκτα γενέσθαι, Ib. III 14, συνήνευκε ὥστε...παριέναι. Plat. Protag. 338 C, ἀδύνατον ὥστε, where see Heindorf's note, and also on Phaedr. 269 D, τὸ δύνασθαι ὥστε...γενέσθαι. Phaedo 93 B and 103 E, ἔστιν...ὥστε...ἀξιόυσθαι (Stallbaum's note), Isocr. Archid. § 40, γέγονεν ὥστε...κρατηθῆναι. Dem. de F. L. § 124 μῆδ' ἦν ὥστ' ἰδεῖν ἅπαντας (with Shilleto's critical note). Aesch. de F. L. p. 49 § 158, εἴσατε...ὥστε...ἀναστρέφεισθαι. Ar. Pol. II 2, 1261 a 34, συμβαίνει... ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, Ib. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν. Ib. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, συμβέβηκεν ὥστε...τὴν πολιτ. εἶναι. Soph. Oed. Col. 570, Ib. 1350 (Dind.), δικαίων ὥστ' ἐμοῦ κλύειν, Philoct. 656, ἄρ' ἔστιν ὥστε καγγυθεν θέαν λαβεῖν. Eur. Iph. T. 1017, πῶς οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὥστε μῆθ' ἡμᾶς θανεῖν.

‘Or (in justifying oneself), admitting a wrong done, to balance (or compensate) it (by something else which may be taken as a set-off, or drawback, in diminution of the wrong); for instance you say, what I did was injurious no doubt, but honourable; or painful, but serviceable; or anything else of the same sort’. The comparison of a few passages will best illustrate the meaning of ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι. Ar. de part. Anim. I 5. 3, 644 b 22. The author is comparing the interest and value in natural philosophy of the objects of sense, things that we can see and touch and handle, and so examine and satisfy our curiosity about, with those that are beyond the reach of our senses, οὐσίας ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. Though the latter are in themselves higher and more excellent, “yet by their greater nearness to us, and more immediate connexion with our nature, there is a sort of compensation, ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι, when they are compared with the things divine as objects of study.” Dem. de Cor. § 138, τῆς ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡδονῆς καὶ χάριτος τὸ τῆς πόλεως συμφέρον ἀνταλλαττόμενοι, ‘bartering, exchanging for, compensating by.’ Plat. Phaedo 69 A, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονάς, καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας, καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι...ὥσπερ νομίσματα: and other passages collected by Wyttenb. ad loc. Dinarch. adv. Dem. § 2, μῆδὲ τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἀντικαλλάσασθαι τῶν τοῦ κρινομένου λόγων. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 92, ῥῆμα μόνον ἀντικαταλλαξάμενος ἀντὶ τούτων. Isocr. Phil. § 135, ὑπὲρ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν τὸ ζῆν ἀντικαταλλαξάμενους. (Ernesti *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v., *ex-cusare reum*!)

§ 3. ‘Another method is (to extenuate the ἀδίκημα by the milder

οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλλων ἔφη, ἵνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἐκόντι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἔτη ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβούλετο ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο ὃ διεβάλλετο ποιῆσαι, συνέβη δὲ βλαβῆναι. “ δίκαιον δὲ μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν.”
4 ἄλλος, εἰ ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ διαβάλλων, ἢ νῦν ἢ πρό-

terms), (to say) that it is a mistake, or an accident, or compulsory', done under compulsion: *βία*, see I 10. 14, and Appendix C to Bk. I., Introd. p. 225, and the references there. *ἀνάγκη* or *βία*, 'overpowering force', *forza maggiore*, *force majeure*, absolves from responsibility. Four *degrees of criminality* are thus distinguished in Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 11, (1) *ἀτύχημα*, a mere accident, an injury done unintentionally without knowledge of the *special circumstances* of the case: (2) *ἀμάρτημα*, an error or mistake, where the act is intentional but the injury unintentional (the case of killing a friend with a gun supposed not to be loaded); this does not include the case of moral ignorance, ignorance of right and wrong, for which a man is responsible: (3) *ἀδίκημα*, a wrong, intentional in a sense, but without *deliberation* or *malice prepense*, as a deadly blow dealt in a fit of passion, when the judgment is for the moment overpowered; (this is, I believe, the only place in which this degree is distinguished from the following: at all events the *ordinary* division is threefold.) All these are short of actual guilt or crime. The last stage, of actual crime, is (4) *ἀδικία*, a wrong act committed with full knowledge of the circumstances, and deliberate purpose, *ὅταν ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός*. With this compare III 2, on the intentional and unintentional. Comp. also Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 8, 9.

'As for instance Sophocles said that his trembling was not, as his accuser (or traducer) said, assumed to convey the appearance of old age, (and thereby obtain the sympathy and compassion of the judges) but compulsory (and therefore he was not responsible for it); for his eighty years were quite unintentional'. On Sophocles—not the poet—see note on I 14. 3. The same Sophocles is mentioned again III 18. 6.

'And again, by a balance (compensatory interchange or substitution) of motives; (for instance) that you had no intention of injuring him; what you really intended to do was so and so, and not that which was falsely laid to your charge; the *injury* was an accident (not of the *essence* of what you did: a mere *συμβεβηκός*). "I should deserve to be hated if that were my intention in doing it". This seems to be introduced as a specimen of what might be said on such an occasion; and contrary to his usual practice, Aristotle's own manufacture.

§ 4. 'Another (way or topic) is *recrimination*, when the accuser is involved in the same charge, either at the present time or on some previous occasion; either himself or any of those *near* to him (relatives, connexions, intimate friends)'. If you can shew that your adversary or any one very near to him is liable to the same charge as that of

- 5 *τερον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπερι-
λαμβάνονται, οὓς ὁμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ δια-
βολῇ, οἷον εἰ ὅτι καθάριος ὁ¹ μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα.*
6 *ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους διέβαλεν, ἢ ἄλλος αὐτούς, ἢ ἄνευ δια-
βολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο ὥσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἱ πεφήνασιν*

¹ *fortasse transponendum aut prorsus omittendum.*

which he accuses you, though the charge may not therefore fall to the ground, at any rate you can silence him by saying, that *he* at all events was not the person to make it. Majoragius cites Cic. pro Ligar. § 2. *Habes igitur, Tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum, confitentem reum, sed tamen ita confitentem, se in ea parte fuisse, qua te, Tubero, qua virum omni laude dignum, patrem tuum. Itaque prius de vestro delicto confiteamini necesse est, quam Ligarii ullam culpam reprehendatis.* He adds that the whole of the *exordium* of the fifth action against Verres is to prove, *neminem debere alterum accusare de ea re qua ipse sit infectus.*

§ 5. 'Again, if others are included in the charge who are admitted not to be liable to the accusation; for instance if (it be argued) that so and so is an adulterer because he is a smart dresser, (the reply is) why in that case so must Smith and Jones be adulterers'—although it is perfectly well known that Smith and Jones are entirely free from that vice. Bekker and Spengel accept Riccoboni's, and Bekker's own, suggestion *καθάριος* for *vulgata lectio* *καθαρός*: but they retain the article *ὁ* in its old position *ὅτι καθάριος ὁ μοιχός*. With this reading the only translation can be, "that all adulterers dress smartly", which is not to the point. The *converse* is required by the *argument*—which is, to free yourself from a suspicion which has arisen from some accidental association, by shewing that, if the two things were really associated, others would be liable to the same suspicion, who are known *not* to be obnoxious to it: "if, as is alleged, all smart dressers were adulterers, then so and so, who are known *not* to be liable to the charge, would be involved in it": and besides this, the following passages on the same subject shew that this *was* the argument that was used. *καθάριος*, II 4. 15, for 'neatness and cleanliness in dress' and attention to personal appearance: the *argument* from this appears II 24. 7, *ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστής, καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός* τοιοῦτοι γὰρ; and de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 9, *βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστής ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος*. It is necessary therefore, besides the alteration of *καθαρός* into *καθάριος*, either to change the position of the article, *εἰ ὅτι ὁ καθάριος μοιχός* or to omit the article altogether *εἰ ὅτι καθάριος μοιχός*. If such a mistaken inference *has been drawn*, you infer from this example by *analogy* to a like case.

§ 6. 'Again, if (your accuser) ever brought against others (the same) charges (which he is now bringing against you); or if, without a direct accusation, these same were ever subjected to the same suspicions as you yourself are now; who have been shewn to be entirely innocent of them'—you may infer by analogy that a similar mistake is likely to have been made in the present case.

7 οὐκ ἔνοχοι. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν δια-
βάλλοντα· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὅς¹ αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ
8 τούτου λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοί. ἄλλος, εἰ γέγονε
κρίσις, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα ἐν τῇ
ἀντιδόσει κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβής, ὅς γ' ἐποίησε
κελεύων ἐπιорκεῖν

ἢ γλῶσσ' ὁμῶμοχ', ἢ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.

p. 140.

¹ δ

§ 7. 'Or again, (another topic may be derived) from recrimination, by a retort upon the accuser: (the inference being, that) it is strange that where (in what, δ,) a man himself is not to be trusted, his statements should be trustworthy'. MSS ὁ αὐτός, Bekker Ed. 3, and Spengel (apparently from Bekker) δs. I read δ as nearer to the text, 'in what'.

§ 8. 'Another is, the appeal to a previous decision; an instance of which is Euripides' reply to Hygiaenon, in the *exchange* case, in which the latter accused him of impiety for the verse that he wrote in recommendation of perjury, "the tongue hath sworn; but the mind is unsworn". His reply was that the other had no right to bring cases (decisions) out of the Dionysiac contest into the courts of law: for he had already given an account (stood his trial) of them (his words, αὐτῶν, included in the verse), or was prepared to do so, if the other chose to accuse him'. This celebrated verse, Hippol. 608, probably owes a good deal of its notoriety to Aristophanes' parody of it near the end of the *Frogs*. Seldom has so "much ado about nothing" been made as about this unlucky line. The charge of recommending perjury is at any rate a gross exaggeration. Nor does it necessarily imply even mental reservation. Cicero, de Off. III 29. 107 (quoted by Monk ad loc.), puts the case very clearly. *Quod ita iuratum est ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est: quod aliter, id si non feceris nullum est periurium. Non enim falsum iurare periurare est; sed quod ex animi tui sententia iuraris, sicut verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite enim Euripides, Iuravi lingua, mentem iniuram gero.* See the whole of Monk's note. Paley in his note follows Cicero. Of course the deceit, if there be any, lies in the intention and not in the word; and this is all that Hippolytus seems to say. He never intended that his oath should be kept in *that* sense: and his ignorance of the circumstances absolves him from the responsibility, or obligation of the oath. See above in note on § 3¹.

We learn from this passage that Euripides (the tragic poet) was

¹ I find this note in one of my copies of the Hippolytus. "I don't think the principle implied in this (the verse of Eurip.) can be defended. Hippolytus says that he swore to keep the secret in ignorance of the nature of it: now that he knows *that*, he is freed from the obligation of keeping it. Has a man a *right* to lay himself under an obligation, of the nature of which he is ignorant?" However the question still remains, if the oath *has been* taken in ignorance, is he still bound to keep it? The last sentence was added when this Commentary was written.

ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγῶνος κρίσεις εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἄγοντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδωκέναι λόγον ἢ δώσειν, εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.
 9 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκον, καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι ἄλλας κρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι. κοινὸς δ' ἀμφοῖν ὁ τόπος τὸ σύμβολα P. 1416 λέγειν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρω ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι οἰκείος τῷ

capable of pleading a cause in public. Another public speech, in an embassy to Syracuse, is attributed to him in II 6. 20 ult., where see note.

On the ἀντίδοσις, the compulsory 'exchange of property', in the case of an unfair assignment of a liturgy at Athens, see Böckh *Publ. Econ.* Bk. IV. ch. 16. It does not appear from the text which of the two parties it was that proposed the exchange.

Valckenaer ad Hippol. 612, p. 232, would change the name in the text to Ὑγιαίνερον, as more agreeable to the analogy of Greek proper names. The name is right. Harpocr. quotes twice the speech of Hyperides πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα, sub vv. ἔφη καὶ νέα et θέσθαι.

§ 9. 'Another (may be borrowed) from the accusation of calumny and malicious insinuation itself, (shewing) its enormity (magnitude, how great it is)—and this in particular that it raises extraneous points for decision' (ἄλλας different from, foreign to, the question at issue: like Hygiaenon's quotation in the last section, which may perhaps have suggested this topic. This seems to fix the meaning of ἄλλας and so Victorius: otherwise it might be "gives rise to other trials," one trial generated out of another *ad infinitum*); 'and because it places no reliance on the facts of the real matter at issue'. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 12, and Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 18, who διαβάλλει διαβολήν—and in good round terms.

'Common to both (τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ ἀπολογουμένῳ) is the topic of *signs* and *tokens*: as, for example, in (Sophocles') Teucer, Ulysses charges him with being closely connected with Priam (i. e. with the enemy: closely connected in a double sense: it is an *inference* from his connexion by blood to his *political* connexion, to his favouring the cause of Priam); for Hesione (Teucer's mother) was his (Priam's) sister¹: the other (Teucer) replies (in the same topic) that his *father*' (a still *nearer* relation. See Apollo's speech in Aesch. Eumen. 657—673 and in many other places, on the nearer connexion, and higher obligation, of the son to the father than to the mother) 'Telamon, was Priam's enemy, and also that he did not betray (inform against) the spies to him'. This play of Sophocles has already been *named* before—in II 23. 7. There are only two short fragments of it remaining (Dind., Wagn. *Soph. Fragm.*), from

¹ On this connexion, Victorius refers to Virg. Aen. VIII 157, *Nam meminī Hesiones visentem regna sororis Laomedontiadem Priamum* seq.; and Soph. Aj. 1299 seq., where Teucer in answer to Agamemnon, boasting of his descent, says, ὃς ἐκ πατρὸς μὲν εἰμι Τελαμῶνος... ὅστις... ἔσχει ξύνευνον μητέρ', ἡ φύσει μὲν ἦν βασιλεια, Λαομέδοντος.

Πριάμῳ· ἡ γὰρ Ἑσιόνη ἀδελφή· ὃ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἐχθρὸς τῷ Πριάμῳ, ὁ Τελαμών, καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατεῖπε 10 τῶν κατασκόπων. ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, τὸ ἐπαινοῦντι μικρὸν μακρῶς ψέξαι μέγα συντόμως, ἢ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα προφέρει ἐν ψέξαι. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι· τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ βλάπτειν πειρῶνται, μιγνύντες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ. κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ

which absolutely nothing is to be learned as to the plot of the play. It is clear from this passage, that Ulysses' accusation was that Teucer had betrayed the Greek cause, and had dealings with the enemy. The charge is supported by the *sign* of Teucer's connexion—in the double sense above explained—with Priam; and met by the other with two signs or tokens leading to the opposite inference. Wagner, *Soph. Fragm.* (*Fr. Trag. Gr.* 1, 385—391, Τεῦκρος), supposing that Pacuvius "*Soph. fabulam imitatione expressisse*", collects a number of his fragments from various Latin writers, from which he derives an interpretation of the story of the play, totally different—as he candidly admits—from that which we shall gather from this passage. But as the interpretation of this passage is perfectly clear, and his hypothesis altogether the reverse, uncertain in every particular, there is little doubt which of the two is to be preferred for the elucidation of Ar.'s text—provided we confess our entire ignorance of all else in and about the play in question.

§ 10. 'Another, for the accuser, is to praise some trifle at great length, and then (under cover of that) to introduce in concise (and pregnant) terms a *censure* of something that is of real importance; or after a preliminary enumeration of a number of advantages (virtues and accomplishments, which have little or nothing to do with the point at issue) hold up that one thing to censure which has a direct and real bearing on the question'. *προφέρειν*, to *promote* (carry forward), aid, assist, further. Hes. Op. et D. 579, ἡὼς τοι προφέρει μὲν ὁδοῦ, προφέρει δὲ καὶ ἔργου. Thuc. I 93, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικούς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν.

Victorius illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. I 4. 94 seq. and the following well-known passage from Cic. pro L. Flacco, IV 9. *Verumtamen hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras: do multarum artium disciplinam: non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam: denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt non repugno: testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit: totiusque huius rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus, ignorant.*

'(Topics) such as these are at the same time most artful and most unfair: for they endeavour to do harm with what is good (to convert the good into an instrument of mischief) by mixing it with the bad'; like one who mixes poison with wholesome food. 'Another topic common to both accuser and excuser is, that since the same act may always be attri-

ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἔνεκα
πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ
χειρόν ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ
βέλτιον· οἷον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσσεά προ-
είλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν
Ὀδυσσεά, τῷ δ' ὅτι οὐ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ
ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῦλον.

I καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα, διήγησις CHAP. XV
δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ
κατὰ μέρος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ

buted to several (different) motives, the accuser has to depreciate (dis-
parage, put a *bad* character or construction upon) it, by selecting the
worse (lit. by *directing* his selection to what is worse), the apologist to
put the more favourable interpretation upon it' (*interpretari in peius, in
melius*).

ἐκλαμβάνειν. ἐκ of 'selection.' Rhet. ad Al. 10 (11). 2, ἐκληπτέον.
Ib. 2 (3). 26, ἐκλάβωμεν. Top. Z 4, 141 ὁ 4, ἐκλαβεῖν. ἐκλέγειν and ἐκ-
λαμβάνειν—technically applied to the selection of topics—are illustrated
by Poste, Post. Anal. p. 21, n. 1, and p. 121, n. 1. Similarly we have ἐκ-
κείσθαι, Rhet. III 9. 2, ἐκθέσθαι, Phys. VI 5. 9, ἐκτιθέναι, Rhet. ad Al. 29 (30).
21, ἐκκείσθαι, pluries, Top. A 9. ἐκτιθέναι, ἔκθεσις, Waitz, Ind. ad Org.
s. vv. Poet. XVII 5, ἐκτίθεσθαι. Ar. Pol. IV (VII) 13, sub init. ὁ σκοπὸς
ἔκκειται καλῶς, "the mark stands well out, full in view, prominent." Lite-
rally, Dem. c. Mid. § 103, πλὴν ὧν ἐκκείτο (Euctemon, 'publicly posted',
affiché) πρὸ τῶν Ἑπανύμων. Dem. (?) κατὰ Θεοκρ. § 8, ἐξέκειτο δὲ πολὺν
χρόνον ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ συνεδρίου ἢ φάσις.

'For instance, (to say) that Diomedes preferred Ulysses (to be his
companion in the nocturnal adventure), on the one side because he sup-
posed Ulysses to be the best (i.e. the most valiant) of men (or the best
companion, for such an occasion), on the other, not for that reason, but
because, from his worthlessness, he was the only (one of the heroes)
of whose rivalry he (Diom.) was not afraid'. *Supra* II 23. 20, 24: where
the same case is given, and the two sides opposed, in illustration of
two different topics. See Hom. Il. K [x] 242 seq.

'And so much for the treatment of διαβολή'.

CHAP. XVI.

On the various divisions of the parts of the speech, including διή-
γησις, the special subject of the following chapter, see the introductory
remarks to c. 13, Introd. p. 331 seq., and in the Commentary.

Ἰσοκράτης ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ φησὶν ὡς ἐν τῇ διηγῇσει λεκτέον τό τε πρᾶγμα
καὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὰς διανοίας, αἷς ἑκάτερος
τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων χρώμενος τότε τι πέπραχεν ἢ μέλλει πράττειν, καὶ τούτων
τοῖς συμβαλλομένοις ἡμῖν χρηστέον (from Syrianus, Sopater, and Anon. ap.
Walz, Benseler Isocr. II 276, ἀποσπάσμ. No. 3); Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37).

λόγος· σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον
(οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων) τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς
τέχνης· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἐστὶ δεῖξαι, εἰν ἢ
ἀπιστον, ἢ ὅτι ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα.
2 διὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐφεξῆς δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι πάντα,
ὅτι δυσμνημόνευτον τὸ δεικνύναι οὕτως. ἐκ μὲν οὖν
τούτων ἀνδρείος, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε σοφὸς ἢ δίκαιος. καὶ
ἀπλούστερος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ἐκείνος δὲ ποικίλος καὶ

14, the διήγησις is there called ἀπαγγελία. Cic. de Or. II 19 § 83;
80 §§ 326—330. Orat. XXXV 122, 124. Orat. Part. IX 31, 32. de Inv.
I 19. 27—21. 30. By Quintilian *narratio* is treated in great detail in
IV 2. [Volkman, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, §§ 11—27, esp.
§ 13, *die Erzählung*.]

§ 1. 'In the epideictic branch of Rhetoric narration is not consecutive
but fragmentary'. οὐκ ἐφεξῆς, not continuous, one part of it following the
other in a regular series or succession, but broken up into parts, piece-
meal, κατὰ μέρος, to aid the memory by giving opportunity for proving
each point of laudation as it arises. 'For we *have* to go through'
(*narrate*, or enumerate in detail; there *must be* a narration; 'all the
actions which form the subject of the panegyric' (*lit.* out of which the
speech, i. e. the praise conferred by the speech, is made to arise: the
special topics of ἔπαινος are 'moral action', πράξεις; see on this Appendix
B to Bk. I c. 9, Introd. p. 212 seq.): 'for the speech is constructed
with (or from) one element with which *art* is not concerned—because
the speaker is not the author of the actions he praises' (*art* is *pro-*
ductive, Eth. Nic. VI 4. The speaker has not *made* his materials
himself: he finds them ready to his hand, and *uses* them. These are
the ἀτεχνοὶ πίστεις of I 15)—'and another which is derived from the
(rhetorical) art (these are the ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεις, the inferences which are
derived from the materials); and this (the latter) is to prove either the
fact, if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain quality, or quantity
(amount, magnitude, importance), or all three'.

§ 2. 'And it is this character of an epideictic speech (this necessary
admixture of inference with statement of facts) that sometimes obliges
the speaker not to relate everything *seriatim* (one after another, in
continuous, uninterrupted order), because a proof of this kind (a long
series of statements followed by a still longer series of proofs, which
after the first two or three topics would be difficult to recollect in their
proper connexion, so as to fit them together,) would be difficult to retain
in the memory. From *this* set of topics he (the hero) is to be shewn
to be brave, from the others to be wise or just, (and the proofs of these
would get intermixed and confounded in the hearer's memory). And
the speech by this arrangement of topics (οὗτος) is simpler; by the
other it is made puzzling (prop. parti-coloured, and so by the *variety*,
perplexing) and not smooth' (i. e. *plain* and easy—like a smooth surface
to walk or drive over).

3 οὐ λιτός. δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀναμνησκέειν·
διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως, οἷον εἰ θέλεις
Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινέειν· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες τὰς πράξεις,
ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς δεῖ. εἰ δὲ Κριτίαν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ p. 141.

λιτός] connected with λισσός and λείος. The metaphor is from a smooth and easily travelled road; like the road to vice, smooth and easy, λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθει ναίει, in Hesiod's often-quoted lines, Op. et D. 287—292: and Euripides' style, in Archimelus' epigram, Anthol. II 64, λείη μὲν γὰρ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐπικροτός—"it seems indeed to the eye a smooth and well-beaten track"—εἰ δέ τις αὐτὴν εἰσβαίνει χαλεποῦ τρηχύτερη σκόλοπος. It is applied frequently by Dionysius to style in the sense of ἀπλοῦς, εὐτελής (Hesych.). In de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 2 init., the terms λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής are applied to a style like that of Lysias, plain, smooth, simple, easy, opposed to the rough, rugged, contortions of that of Thucydides. In de vet. script. cens. c. 2 § 11, it is opposed to ὑψηλός, 'low or mean', ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης οὔτε ὑψηλός ἐστὶν οὔτε μὴν λιτός: de Thuc. Iud. c. 23, it is 'simple and unadorned', λέξις λιτὴν καὶ ἀκόσμητον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν περιττόν: and in de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 34, it is again opposed to ὑψηλός, 'low', τὴν λιτὴν καὶ ἰσχυρὴν (thin, *tenuis*;) καὶ ἀπέριττον (without any striking points or features, 'flat').

§ 3. 'Of well-known actions the hearer should merely be reminded (they should merely be suggested, by a brief allusion, not dwelt upon); and therefore most people¹ (i.e. men of ordinary education) *in such cases* don't require a regular narrative of them'—everybody at once remembers that Achilles conquered Hector; people only need to be *reminded of that*—'as for instance, if you want to praise Achilles: for his actions are known to everybody, they only require to be employed (that is, to be enlarged upon, and commented, for the purpose of enhancing their glory). If Critias is to be praised (or censured), he *does* want one: for not many people know anything about him'. Critias too—one of the Thirty—was a famous man in his day: one wonders that he should have been so entirely forgotten in Aristotle's time. Pericles and Alcibiades still lived fresh in men's memories; though I don't mean that the three were absolutely on a level in contemporary reputation.

It appears that between ἴσασι and νῦν δὲ γελοίως there has been a gap in the MSS, including A^o, which has been filled up with an extract from I 9, on ἔπαινος, §§ 33—97. Comp. Spengel, in a paper on the Rhet. ad Alex. in *Zeitschrift für Alt. Wiss.* 1840, p. 1226. Bekker's *Variae Lectiones* include A^o with the rest, as having the interpolated passage: Buhle, ad h. l., says "in nearly all the Edd. except that of Victorius and his followers," the interpolation is found.

The abrupt transition from the epideictic to the dicastic branch had already made Vettori (for once I will give him his proper name) suspect

¹ There is a temptation here to understand οἱ πολλοί as 'the heroes of the declamation'; 'those who have their actions narrated'—which is to be resisted. It is not true in *this* sense.

4 πολλοὶ ἴσασιν...νῦν δὲ γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασι
 δεῖν εἶναι ταχέϊαν.· καίτοι ὥσπερ ὁ τῷ μάττοντι
 ἐρομένῳ πότερον σκληρὰν ἢ μαλακὴν μάξῃ, “τί δ’;”
 ἔφη, “εὖ ἀδύνατον;”. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· δεῖ γὰρ μὴ
 μακρῶς διηγέισθαι ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προοιμιάζεσθαι μακρῶς,
 οὐδὲ τὰς πίστεϊς λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ
 ἢ τὸ ταχὺ ἢ τὸ συντόμως, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετρίως· τοῦτο
 a *lacuna*. The words νῦν δέ, which have no reference to anything pre-
 ceding, suggest the same conclusion.

§ 4. Something is here lost. ‘But as it is, it is absurd to say’ (as the writers on Rhetoric do in their treatises; and especially Isocrates) ‘that the narration ought to be rapid’. This precept is suggested in Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 3, in the word βραχυλογία; and 30 (31). 4, it is further recommended that the narrative of a δημηγορία should be βραχεία and σύντομος. See Spengel’s note on ed. of Anaximenes’ Ars Rhet., pp. 214, 5: and 219. Cic. de Orat. 11 80. 326. Quint. IV 2. 31, 32, (Narrationem) plerique scriptores, maxime qui sunt ab Isocrate, volunt esse lucidam, brevem, verisimilem...Eadem nobis placet divisio; quanquam et Aristoteles ab Isocrate in parte una discesserit, praeceptum brevitatis irridens, tanquam necesse sit longam aut brevem esse expositionem, nec liceat ire per medium. From Plato Phaedr. 267 A, it appears that this precept appeared in rhetorical treatises as early as those of Tisias and Gorgias; and a remark of Prodicus, to precisely the same effect as that of the customer to the baker here, is quoted, 267 B. The precept, that it should be σύντομον, is found also in Dionysius de Lys. Ind. c. 18, (p. 492 R): probably taken from Isocrates. (Spengel’s *Artium Scriptores*, p. 158).

The extract from *Isocrates*, on this quality of the διήγησις, is quoted at the commencement of this chapter. This is one of Vettori’s evidences (perhaps the best) of Aristotle’s dislike of Isocrates. This subject is discussed in *Intro.* pp. 41–45, and the probability of the hypothesis reduced to a minimum. If they ever were enemies—as is likely enough in Ar.’s early life—after the death of Isocrates, by the time that this work was completed and published, all trace of *hostility* (γελοίως φασίν can at the worst hardly imply hostility) must have long vanished from Aristotle’s mind.

‘And yet—just as the man replied to the baker when he asked him whether he should knead his dough (τὴν μάζαν) hard or soft¹, “what”, said he, “is it impossible to do it *well*?”—so here in like manner; that is to say (γάρ), the narration should be no more over long² than the *proo-*

¹ Spengel, *Art. Script.* 169 note, has discovered here some fragments of a comic verse: which he thus restores: σκληρὰν δὲ...ἢ μαλακὴν μάξω; τί δέ; ἀδύνατον εὖ <μάττει σε>. [The addition of πότερον would fill the blank left in the first line.]

² It would be difficult to assign any sufficient reason (in point of the sense) for making the distinction of μὴ and οὐδὲ here; though we may say, grammatically, of course, that the μὴ is joined immediately with the inf. mood, whereas the two οὐδέ-s following require δεῖ to be supplied *after* them in each case.

δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅσα δηλώσει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ ὅσα P. 1417
 ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν γεγονέναι ἢ βεβλαφέναι ἢ ἡδίκη-
 κέναι, ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἡλίκα βούλει· τῷ δὲ ἐναντίῳ τὰ
 5 ἐναντία. παραδιηγείσθαι δὲ ὅσα εἰς τὴν σὴν ἀρετὴν
 φέρει, οἷον “ἐγὼ δ' ἐνουθέτουν αἰεὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγων,
 μὴ τὰ τέκνα ἐγκαταλείπειν,” ἢ θατέρου κακίαν· “ὁ
 δ' ἀπεκρίνατό μοι ὅτι, οὐκ ἂν ἦ αὐτός, ἔσται ἄλλα
 παιδία,” ὁ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους Αἰγυπτίους ἀποκρί-
 νασθαί φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος. ἢ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς δικα-
 6 σταῖς. ἀπολογουμένῳ δὲ ἐλάττων ἢ διήγησις· αἱ γὰρ
 ἀμφισβητήσεις ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ βλαβερόν εἶναι

*miu*m should be over-long, or the proofs: for neither in *these* two cases does the excellence consist in the rapidity or conciseness, but in the observation of the due mean: and that is, to say just so much—and no more—as will clearly explain the facts of the case, or will (make the judge suppose) establish in the judge's mind the conviction of their having occurred, (the question of *fact*, τὸ ὄντι), or that by them injury has been done (harm and loss) or *wrong* (according to the *status* or issue which you wish to raise): or (as will produce on him the impression, make him suppose them,) of any amount or magnitude that you please (to estimate them at): or the opposites of these, for the opponent', if he be the pleader.

§ 5. ‘You may slip into your narrative (bring in by a side wind, on the sly, παρεμβάλλειν, *supra* c. 14. 9) anything that tells to the advantage of your own character—as for instance, “and I always admonished him to do what was right, *not* to leave his children behind him in the lurch” (in distress and difficulty), or to the disadvantage of your opponent's; “but he made answer to me, that wheresoever he was himself, there would he find other children:” the answer, as Herodotus tells us, of the revolted Egyptians (to the king who was inviting them to return).’ The story of the latter part of the alternative is told by Herodotus II 30, with the addition of certain circumstances, which add indeed to its graphic character, but cannot be here repeated. Aristotle seems to have tacked on the first part of the alternative—out of his own head—to make a little “imaginary conversation.” ‘Or (to slip in) anything else that is likely to be agreeable to the judges’.

§ 6. ‘In defence’—when you have to narrate circumstances in order to correct an opponent's statement of the facts—‘the recital may be shorter (because most of the story has been already told by the other), and as the issues (ἀμφισβητήσεις is Arist.'s term for what were afterwards called *στάσεις*, *status*) are (on the defensive side) the denial either of the fact, or the injury, or the wrong, or the degree (the estimated *amount* of the crime and penalty), we must therefore waste no time upon proving what is already admitted, unless it (the proofs of any of the facts) chance

ἢ μὴ ἄδικον ἢ μὴ τηλικούτον, ὥστε περὶ τὸ ὁμολογούμενον οὐ διατριπτέον, ἐὰν μὴ τι εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνη, 7 οἷον εἰ πέπρακται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄδικον. ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν ὅσα μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οὔκτον ἢ δεινῶσιν φέρει. παράδειγμα ὁ Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἐξήκοντα ἔπεσι πεποιήται. καὶ ὡς Φάυλλος τὸν κύκλον, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ Οἶνῃ πρόλογος.

to contribute to the establishment of the issue (on which we *do* rest our case); for instance, when we admit the fact, but deny the wrong'. Though on the other hand, it may be necessary, whilst we admit the facts of our opponent's case, still to go over that ground, in order to clear up points which have a bearing upon the *justice* of the act which is acknowledged to have been done.

§ 7. 'Events should generally be recited as past and gone—except those which by being acted' (represented as actually done, passing before the eyes, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, note on III 11. 2,) 'may afford an opportunity for exciting either commiseration or indignation'. δεινῶσις, and ἔλεος, οἶκτος, σχελιασμός, are two ordinary 'common topics', (subordinate varieties of αὔξισις and μείωσις,) of *appeals to the feelings* in use amongst rhetoricians. See notes on II 21. 10, and 24. 4. Of Thrasyarchus, and his use of these in his Rhetoric, Pl. Phaedr. 267 C, D, and of the early rhetoricians in general, Ib. 272 A, where βραχυλογία is joined with the other two.

'An example of this is "the story of Alcinoüs," (it *is* an example) *because* it is told (πεποιήται, composed, written) to Penelope in sixty verses', i. e. the long story of Ulysses' wanderings, which occupies in the narration of it to the Phaeacians four whole books of the Odyssey, IX—XII, is condensed by Ulysses, when he repeats it to Penelope, Od. ψ' [xxiii] 264—284, 310—343, into a summary of 55 verses—which here (with the characteristic inaccuracy of the ancient writers in calculations and descriptions of all kinds) are called in round numbers sixty—and thus furnishes a good example of the *summary* treatment required in an ordinary narrative. Vater, who explains all this in his note, understates the actual number by two. "Hi versus quinquaginta et tres numero rotundo recte (correctly enough for the occasion, I suppose) ἐξήκοντα ἔπη nominantur."

'And as Phayllus reduced (condensed: ἐποίησε, I suppose, must be understood from πεποιήται, 'composed') the Epic cycle: and Euripides' prologue to the Oeneüs'. These three cases are appealed to as well-known instances of concise summaries. The Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, in its original form, when given at length with all its details, became proverbial for "a long story." Erasmus *Chil.* Ἀπόλογος Ἀλκίνου ἐπὶ τῶν φλυαρούντων καὶ μακρὸν ἀποτελούντων λόγον, Suidas s.v. Plato, Rep. x 614 B, uses it in the same proverbial application. See Ast and Stallbaum *ad locum*. The Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος appears in Aelian's list of βασιφθῆαι into which the Homeric poems were divided for recitation (Var. Hist. XIII 13, π. Ὀμήρου ἐπῶν καὶ ποιήσεως, quoted by Paley, Pref. to Hom. Il. p. xlvii). It is quoted again to supply an instance of ἀναγνώρισις, Poet. XVI.

Of Phayllus nothing whatever is known. It seems that this is the

8 ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιᾶν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιά τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἦθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ' οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ

only place in which his name occurs; neither is it to be found in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* We gather from the notice of him here, that whether poet or rhapsodist, he attempted to reduce the whole of the Epic Cycle into a brief summary. F. A. Wolf is so staggered by the overwhelming labour of such a task that he prefers to read Κύκλωπα, from a correction in one of the MSS; overlooking the fact that τὸν Κύκλωπα is *not* in point here; τὸν κύκλον, which gives a second instance of a summary, is.

The third example is the prologue to Euripides' Oeneus. Four lines and a half of this are to be found in Wagner's collection, *Fragm. Eurip.* p. 290, Oen. Fr. 1. and Dindorf, Eur. Fr. Oeneus. They are written with Euripidean compactness, and seem to justify their citation for this purpose.

§ 8. 'The narrative should have an ethical cast: this will be effected when (if) we know what imparts this ethical character. One thing in particular that does so, is any indication of a moral purpose (II 21. 16, III 17. 9, Poet. VI 24): it is by (the quality of) this that a moral quality is given to character: and the quality (good or bad) of the moral purpose is determined by the end'. On προαίρεσις, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, VI 2. 'Consequently Mathematics (mathematical calculations or reasonings, λόγοι) can have no moral character, because they have no moral purpose: for they have no (moral or practical) end in view'. (*Their end is the intellectual one, truth.*) 'But the "Socratic dialogues" have (a moral purpose, and an ethical and practical end), for they treat of such (ethical) subjects'. On this class of works, called collectively 'Socratic dialogues', see Grote, *Plato* III 469; also Heitz, *Verl. Schrift. Ar., die dial. des Arist.* pp. 140—144. By 'Socratic dialogues' are meant dialogues on moral philosophy, after the manner of Socrates, and therefore bearing his name, whether (as in Plato and Xenophon) he was an interlocutor, or not; the compositions of Socrates' friends and followers, the Socratic 'family', Xenophon, Plato, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Phaedo, (*Socraticum domum*, Hor. Od. I 19. 14, comp. III 21. 9, *Socraticis sermonibus madet*, Ars Poet. 310. *Socraticae chartae*, all meaning moral philosophy). On Socrates' philosophical pursuits and studies see Arist. de part. Anim. I 1. 44, 642 a 28, Cic. Tusc. Disp. v 5. 10, Academ. Post. I 4. 15. Conf. Athen. XI 505 C, 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν οὕτως γράφει, "Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμέτρον τοὺς καλουμένους Σώφρονος μίμους...μη φῶμεν...ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξαμενοῦ τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων." ἀντικρὺς φάσκων ὁ πολυμαθέστατος Ἀρ. πρὸ Πλάτωνος διαλόγου γεγραφέναι τὸν Ἀλεξαμενόν. This extract will serve as a corrective to Poet. I 8, from which it *might* seem that the 'Socratic dialogues' were in verse. See

9 τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν. ἄλλα ἠθικὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἦθει, οἷον ὅτι ἅμα λέγων ἐβάδιζεν· δηλοῖ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν ἡθους. καὶ μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως. “ἐγὼ δ' ἐβουλόμην· καὶ προειλόμην γὰρ τοῦτο· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ὠνήμην, βέλτιον.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ ^{p. 142.} φρονίμου τὸ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ· φρονίμου μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ

Tyrwhitt's note ad loc. p. 110. The meaning of that passage is, that the Socratic dialogues are not to be called poetry or verse, although they have a dramatic character (Gräfenhan).

§ 9. ‘Another, different, kind of ethical drawing or representation (ἄλλα; no longer confined to *moral* qualities, but the representation of *character* in general) are the characteristic peculiarities that accompany each individual character: for instance, “so and so walked on as he was talking”—an indication of audacity and rudeness of character’. The rudeness and insolence are shewn in *not stopping* to speak to the other; it is a sign of slight esteem and contempt, ὀλιγωρία. The characters here spoken of differ in one point from the dramatic characters of III 7. 6,—though they belong to the same family, the *third* kind of ἦθη, Introd. p. 112—in that these are the characteristic peculiarities of *individuals*, the others those of *classes*. A good specimen of this *ethical* description occurs in Demosth. de F. L. § 361, a portrait of Aeschines; and two similar traits in c. Steph. a' § 63, οὗτος γὰρ, ἥνικα μὲν συνέβαινε εὐτυχεῖν Ἀριστολόχῳ τῷ τραπεζίτῃ, ἴσα βαίνων ἐβάδιζεν ὑποπεπτωκὼς αὐτῷ...ἐπειδὴ δ' ἀπώλετ' ἐκείνος κ.τ.λ. and § 77, ἐγὼ δ'...τῆς μὲν ὕψεως τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ ταχέως βαδίζειν καὶ λαλεῖν μέγα (signs apparently of ill-breeding) οὐ τῶν εὐτυχῶς πεφυκότων ἑμαυτὸν κρίνω. The ἴσα βαίνειν in the former passage, is ‘to keep pace with’, ‘to walk on a level’, ‘place oneself on equal terms with’ another. See Shilleto ad loc. de F. L. (His reference to the passage of c. Steph. should be § 63, not 77.)

‘And again, in speaking, let your words seem to proceed, not from the intellect (as the effect of calculation, deliberation), but as it were from a moral purpose or intention (the will; or, as we should say, the heart)’. “Let your style bear the impress, not so much of intellectual subtlety and vigour, as of good feeling and sound moral purpose: the one may be the mark of a wise man, the other is that of a good—and, what is more to the purpose in Rhetoric, a popular—character.” Introd. (slightly altered). “And I wished this to take place; in fact such was my purpose and intention: it is true that I gained nothing by it; but even so it is better.” The one is characteristic of a wise or prudent man, the other of a good one: for prudence (worldly, practical, wisdom) shews itself in the pursuit of one's interest, goodness in that of the fair, high, noble, right’.

‘If any (trait of character that you introduce) seem incredible, then add the statement (or explanation) of the cause or reason, as (in) the example that Sophocles gives, the passage of (from) his Antigone “that

ωφέλιμον διώκειν, ἀγαθοῦ δ' ἐν τῷ τὸ καλόν. ἂν δ' ἄπιστον ἦ, τότε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, ὥσπερ Σοφοκλῆς ποιεῖ παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολόμενα,

μητρὸς δ' ἐν ᾧ καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων,
οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅς τις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ἄ-

she cared more for her brother than for husband or children, for the one could be replaced (recovered) if they were lost—but when father and mother are buried in the grave, no brother can spring up evermore". This is Antigone's reason for preferring the burial of her brother's body to marriage with Haemon, a husband and children: she has shewn her character in the preference, and the obstinacy in which she adheres to it. It is the conclusion of a beautiful passage, beginning, *ὦ τύμβος, ὦ νυμφεῖον*, Antig. 891—912. Arist. has altered *κεκευθότων* of the original to *βεβηκότων*.

The same answer is put into the mouth of the wife of Intaphernes, when Darius, having condemned her husband and the whole of his family to death, allows her to choose one of the number whose life is to be spared. She chooses her brother, and when Darius expresses his surprise and demands the reason, replies thus: "ὦ βασιλεῦ, ἀνὴρ μὲν μοι ἂν ἄλλος γένοιτο, εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι, καὶ τέκνα ἄλλα, εἰ ταῦτα ἀποβάλοιμι· πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκ ἔτι μὲν ζώντων, ἀδελφεὸς ἂν ἄλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ γένοιτο. ταύτη τῇ γνώμῃ χρεωμένη ἔλεξα ταῦτα." The comparison of these two passages of the poet and historian, and another equally close correspondence of Herod. II 35 with Soph. Oed. Col. 337, have led to the inference that there was some connexion or acquaintance between the two. When or where they met, if they ever did meet, cannot now be ascertained: Samos (which has been suggested) is out of the question; for Herodotus was at Thurium before Sophocles was appointed to his command in the expedition under Pericles against that island. The Antigone was produced in 440 B.C. It is probable that some parts of Herodotus' history had been published¹ before the final completion of the work at Thurium, and Sophocles may have thus obtained access to them. That he was the borrower, there can be no reasonable doubt. At all events that Sophocles was an admirer of Herodotus we know from Plutarch, who gives us the first line and a half of an epigram by Sophocles in his honour; *ᾧδῃν Ἡροδότῳ τεύξεν Σοφοκλῆς ἐτέων ὧν πέντ' ἐπὶ πεντήκοντα*; adding that it was *ὁμολογουμένως Σοφοκλέους*.

'If you *have* no reason to give, *at any rate* you may say that "you know that what you say will convince nobody, but such is your nature (you can't help being virtuous and disinterested, do what you will)—for

¹ There is a doubtful story of a recitation at Olympia.

πιστα λέγων, ἀλλὰ φύσει τοιοῦτος εἶ· ἀπιστοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐκόντα πλὴν τὸ συμφέρον. 10 ἔτι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγειν, διηγούμενον καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα, καὶ ἃ ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἰδία ἢ αὐτῷ, ἢ ἐκείνῳ προσόντα· “ὁ δ’ ὥχετό με ὑποβλέψας.” καὶ ὡς περὶ Κρατύλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων καὶ τοῖν χεροῖν P. 1417b. διασείων· πιθανὰ γάρ, διότι σύμβολα γίνεται ταῦτα ἃ ἴσασιν, ἐκείνων, ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν. πλεῖστα δὲ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὁμήρου ἐστίν.

ὡς ἄρ’ ἔφη, γρῆνυς δὲ κατέσχετο χερσὶ πρόσωπα.

people never believe in disinterested motives”¹. (*Lit.* people always disbelieve that any one does anything intentionally except what is for his own interest.) Even such a *reason* is better than none at all.

§ 10. ‘Further, besides the *ἦθος*, topics may be also derived from the expression of emotion of various kinds, by introducing in your narration both the usual accompaniments of these emotions (the outward expressions, attitudes, and other external indications), which everybody is acquainted with, and also any *special* peculiarities by which you yourself or the adversary may be distinguished (which may be attached to, belong to, *προσόντα*). These special touches and traits in the expression of individual emotion will lend a lifelike character to the descriptions of your narrative, and impart fidelity to your own impersonations of feelings, and your representation of them as they manifest themselves in others. How true and lifelike all that is, the audience will say: that can be no counterfeit: the man is evidently in earnest. Again, the same popular fallacy as before; the illicit inference from the faithfulness of the imitation to the sincerity of the feeling and truth of the fact.

‘Such indications are “and he went away with a scowl at me from under his eyebrows” (so *ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας* of ‘an angry glance’, Pl. *Phaed.* 117 B; three other examples in Ast’s *Lex.*, where it is joined in the same sense with *ὡς καταφρονοῦντα*, *Symp.* 220 B, *ὥσπερ τι ἀδικοῦμενος*, *Eryx.* 395 A, *ὑποβλέφονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι*, *Crit.* 53 B. *ὑπό* represents an ‘under-look’. Comp. the Homeric *ὑποδρα ἰδών*): ‘and as Aeschines says of Cratylus “furiously hissing and shaking his fists”’ (*διὰ* in both participles is intensive, ‘thorough, thoroughly’; here ‘violently’: Aeschines and Cratylus are supposed by Victorius to be, the one Socrates’ intimate, the other Plato’s instructor in the Heraclitean philosophy, and the Eponymus of one of his dialogues: but nobody really knows): ‘these are persuasive, because these things (indications of passion) which they *do* know are made (by the speaker) signs or tokens of those that they *don’t* know (in the manner above explained). A great number of these (indications of

¹ Comp. *Rhet.* ad Al. 7 (8). 10, *πειρῶ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν καὶ ὡς λυσιτελὲς ἦν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ποιεῖν*· οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτοὶ τὸ λυσιτελὲς μάλιστα προτιμῶντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νομίζουσιν ἕνεκα τούτου πάντα πράττειν.

οἱ γὰρ δακρύειν ἀρχόμενοι, ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. καὶ εὐθὺς εἰσάγαγε σεαυτὸν ποιόν τινα, ἵνα ὡς τοιοῦτον θεωρῶσι καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον· λανθάνων δὲ ποίει. ὅτι δὲ ῥάδιον, ὁρᾶν δεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀπαγγελλόντων· περὶ ὧν γὰρ μὴθὲν ἴσμεν, ὅμως λαμβάνομεν ὑπόληψίν τινα. πολλαχοῦ δὲ δεῖ διηγῆσθαι, καὶ
 11 ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ. ἐν δὲ δημηγορία ἥκιστα διήγησίς ἐστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγείται· ἀλλ’

feeling) may be obtained from Homer: "Thus then he spake; and the aged dame (Euryclea, Ulysses' old nurse) held fast (clasped) her face with her hands" (Hom. Od. τ' [XIX] 361)—for people, when they are beginning to cry, are apt to lay hold of their eyes. Introduce yourself at once (to the audience) in a particular character (in that, namely, which you wish to bear in their eyes) that they may regard you as such: and the adversary in the same way (*mutatis mutandis*): only take care that the design isn't detected. That there is no difficulty in this—in conveying these impressions to the audience, how readily they seize, and draw inferences from, these indications of emotion, expression of features, action and the like—must needs be seen' (retaining δεῖ with Bekker, Spengel omits it) 'from the case of messengers: of things that we know nothing whatever about, we nevertheless (instantly) conceive a notion or suspicion' (from the face, expression, gestures, general appearance of the messenger; as if he is hot and tired, and so on).

See what a ready tongue suspicion hath! He that but fears the thing he would not know, hath by instinct knowledge from others' eyes, that what he feared is chanced. Northumb. *Henry IV.* Act 1, Sc. 1, 84. Victorius refers to Soph. Trach. 869 (Dind.) as an instance of this, the suspicions of the Chorus gathered from the old woman's face.

'The narrative should be (not confined to one place and continuous, but) distributed over the speech (πολλαχοῦ 'in many places'), and sometimes not at the beginning'. In saying οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ, Ar. is referring to his own division of the speech, which excludes the προοίμιον and commences at once with the πρόθεσις, c. 13. The narrative, he says, should sometimes even be entirely out of its proper place, which is at the beginning.

§ 11. 'In public speaking there is least occasion for narrative, because no one ever gives a narrative of things future' (the only province of deliberative Rhetoric, from which *all* its materials are derived; ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν): 'but if there *be* a narrative, it must be of things past, in order that with these in their recollection they may be better able to deliberate about things to come'. Gaisford refers to Dionys. Ars Rhet. X 14, ὅλη μὲν ἰδέα συμβουλευτικῇ διηγήσεως οὐ δέεται· ἴσασι γὰρ οἱ βουλευόμενοι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦνται, καὶ δέονται μαθεῖν ὃ πρακτέον ἐστίν, οὐχ ὅπερ βουλευτέον.

'Or it may be employed in the way of accusation or of praise', διηγῶνται, εἰ διηγούνται, to be understood from the preceding. 'But in

ἐάν περ διήγησις ἦ, τῶν γενομένων ἔσται, ἢ ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλεύσονται περὶ τῶν ὕστερον. ἢ διαβάλλοντες, ἢ ἐπαινοῦντες. ἀλλὰ τότε, οὐ τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον. ἀν δ' ἢ ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τε καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθύς, καὶ διατάττειν οἷς βούλονται· οἶον, ἢ Ἰοκάστη ἢ Καρκίνου ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι αἰεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν υἱόν, καὶ ὁ Αἴμων ὁ Σοφοκλέους.

I τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι· ἀποδει-
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that case, (the speaker who thus employs it) does not fulfil the proper function of the adviser' (whose office is to exhort and dissuade).

The following sentence to the end of the chapter I have done what I can to elucidate in the *Introd.* p. 354. No commentator, except Victorius, whose explanation I have there criticized, has bestowed a single word upon it; not even Spengel in his recent edition: I suppose he has given it up as hopeless. What it seems to me to mean is something of this kind—but I think there is most likely some latent corruption. 'If there be anything incredible in your narrative, you may promise your audience (omit *τε*) to add¹ a reason (i. e. explanation, to *account for* it), and a full, detailed, explanation of it as long as they please'. διατάττειν is one of the chief difficulties of the passage. The only appropriate meaning that occurs to me is to 'set out in order, i. e. set forth in full and clear detail': οἷς βούλονται 'with what, with as many details as, they please'. 'As Carcinus' Jocasta, in his *Oedipus*, is perpetually promising, in answer to the inquiries of the man who is looking for her son—(something or other, which is left to be supplied by the hearer's knowledge of the context: probably, to satisfy him). And Sophocles' *Haemon*'. This last example must be given up as hopeless: there is nothing in the extant play which could be interpreted as is required here. And what Carcinus' Jocasta has to do with the topic to be illustrated, is not easy to see. Carcinus' *Medea* has been already quoted II 23, 28, where an account is given of him in the note. His *Thyestes* is referred to, *Poet.* XVI 2, and a fault pointed out, XVII 2. And as if to aggravate the difficulties which surround the interpretation of this passage, Wagner, in his collection of the *Tragic Fragments*, has chosen to omit this reference to Carcinus.

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Of the various kinds of proof, the various ways in which facts and statements may be made to appear probable, *πίστεις*, some are direct and logical, and appeal exclusively to the reasoning faculty; others indirect, which by appealing to the moral sense *ἦθος*, or to the emotions *πάθος*, support the logical arguments by the favourable impressions they produce upon the hearts and feelings of the listeners, who are ever ready to

¹ καὶ αἰτίαν a reason in addition, besides the mere statement.

κύναι δὲ χρή, ἐπεὶ περὶ τεττάρων ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητουμένου φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· οἶον, εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν ἀμφισβητεῖ, ἐν τῇ κρίσει δεῖ τούτου μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν, εἰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαψεν, τούτου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τοσόνδε ἢ ὅτι δικαίως. ὡσαύτως καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἢ
 2 ἀμφισβήτησις. μὴ λανθανέτω δ', ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβήτησει μόνῃ, τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι

draw inferences from what *they feel* to the truth of what is said; and further the adventitious and external aids, which are not invented by the speaker but found ready for use and applied by him in evidence of the facts of his case: of these three the first only have any pretension to the character of ἀποδεικτικά. But not even these are entitled to the name in its strict and proper sense, ἀπόδειξις 'demonstration' implying conclusions universal and necessary and a rigorous exact syllogistic method. This belongs, strictly speaking, exclusively to the domain of Science and to the sphere of certainty, to which no conclusion of Rhetoric can ever attain. When it is said therefore in § 1, that "the proofs of preceding statements, and refutation of those of the adversary"—which from the third division of the speech—"must be demonstrative",—no more is meant than that they must be demonstrated, so far as the nature and limits of rhetorical proof permit, that is, that they must be such, so far consistent with sound reasoning and the rules of logic, as will induce those who hear them to *believe* what they seek to establish. We have very frequently had to remark the language of strict Logic applied to the laxer methods of Rhetoric, here it is done a little more formally than usual.

'The point to which this *proof* must be directed (addressed) of the four questions on which the issue may turn, is the particular point on which the issue is actually joined between the two contending parties: for example, if the issue is the question of *fact*, was the thing done or not? in the trial *this* is the point that he must most aim at establishing; if of *harm or loss*, injury, at *that*; or if—these two being admitted—the question is one of *the degree* or amount of the injury; or of the justice of the action—admitting the fact and the injury and even the amount charged—of that; just as much (in the three last cases) as if the issue had been one of that same thing as a *fact*'. Spalding, ad Quint. III 6. 60, seems to understand περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο of a distinct issue, the *στάσις ὁρμική*, or *status finitivus*.

§ 2. 'But let it not be forgotten that this issue (of *fact*) is the only one in which it may happen that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue: for in such cases, ignorance (which exempts from responsibility, see note on c. 15. 3) cannot be pleaded (cannot be assigned as the cause or reason), as it may when the issue is the justice (or injustice) of the act'—and the same of the *injury*, and alleged degree or amount of the offence—'and therefore in this issue alone the topic may be dwelt

πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ-
 τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν, ὥστ' ἐν τούτῳ
 3 χρονιστέον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπι-
 δεικτικοῖς τὸ πολὺ, ὅτι καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, ἡ αὔξησης
 ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα δεῖ πιστεῦσθαι· ὀλιγάκις
 γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις φέρουσιν, εἰς ἀπίστα ἢ
 4 ἢ εἰς ἄλλως αἰτίαν ἔχει· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς
 ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμφισβητήσκειν ἂν τις, ἢ ὡς ἔσται
 upon, but not in the (three) others'. It is important to observe here a
 qualification of the apparent meaning, which has not been—at all events
 distinctly—pointed out by the Commentators. It would not be true to
 say *universally* that when the issue is that of fact, whether the act
 alleged has or has not been committed, that one of the two parties con-
 cerned must necessarily be a rogue: as when A accuses B of murder, the
 question is one of fact, is B guilty or not guilty? B may be perfectly
 innocent, though the circumstantial evidence is so strong as to justify A
 in bringing the charge. All that is meant is, that there is a certain class
 of cases which fall under this *status* or issue, in which this topic may be
 safely used. Comp. Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 30, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγ-
 μασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὃν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν,
 ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. This is the case of a deposit, which A seeks
 to recover from B, who denies having received it. Here—unless either
 of them has forgotten the transaction—either A, if he seeks to recover
 what he knows that he has never confided, or B, if he refuses to restore
 what he knows has been lent him, must intend to defraud the other
 (Schrader). This is repeated from Introd. p. 356, note.

MS A° (Bekker) has *χρηστέον*, which has not been adopted either by
 Bekker or Spengel. The Schol., quoted by Gaisford *Not. Var.*, manifestly
 reads *χρηστέον*.

§ 3. 'In the epideictic branch, in its ordinary topic, amplification
 is mostly employed in shewing that things are fair (fine) or useful'—
 the other, *μείωσις*, 'detraction' employed in censure, is omitted as *less*
usual—'the facts must be taken on trust: declaimers seldom adduce
 proofs of these; only when they seem incredible, or some one else has
 got the credit of them (been *charged* with them; made responsible for
 them)'. Bekker and Spengel have both adopted *ἄλλως* without manuscript
 authority, from a conjecture of the former in his 4to ed. I think they
 must have overlooked the natural interpretation of *ἄλλως* given in the
 translation. *πιστεῦσθαι* belongs to the family of irregular passives,
 of which an account, and a list, are given in Appendix (B) [Vol. I p. 297].

§ 4. 'In public, deliberative, speaking (the four forensic issues may
 be applied to its special subjects), it may be contended (against an oppo-
 nent), (1) that the future *facts* alleged will not be (i. e. that the conse-
 quences which are assumed to result from the policy recommended will
 not take place); or admitting that, (2) that it will be unjust; or (3) inex-
 pedient; or (4) that the amount and importance of them will not be so

μὲν ἂ κελεύει, ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἢ οὐ
 τηλικαῦτα. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν εἴ τι ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ
 πράγματος· τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν
 5 ἄλλων, ὅτι ψεύδεται. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα P. 1418.
 δημηγορικώτερα, τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἢ
 μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον· ὥστ' ἐκ τῶν γενομένων
 ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἢ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ
 ὄντων, οὗ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξις ἔστι καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ
 6 τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ

great as the other anticipates. (The principal attention of the speaker is of course to be directed to the point immediately in question,) but he must *also* be on the look out for any lurking fallacy or misstatement outside the main point or issue: for the one may be shewn necessarily to imply the other'. τεκμήριον, a necessary sign, or indication, I 2. 17. The construction is, ταῦτα φαίνεται τεκμήρια τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ψεύδεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.

§ 5. 'Examples are most appropriate to public speaking, enthymemes more so to forensic'. Pleading gives more occasion to the employment of logical reasoning; it admits of closer and subtler argumentation; for the reasons stated in III 12. 5. Comp. I 9. 40, where the facts are the same, but the reason assigned for the latter different.

'For the one', (understand δημηγορία, from δημηγορικώτατα. Victorius understands συμβουλή, and Vater πίστις,) 'dealing as it does with the future, is forced consequently to derive examples from past events (from which the *analogous events* future are inferred), whilst the other' (understand in like manner δίκη from δικανικώτερα; not πίστις as Vater) 'deals with matters of fact, true or false, which admit to a greater extent (than deliberative speaking) of demonstrative reason and necessary conclusions (not to the full extent, which is found only in science): for past facts involve a kind of necessity'. Past events are beyond recall, fixed and definite, and thus have a *sort of* necessary character about them; and they can be argued about, and their relations deduced, with some approach to certainty: about things future no exact calculation is possible, anticipation and inference from the past is all that nature allows: uncertainty is the characteristic of the future.

§ 6. 'The enthymemes, or argumentative inferences, should not be all brought forward one after another, in a continuous connected series, but mixed *ἡρ* (ἀνά) with other topics: otherwise they injure one another by destroying (κατά) the effect¹. (And this is not all,) for there is *also* a

¹ This is, "to relieve the weariness, and assist the intelligence of the uncultivated audience. A long and connected chain of arguments not only puzzles and confounds a listener unaccustomed to continuous reasoning, but also wearies and overwhelms him: so that, one argument coming upon another before he has perceived the force of the preceding, they clash together, come into conflict, as it were, and the force and effect of the whole is weakened or destroyed. Comp. I 2. 12, II 22. 3, *alibi*." From Introd. p. 357.

ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ' ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μή, καταβλάπτει
ἄλληλα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος·

ὦ φίλ', ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσ' ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνὴρ,
7 ἀλλ' οὐ τοιαῦτα. καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα
ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, ποιήσεις ὃ περ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν
φιλοσοφούντων, οἳ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα
8 καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἔξ ὧν λέγουσιν. καὶ ὅταν πάθος
ποιῆς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος
ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ
αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας αἱ ἅμα, καὶ ἢ ἀφανίζουνσιν ἢ
ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν. οὐδ' ὅταν ἠθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ

limit of *quantity*; (as Homer says, Od. IV 204, Menelaus to *Nestorides Pisistratos*), "Dear boy, seeing that thou hast said as much as a prudent man would" (speak and utter, εἶποι καὶ ῥέξειε)—τόσα he says, not τοιαῦτα', shewing thereby that it is the *quantity* and not the *quality* of the words that he had in view.

§ 7. '(Another topic is) not to look for arguments about every thing (see again II 22.3): otherwise, you will do like some philosophers, who draw conclusions better known and more to be trusted (easier to believe, more self-evident or evident at first sight) than the premisses from which they deduce them. Quint. V 12. 8, *Nec tamen omnibus semper quae invenerimus argumentis onerandus est iudex: quia et taedium afferunt et fidem detrahunt... In rebus vero apertis argumentari tam sit stultum quam in clarissimum solem mortale lumen* (a lamp, or other artificial light, made by human agency) *inferre*.

§ 8. 'Also, when you are trying to excite emotion (appealing to the feelings) use no logical argument: for either it will knock out (drive out, expel) the emotion, or (the emotion will get the better of it and) the argument will have been stated in vain: all simultaneous *motions* mutually drive out one another, and are either obliterated altogether (by the co-existence) or (the less powerful) is (still further) weakened'; overpowered by the stronger. Comp. Poet. XXIV 22, νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον, and again § 23, ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλιν ἢ λίαν λαμπρὰ λέξεις τὰ τε ἥθη καὶ τὰς διανοίας. Long. de Subl. § 15, φύσει δέ πως, ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἅπασιν, αἰ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀκούομεν' ὅθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικού περιελκόμεθα εἰς τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἐμπληκτικόν, ᾧ τὸ πραγματικὸν ἐγκρύπτεται περιλαμπόμενον. And again § 17 ult. τῶν λόγων τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ὑψηλὰ, ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐγγυτέρω κείμενα διὰ τε φυσικὴν τινα συγγένειαν καὶ διὰ λαμπρότητα, αἰ τῶν σχημάτων προεμφανίζεται, καὶ τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν ἀποσκιάζει καὶ οἷον ἐν κατακαλύψει τηρεῖ. Twining ad Poet. p. 424, note 227.

'Nor again, when you would give the speech an ethical cast, should there be any attempt to combine enthymeme with it; for proof has no

δεῖ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἅμα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὔτε ἦθος p. 144.
 9 οὔτε προαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις. γνώμαις δὲ χρηστέον
 καὶ ἐν διηγήσει καὶ ἐν πίστει· ἠθικὸν γάρ. “καὶ ἐγὼ
 δέδωκα, καὶ ταῦτ’ εἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεῖ πιστεύειν.” εἰ δὲ
 παθητικῶς, “καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἡδικομένη·
 10 τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ περίεστι τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δί-
 καιον.” τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικά-
 ζεσθαι, εἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ μέλλον· ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ
 τὸ γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς

moral character nor moral purpose’. When the hearer’s mind, says Schrader (in substance), is occupied with the impression of the moral and intellectual good qualities which the speaker is endeavouring to convey to them, of his intelligence and good intentions, he has neither time nor inclination to attend to the proof of anything else.

§ 9. ‘Still, general maxims are to be employed both in narrative and in proof, by reason of the ethical character which belongs to them’. (See II 21. 16, III 16. 8.) This is illustrated by a γνώμη that “it is folly to trust” any one, in the instance of a deposit which has not been returned (Victorius). The maxim is expressed by Epicharmus in the well-known verse, Νᾶφε, καὶ μέμασ’ ἀπιστεῖν· ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν, quoted by Polybius, Dio Chrysostom, and Cic. ad Att. I 19. 6. Müller, *Fragm. Phil.* Gr. p. 144. Epicharm. Fr. 255.

‘And I have given it, and that, knowing all the while “that trust is folly”. If your object is to appeal to the feelings (ἔλεος is the πάθος here appealed to), (express it thus) “And I don’t regret it, though I have been wronged: for he (the opponent) it is true has the advantage in profit, but I in justice”’. Compare the first example in c. 16. 9.

§ 10. ‘(Here again, as in general) public speaking is more difficult than pleading (see I 1. 10); and naturally¹ [so, because it is concerned with the future.]

[On the ‘times’ with which the three classes of speeches, λόγοι δικανικοί, συμβουλευτικοί and ἐπιδεικτικοί are concerned, see I 3. 4, τῷ μὲν συμβουλευόντι ὁ μέλλον...τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γεγόμενος κ.τ.λ.

ἐκεῖ δὲ—ἀδήλων δέ] ‘whereas in the former case (forensic oratory) the speaker is concerned with the past, which, as Epimenides the Cretan said, is already known even to diviners; for he himself was not in the habit of divining the future, but only (interpreting) the obscurities of the past.’

καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν] as has been noticed elsewhere, “was doubtless meant by Epimenides as a sarcasm upon his prophetic brethren, who pretended to see into futurity. ‘Even diviners’, said he, ‘impostors as they are, can prophesy what is past’”. Introd. p. 358, note.

¹ At this point the manuscript of Mr Cope’s Commentary comes to an end; the rest of the notes have accordingly been supplied by Mr Sandys.

ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομέ-
νων οὐκ ἔμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν
ἀδήλων δέ. καὶ ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς δικανικοῖς·
ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ῥᾶον εὐρεῖν ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ οὐκ ἔχει
πολλὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ,
ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' ἥκιστα πάντων, εἰ μὴ

The statement that Epimenides specially devoted himself as a soothsayer to solving the riddles of the past, is exemplified by his being invited by the Athenians to advise them as to the purification of the city from the pestilence which arose in consequence of the crime of Cylon (Plutarch, reipubl. ger. pr. 27, Pausanias, I 14.4, Diogenes Laert. I 10: Grote, *H. G.* chap. x *sub finem*). Plato, who calls him a θεῖος ἀνὴρ, speaks of his foretelling the future (Legg. 642 D), and the very gift which in the text he appears to disclaim is similarly ascribed to him by Cicero, who after saying *est enim ars in iis qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt*, classes Epimenides among those who are destitute of this art; *qui non ratione aut coniectura, observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quadam animi, aut soluto liberoque motu, futura praesentiunt* (de divin. I 18.34). But the office of the prophet, or intermediary interpreter between God and man, was not necessarily confined to the prediction of the future, but also included the expounding of the will of heaven respecting the present and the past. Spengel observes: “dicit ἔμαντεύετο, non ἔμαντεύσατο, i.e. plerumque, non semper.”

καὶ ὁ νόμος—ἀπόδειξιν] ‘Besides, in forensic pleadings, the law supplies a subject; and when you once have your starting-point, it is easier to find your proof’.

‘And it (namely, public speaking) does not admit of many digressions, such as references to one’s opponent or to oneself; or again, appeals to the emotions’. The subject of οὐκ ἔχει is τὸ δημηγορεῖν, all the intervening clauses from ἐκεῖ δέ down to ἀπόδειξιν being parenthetical.

By διατριβαί are meant ‘landing-places’, where the speaker may pause and linger for a while, and whence he may even expatiate into a passing digression. This use of the word, which is not noticed in Liddell and Scott, is defined in Ernesti’s *Lex. Techn. Gr.* as *commoratio, excursio et quoddam ἐπεισῶδιον, quo orator subinde utitur, ornatus atque amplificationis gratia*. Comp. Menander, διαίσεις ἐπιδεικτικῶν (Spengel’s *Rhet. Gr.* III 338), ἔπειτα (τὰς διατριβάς) εἶναι τῷ ποιητῇ μὲν ἄλλα (ἄλλως Waitz) προσφόρους· ἢ γὰρ ἐξουσία καὶ τοῦ κατὰ σχολὴν λέγειν, καὶ τὸ περιστέλλειν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς κόσμοις καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς οὔτε κόρον οὔτε ἀηδὶαν παράσῃσι, (καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὡσαύτως ὅτι ἐνιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν προσφέρουσι τὰς ἀκαίρους διατριβάς) συγγραφεῖσι δὲ ἢ λογοποῖοις ἐλαχίστη ἐξουσία.

ἀλλ' ἥκιστα—ἐξίστηται] ‘On the contrary, there is less room (for digression) in this than in either of the other branches of Rhetoric, unless the speaker quits his proper subject’. With ἐξίστηται, compare *supra* 14. I, εἰ μὴ ἐκτοπίσῃ.

ἐξίστηται. δεῖ οὖν ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλευόντων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν 11 τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δ' ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· αἰεὶ γὰρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ ὁ ἔλεγε Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος,

οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες] This does not imply that Aristotle himself was absent from Athens while writing the Rhetoric; here and elsewhere he simply uses the phrase which would be most intelligible to his readers, whether at a distance from Athens or not. Poet. v 6, 1449 δ 7, τῶν Ἀθήνησιν (κωμωδοποιῶν) Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν κ.τ.λ. and *supra* 11 23. 11 Ἀθήνησι Μαντία τῷ ῥήτορι. This usage is rather different from the suspicious phrase in c. 11 ad fin., οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.

ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ] The Panegyric of Isocrates is strictly speaking a λόγος συμβουλευτικός, as its ostensible object is to advise Athens and Sparta to unite their forces against Persia, under the lead of the former state, but incidentally it becomes a λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός, in so far as it eulogizes the public services of Athens (§§ 21—98), while it also digresses into the region of λόγος δικανικός when it attacks (κατηγορεῖ) the conduct of Sparta and her partisans (§§ 110—114).

ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ] By this is meant the pamphlet generally known as *Isocratis de Pace*, where the policy of the Athenian general Chares in the conduct of the Social war is criticised, though his name is not mentioned, § 27, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕξω τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐπιχειροῦντα δημηγορεῖν... τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθαι τῶν δὲ κατηγορῆσαι.

§ 11. 'In speeches of display you must introduce laudations into your speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does; for he is always bringing in some character'. The reference to Isocr. is explained by his laudatory episode on Theseus in the Helen §§ 22—38; on Agamemnon in the Panathenaicus §§ 72—84; and on Timotheus in the ἀντίδοσις § 107 seq. Spengel, who gives the first two references, also cites some less striking instances, the episode on Paris in Hel. §§ 41—48, on Pythagoras and the Egyptian priests in Busiris §§ 21—29, and on poets ib. §§ 38—40. Comp. Dionys. Halic. de Isocr. Iud. c. 4, where, among the points in which Isocrates appears superior to Lysias, special mention is made of τὸ διαλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοειδίαν ἰδίαις μεταβολαῖς καὶ ξένους ἐπεισοδίοις.

ἐπεισοδιοῦν] Poet. XVII 7, ὑποθέντα τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπεισοδιοῦν, ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκεία τὰ ἐπεισόδια σκοπεῖν. ib. XXIV 7, (of epic poetry) τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἀνομοίοις ἐπεισοδίοις. Quintil. III 9. 4, *egressio vero vel... excessus, sive est extra causam, non potest esse pars causae; sive est in causa, adiutorium vel ornamentum partium est earum ex quibus egreditur.*

'And this is what Gorgias meant when he remarked that he was never at a loss for something to say; for if (for instance) he speaks of

τοῦτο ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει, Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ,
εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἢ
12 τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ· ὁ τοιόνδε ἐστίν. ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν
ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν
δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθικῶς· καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπιει- P. 1418 δ.
κεῖ ἀρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.

Achilles, he (naturally) praises Peleus, next Aeacus, then Zeus himself (the father of Aeacus); and similarly valour also (the special virtue of Achilles), and so and so (so *ad infinitum*); and this is just what I have been describing'.

From this passage of Gorgias the existence of a panegyric oration 'in praise of Achilles', is inferred by Dr Thompson (on p. 178 of his ed. of the Gorgias), who also suggests that "a fragment preserved by the Scholiast on Iliad IV 450 may have belonged to this speech: ἀνεμίσγοντο δὲ λίταις ἀπειλαὶ καὶ εὐχαῖς οἰμωγαί."

The unfailing resource of complimentary episodes on which Gorgias appears to have prided himself, may be paralleled by Pindar's favourite device of leading up by easy transitions to the praises of the Aeacidae (Isthm. IV (V) 20, τὸ δ' ἐμὸν οὐκ ἄτερ Αἰακιδῶν κέαρ ὕμνων γεύεται); and also by the artifice adopted by the rhetorician Lycophron, de Soph. El. 15, 174 ὁ 30, as explained by Alexander Aphrodisiensis:—"the sophist Lycophron, when he was compelled by some persons to write an encomium upon the lyre, and found that he hadn't very much to say about it, first very briefly touched upon the praises of the sensible lyre, which we have here on earth, and then mounted up to that in heaven,...the constellation called the Lyre, upon which he composed a long and beautiful and excellent discourse" (from Cope's translation in *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, Vol. II, No. v, p. 141).

ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ] In Vol. III, No. VII, p. 75 of the Journal above mentioned, Mr Cope has the following note: "The sentence hangs so ill together, and the ἢ has so little meaning, that I think we ought to change it into the relative pronoun ἣ: and then the sentence will run 'and in like manner valour, which performs such and such feats,' i.e. he first praises valour generally, and then proceeds to enumerate different acts of prowess; which may be multiplied *ad infinitum*." This suggestion, it may be remarked, harmonizes fairly with the reading of MS A^c ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ (not ὁ) τοιόνδε ἐστίν. It has been anticipated by Foss (de Gorgia p. 77 ap. Spengel) who proposes ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ὁ τοῖον γέ ἐστιν.

Spengel's own suggestion is εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων (A^c, Q, Z^b) Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ, ποιεῖ ὁ τοιόνδε ἐστίν.

§ 12. 'If you have proofs to produce, you may express yourself both in the ethical style, and in that of proof besides; but if you are at a loss for enthymemes, then in the ethical style alone. In fact, it better befits a man of worth to appear in his true character than that his speech be elaborately reasoned'. The change of subject in the last clause would have been more sharply marked by αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι χρηστὸν ἢ τὸν λόγον

13 τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δηλονότι συλλελογίσται· παρ' ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τάναντία γνωρίζεται.

14 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐκ ἕτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεων ἔστι τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς τάναντία ἀπαντᾶν λύνοντα καὶ προ- p. 145.

ἀκριβῆ. Spengel asks with some reason, "nonne nexus flagitat χρηστὸν τὸν λόγον φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀκριβῆ? magis enim convenit probo viro, ut ἠθικῶς quam ut ἐπιδεικτικῶς loquatur."

§ 13. 'Of enthymemes, those that refute are more popular than those that prove; because a syllogistic conclusion is more clearly drawn (thereby); for opposites are more readily recognised when set beside one another'. Comp. II 23. 30, εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παράλληλα δὲ φανερά εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον. The ἔλεγχος which is described in Anal. Pr. II 20, 66 b 10, as ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός, meets the opponent's *conclusion* with a counter-syllogism drawing a conclusion contrary to that of the opponent, while the *ἐνστασις* checks the opponent's argument at an early point by attacking one of his *premisses* (see Introd. pp. 264, 5).

§ 14. 'The refutation of your opponent is *not* a distinct division of the speech; on the contrary, it is part of the *proofs* to refute the opponent's positions either by contrary proposition or by counter-syllogism' (i.e. by ἔλεγχος).

Quint. III 9. 5, *Tamen nec his assentior, qui detrahunt refutationem, tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles, haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat.*

'Now both in public deliberation and in forensic pleading it is necessary, when you are the opening speaker, to state your own proofs first, and then to meet the arguments on the other side, by direct refutation and by pulling them to pieces beforehand.'

For ἀπαντᾶν, comp. Apsines Rhet. περὶ λύσεως c. 7 (Spengel's *Rhet. Gr.* II 366), σὺ δὲ κατ' αὐξήσιν ἀπαντήσῃς κατὰ πηλικότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν αὐξητικῶν ἢ κατὰ ἀντιπαράστασιν.

For προδιασύροντα ('cutting up by anticipation') comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19). 13, προδιέσυρε λέγων, ib. § 12, προκατέλαβε...προδιέβαλεν...διασεσύρθαι πρότερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ib. 33 (34). 1, προκαταλαμβάνων διασύρεις. Isocr. ἀντίδοσις § 199, διασύρουσι (τὴν παιδείαν) ὥς οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖν δυναμένην (ib. § 300); Dem. Or. 13 § 12, διέσυρε τὰ παρόντα καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἐπήνεσε.

'But if there is much variety in the opposition, you should *begin* with the points opposed to you'. For πολύχους (manifold, complex, diversified,

διασύροντα. ἂν δὲ πολύχους ἦ ἡ ἐναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἃ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελών οὕτω
 15 τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν. ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύνοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν εὐδοκιμηκότα ἦ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδιαβεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἡ ψυχὴ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος εὖ δοκῇ εἰρηκέναι. δεῖ οὖν χώραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἔσται δὲ ἂν ἀνέλγης. διὸ ἢ πρὸς πάντα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα ἢ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ

πολυειδής), comp. de Part. Anim. II 10, 656 a 5, πολυχονστέρα ἰδέα, where it is combined with πολυμορφότερα.

On Callistratus, see note on I 7. 13. The reference is probably to the embassy on which Callistratus was sent into the Peloponnesus, shortly before the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362. ἡ Μεσσηνιακὴ ἐκκλησία can hardly mean anything else than 'the public assembly of the Messenians', and not 'the assembly held (at Athens) respecting the Messenians', (which last appears to be the view of Sauppe, *Or. Att.* II 218, note 1; A. Schaefer, *Dem. und seine Zeit* I p. 113, rightly understands it *die Volksgemeinde der Messenier*). It was on this embassy that Epaminondas, *cum in conventum venisset Arcadum petens ut societatem cum Thebanis et Argivis facerent*, was confronted by Callistratus, *Atheniensium legatus qui eloquentia omnes eo praestabat tempore*, who urged them to ally themselves with Athens (Nepos, Epam. 6, quoted by A. Schaefer).

προανελών κ.τ.λ.] i.e. It was not until after he had by anticipation got rid of the arguments of his opponents that he stated his own arguments. οὕτω, 'accordingly'; similarly used after the participle *μαχεσάμενον*, at the end of the next section.

§ 15. 'When you are speaking in reply, you should first mention the arguments against the statement on the other side, by refuting that statement and drawing up counter-syllogisms, and especially if the arguments on the opposite side are well received; for just as the mind refuses to open itself favourably to one who has been made the victim of prejudice, the same applies to oratory also, if your opponent is held to have made a good speech'.

'You must therefore as it were make room in the hearer's mind for the speech that is about to be made, and this will be effected by getting out of the way your opponent's speech' (with which the minds of your audience are pre-occupied).

'Hence you should establish the credibility of your own case, by first contending either against all or the most important or the most popular or the most easily refuted of the adverse arguments'. As an instance, Aristotle refers to the lines in the Troades of Euripides, beginning with

τὰ εἰλέεγκτα μαχεσάμενον οὕτω τὰ αὐτοῦ πιστὰ
ποιητέον.

ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι
ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἦραν.

ἐν τούτοις ἤψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου.

- 16 περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα· εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος,
ἐπειδὴ ἓνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρο-
λογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλον ἢ λοιδορίαν
ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὃ περ Ἴσο-

96b, the first line of Hecuba's lengthy reply to Helen's speech in her own defence; then follows a line καὶ τήνδε δεῖξω μὴ λέγουσαν ἔνδικα. After this, in a passage beginning with the lines ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἦραν παρθένον τε Παλλὰδα οὐκ ἐς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἐλθεῖν δοκῶ, she disposes of Helen's weakest argument first, an argument which Euripides, like a skilful rhetorician, has placed in the *middle* of Helen's speech, lines 932—5, νικᾷ Κύπρις θεὰς, καὶ τοσόνδ' οὐμοὶ γάμοι ᾤνησαν Ἑλλάδ', οὐ κρατεῖσθ' ἐκ βαρβάρων.

§ 16. 'As regards ethical proof, since there are some things, which, if you say them of yourself, are either invidious or tedious or provoke contradiction, or which, if said of another, involve slander or rudeness, you must ascribe them to some one else instead'.

The reference to the Philippus of Isocrates points (according to Victorius) to p. 96 D §§ 72—78, where the writer gets rid of the indelicacy of himself reminding Philip of the current imputation that his growing power οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταύτῃ αὐξάνεται, by attributing it to others in the words, αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ σε διαβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοὶ φθονούντων in § 73, and by describing it in § 78 as τοιαύτην φήμην σαντῶ περιφυσμένην, ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ περιθεῖναι σοὶ ζητοῦσι. This, however, seems to be open to the objection pointed out by Spengel, that Isocrates can hardly be regarded as putting what are really *his own* views as a friend of Philip into the mouth of that monarch's enemies ("at vix Isocrates ipse haec animo probans vera putabat"). Spengel accordingly prefers taking it as a reference to §§ 4—7, where, instead of expressing his own satisfaction with one of his compositions, he states that his friends who have heard it recited had been struck by its truthful statement of facts, § 4, and had expected that, if published, it would have led to the establishment of peace; it so happened, however, that Philip had concluded peace, before the fastidious rhetorician had elaborated his pamphlet to a sufficient degree to think it deserving of publication. Perhaps a still more apposite passage, which is omitted by Victorius and Spengel, is that in p. 87 B, § 23, where the writer, after describing himself as deterred by his friends from addressing Philip, adds that finally ἔσπευδον μᾶλλον ἢ γὰρ πεμφθῆναί σοι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ἔλεγον δ' ὡς ἐλπίζουσιν οὐ μόνον σέ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξειν μοι χάριν ὑπὲρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας.

κράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει; καὶ
ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα
περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ

χρημάτων δ' ἄελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπώμοτον,
καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ
οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.

καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης

ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει] §§ 141—149, ἀκροώμενος δέ τις τῶν ἐπιτηδεῶν ἐτόλμησεν
εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ. In the course of the passage referred to, the rhetorician makes
his imaginary friend compliment him on his writings as οὐ μέμψεως ἀλλὰ
χάριτος τῆς μεγίστης ἀξίους ὄντας, an expression which would have been
open to the imputation of indelicacy (περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἐπίφθονον), had not
the writer ingeniously placed it in another man's mouth. The device is
sufficiently transparent, even if it were not for the candid confession in
§ 8, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπαινεῖν ἑμαυτὸν ἐπιχειροῖν, ἐώρων οὔτε...ἐπιχαρίτως οὐδ'
ἀνεπιφθόνως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν δυνησόμενος.

The same device, in a less refined form, may be noticed in the modern
parallel from *Martin Chuzzlewit*, which will occur to every reader (chap.
xxv).

Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει...ἰάμβῳ] Hor. A. P. 79, *Archilochum proprio rabies
armavit iambos*. Comp. note on II 23. 11. Archilochus (*Lycambae
spretus infido gener*, Epod. VI 13), instead of directly attacking Neobule,
the daughter of Lycambes, puts his lampoon into the mouth of her own
father, thereby ostensibly refraining from a coarseness of invective, which
would imply ἀγρουκία on his own part, but really intensifying its bitter-
ness; as the reader will naturally argue, 'If her own father can say nothing
better of her, what will the rest of the world say?' Comp. Bergk, *Gr.
Lyr.*, p. 542, ed. 2, *Archil. fragm.*, οἴην Λυκάμβεω παῖδα τὴν ὑπερτέρην.
Stobaeus (CX 10, Bergk u. s. p. 552) has preserved nine trochaic lines
beginning with the first of the two quotations given by Aristotle, but
there is nothing in the passage, so far as there quoted, which illustrates.
Aristotle's object in here referring to it. There is a rendering of the lines
by J. H. Merivale in Wellesley's *Anthologia Polyglotta* p. 220, beginning
Never man again may swear, things shall be as erst they were.

οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω] τοῦ πολυχρῆστου μέλει. The four lines of which this is
the first are preserved by Plutarch de tranquill. an. c. 10 (Bergk *Gr. Lyr.*
p. 541) and are thus rendered by Milman, *No care have I of Gyges' golden
store, Unenvious I for nought the gods implore; I have no love of wide
and kingly sway But turn from pride my reckless eyes away*. On
Gyges, the wealthy king of Lydia, compare Herod. I 12, τοῦ (sc. Γύγεω) καὶ
Ἀρχίλοχος ὁ Πάριος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον γενόμενος ἐν ἰάμβῳ τριμέτρῳ ἐπε-
μνήσθη. Archilochus is inveighing against the vice of envy and the vanity
of riches, and with a dramatic skill that is one of his characteristics, gives
expression to his own feelings by ascribing them to Charon the contented
carpenter (comp. Mure, *H. G. L.* III 167).

Σοφοκλῆς] Antig. 688—700, where Haemon quotes the talk of the

17 πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον “χρὴ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῖεν.” ἐνθυμηματικῶς δέ, “εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὠφελιμώταται ὧσι καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι.”

I περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὐκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μά-
λιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκῶς ᾖ, ὥστε ἐνὸς

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town about Creon's treatment of Antigone, instead of himself directly attacking him. 693, τὴν παῖδα ταύτην οἷ' ὀδύρεται πόλις..., 700, τοιάδ' ἐρεμνὴ σὺν' ἐπέρχεται φάτις.

§ 17. 'Further, you should occasionally transform your enthymemes and express them as general maxims'. Comp. II 21. 1, 2, with the notes in Vol. II p. 206. On the 'enthymeme', see Saint-Hilaire's *Rhétorique d'Aristote*, Vol. II pp. 345—376; and Jebb's *Attic Orators*, II 289.

Aristotle's example of a γνώμη seems to be a general reminiscence of a passage in Isocr. Archidamus p. 126 B § 50, χρὴ δὲ τοὺς μὲν εὖ πράττοντας τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλείστον ἂν τις χρόνον τὰ παρόντα διαφυλάξειεν τοὺς δὲ δυστυχοῦντας τῷ πολέμῳ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ τῆς καινουργίας θάττον ἂν μεταβολῆς τύχοιεν. Spengel gives a reference to Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3). 32, δεῖ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας μὴ περιμένειν ἕως ἂν πέσωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. In expressing the γνώμη in the form of an ἐνθύμημα, Ar. alters διαλλαγὰς into its synonym καταλλαγαί, possibly for no other reason than to avoid the reiteration of similar sounds in δεῖ...διαλλαγαί...διαλλάττεσθαι, and the harsh collocation δεῖ διαλλάττεσθαι.

CHAP. XVIII.

This chapter treats of 'Interrogation' of one's opponent (§§ 1—4), and of 'Reply' to his interrogations (§§ 5, 6); it concludes with a few remarks on the use of 'ridicule', as an accessory to argument. These may be regarded as subdivisions of the general subject of proofs, *πίστεις*, dealt with in the previous chapter, to which the present is an appendix.

"A favourite instrument of debate with speakers in the public assembly and law-courts is the interrogation of the adversary. The object of this is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary by surprise and extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place him in an awkward dilemma, by shaping your question in such a way that he must either by avowing it admit something which his antagonist wishes to establish, or by refusing seem to give consent by his silence to that which the questioner wishes to insinuate; or to gain some similar advantage." Introd. p. 362.

A Greek paraphrase of the first six sections of this chapter, with the headings *περὶ ἐρωτήσεως* and *περὶ ἀποκρίσεως*, which owes its interest

προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον· οἶον Περικλῆς
Λάμπωνα ἐπῆρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας

mainly to the rareness of such commentaries on the Rhetoric, was edited in 1838 by Seguer from a MS in the library in Paris, and is reprinted in Spengel's *Rhetores Graeci* I pp. 163—8, and also in his edition of the *Rhetoric*, Vol. I pp. 147—152. It is a puerile piece of composition, but one or two extracts from it will be given where the writer's language really illustrates the text of Aristotle.

On the subject of Interrogatories it may be noticed, that by Athenian Law either party to a suit might put questions to the other, and demand a reply, not only at the preliminary hearing (ἀνάκρισις) but also at the trial itself (Plato, *Apol.* 25 D, ἀποκρίναι ᾧ γὰθ' καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνασθαι). In the former instance, the answers were taken down in writing, and produced in court if wanted; in the latter, the questions could only be asked by the party addressing the court, who could not himself be interrupted by any interrogation on the part of his opponent, but only by the enquiries of the jury, which were sometimes even invited by the speaker. (Comp. C. R. Kennedy's *Demosthenes* IV Appendix VII *On Interrogatories*).

Such interrogations, judging from the few specimens that have come down to us, were of the simplest kind; and owing to the large number and the natural impatience of the audience present, (whether as members of the general assembly or of the jury, in cases of the deliberative or the forensic class respectively), anything approaching an elaborate and protracted cross-examination was quite out of the question.

As instances we may quote the following: Isaeus Or. 10 (π. τοῦ Ἀγνίου κλήρου) §§ 4, 5, σὺ δ' ἀνάβηθι δεῦρο... ἐρωτήσω σε. ἀδελφός ἐσθ' ὁ παῖς Ἀγνίου, ἀδελφιδοῦς ἐξ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἀδελφῆς γεγωνός, ἢ ἀνεψιός, ἢ ἐξ ἀνεψιοῦ πρὸς μητρὸς ἢ πρὸς πατρός; ... δεῖ δὴ σε τῆς ἀγχιστείας, ὃ τι ὁ παῖς Ἀγνία προσήκει, τὸ γένος εἰπεῖν. φράσον οὖν τουτοισί.—αἰσθάνεσθε ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὴν συγγένειαν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνεται πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ δεῖ μαθεῖν ὑμᾶς. καίτοι τὴν γε πράττοντά τι δίκαιον οὐ προσήκειν ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ' εὐθὺς λέγειν.

Lysias Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν σιτοπώλων) § 5, (α) μέτοικος εἶ; (β) ναί. (α) μετοικεῖς δὲ πότερον ὥς πεισόμενος τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς τῆς πόλεως, ἢ ὥς ποιήσων ὃ τι ἂν βούλῃ; (β) ὥς πεισόμενος. (α) ἄλλο τι οὖν ἀξιοῖς ἢ ἀποθανεῖν εἴ τι πεποίηκας παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἐφ' οἷς θάνατος ἡ ζήμία; (β) ἔγωγε. (α) ἀποκρίναι δὴ μοι, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς πλείω σίτον συμπρίασθαι πεντήκοντα φορμῶν, ὢν ὁ νόμος ἐξείναι κελεύει; (β) ἐγὼ τῶν ἀρχόντων (not the Archons but the σιτοφύλακες of § 7) κελευόντων συνεπριάμην. ib. Or. 13 (κατὰ Ἀγοράτου) §§ 30—33, ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἐξελέγξω. ἀποκρίναι δὴ μοι κ.τ.λ. ib. Or. 12 (κατ' Ἐρατοσθένους) § 25, set forth at length in *Introd.* p. 364, note. Spengel also gives a reference to *Dem. de Cor.* § 52.

The subject of questioning and replying in sophistical debate is treated by Aristotle himself in the *Sophistici Elenchi*, esp. c. xv and xvi, (*Grote's Aristotle* II pp. 109—115; see also *Top. Θ*). Some of the more striking parallels will be quoted in the course of the commentary.

§ 1. 'As to Interrogation, you may opportunely resort to it, when your opponent has said the opposite, so that as soon as one more

ιερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δέ, “καὶ πῶς ἀτέ-
 2 λεστος ὢν;” δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερόν ᾗ, τὸ
 δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾗ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ
 τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερόν ἀλλὰ
 τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἶον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ
 φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν εἴρηκεν εἰ δαιμόνιον
 τι λέγοι, ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες
 ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δέ, “ἔστιν
 οὖν” ἔφη “ὅς τις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἶεται εἶναι, θεοὺς
 question is put to him, a contradictory result ensues’, i.e. the result is
 a *reductio ad absurdum*.

This Topic is exemplified by Pericles’ retort to Lampon, the sooth-
 sayer, who is mentioned in Arist. Av. 521, Λάμπων δ’ ὄμνυσ’ ἔτι καὶ νυνὶ
 τὸν χῆν’ ὅταν ἐξαπατᾷ τι, and Plut. Pericles c. vi, Λάμπωνα τὸν μάντιν.
 On τελετή, see note on II 24. 2.

The fragment περὶ ἐρωτήσεως (as Spengel points out), besides having
 ἤρετο and ἀνῆρετο instead of ἐπῆρετο and ἤρετο respectively, closes with
 the paraphrase συμψήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Λάμπωνος, καὶ πῶς εἶπεν ἀτέλεστος ὢν.

§ 2. ‘Or, secondly, (you may employ interrogation) when *one* point
 is self-evident, and it is clear that the person interrogated will grant
 you the *other* as soon as you put the question. For, when you have
 obtained your first premiss by asking your opponent to admit it, you
 must not proceed to put what is self-evident in the form of a question,
 but simply state the conclusion yourself’. Soph. El. 15, 174 b 38,
 οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτατικῶς ἐρωτᾶν· ἕνια δ’ οὐδ’ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ’ ὡς
 ὁμολογουμένῃ χρηστέον. Top. Θ 2, 154 a 7, οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐρώτημα
 ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνανεύσαντος, οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι συλλογισμός.

The illustration is taken from the Apologia of Socrates. ‘Socrates,
 when accused by Meletus of denying the existence of the gods, asked
 (*vulg. lect.* said), if there was anything which he called divine, and on
 his admitting this, he enquired whether the divine beings (*δαίμονες*) were
 not either children of the gods or of godlike nature, and on his answering
 “Yes”, “Is there any one” he said “who believes in the existence of
 the children of the gods and yet denies that of the gods themselves?”
 This corresponds only partially to the well-known passage in Plat. Apol.
 p. 27, already commented on in the note on II 23. 8. There is probably
 some corruption in the word εἴρηκεν where we should expect ἡρώτα
 or ἤρετο. Spengel, following A^o and the *vetus translatio*, reads εἴρηκεν
 ὡς ἂν δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι, ἤρετο. “Illud ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ sensui et consilio
 Aristotelis repugnat, neque εἴρηκεν εἰ significat : *quaesivit ex Meleto num*
daemonion quid crederet. Sed Meletus de Socrate εἴρηκεν ὡς ἂν δαιμόνιον
 τι λέγοι.” After quoting part of the passage of Plato, he says in con-
 clusion, “Vides Socratem id quod Meletus dixit, non interrogare, sed
 affirmare.”

3 δὲ οὐ;” ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξειν ἢ
4 παράδοξον. τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλ’ ἢ σο-
φιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λῦσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως
ἀποκρίνηται, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ’ οὐ, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ
δ’ οὐ, ἢ πῇ μὲν πῇ δ’ οὐ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντες.
ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχειρεῖν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστή, κεκρατῆσθαι
δοκεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν
τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ. διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα
συστρέφειν δεῖ.

§ 3. ‘Further, (interrogation is appropriate) when the speaker is in-
tending to shew up his opponent either in a self-contradiction or a paradox’.

§ 4. ‘Fourthly, when it is impossible (for the opponent) to meet the
question, without giving a sophistical answer’. For the examples of this
topic, *ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ’ οὐ*, κ.τ.λ., comp. Soph. Elench. 19, 177 a 21, ‘the
proper way for the respondent to deal with questions involving equivoca-
tion of terms or amphiboly of propositions is to answer them, at the
outset, with a reserve for the double meaning’: *ὥσπερ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν*
ὅτι ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δ’ ὥς οὐ. καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἔστιν ἃ, ἔστι δ’ ἃ οὐ
(Grote’s *Ar.* II 114), where the interrogation is characterized as sophisti-
cal, while here the same invidious epithet is applied to the answer.
Comp. Top. Θ 7, *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσαφῶς καὶ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων...τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος*
τὸ δ’ ἀληθές. As an instance of a quibbling answer, we may compare the
subtle distinction drawn by the over-intelligent servant in reply to the
enquiry whether his master Euripides was at home; *Ar. Ach.* 396,
(*ἔνδον ἔστ’ Εὐριπίδης*;) οὐκ ἔνδον, ἔνδον τ’ ἔστιν, εἰ γνώμην ἔχεις.

θορυβοῦσιν] This is a neutral word, and may be used of expressions of
either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience, any ‘sensa-
tion’ in fact, whether breaking out into applause or the reverse (see
Riddell’s note on its application to *δικασταί*, *Introd.* to Plato’s *Apology*,
p. IX). *Isocr. ἀντίδοσις*, § 20, *μετὰ θορύβου καὶ χαλεπότητος ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν*
ἀπολογουμένων. It is used of disapprobation (as here) in *Rhet. ad Alex.*
18 (19). 3, 6, 7, 8.

ὥς ἀποροῦντες] It is not the audience that is perplexed; on the con-
trary it has a perfectly clear opinion on the obviously shuffling character
of the answer, and expresses its displeasure accordingly. It is the
person who gives a ‘sophistical’ answer, who is apparently perplexed;
hence we should accept the correction *ὥς ἀποροῦντος* proposed by Spengel
and Schneidewin. The Paris MS A° actually has *ἀποροῦντας*, which sug-
gested to Spengel the alternative emendation *ἀποροῦντα*. Similarly the
fragment *περὶ ἐρωτήσεως* has, *πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς οὕτω ἀποκρινάμενους οἱ ἀκροώμενοι*
θορυβοῦσιν ὥς ἀποροῦντας καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντας ἀντειπεῖν.

‘But otherwise’ (i.e. except under the above limitations), ‘the speaker
must not attempt interrogation; for if his opponent should interpose an
objection, the questioner is considered beaten’. *ἐνστή* is here used of
giving a check by interposing an ‘instance’ or *ἐνστασις*. See *Introd.* p. 269.

ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν] ‘to pack into as small a compass as possible’.

- 5 ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα διαι-
 ροῦντα λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα
 ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθύς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν
 ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ ἐπὶ ἢ συλλογίσασθαι. οὐ γὰρ χαλε-
 πὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ λόγος. φανερόν δ' ἡμῖν ἔστω
 6 ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ λύσεις. καὶ συμ-
 περαίνόμενον, εἰς ἐρώτημα ποιῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν

II 24. 2, τὸ συνεστραμμένον καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα. Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 6, ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις. The verb is used metaphorically to express conciseness and condensation of style; in its literal meaning it might be applied to any squeezing and compacting process like that (for instance) of making a snowball. Comp. note on II 7. 5, *συνηναγκάσθησαν*.

§ 5. 'In answering, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing a distinction, and not expressing yourself too concisely'. Top. Θ 7, 156 a 26, εἰς (τὸ ἐρωτηθὲν) ἐπὶ τὶ μὲν ψεῦδος ἢ, ἐπὶ τὶ δ' ἀληθές, ἐπισημαντέον ὅτι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται καὶ διότι τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος τὸ δ' ἀληθές ὕστερον γὰρ διαιρουμένου ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ συνεώρα τὸ ἀμφίβολον. In the fragment *περὶ ἀποκρίσεως* (as Spengel notices) the latter part is paraphrased in such a manner as to shew that the writer read *διαίρουντα λόγῳ* (omitting *καὶ μὴ*) *συντόμως*.

'In answering questions that appear to involve you in a contradiction, you must give your explanation immediately in your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion'. This corresponds to what in the old style of our legal pleading would have been termed 'confession and avoidance'.

ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] namely in Top. lib. VIII (Θ), in the opening words of which *πῶς δεῖ ἐρωτᾶν* is mentioned as one of the subjects of the book; *περὶ ἀποκρίσεως* is treated from c. 4 to c. 10; (Grote's *Ar.* Vol. II 47—54). Spengel somewhat questionably remarks: "notandus imperativus ἔστω, hoc enim ut εἰρήσθω, librum illum nondum compositum esse indicare videtur;" (on the perfect imperative, see note on I 11. 29). He adds, "neque ἔσται, quod deteriores exhibent, placet, praesens expectamus, aut intelligendum potius verbum in hac formula."

§ 6. A second precept for 'answering'. 'When a conclusion is being drawn, if your opponent puts the conclusion in the form of a question, you must add the cause of your conduct'. *συμπεραίνόμενον* is a neuter accusative absolute. It is here passive, not middle, though the *vetus translatio* renders it *concludentem*, which is contrary to the sense required and to the general use of the verb, which is rarely found in the middle. Spengel even asserts *non dicitur media forma*, but this assertion (unless I misunderstand his meaning) is refuted by Top. Η 5, 150 a 33, ῥᾶν γὰρ ἐν συμπεράνασθαι ἢ πολλά, and by Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 22, ἀγαπητὸν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς...τὰληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι (which cannot be taken as any other than the middle voice).

αἵτιαν εἰπεῖν· οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προβούλοις, καταστήσῃ τούς τετρακοσίους, ἔφη. “τί δέ; οὐ πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἐδόκει εἶναι;” ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν σὺ ταῦτα ἔπραξας τὰ πονηρά;” “ναὶ” ἔφη. “οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω.” καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολλύναι ἄτεροι, ἔφη. ὁ δὲ “οὐκοῦν σὺ τούτοις ταῦτ’ ἔθου;” καὶ ὅς ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν” ἔφη “καὶ σὺ ^{p. 147.} ἀπόλοιο;” “οὐ δῆτα” ἔφη. “οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ’ οὐ, ἀλλὰ γνώμη.” διὸ οὐτ’ ἐπερωτᾷν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὔτε τὸ ^{P. 1419 b.} συμπέρασμα ἐπερωτᾷν, εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ περιῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

7 περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρήσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν

Σοφοκλῆς] On this statesman and orator (not the poet), and on the ten πρόβουλοι of whom he was one, see note on I 14. 3.

εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας] ‘called to account for his administration of the office of ephor’. The ephors are charged with being liable to venality in Pol. II 9, 1270 b 10, διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὄντι. The ephor in the present instance repudiates the charge, and insists that he had not acted on the prompting of bribery, but ‘on principle’ (γνώμη).

οὐτ’ ἐπερωτᾷν—ἀληθοῦς] ‘hence (to avoid being thus foiled), you should neither put a further question after drawing the conclusion nor express the conclusion itself in the form of a question, unless the truth of the facts is superabundantly clear’. Comp. Top. Θ 2, 154 a 7, already quoted on § 2.

§ 7 treats very briefly of ‘jests’, as a useful accessory in debate; *Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res* (Hor. Sat. I 10. 14). The subject of *ridiculum* is treated by Cicero de Oratore, II 58, 236 seq., Quintil. VI 3. 22—112, *haec tota disputatio a Graecis περὶ γελοίου inscribitur* (§ 22)...*usus autem maxime triplex, aut enim ex aliis risum petimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis* (§ 23). For other references see note on I 11. 29.

δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας—ὀρθῶς λέγων] ‘Gorgias laid it down, and rightly too, that you should confound (spoil the effect of) the seriousness of your opponents by ridicule, and their ridicule by seriousness’. In a Scholium on Plat. Gorg. p. 473 E, (where Socrates says to Polus) γελᾶς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι εἶπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μὴ, the dictum of Gorgias is quoted in the following form: (δεῖ) τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν

σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὐ. ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὃ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου.

ἀντιδίκων γέλωτι ἐκλύειν, τὰ δὲ γελοῖα ταῖς σπουδαῖς ἐκκρούειν (Plato, ed. Baiter and Orelli, p. 910 b 20; Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* III 131). The only material variation between the two forms of quotation is Aristotle's probably intentional alteration of τῶν ἀντιδίκων, which would apply to the forensic branch alone, into τῶν ἐναντίων, which extends the applicability of the remark to all the three branches of Oratory. Dr Thompson observes that "the remark is one which could not have been made by an ordinary man, and the sentence is too nicely balanced for a mere colloquial dictum" (*Gorgias*, p. 178). The first half of Gorgias' precept may be exemplified by the familiar line, *And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley by a grin* (Dr Brown's *Essay on Satire* II 224).

One of the best classical instances of the effective use of pleasantry to neutralize over-strictness on the part of one's opponent is Cicero's good-humoured banter of his friends Sulpicius and Cato, in the speech *pro Murena* (§§ 19—30 and §§ 61—65). We may also compare Dem. Or. 54 (κατὰ Κόνωνος) §§ 13 and (as an illustration of meeting jest by earnest) 20, εἴτα γελάσαντες ὑμεῖς ἀφήσετε; οὐ γὰρ ἂν γέλως ὑμῶν ἔλαβεν οὐδένα, εἰ παρῶν ἐτύγχανεν κ.τ.λ. Comp. Or. 23 § 206, ἂν ἐν ἡ δὲ ἀστέια εἴπωσι...ἀφίετε, Arist. Vesp. 566, οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν μύθους· ἡμῖν οἱ δ' Αἰσώπου τι γέλοιον· οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ' ἢ ἐγὼ γελάσω καὶ τὸν θυμὸν κατὰθωμαι. See also Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 29, *Ueber Lachen und Witz*.

ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς] See note on I II. 29, διώρισται περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ] Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 17, τοῦ ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκοῦειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικῇ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει. Cic. de Off. I 29. 103, *ipsius genus iocandi non profusum nec immodestum, sed ingenium et facetum esse debet*, § 104, *facilis est distinctio ingenui et illiberalis ioci*.

τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται] Cic. Orator, § 88, *ridiculo sic usurum oratorem, ut nec nimis frequenti, ne scurrile sit...neque aut sua persona aut iudicium aut tempore alienum*. There is a kind of quiet irony observable in Aristotle's hint that the orator is to select his special line of pleasantry according as he happens to be a gentleman or the reverse.

εἰρωνεία—ἑτέρου] 'Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery: one who resorts to irony makes his joke for his own amusement only, whereas the buffoon does so for an ulterior object'. On βωμολοχία, comp. Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 4, οἱ τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοὶ, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λεγεῖν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον. *ib.* line 34, ὃ δὲ βωμολό-

I ὁ δ' ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἕκ τε τοῦ CHAP. XIX.
 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸν
 ἐναντίον φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι,
 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστῆσαι,
 καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως. πέφυκε γὰρ μετὰ τὸ ἀποδείξαι

χὸς ἦτων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέ-
 λωτα ποιήσει. On εἰρωνεία, comp. ib. c. 13, οἱ δ' εἰρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες
 χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἦθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ
 φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκρὸν: see also the references in note on II 2. 24, to which
 may be added Auctor ad Herennium IV 34. 46, where irony is called
permutatio.

It is a nice question whether αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα is neuter (as Mr Cope takes
 it in the *text* of the Introd. p. 366), or 'perhaps masculine' (as he suggests
 in the *note*, and as I have ventured to translate it above). The latter is
 the view supported by Victorius: "Qui utitur dissimulatione, sibique
 semper in sermone detrahit, atque aliis plusquam vere concedi possit,
 tribuit, ut ipse oblectetur, voluptatemque ex aliorum stultitia capiat, hoc
 facit, quare sibi servit: contra scurra ridiculus est, et iocos undique
 captat, ut alii voluptatem gignat, quod illiberale ac sordidum est, omnia
 facere, ut alii turpiter inservias."

CHAP. XIX.

The book appropriately closes with a chapter on the Peroration:
 the contents of that portion of the speech are distributed under four
 heads: (1) to inspire the audience with a favourable opinion of yourself
 and an unfavourable one of your opponents, (2) amplification and
 extenuation, (3) the excitement of the emotions of your audience, (4)
 refreshing their memory by recapitulation.

Cornificius, II 30. 47, gives three divisions, (1) *enumeratio*, (2) *ampli-
 ficatio*, (3) *commiseratio*. Cic. de Inv. I 52. 98, (1) *enumeratio*, (2) *indig-
 natio*, (3) *conquestio*. Apsines 12 p. 384, (1) ἀνάμνησις, (2) ἔλεος, (3) δει-
 νωσις (ἡ δὲ δεινωσις κατὰ τὴν αὐξήσιν θεωρεῖται). *Amplificatio* and *com-
 miseratio* are sometimes brought under one head, thus reducing the
 divisions to two, as in Cic. part. orat. 15. 52, (1) *amplificatio*, (2) *enum-
 ratio* (Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, § 29).

In spite of what is here said about αὐξήσις, the student of ancient
 eloquence cannot fail to be struck by the quiet character of most of the
 perorations of the Attic orators. Perhaps the tamest of all (to our modern
 taste) is the closing sentence of Lysias Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν σιτοπώλων) § 22,
 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι δεῖ πλείω λέγειν· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀδικούντων,
 ὅτε δικάζονται, δεῖ παρὰ τῶν κατηγορῶν πυθέσθαι, τὴν δὲ τούτων πονηρίαν
 ἅπαντες ἐπίστασθε. ἂν οὖν τούτων καταψηφίσσθε, τὰ τε δίκαια ποιήσετε καὶ
 ἀξιώτερον τὸν σῖτον ἀνήσσεσθε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τιμιώτερον. It is well
 remarked by Brougham that "the perorations, if by this we mean the con-
 cluding sentences of all, in the Greek orations, are calm and tame, com-
 pared with the rest of their texture, and especially with their penultimate

αὐτὸν μὲν ἀληθῇ τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον ψευδῇ, οὕτω τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπιχαλκεύειν. δυοῖν δὲ θατέρου δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι τούτοις ἀγαθὸς ἢ ὅτι ἀπλῶς, ὃ δ' ὅτι κακὸς τούτοις ἢ ὅτι ἀπλῶς. ἐξ ὧν δὲ δὴ τοιούτους κατασκευάζειν δεῖ, εἴρηνται οἱ τόποι πόθεν σπουδαίους δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ φαύλους. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο δεδειγμένων

portions, which rise to the highest pitch of animation' (vol. VII, *Rhetorical Dissertations*, pp. 25, 184; see also especially Jebb's *Attic Orators* I p. ciii).

πέφυκε—ἐπιχαλκεύειν] 'For the natural order is first to prove your own case to be true and your opponent's to be false; and after that, to use praise and blame, and to elaborate these topics'. These words give the reason for giving the *first* place in the four heads to inspiring in the audience a favourable opinion towards yourself.

ἐπιχαλκεύειν] is a difficult word to translate satisfactorily in the present context. Victorius dubiously explains it: "expolire et quod factum iam est cursim festinanterque eo consilio ut concinnes, iterare ac repetere." It is metaphorically used in Arist. Nub. 422, where Strepsiades offers himself (not his son, as Ernesti says *Lex. Techn. s.v.*) to Socrates, as sturdy and tough material for him to hammer upon and forge to his purpose, ἀλλ' ἐνεκὲν γε ψυχῆς στεινῆς...ἀμέλει θαρρῶν, οὐνεκα τούτων ἐπιχαλκεύειν παρέχοιμ' ἄν (for a Latin metaphor from the anvil, comp. Horace, *A. P.* 441, *male tornatos incudi reddere versus*). At first sight the word might be supposed to refer to ἀνάμνησις, which is subsequently explained in the words πολλὰκις εἰπεῖν, in which case it would mean 'to hammer your subject down', 'drive it home'; but μετὰ τοῦτο in § 2 shews that in the present section Ar. is only dwelling on the first of the four heads of the epilogue, and does not at present touch on ἀνάμνησις, which is reserved for § 4. Consequently we must understand it to mean 'to elaborate', 'to finish off', the topics belonging to the first head. It may also mean to mould the audience to one's purpose. Brandis in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV 1, p. 45, points out that his *Anonymus* read the clause as follows: καὶ μετὰ (not οὕτω) τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν τὸ (not καὶ) ἐπιχαλκεύειν, in which case the last word corresponds to the *third* head, εἰς τὰ πάθη καταστήσας τὸν ἀκροατήν.

'Now (in this) you must aim at one of two objects; to represent yourself as either relatively or absolutely good, and your opponent as either relatively or absolutely bad'. As is remarked in the *Introd.* p. 368, 'the virtue assumed may be either virtue *per se*, and independent of all other considerations, as times, places, and persons—or in default of this, at any rate good to the judges or audience; as it may be, useful, or well-disposed'. On ἀπλῶς, see note on I 2. 4.

εἴρηνται οἱ τόποι] See I 9. 1.

§ 2. δεδειγμένων—ἐστίν] 'The next point in the natural order is to proceed to amplify what has already been proved (*δεδειγμένον*), or again to depreciate (what has been proved by your opponent); for the facts must be

ἤδη αὖξιν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ταπεινοῦν· δεῖ γὰρ
τὰ πεπραγμένα ὁμολογεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποσὸν
ἐρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων αὖξισις ἐκ προὔπαρ-
χόντων ἐστίν. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ αὖξιν καὶ ταπεινοῦν,
3 ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι πρότερον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, δῆλων
ὄντων καὶ οἷα καὶ ἡλίκα, εἰς τὰ πάθη ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροα-
τήν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἔλεος καὶ δεινώσις καὶ ὀργή καὶ
μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις. εἴρηνται δὲ καὶ
4 τούτων οἱ τόποι πρότερον. ὥστε λοιπὸν ἀναμνησαί
τὰ προειρημένα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀρμόττει ποιεῖν οὕτως p. 148.
ὥσπερ φασὶν ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες·
ἵνα γὰρ εὐμαθῇ ἡ, κελεύουσι πολλάκις εἰπεῖν. ἐκεῖ μὲν
οὖν δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ περὶ οὗ ἡ
κρίσις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ δι' ὧν δέδεικται κεφαλαιωδῶς.
admitted, if one is to treat of the question of degree (by way of amplification
or the reverse); just as the growth of the body arises from something
pre-existing.' δεδειγμένον is supported by the *vetus translatio* and all
the MSS except A^o, which has δεδειγμένων, an awkward genitive absolute
which is left standing alone owing to the loss of some words which
would have made the sentence run like the next transition in § 3, μετὰ
δὲ ταῦτα, δῆλων ὄντων καὶ οἷα καὶ ἡλίκα. Spengel suggests as an alternative
that the participle refers to "ipsam argumentationem, i.e. confirmationem
et confutationem, quod suadent verba δεῖ γὰρ τὰ πεπραγμένα ὁμολο-
γῆσθαι."

ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι] See I cc. 7, 9, 24; and II 7. 2.

§ 3. ἡλίκα] referring particularly to αὖξιν καὶ ταπεινοῦν.

ἔλεος] 'commiseration'. Cic. de Inv. I 55. 106, *Conquestio oratio
auditorum misericordiam captans*, ib. § 100. *Supra* II 8. 2.

δεινώσις] 'indignation'. See note on II 21. 10, *σχετλιασμῶ* (correspond-
ing to ἔλεος) καὶ δεινώσει, and note 3 on p. 368 of *Introd.* Cf. Plat. *Phaedr.*
272 A, *ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως*.

On ὀργή see II 2. 1 and 4. 31; on μῖσος, II 4. 31; on φθόνος, II 9. 3
and 10. 1; on ζῆλος, II 11. 1.

οἱ τόποι] See II cc. I—I I, where however δεινώσις and ἔρις are not, like
the other topics, specially treated of.

§ 4. 'The remaining branch of the peroration is the recapitulation
of the previous parts of the speech. At this point you may appropriately
do what some, absurdly enough, advise one to do in the exordium. They
recommend you to state your points again and again that they
may be distinctly understood. In the exordium, however, you should
simply state the subject of the speech, that the point at issue may be
clearly seen; in the peroration you have to state summarily the means
whereby your case has been proved'.

5 ἀρχὴ δὲ διότι ἂν ὑπέσχετο ἀποδέδωκεν ὥστε ἅ τε καὶ
 δι' ὃ λεκτέον. λέγεται δὲ ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς τοῦ
 ἐναντίου. παραβάλλειν δὲ ἢ ὅσα περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμφω
 εἶπον, ἢ μὴ καταντικρύν. “ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν τάδε περὶ
 τούτου, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα.” ἢ ἐξ εἰρωνείας, P. 1420
 οἶον “οὗτος γὰρ τάδ' εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε. καὶ τί ἂν
 ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε ἔδειξεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταδί;” ἢ ἐξ ἐρω-
 τήσεως “τί οὐ δέδεικται;” ἢ “οὗτος τί ἔδειξεν;” ἢ
 δὴ οὕτως ἢ ἐκ παραβολῆς, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ἐλέχθη,
 οὕτω τὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, χωρὶς τὰ τοῦ

§ 5. ‘The first point (in the recapitulation) is (to state) that you have performed all that you have promised’. Isocr. ἀντίδοσις § 75, οἶμαι γὰρ ἀποδέδωκεναι τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν.

‘(The recapitulation) may also consist of a comparison (of the opponent's case with your own); you may either compare what both said on the same point, or else (you may do so) without setting each point over against the other’.

ἢ ἐκ παραβολῆς] as ἀντιπαραβολή is actually the subject of all the preceding part of the section, ἐκ παραβολῆς cannot be contrasted with οὕτως, but must be identical with it. Hence we should either strike out this clause, or at any rate (with Victorius and Spengel), put ἢ into brackets, in which case ἢ δὴ οὕτως will be explained if necessary by ἐκ παραβολῆς. Possibly, however, the clause is due to the intrusion into the text of a marginal explanation of οὕτως such as an abbreviated form of ἡγοῦν (the scholiast's common equivalent for *scilicet*) ἐκ παραβολῆς.

κατὰ φύσιν] i. e. your recapitulation may follow and contrast your own points in the natural order, as they were spoken; and then, if you please, separately, what has been said by your opponent.

τελευτή—λόγος ἦ] ‘As a conclusion (to a speech) the most suitable style is that which has no conjunctions, to make it a true peroration, and not an actual oration’.

τελευτή is with much plausibility conjectured by Victorius, and the conjecture is supported by F. A. Wolf. The nominative is possibly due to the copyist being misled by the apparent parallelism above, ἀρχὴ δὲ διότι κ.τ.λ.—τῆς λέξεως is constructed with ἡ ἀσύνδετος; on this kind of ‘attraction’, comp. note on III 9. 3, ἡ εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεως.

ἐπιλογος...λόγος] Quint. VI 1. 2, *nam si morabimur, non iam enumeratio, sed quasi altera fiet oratio*. *Supra* III 9. 6, αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὖσαι λόγος γίνονται.

εἴρηκα, ἀκηκάετε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε] ‘I must now close; you have heard all; the facts are in your hands; I ask for your verdict’. Considering the carelessness of style which characterizes many portions of the *Rhetoric*, it is all the more striking to find its close marked by a sentence so happily chosen,—a sentence which at once illustrates the point under

6 ἐναντίου λόγου. τελευτῇ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀρμόττει ἡ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος ἦ. “εἶρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.”

consideration and also serves as an appropriate farewell to the subject of the treatise; as though Aristotle had added at the conclusion of his course: ‘I have said all that I had to say; my lectures are now finished; I leave the subject in your hands, and trust it to your judgment’. The closing words of the *Sophistici Elenchi* are at least equally effective, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἡ τῶν ἡκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ’ εὐρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.

The illustration is doubtless a reminiscence of the closing words of one of the best-known speeches of Lysias, Or. 12 (κατ’ Ἐρατοσθένους), παύσομαι κατηγορῶν· ἀκηκόατε, ἐωράκατε, πεπόνθατε· ἔχετε, δικάζετε, a passage which may perhaps find its modern equivalent in some such words as these:

‘The speech for the prosecution must now close; I have appealed to your ears, to your eyes, to your hearts: the case is in your hands; I ask for your verdict.']

APPENDIX (E)

Shilleto's Adversaria on the Rhetoric of Aristotle.

[Among the books belonging to the late Mr Shilleto which have been recently acquired by the University Library, are two interleaved copies of the edition of the *Rhetoric* printed at the Oxford University Press in 1826. One of these, which is in bad condition owing to many years of use, contains a large number of annotations of very unequal value, written in various hands; in the other, which bears on the title-page the name *Richard Shilleto* with the date *Dec. 15, 1863*, apparently all the notes on which his maturer judgment set any value, are copied out by himself in a hand rivalling that of Richard Porson for clearness and beauty. All these notes, and a few selections from the older book, with some trifling omissions, (parallel passages, for instance, already quoted at large in these volumes,) I have transcribed in full by permission of the Syndics of the University Library, and I append them here as an epilogue to Mr Cope's Commentary.]

BOOK I.

A 1. 12, ἀναγκὴ δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] δι' αὐτῶν i. e. τῶν ῥητορικῶν.

I. 13, τοῦτοις ἂν τις ὠφελήσῃε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως κ.τ.λ. Plat. Meno. 87 E, σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεί. ὑγίεια, φάμεν, καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα...ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν.

I. 14, σοφιστὴς μὲν] Intellige; σοφιστὴς μὲν (σοφιστής ἐστι)...διαλεκτικός δὲ οὐ (σοφιστής ἐστι) κ.τ.λ.

2. 12, ἡ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἔχειν] ἔχειν: Plat. Theaet. 183 A, 204 A, I Rep. 351 C inter ἔστιν et ἔχει lis est in Codd. Edit.)

2. 20, κατὰ τρόπον]=ὁρθῶς. Vid. Cobet. N. Lect. p. 87. "Plat. de Rep. IX 581 A, καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρήματον ὁρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν, et post pauca: φιλομαθὲς δὴ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν." Itaque h. l. scribe κατὰ λόγον vel ἢ κατὰ τρόπον. Hoc praefero.

3. 2, ἡ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτὴν κ.τ.λ.] Cicero Orat. Part. 3. 10, *Quid habes igitur de causa dicere?* Cicero Pater: *Auditorum eam genere distingui. Nam aut auscultator est modo qui audit, aut disceptator, id est rei sententiaeque moderator: ita, ut aut delectetur, aut statuatur aliquid.* Sta-

tuit autem aut de praeteritis, ut iudex, aut de futuris, ut senatus. Sic tria sunt genera, iudicii, deliberationis, exornationis: quae quia in laudationes maxime confertur, proprium habet iam ex eo nomen. I de Oratore 31. 141, (non negabo me didicisse) *causarum...partim in iudiciis versari, partim in deliberationibus: esse etiam genus tertium, quod in laudandis aut vituperandis hominibus poneretur.* de invent. II 4. 12, *omnis et demonstrativa et deliberativa et iudicialis causa...Aliud enim laus aut vituperatio, aliud sententiae dictio, aliud accusatio aut recusatio conficere debet. In iudiciis quid aequum sit quaeritur, in demonstrationibus quid honestum, in deliberationibus, ut nos arbitramur, quid honestum sit et quid utile.*

3. 8, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσόμενα οὐχ οἶον τε κ.τ.λ.] alia collegit Herm. ad Plat. Rep. III 389 A. [Rhet.] III 17. 8, Isaei Ciron. Hered. § 27; Dem. Androt. 603, Mid. 532; Plat. Rep. IV 426 B, Dem. πρὸς Φορμίωνα 907, 1 Aphob. 834, Aesch. Choeph. 64, 470, Plat. Symp. 204 A; Lucian, I p. 22, Somnium 17; Bremi ad Aeschin. adv. Ctesiph. § 78; Lysias de olea 108 St=264 R, Theomnest. 116 St=344 R et 117 St=350 R; Herod. VII 101, Lys. xiii § 16, Dem. VII 83 § 28.

οὐδὲ...οὐ γιν. [Rhet.] I 5. 15; (ἀλλ') οὐ, I 11. 9.

4. 6, λήσεται] Anal. Pr. II 19, τοῦτο δ' ἡμᾶς οὐ λήσεται διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι πῶς ὑπέχομεν τὸν λόγον. De λήσω, λήσομαι, disputavi Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 265, 266.

5. 3, κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] dead and live stock, thing-chattels, man-chattels.—Num Plat. Gorg. 511 D idem sibi vult? τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα.

5. 11, ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται] ὧν=τούτων ᾧ (nominativus).

5. 13, τοσούτῳ μείζονι ὥστε μὴ...ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Transl. 'by an amount just so far larger as not to render'. Si voluisset Ar. 'so that we make our movements not more tardily', scripturus fuit ποιεῖσθαι.

5. 15, οὐδ' ἄλυπος καὶ πολυχρόνιος οὐτ' ἄνευ] Quid si οὐδ' ἄλυπος καὶ πολυχρόνιος οὐκ ἄνευ...? Si vera lectio est, ἄλ. καὶ πολ. idem fere valet quod πολυχρόνιος ἄλυπος, ut in Tac. XI Ann. 5, *continuis inde et saevius accusandis reis Suillius*.—[οὐτ'] Bekk. st. De οὐδὲ...οὐ vid. ad 1 3. 8.

6. 24, Κορινθίους δ' οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ἰλιον] Schneidewin Simonides Fragm. XCIV, p. 105, 106. "Schol. Vratisslav. Pind. Olymp. xiii 78, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Σιμωνίδης εἶπε· Κορινθίοισι δ' οὐ μανίει τὸ Ἰλιον οὐδὲ Δαναοί· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ σύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο. Codex Κορινθίοισιν οὐ μανίει, omissis τὸ Ἰλιον, tum Δαναοίς, quae omnia restituit Boeckhius. Numeri dissoluti. Plutarch. Dion. I. Vox μανίειν interpretationi cessit apud Aristot. Rhet. I 6."

7. 14, ἀριστον μὲν ὕδωρ] "So then I will conclude with the saying of Pindarus *optima res aqua*; not for the excellency but for the common use of it." BACON, *Speech Touching Purveyors*, vol. IV, p. 306, ed. MDCCXXX.

τὸ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπέρχει] "degrees of well-doing there could be none, except perhaps in the *seldomness* and *oftenness* of doing well." HOOKER, *Ecccl. Pol.* I 8. 8, vol. I, p. 290, ed. Keble.

7. 21, ὁ κρίνειν ἂν ἢ (vel) κερρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ (sapientes sive omnes sive quam plurimi; cf. II 23. 12) ἢ (aut) οἱ πλείους ἢ (aut) οἱ κράτιστοι.

7. 28, ἡ οὐς οὗτοι κρίνουσι] ἡ οὐς ἀποδέχονται II 22. 3; 23. 12.—Xen. Memor. IV 4. 16, Eur. Heracl. 197.

9. 2,] Quintil. III 7. 6.

9. 38, ὁ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν] ὁ delet Bekk. ed. ult. Sed ὁ idem valet quod εἴ τι.

(δι') 'Αρμόδιον] δι' add. Vater. Bekk. ed. ult.

9. 38, συνήθειαν] Cicero Brut. 12. 48 (Ait Aristoteles) *Isocratem primo artem dicendi esse negavisse, scribere autem aliis solitum orationes, quibus in iudiciis uterentur.* Quid sibi velit Bekker ex uno Codice praeferens ἀσυνήθειαν, quum reliqui tres συνήθειαν praebeant, parum intelligo. Cf. III 13. 3. ["Jebb, *Attic Orators* II p. 68 note 2. Surely ἀσυνήθειαν is utterly inconsistent with III 13." Note in Shilleto's older copy of Rhet.]

9. 41, ἐχομένω] Cf. II 22. 11, 16.

11. 10, πιεῖσθαι] ἐκπιόνται, II 20. 6. ["Lobeck. ad Phrynich. p. 31" u.s.]

11. 23, "Not only what is great strange or beautiful, but anything that is disagreeable when looked upon, pleases us in an apt description... for this reason therefore the description of a dunghill is pleasing to the imagination, if the image be represented to our minds by suitable expressions; though perhaps this may be more properly called the pleasure of the understanding than of the fancy, because we are not so much delighted with the image that is contained in the description, as with the aptness of the description to excite the image." ADDISON, *Spectator*, 418.

11. 8, ἡ δι' ἀπορίαν] ἡ <ει> δι' ἀπορίαν Bekk. st. sed in οἷς latet εἴ τισι.

12. 23, προφάσεως δέεται μόνον ἢ πονηρία] Proverbii scriptor sic scripsisse videtur: δέεται προφάσεως μόνον ἢ πονηρία, vel τό τοι πονηρὸν προφάσεως δέεται μόνον.

12. 28, οἷς χαριούνται] "οὐς A exhibere Thurot *Rev. Arch.* IV 299 dicit." Spengel.

13. 12, ἀντενποιεῖν] ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν. [See Shilleto's article in *Journal of Philology* VII, No. xiii, p. 157].

14. 5, δεξιὰς πίστει] vide ne aut δεξιὰς πίστει (Eur. Med. 21 et ibi Porson) scribendum aut πίστει omittendum tanquam gloss. vocabuli δεξίας.

15. 12, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι] II 25. 10. Thuc. IV. 73, Dem. Pantaen. p. 978 § 41.

15. 10, ἐφ' ὅποτέρου κ.τ.λ.] Cf. II 4. 32. *Suspensa et quo ducerentur inclinatura responderet*, Tac. XI Ann. 34.

15. 12, οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἔνεκα δικάζειν] Plat. Gorg. 454 C, τοῦ ἐξῆς ἔνεκα περαινέσθαι τὸν λόγον. Dem. de Coron. p. 267 § 120, τοῦ δὲ τῶν στεφανούντων ἔνεκα συμφέροντος.

15. 13, πρόσφατοι] vid. Lob. ad Phryn. p. 374, 375.

BOOK II.

B I. 1, αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως]=οἱ κριταί, sive ἐκκλησιασταί sive δικασταί.

2. 5, ὁ ὑβρίζων—ἡσθῆ] I 13. 10, οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε πάντως ὑβρισεν· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκείνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι.

3. 10, ἀδύνατον ἄμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι] "My affright at his baleful aspect begins to abate, and my hatred to arise," Scott, *Kenilworth* ch. xix. "Under this iron domination scarce a complaint was heard;

for hatred was effectually kept down by terror," Macaulay, *Hist. Eng.* I p. 628.

3. 13, παύει...ὀργὴν...ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία πρότερον] 'I have little doubt of procuring a remission for you provided we can keep you out of the claws of justice till she has selected and gorged upon her victims; for in this, as in other cases, it will be according to the vulgar proverb, "First come, first served."' Scott, *Waverley* ch. LXII. "After the first storm there is naturally some compassion attends men like to be in misery." Clarendon, *Rebellion*, Book I p. 3 b. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ τελευταῖοι κρινόμενοι σώζονται πεπαιγμένοι γὰρ τῆς ὀργῆς αὐτῶν ἀκροᾶσθε, καὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἥδη ἐθέλοντες ἀποδέχεσθε, Lysias XIX § 6 p. 152 St = 166 R.

3. 17, αὐτοὺς...παρασκευάζουσι τοιοῦτους] αὐτοὺς i. e. τοὺς κριτάς. Cf. 9. 16. Quid sibi velit Bekkerianum αὐτοὺς, me quidem latet.

4. 18, εἰδότας (τὰ τῶν πλησίον κακὰ)] 'Who make themselves acquainted with.' Thus Plutarch II 73 G, ὁ δ' ἐγκέμενος αἰεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ πικρὸς καὶ ἀτερπής, καὶ πάντα γινώσκων καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν [from Shilleto's older copy].

4. 27, οἷς θαρρόμεν] οὗς MS A°. Spengel. Ego diu conieceram.

4. 31, ὁ μισῶν] Ennius 379, quem metuunt, oderunt: quem quisque odit, perisisse expetit. Ovid II Amor. 2, 10, quem metuit quisque perissee cupit.

4. 32, ἄγειν] I 15. 10.

5. 17, ἡ πλείους...ἡ κρείττους...ἡ ἄμφω] vid. ad 12. 6.

6. 10, πάντα: vid. ad 9. 3.

6. 20, τοὺς πρῶτον δεσθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται] Plato Sophist. 217 C, μὴ τοῖνον, ὃ ξένη, ἡμῶν τὴν γε πρῶτην αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένη. Hinc explicandus locus Aristoph. in Nub. 1215, ἀλλὰ κρείττον ἦν εὐθύς τότε ἀπερυθρίσσαι i. e. μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὸν δεσθέντα.

7. 6, ἀχαριστεῖν] τέτακται μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον πρὸς τοὺς εὖ παθόντας, ὅταν μὴ βουλῶνται χάριν ἐκτίειν τοῖς εὖ πεποιηκόσιν. ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι μὴ θελόντων χρῶνται τῷ ἀχαριστεῖν, Bekk. Anecd. 218, 9. Plat. Symp. 186 C.

8. 6, οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι] Shakesp. *K. Lear* v 3. 231.

9. 2, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχεσθαι] Soph. Electr. 237, πῶς ἐπὶ τοῖς φθιμένοις ἀμελεῖν καλόν;

9. 3, ἅπανιν] all who possess these two feelings (νέμεσις and φθόνος). Cf. Politic. III 9. 1, τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικόν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες (all who uphold either form of government) γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός. πάντα = πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 6. 10.

9. 4, τοὺς πατραλοίας...ὅταν...τύχασιν...οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθεὶ χρηστός] vid. nos ad Aristoph. Av. 652. ["ἐστὶν λεγόμενον δὴ τι τὴν ἀλώπεχ' ὡς φλαύρως ἐκοινωνήσεν ἀετῷ ποτέ. Accusativus *anticipatus* non solum post verba activa ponitur, sed neutralia (ut καὶ καταγελαῖς νιν ὡς ἐνεργάφη Διὸς μηρῷ, Eur. Bacch. 286), deponentia quae intransitiva sunt (ut Πάνακτον ἐδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι Thuc. v 36), passiva (ut praeter h. l. Dem. I Aphob. p. 826 § 47, ἐγγράπτο...τὸν οἶκον ὅπως μισθώσοιτο. Xen. Cyrop. II 1. 5, τοὺς Ἕλληνας οὐδὲν πω σαφὲς λέγεται εἰ ἔπονται. Aristot. Rhet. II 9. 4....); audacius post adiectiva ut infra 1269, δεινόν γε τὸν κήρυκα...εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν. Nec alia est ratio loci Platonici τούτων οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθεῖεν ἔχεις τινα μηχανήν; III Rep. p. 415 C. Madv. Gr. Synt. citat

Xen. Anab. II 1. 5, § 159, Anm. 4." Transcribed from *adv.* on Aristoph. l.c.].

9. 5, φθονερός] Plat. Phileb. 48 B, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γ' ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

10. 11, ἀξιούμενοι] 'for whom a claim is put in.' Vid. nos ad Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 293.

12. 6, ἄμφω ταῦτα] i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνοικοι. Vid. ad Plat. Phil. p. 37 C. ["Plat. Theaet. p. 154 B, εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἔκαστον ἦν τούτων, i.e. μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμόν. Aristot. Nic. Eth. I 9=8, 13, καθ' αὐτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἔκαστον, i.e. ἡδύ, ἀγαθόν, καλόν. Rhetor. II 12. 6, καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι, i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνοικοι, 5. 17, ἢ ἔαν πλείους ὦσιν οἷς ταῦτα συμφέροι, ἢ κρείττους, ἢ ἄμφω." From Shilletto's copy of Badham's *Philebus*, l.c.].

16. 2, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι] Δαῖφάρνης δέ τις ἦν σολοικότερος ἄνθρωπος τῷ τρόπῳ, Xen. Cyrop. VIII 3. 21.

18. 3, πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνάτου καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι] Vide ne ἀναγκαῖα (aut τὸ) Ar. scripserit. In I 3. 4, προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γεγόμενα ἀναμνησκόντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες accusativus cum participiis coniungitur. In Xenoph. Agesil. XI 11, καὶ τὸ μεγαλόφρον (τῷ μεγαλόφρονι Schneider) οὐ σὺν ὕβρει ἀλλὰ σὺν γνώμῃ ἐχρήτο.

19. 21, εἰ ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἔπραξε] 'if he courted, he also succeeded.'

19. 24, συννεφεῖ] συννέφει Cobet, Var. L. p. 134.

21. 13, τὰ δεδημοσιευμένα] Vid. Thucyd. III 113. 13, IV 92. 4. δημοσιεύειν, publicare, Xen. Hellen. I 7. 10.

21. 14, ἄγαν...ἄγαν] 'in excess,' ut servetur ὁ παραλογισμός.

22. 3, τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται] 23. 12, *σῆρτα* I 7. 28, ἢ οἱ κρίνοντες ἢ οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσι.

22. 3, λεκτέον=λέγειν δεῖ, itaque postea εἶναι...συνάγειν.

22. 8, συμβουλευόντες δέ] potuit addere (post δέ) ἢ ἀποτρέποντες. Cf. I 3. 6, II 18. 4. Vid. nos ad Plat. Protag. 331 E. ["Minus negligenter scripsit, nam συμβουλευόμεν ἢ προτρέποντες ἢ ἀποτρέποντες, quanquam alibi (e. g. I 3. 6, II 18. 4) συμβουλευεῖν opponitur ἀποτρέπειν." Extracted from a long note on Protag. l.c. [τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἢ] τὸ ὅμοιον.]

22. 11, ἔχεται] passivum est ut § 16.

23. 6, προεῖτο] Plat. Gorg. p. 520 C, καὶ προεῖσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ...εἰ προεῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης. D, ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προεῖσθαι. Xenoph. Anab. VII 7. 47, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι σοὶ δόξει ἀποδοῦναι πιστεύω καὶ τὸν χρόνον διδάξειν σε, καὶ αὐτόν γε σε οὐχὶ ἀνέξεσθαι τοὺς σοὶ προεμένους εὐεργεσίαν δρῶντά σοι ἐγκαλοῦντας.]

23. 7, τοῦτό τις ἂν εἴπειεν] τις εἴπειεν Bekk. ἂν εἴπειεν A°. An ἀντείπειεν?

23. 20, οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι] κάνωσι Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 391, "καὶ τυφλῷ δῆλον legendum esse κάνωσι, ne senarius in prima sede habeat creticum." Quidni οὐκ * * | ἵνα κτάνωσι κ.τ.λ.

25. 10, ἂν οὕτως ἐλύθη] ἂν οὕτως ἐλυθῇ. Cf. infra ἂν λύσῃ.

BOOK III.

Γ 1. 6, φαντασία] Gataker ad Antonin. I § 7, p. 8.

2. 3, ἢ περὶ [λίαν] μικρῶν] 'or if one speak about very trivial matters.'

2. 8, οὐκ ἔστιν] Cf. Ethic. Nicom. III 1. 8, ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖτον.

2. 13, ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον] Quintil. X 1. 6, *cum sint aliis alia aut magis propria*.

3. 4, ἔναιμα] Lob. ad Phryn. p. 375 (ἄναιμα 3 codd. Bekkeriani). χλωρὸν αἶμα Soph. Trach. 1055, *decolorem* Cicero vertit Tusc. II 8. 20. Sed vid. Eur. Hecub. 129.

3. 4, ἐπιτείχισμα τῶν νόμων] Dem. Philipp. 41 § 5 ad q. 1. Sauppius citat de Rhod. Libert. p. 193 § 12 et locum nostrum. Errat Hemsterh. ad Lucian. Nigrin. 23, Tom. I p. 63. Eadem sententia est quae in Taciti Annal. XIV 57 et XVI 22. φρούριον ἐτειχίσθη Ἀταλάντη (Thuc. II 32); itaque Ἀταλάντην ἐπιτείχισμα τῆς Λοκρίδος appellat Diodot. XII 44.

5. 4, πότε] Dem. de fals. leg. § 260.

7. 7, γὰρ] Eth. Nic. v. 10=8. 3 πολλά γὰρ.

9. 8, ἐλθόντες ὡς ὑμᾶς] εἰσελθόντες δ' εἰς Cobet Var. Lect. p. 368. Si aequae ἐν ὑμῖν (i. e. τοῖς δικασταῖς Aphob. I. 813 § 1) et παρ' ὑμῖν § 2, et I contr. Stephan. 1101 § 1, alibi, dicitur; quidni aequae dicatur εἰς ὑμᾶς et ὡς ὑμᾶς? Vide etiam ne ἐλθόντες possit defendi Aphob. I. c. εἰς δ' ὑμᾶς τοὺς οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀκριβῶς ἐπισταμένους ἐλήλυθεν.

11. 6, θράττει σε] Cobet Nov. Lect. p. 655 "Quid igitur erat quod diceret quum θράττει σε videretur dicere? Nempe Θράττει εἰ, e Thessa natus es, ut satis Aristoteles ipse confirmat addens, εἰ μὴ...εἶναι."

11. 13, μύωπα] *Iuscitiosum* (Gell. IV 2). Arist. XXXI Probl. 8, διὰ τί οἱ μύωπες μικρὰ γράμματα γράφουσι; ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ μὴ δέξιν ὀρώντας ποιεῖν ἔργον δέξιν ὀρώντων· πότερον ὅτι μέγαλα φαίνεται τὰ μικρὰ ἐὰν ᾗ ἐγγύς· οἱ δὲ προσάγοντες γράφουσιν; ἢ διὰ τὸ συνάγοντας τὰ βλέφαρα γράφειν; cf. 15 et 16... [From Shilleto's older copy].

11. 14, ὁ Καρπάθιος...τὸν γλαῶ] "In Iceland, the reindeer were introduced by the Danish Government about the middle of the last century; but they are understood to have proved a nuisance instead of a benefit. They have not the wolf to check the tendency of their population to exceed the means of subsistence, and they have multiplied so as to devour the summer pastures on which the inhabitants depend for their cattle; and having been allowed to run wild they are of no use." Laing, *Norway* p. 418.

14. 6, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που] An ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προῖοντι γέ που?

19. 1, ἐπιχαλκεύειν] "auditoris animum sibi conformare et conciliare," —velut "incude formare." [From Shilleto's older copy.]

GREEK INDEX

TO TEXT AND NOTES.

The references are to Book, Chapter, and Section.

a 2. 4ⁿ refers specially to the *note*;

β 7. 4n¹ indicates the *notes in small print* at the foot of the page.

ap. for *apud* denotes words and phrases *quoted* by Aristotle.

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ἀνάγεσθαι	α 4. 3	ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας	β 6. 13
ἀναγκαῖον	β 25. 9, 10; γ 15. 3	Ἄναξαγόρας	β 23. 11
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν	α 11. 4	Ἄναξανδρίδον λαμβεῖον	γ 10. 7 e
ἀναγκαῖα	α 2. 17	Ἄναξανδρίδου γεροντομανία	γ 12. 3
ἀναγκαῖα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ	α 2. 14	τὸ Ἄναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον	γ 11. 8
ἀναγκαῖων	β 25. 10	ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις	β 9. 1
μὴ ἀναγκαῖων ἡδονῶν	α 10. 9	ἀνάπαλιν	α 7. 12
δι' ἀνάγκην	α 12. 14	ἀναπαύσεις	α 11. 4
πάντα ἀναδιδῶσι	β 15. 3	ἀναπηρία	β 8. 10
		ἀναπνεῖ	α 2. 18

ἀνασκευάζειν	β 24. 4	four varieties of ἀντικείμενα (note)	
κώπης ἀνάσσει	αφ. γ 2. 10		β 19. 1 ^a
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ἀνάσχετος	γ 11. 8	ἀντίκρουσις	γ 9. 6
ἀνατρέψαι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς	β 23. 11	ἀντιλέγοντας	β 3. 5
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ἀνδρία	α 5. 6	ἀντιπαθεῖν	β 4. 31; 5. 8
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ἀνεγκλήτους	α 4. 11	ἀντιποιούντες	β 2. 5
ἀνείκασι	β 13. 14	ἀντιποιούσιν	β 2. 7
ἀνελεύθερος	α 10. 4	ἀντιπράττειν	β 2. 9
ἀνελεύθεροι	β 13. 5	Ἀντισθένης	γ 4. 3
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ἀνελπίστων	β 5. 14	ἀντίστροφος	α 1. 1
ἄνεσις	α 11. 29	ἀντιστρόφον	γ 9. 6
ἄνευ τύχης	α 5. 15	ἀντιστρόφοις ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν	γ 9. 1
ἀρέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον	α 13. 18	ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι	β 25. 2; γ 17. 15
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τῶν ἀνθρώπων	α 5. 10	ἀντιτείνοντας	β 4. 19
αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικὰς	α 2. 7	ἀντιφιλούμενος	β 4. 2
ἀνιαρόν	αφ. α 11. 4	ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος Πλήξιππος	β 2. 19
ἀνιάσι	γ 14. 9	Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής	β 6. 27
ἀνιέμεναι...ἐπιτεινόμεναι	α 4. 12 ^a	ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος	β 23. 20
ἀνομολογούμενα	β 22. 15 ^a ; 23. 23 (bis)	ἀνύειν	γ 9. 3
ἀνταγωνισταί	β 5. 9	ἀνυπερβλήτως	α 11. 13
ἀνταγωνιστάς	β 10. 6	ἀνωμαλίσθαι	γ 11. 5
ἀνταγωνιστεῖν	γ 15. 10	φρῆν ἀνώματος	αφ. γ 15. 8
ἀνταποδιδόναι	γ 4. 4; 5. 2	ἀνώνυμον	γ 2. 12; 3. 3
ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον	α 9. 24	τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν	α 13. 16
τὴν ἴσιν ἀνταποδιδούσιν	β 2. 17	ἀξιοῖσιν	α 2. 4; 9. 1
ἀντεραστάς	β 10. 6	ἀξίωμα	β 17. 4
ἀντενποιεῖν τὸν εὐποιήσαντα	α 13. 12	ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα	γ 2. 1
ἀντιδιαβάλλειν	γ 15. 7	ἀόριστος αἰτία	α 10. 12
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ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι	γ 15. 2, 3	ἀπαθεῖ	β 1. 4
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ἀπαλλοτριῶσιν, δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν	α 5. 7	ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔδωκαν	β 7. 5
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ἀπηνθηκότα	γ 10. 2	ἀποδοθησόμενος (σύνδεσμος)	γ 5. 2
μακρὰν ἀπαρτᾶν	γ 5. 2	ἀποδοκιμάζεται	γ 12. 2 c
ἀπαταῖσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον	α 10. 4	τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν	β 23. 12
ἀπειληφότα	α 11. 3	ἀποκάμπτοντες	γ 9. 6
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δι' ἀπειρίαν	α 13. 13	ἀπόλαυσις	β 11. 4
ἄπειρον	γ 6. 7	πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν	α 5. 11
τὸ ἄπειρον	γ 8. 2; 9. 2	ἀπολαυστικός	α 5. 7; 9. 23
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ἀπελευθερούμενος	γ 8. 1	ἀπονεύεσθαι	α 1. 11
ἀπέραντος	γ 8. 1; 9. 3	ἀπονίαι	α 11. 4
ἂ ἀπεχθίζονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς	α 6. 29	ἀποπλάνησιν	γ 13. 5
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ἀπο- and de-, verbs compounded with,		ἀπόφησιν	γ 11. 7
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τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολὰς	α 6. 4	ἀπρέπεια	β 6. 2
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ἀποδέξαιτ' ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος	β 21. 15	ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ	α 1. 5
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	24. 1	ἐξαμαρτᾶν	α 15. 23
		ἐξαπατᾶ	γ 11. 6

ἐξαριθμεῖν	γ 9. 9	ἐπίzeugται	γ 9. 7
ἐξειλεγμένοι	β 22. 16	ἐπεῖ...ὁ δὲ	α 1. 11; β 25. 10
ἐξω	β 22. 16	ἐπείρασε	β 19. 21
ἀπὸ ἐξως	α 1. 2; note on α 11. 2	ἐπεισοδιῶν ἐπαίνοισ	γ 17. 11
ἐξεί	γ 7. 6	γινώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλη	γ 3. 3
ἐξείς	α 6. 9; β 12. 2; γ 7. 6	ἐπεξέλεγχος	αφ. γ 13. 5
κατὰ τὰς ἐξείς πράττειν	α 10. 9	ἐπεξελεθῆν	α 12. 4, 19, 20
ἐξεδρυσ	αφ. γ 3. 3	ἐπεξιέναι	α 12. 24, 35
ἐξετάζειν	α 1. 1	ἐπεργάσασθαι...δημοσίαν	α 13. 9
ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως	β 15. 3	ἐπερωτῆσαι	γ 18. 5
ἐξίστησιν	γ 8. 1	ἔπεται ἢ τῷ ἅμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ	δυνάμει
ἐξίστηται	γ 17. 10		α 7. 5
ἐξέστηκε	γ 2. 3	ἐπηρεάζων	β 2. 4
ἐξω (τοῖς ἐκτός) τοῦ πράγματος	α 1. 9, 10, 11	ἐπηρεασμός	β 2. 4; 4. 30
ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν	α 1. 9	ἐπι-, adjectives compounded with, expressing tendency or liability to,	β 4. 13 ⁿ
ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς	α 1. 8	ἐπι-, verbs compounded with, implying	
ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ	α 4. 9	reciprocity,	α 13. 9 ⁿ
ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι	β 6. 11	ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν	α 6. 22
ἐπαγγελμα	β 24. 11	ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνειν	γ 15. 10
ἐπαγγελτικώτερον	β 23. 12	ἐπιβουλεύειν	α 7. 13
ἐπάγοντα	α 2. 8	ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι	α 2. 19
ἐπαγωγή	α 2. 8, 9	ἐπίβουλος	α 9. 28; β 21. 14
ἐπαγωγή (ἀρχή)	β 20. 2	ἐπιγαμίαι	α 14. 5
οὐκ οἰκείον ῥητορικοῖς	β 20. 9	οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι	α 15. 21
δι' ἐπαγωγῆς	β 25. 8	ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν	α 13. 9
(τόπος) ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς	β 23. 11	τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονικῇ	α 7. 32
ἐπαγωγήν ῥητορικὴν	α 2. 8	ἐπιδέδωκεν	α 15. 15
ἐπαίειν	α 4. 12	ἡ ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη	γ 12. 5
περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίειν	α 4. 13	ἐπιδεικτικόν	α 3. 3
ἐπαινεῖν ἄψυχα	α 9. 2	ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι	α 3. 9
ἐπαινούντι μικρὸν μακρῶς		ἐπιδεκάτων (τόκων)	αφ. γ 10. 7 e
ψέξει μέγα συντόμως	γ 15. 10	ἐπιδέξιοι	β 4. 13
τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις ἐπαινουμένων	α 9. 26	ἐπιδήλοισ (ἐπιθέτοις)	γ 3. 3
τὸ ἐπαινετόν	α 6. 24	ἐπιδιήγησις	αφ. γ 13. 5
ἐπαινος	α 3. 3	ἐπίδοξον πολεμῆν	α 4. 9
ἐπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς	α 9. 33	ἐπιδραμεῖν	α 15. 1
ἐπακολουθοῦσι	α 10. 10	ἐπικέες	α 13. 13, 19; 15. 6
ἐπαναφέρουσιν	α 3. 5	ἐπικέες ὁ ζῆλος	β 11. 1
ἐπαναφέροντες	α 8. 5	ἐπικεῖς	β 1. 6
ἐπαναφέρειν	α 15. 26	τοῦ ἐπικεῖτος τυχεῖν	α 12. 15
ἐπάνοδος	γ 13. 3	ἐπικεῖας τυχεῖν	α 12. 28
ἐπανορθοῦν	α 11. 22	τὴν ἐπικεῖαν τοῦ λέγοντος	α 2. 4
ἐπανορθώσασθαι	β 23. 1	ἐπικεῖσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάττον	α. 2. 4
ἐπανορθώσεις	β 5. 17	τοῖς ἐπικεῖσιν ὡς δικαιοτέροις	α 15. 4
ἐπάρηται	α 13. 13	ἐπιzeugνύνειν	γ 5. 7
ἐπάταξε	α 13. 10		

ἐπιζευγυής	γ 5. 7	ἐπίτροπος	γ 8. 1
ἐπιζευγύναι	γ 6. 5	ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ	γ 11. 5
ἐπιζήμιος	α 14. 7; β 23. 21	ἐπιφανείς	α 5. 5
ἐπιθέσεις ποιέσθαι	γ 2. 14	ἐπίφθονον	γ 17. 15
τὰ ἐπίθετα	γ 2. 9; 3. 3; 7. 11	ἐπιχαλκεῖν	γ 19. 1
ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις	α 11. 5	Ἐπίχαρμος	α 7. 31; γ 9. 10
ἐπιθυμία...βούλησις	β 19. 19"	ἐπιχαίρεκάκος	β 9. 5
ἐπιθυμητικοί	β 12. 3; 13. 13	ἐπιχαίρουσι	β 2. 20
ἐπικεχεῖρηται	γ 1. 3	ἐποικοδομεῖν	α 7. 31
τοῦ ἐπικτήτου	α 7. 33	(τόπος) παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον	β 24. 7
ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν	γ 16. 10	ἐποποιοί	γ 3. 3
ἐπιλέγεσθαι	β 20. 9	ἔπος καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταυτό	β 24. 3
ἐπιλέλησται	β 19. 17	ἐπούρωσις	αφ. γ 13. 5
ἐπίλογος	γ 13. 3; 4; 19. 1	ἔπτατ' οἷστός	αφ. γ 11. 3
ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος	γ 19. 6	ἔργον	α 2. 12
ἐπίλογος ('a supplementary addition')		αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ τέκνα	α 11. 26
	β 20. 9	ἔργον θητικόν	α 9. 26
ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι	β 17. 3	πρὸ ἔργου (δῖς)	α 1. 10
ἐπιμελοῦς τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν	α 12. 19	τὰ ἔργα σημεία τῆς ἕξεως	α 9. 33
Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής	γ 17. 10	ἐπὶ Ἑργοφίλου	β 3. 13
ἐπίπεδον	γ 6. 1	ἐρείπιον, ῥάκος οἰκίας	γ 11. 13
ἐπίπλων κτήσις	α 5. 7	ἔρις	γ 19. 2
ἐπιπόλαιος	γ 10. 4, 6; 11. 10	ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς,	β 24. 10
ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν	α 15. 22; β 16. 1	ἐριστική	β 24. 11
ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι	β 23. 30	ἐριστικοί	γ 14. 1
ἐπιπτεσθαι μενεαίνων	αφ. γ 11. 3	ἐριστικά παιδιαί	α 11. 15
ἐπισιτισαμένους	γ 10. 7b	κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς	β 24. 2
ἐπισκευάζων	α 4. 6	ἐρυθροδάκτυλος ἡώς	γ 2. 13
ἐπισκοτεῖν	γ 3. 3	ἐρυθρόν	γ 11. 15
ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει	α 1. 7	περὶ ἐρωτήσεως	γ 18. 1
ἐπιστήμη ἀφωρισμένη	α 1. 1	ἔρως	Appendix (A) vol. I p. 293
κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην	α 1. 14	ἔρωτος ἀρχή	α 11. 11
ἐπιστήμαι	β 19. 8	ἐσθῆτας τῶν πεπονθότων	β 8. 16
ἐπιστητόν	β 24. 10; γ 17. 10	περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου	β 19. 23
ἐπισυστελλόμενον	γ 2. 3	ἐσπουδασμένοι παιδιαί	α 11. 15
ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ	γ 10. 7i	ἔστω (popular def.)	α 5. 3"; 6. 2; 7. 2;
ἐπιτεινόμεναι	α 4. 12"		10. 3; β 3. 2; 4. 1; 5. 1; 6. 2; 7. 2;
ἐπιτείχισμα νόμων	αφ. γ 3. 4		8. 2
ἐλλιπῇ ἐπιτελεῖν	α 11. 22	ἐταιρεία	β 4. 28
ἐπιτηδεῖους τόπους	α 4. 10	ἐτερόφθαλμος	α 7. 41; γ 10. 7a
ἐπιτήδευμα	β 23. 18	ἔτλησαν	αφ. γ 7. 11
ἐπιτηδεύοντες ταῦτα	β 4. 21	εὖ ποιῇ	γ 2. 6
ἐπιτηροῦσιν δίκην	α 12. 5	Εὐαγόρας	β 23. 12
ἐπιτηρεῖν δίκην	α 12. 25	εὐαλαζόνευτα	β 15. 2
τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδύ	α 11. 27	εὐανάγνωστος	γ 5. 6
ἐπιτιμῆσεως	α 1. 12	εὐανάνευστος (λέξις)	γ 9. 5
ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς θεοῖς	α 15. 31	εὐβάστακτα	α 12. 34
ἐπιτρίτων τόκων	αφ. γ 10. 7e	Εὐβουλος	α 15. 15

εὐγενές...γενναῖον	β 15. 3	εὐλαβούμενον	γ 3. 7
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εὐγενείας ἦθος	β 15. 2	εὐμαθής (<i>bis</i>)	γ 9. 3
εὐγῆρια	α 5. 15	εὐμαθῇ	γ 19. 4
εὐγῆρως	α 5. 15	εὐμάθεια	α 6. 15
εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς	α 5. 3	εὐμετάβολοι	β 12. 4
εὐδαιμονία	α 5. 1; 6. 8	εὐμετάβλητα	α 12. 34
εὐδαιμονισμός	α 9. 34	εὐμνημόνευτος	γ 9. 3; 13. 3
εὐδιάβολος	α 12. 22	εὐμνημονεντότερα	α 9. 25
εὐδοκμεῖ τὰ ἐλεγκτικά τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων	β 23. 30	εὐνοια	β 1. 5
εὐδοκμοῦντα	γ 10. 1	ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις (τῶν πολέων)	α 1. 4
εὐδοκμοῦντι νόμῳ	α 15. 9	Εὐξένοφ γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ ἐπισταμένῳ	γ 4. 3
εὐδόκιμοι	β 4. 11	περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως	γ 7. 2
εὐδοξία	α 5. 8	εὐπαρακολούθητον	α 2. 13
εὐέλεγκτα	γ 17. 15	εὐπαρόρμητοι	β 2. 10
εὐέλπιδι	β 1. 4	εὐπιστοι	β 12. 7
εὐέλπιδες	β 12. 8, 9	τὸ εὐποιητικὸν ἡδύ	α 11. 22
εὐεξαπάτητοι	β 12. 8	εὐποιητικὸς τῶν ἄλλων	β 2. 25; 4. 8
εὐεπακολούθητον	α 2. 13	εὐποιητικὸς εἰς χρήματα	β 4. 8
εὐεργασία	α 5. 9	εὐπορήσομεν	β 26. 5
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 19	εὐπραγαίαι	α 9. 19
εὐεργετήματα	α 9. 20	εὔρηται καὶ κατασκευάσθη (perf. and aor. combined)	α 9. 38 ^a
εὐεργετικὴ δύναμις	α 9. 4	Εὐριπίδης	γ 2. 5; 14. 6
εὐεργετικῆς δόξης	α 5. 9	Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα	γ 15. 8
εὐήθεις...κακοήθεις	β 12. 7 ⁿ	Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις	β 6. 20
εὐήθη	γ 1. 9; 12. 2	Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη	β 23. 29
ἐν εὐήμεριᾳ	β 3. 12	Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου	γ 2. 10
εὐθεώρητα	α 15. 25	εὐρυθμος λέξις	γ 8. 7
εὐθνήια κτημάτων	α 5. 3	εὐρυμέδων αἰθήρ	αφ. α 13. 2
Εὐθυδήμου λόγος	β 24. 3	ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν	γ 12. 3
εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ἀτυχίαις	β 2. 20	εὐστοχος	γ 11. 5
Εὐθύνος	β 19. 14	εὐσυλλογιστότερα	α 1. 12
εὐθύνas διδῶσιν	γ 10. 7 ⁿ	εὐσύνθετος λόγος	γ 3. 3
εὐθύνas δοῦναι (<i>bis</i>)	γ 10. 7 ^b	μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον	γ 9. 3
εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία	γ 10. 7 ⁿ	εὐσύνοπτον	γ 12. 5
εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας	γ 18. 6	εὐσχίμων βαρύτης	β 17. 4
εὐθύς	α 10. 10; 11. 15	εὐτεκνία	α 5. 4, 5
κατ' εὐθυρίαν	β 2. 9	εὐτελεῖς	β 15. 3
εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι	γ 7. 8	εὐτελῇ ὀνόματα καὶ πράγματα	γ 7. 2
εὐκατάλλακτος	β 4. 17	εὐτραπεία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις	β 12. 16
τὰ εὐκατέργαστα	α 6. 29	εὐτράπελοι	β 12. 16; 13. 15
εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν	β 2. 11, 12	εὐτυχήματα	α 5. 17
εὐκολοι	β 4. 12	εὐτυχία	α 5. 4, 17; β 17. 5
Εὐκτῆμων	α 14. 3	εὐφραστος	γ 5. 6
εὐλαβεῖς	α 12. 19	εὐφνεῖς	α 6. 29
τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον	α 9. 28	εὐφνᾶ γένη	β 15. 3
εὐλαβεῖται	α 12. 6	εὐφνουῖς	γ 10. 1

εὐφύια	α 6. 15	ἡδονή (def.)	α 11. 1
εὐχέσθαι...πτωχεύειν	γ 2. 10	τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι	α 6. 7
ὁσμὴν [εὐωδίας]	α 11. 5	ἡδὺ μεμνησθαι πόνων	αβ. α 11. 8
ἐφαρμόττειν	α 15. 10	τὸ ἡδύ	γ 2. 8
ἐφεξῆς α 7. 1; β 15. 10; γ 16. 1, 2; 17. 6		ἡδὺν ἰδεῖν	α 5. 11
ἔφσιν	β 4. 31 n ²	ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι	α 6. 7
ἐφιεμένους	β 10. 6	ἡδέα	α 11. 8
πάντα ἐφίεται τὰ ζῶα τῆς ἡδόνης	α 6. 7	τῶν ἡδέων	α 11. 22
ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου	αβ. γ 10. 7 c	τῶν ἡδέων (τι)	α 11. 4"
ἐφορία	γ 18. 6	ἡδεσθαι	α 11. 6
ἐφ' ὑμῖν	α 4. 3	ἡδιον	α 7. 23
ἔχσθαι ταῖς δίψαις	α 11. 10	(τι) τῶν ἡδίστων	α 11. 16
ἐχόμενον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν	γ 1. 2	ἡδύσματι...ἐδέσματι	γ 3. 3
ἐχόμενος	γ 8. 4	ἡθος (τί ποιεῖ)	γ 16. 8
ἔχθρα...ὀργή	β 4. 31	ἡθος ἔχοντες λόγοι	β 21. 16
ἔχθρας (ποιητικά)	β 4. 30	ἡθει τοῦ λέγοντος (note on ἡθος and	
ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι	α 9. 24	πάθος)	α 2. 3
τοὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχθροῦς	β 4. 7	ἡθη, three kinds of, notes on, α 8.6; γ 7.6	
ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν	α 6. 24	ἡθους	α 2. 4
ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα	β 21. 11	ἡθικὴ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις	γ 7. 6
ἐχίνος	β 20. 6	ἡθικὴ πίστις	α 2. 3
		ἡθικὴ λέξις	γ 7. 1
ζῆλος (def.)	β 11. 1	ἡθικοὶ λόγοι (διὰ τίνων γίνονται)	
ζῆλος	γ 19. 2		β 18. 1; 21. 16
ζηλουμένοις	α 5. 5	ἡθικά (τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἡθει)	γ 16. 9
ζηλοῦσθαι	β 4. 24	ἡθικῶς	γ 17. 12
ζηλωτοί	β 11. 5	τὸν ἡλίθιον χρηστόν	α 9. 28
ζηλωτά	β 11. 4	ἡλιξ ἡλικά τέρπει	αβ. α 11. 25
ζηλωταί, θυμασταί,	β 6. 24	ἡλικες	β 6. 12
ζηλωτικοί	β 11. 1, 3	ἡλικίαι	β 2. 11; 12. 2
ζημοῦν μικροῖς	α 12. 4	ἡμέρα πρώτη	β 12. 8
ζῆν ἀφ' ἐτέρων	β 4. 9	τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ	β 13. 8
πρὸς ἄλλον	α 9. 28	ἡμιόλιος	γ 8. 4
πρὸς τὸ σύμφερον	β 13. 9	κατὰ τὸ ἡμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσιν	α 5. 6
πρὸς τὸ καλόν	β 14. 2	ἡμωβελία	α 14. 1
τῇ ἐλπίδι	β 12. 8	ἦν (was defined to be)	α 6. 23; 7. 7, 8, 28;
τῷ ἡθει	β 12. 12		β 7. 5; 13. 15; γ 2. 6
τῇ μνήμῃ	β 13. 12	ἡνεκέως	αβ. α 13. 2
κατὰ λογισμόν	β 13. 14	ἡνεμοεῖς λόφος	αβ. γ 6. 7
πρὸς οὐς ζῶσιν	α 12. 28	Ἡρακλείαις στήλαις	β 10. 5
Ζήνωνι	α 12. 10	Ἡρακλειδῶν	β 22. 6
ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ	αβ. γ 11. 13, 15	τὰ Ἡρακλείτου	γ 5. 6
ἦ alternative, prefixed to interrogative sentences,	β 6. 27	ἡρεμήσις ὀργῆς	β 3. 2
ἦδη	α 1. 7 (ὅς)"; 6. 22, 24; β 2. 12; 6. 12 (ὅς)	Ἡρόδοτος (II 30)	γ 16. 5
		Ἡροδότου Θουρίου	γ 9. 2"
ἦδη διαφέρει	α 10. 11	ὁ ἡρῶς (ῥυθμός) σεμνός	γ 8. 4
		ἡρρώστηκεν	α 12. 6
		ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν	β 24. 11

ἤττους τοῦ θυμοῦ	β 12. 5	ἔργον θητικόν	α 9. 26
τοῦ κερδαίνειν	β 5. 7	θλίβειν	α 5. 14
		θορυβούνται	α 2. 10
θαρραλέα	β 5. 17	ἐθορύβησαν	β 23. 22
θαρραλέον ἡ ὀργή	β 5. 21	θορυβεῖται	β 23. 30
θαρρεῖν, θύρσος	β 5. 16, 14. 1	καταπλήττουσι θορυβοῦντες	γ 7. 5
τὰ μέλλοντα	β 5. 18	θορυβοῦσιν	γ 18. 4
τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδύ	α 11. 21	Θρασύβουλος	β 23. 25
θαυμάζουσι	α 6. 29	Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκά-	
τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδύ	α 11. 18	λει	β 23. 29
τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐπιθυμητόν	α 11. 21	Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις	γ 1. 7
ἡδύ τὸ θαυμαστόν	γ 2. 3	Θρασύμαχος	γ 11. 13
θαυμασταί	β 6. 24; γ 2. 3	Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον	β 23. 29
Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις	α 2. 19	ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου	γ 8. 4
θέλειν (for usual prose form ἐθέλειν)		τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρείον	α 9. 29
εἰ θέλεις	γ 16. 3	θρασυτής	β 14. 1
διδόναι θέλει	α 15. 32	θράττει	αφ. γ 11. 6
τὸ θέλειν	α 15. 31	θρηνεῖν...θύνει	β 23. 27
μὲν θέλει	α 15. 32	τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοῖναις γνώμαις	
μὴ θέλει	α 15. 32		β 21. 11"
μὴ θέλειν	α 15. 30, 32	τὸ θρυλούμενον	γ 7. 9
θέλωσιν	β 24. 7	διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ὀργήν	α 10. 17
θεμέλιος	β 19. 25	οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς	β 13. 13
Θεμστοκλῆς	α 15. 14	θυμικοί	β 12. 5
-θεν, peculiar use of words ending in,		θυμώδεις	β 12. 9
	α 11. 16"	τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν	αφ. α 6. 23
Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ νόμῳ	β 23. 17	θυσσάμενους	β 21. 11
Αἴας ὁ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 20, 24	θυσιαί	α 5. 9
Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 3"		
ἐκ νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 11	εἰς τὸ ἱαμβεῖον μετέβησαν	γ 1. 9
ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου	β 23. 13	ἱαμβεῖα φθέγγονται	γ 8. 4
ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις	γ 9. 9	ἱαμβος ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν	γ 8. 4
Θεόδωρος	γ 11. 6	ἱασις	α 14. 2
περὶ Θεόδωρον	γ 13. 5	Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς	α 12. 31
ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη	β 23. 28	ἱατὸν χρόνῳ	β 4. 31
τὸ Θεοδώρου	γ 11. 6	ἱατρεύματα	γ 14. 7
Θεοδώρου φωνή	γ 2. 4"	ἱατρικὴ	α 2. 1
θερίζειν κακῶς	αφ. γ 3. 4	ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι	β 2. 13
θερμοί	β 13. 7	ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος	α 15. 21
ὁ θεωρός	α 3. 2	ἴδιος νόμος	α 10. 3; 13. 2
θεωρήματα	α 4. 4	τὰ ἴδια ἀγαθὰ	α 6. 28
Θηβαίους διείναι Φίλιππον	β 23. 6	τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις ἴδια καλὰ	α 9. 26
τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος	β 23. 3	ἴδια	β 22. 12
ἔγνω θῆρ θῆρα	αφ. α 11. 25	ἴδια ὀνόματα	γ 5. 3
θηρεύειν	β 21. 15	ιδιώτην	β 23. 5
θηρευτικὴ	α 11. 15	ιδιωτικοὶ	γ 12. 2 c
τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα μείζον	α 14. 5	Ἰδριεύς	γ 4. 3
τὸν θησαυρὸν εὔρεν	α 5. 17	ἵεναι εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν	α 11. 3

ἱεροσυλεῖν	α 7. 5; 13. 9	καινὰ λέγειν	γ 11. 6
ἱέρων	β 16. 2	καιροὶ	α 7. 32
ἱκανὸν	α 5. 11	καιροὶ αἴτιοι	α 5. 9
ἱκετηρίαν	γ 10. 7 ^l	τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι	β 7. 3
ἱματιδάριον	αφ. γ 2. 15	κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους	α 6. 20
Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου	γ 16. 11	κακοῖθεις...εὐθεις	β 12. 7 ⁿ
Ἰππίας	α 2. 11	κακοῖθεις, κακοῖθεια	β 13. 3
Ἰππόλοχος	α 9. 38	κακοηθιστέον	γ 15. 10
τὴν Ἰσην (μοῖραν)	β 2. 17 ⁿ	κακολόγοι	β 4. 18; 6. 20
Ἰσοθμίων πανήγυρις	αφ. γ 3. 3	κακοπαθεῖν	β 20. 6
Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου	β 23. 11	κακουργεῖ παρὰ ταύτας	γ 2. 7
Ἰσοκράτης	α 9. 38	κακοῦργον	α 1. 10
	β 19. 14; 23. 18	κακουργία	β 12. 15; 13. 14
γ 10. 7 ⁱ ; 11. 7; 17. 10; 17. 16 (dis)		κακουργικά	β 16. 4
(Paneg. § 1)	γ 14. 2	σώματος κακώσεσι	β 7. 3; 8. 9
ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ	γ 7. 11	καλάμη γῆρας	αφ. γ 10. 2
Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον	γ 14. 1	Καλλίας	α 2. 11; β 4. 31; γ 2. 10
περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης Ἰσοκράτης	β 23. 12	καλλιποῖτο	γ 2. 3
Ἰσοκράτης (Evagoras)	β 23. 12	Κάλλιππος	α 12. 29
ἱστορίαι	α 4. 13	Καλλίππου τεχνή	β 23. 14, 21
ἱστορικὸν τῶν παρ' ἄλλοις εὐρημένων		Καλλισθένης	β 3. 13
	α 4. 8	Καλλίστρατος	α 7. 13; 14. 1; γ 17. 14
ἰσχυρὸς	α 5. 12	κάλλος	α 5. 11
ἰσχυρῶς	β 2. 14	κάλλος ὀνόματος	γ 2. 13
ἰσχύς (def.)	α 5. 12	καλλωπιστής	β 24. 7
τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα	β 13. 2	καλόν (defined)	α 9. 3
Ἰταλιῶται	β 23. 11	τὰ καλὰ...δύο γένη	α 6. 7
Ἰφικράτης	β 21. 2; 23. 8, 17	μεταφορὰς ἀπὸ καλῶν	γ 2. 13
	γ 2. 10; 10. 7 ^c , ^h ; 15. 2	ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσιν	γ 9. 2
ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον	β 23. 6	καμπύλῳ	β 21. 2
πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα	β 23. 7	κἂν εἰ	α 1. 5 ⁿ
Ἰφικράτης (ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρχε ταῦτα)	α 7. 32	κανὼν στρεβλὸς	α 1. 5
τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, ἐξ οἷων εἰς οἷα, α 9. 31		καπηλεία	γ 10. 7
		Καρκίνου Μηδεία	β 23. 28
καθάπερ	α 2. 10	ὁ Καρπάθιος τὸν λαγὼ	γ 11. 14
καθάριος μοιχός	γ 15. 5	κάρπιμα	α 5. 7
καθαρίους	β 4. 15	κατὰ ('in the case of')	α 7. 21
καθίζοντες	β 3. 6	κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν	α 4. 4
καθόλου, opp. το κατὰ μέρος		καταβάλλει ἄλληλα	γ 17. 6
	α 1. 7; 2. 15 ^{ter} , 18	καταγελᾶν	β 2. 12
καθόλου	α 2. 9; 13. 13; β 25. 8	καταδικάζειν	α 15. 28
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου	α 2. 19	κατακορή	γ 3. 3
καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου	α 3. 9	κατακόρως	γ 7. 7
τὸ καθ' ἑκάστων καθόλου	α 2. 18	καταλλακτικώτερος	α 9. 31
καθόλου μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν	β 21. 10	καταλλάττεσθαι	α 9. 24; 12. 24
καὶ, δὲ and τε	α 4. 4 ⁿ	καταμαντεύομενοι τὰ μέλλοντα	α 9. 40
καὶ...δὲ	α 6. 23 ⁿ ; β 22. 3; 23. 18	καταντικρὺ	γ 19. 5
καὶ...καὶ	γ 1. 3, 9	καταπαύεσθαι	α 12. 25

καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς	γ 7. 5	κεχρονικότες	β 3. 13
καταπραΰνειν	β 3. 17	Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτόν	γ 4. 3
κατασιωπᾶν	γ 12. 1	Κηφισόδοτος	γ 10. 7 <i>a, f, g</i>
κατασκευάζειν	α 4. 6; 15. 21	τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον	α 15. 7
κατασκευάζειν τοιοῦτους	β 2. 27	οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος	β 15. 3
κατασκευάζει	β 1. 7	τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας	αφ. γ 10. 7 <i>k</i>
κατασκευασθῆναι	α 2. 2	κίνδυνος	β 5. 2
τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν	β 26. 3	κινδυνευτικός	α 9. 29
κατάστασις	β 3. 2	κινεῖν ἕτερον	α 5. 12
κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν	α 11. 1	κινῆσαι	γ 1. 8
καταφρόνησις	β 2. 3; 11. 7	κοία κίνησις ἡ ψυχῇ	β 23. 13
καταφρονητικός	β 2. 24; 11. 7; 15. 2	κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς	α 11. 1
καταφρονεῖσθαι	β 2. 17	Κλεοφῶν	α 15. 13; γ 7. 2
καταψεύδεσθαι	α 15. 26	κλέπτεται εὖ	γ 2. 5
ῥαδίως καταψευδόμενοι ὡς πανσόφιοι	α 15. 26	κλέπτεται	γ 7. 10
κατελιγμένας (τέχνας)	α 2. 20	τὸν κλέψαντα λαβεῖν	γ 2. 10
κατεπιεῖν	β 5. 7; γ 15. 10	κέκλεπται	γ 2. 10
κατελθεῖν	β 23. 13	Κλέων (<i>quiliβet</i>)	β 2. 2; γ 5. 2
(λέξις) κατεστραμμένην	γ 9. 1, 3	Κλέων	γ 8. 1
κατευορκήσαντας	αφ. γ 3. 1	κληρουχία	β 6. 24
κατέχειν	α 5. 14	κληρῶ διανεμόνται τὰς ἀρχάς	α 8. 4
κατεψυγμένοι, κατάψυξις	β 13. 7	οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἀρχειν	β 20. 4
κατηγόρει	α 14. 1	τῷ κοινῷ	α 5. 6
κατηγορία	α 3. 3	κοιῇ	α 6. 16
περὶ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας	α 10. 1	κοινὸν δίκαιον	α 13. 2
κατοικτεῖρειν	β 20. 6	κοινὸς νόμος	α 13. 2
κάτοπτρον βίου	αφ. γ 3. 1	κοινὰ γινώμμαι	β 21. 11
κατορθοῦντες	β 2. 10	κοινὰ πιστεῖς	β 20. 1
ἐν κατορθώσει	β 3. 12	κοινὰ	β 22. 12
κατάρθωσαν	α 6. 29	κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς	β 24. 2
κατάρθωκεν	α 9. 38; β 5. 18	τοὺς κοινούς ὁμοίως πάντων	α 2. 22
Καύνιος ἔρωσ	β 25. 4	κοινότερον	α 1. 10
καχύποπτοι	β 13. 3	κοινωνία	α 13. 2
κατωμόσατο	α 15. 28	κοινωνικός	β 24. 2
κείμενοι...τιθέμενοι	α 15. 23	κολακείας σημεία	β 6. 8
κειμένους νόμους α 1. 7; κείσθαι νόμον		ὁ κόλαξ ἡδύ	α 11. 18
α 15. 12		κόλασις ἡσῖς	α 14. 2
κεκτῆσθαι...χρησθαι	α 5. 7	κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἔνεκα	α 10. 17
κενολογεῖν	β 19. 27	κόλασις οἰκετῶν	β 3. 5
κενόν	γ 13. 5	κόλλησιν	γ 2. 12
κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ	αφ. β 4. 21; 10. 6	κολοβὸν ποιεῖν	γ 8. 6
κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ ἀπ' αἰσχρῶν	β 6. 5	ἀεὶ κολοῖός παρὰ κολοῖον	αφ. α 11. 25
συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια	β 24. 2	κομᾶν καλόν, ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι,	α 9. 26
κεφαλαιωδῶς	γ 14. 8; 19. 4	κομῶντα	γ 11. 13
ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ	β 16. 3	ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη	β 24. 11
κεφαλῆς	β 19. 10	κορδακικώτερος (ῥυθμός)	γ 8. 4
κεχρημένος	β 23. 12	κοσμεῖν	γ 2. 10

κεκοσμημένην (λέξιν)	γ 2. 2	κώρυκος	αβ. γ 11. 13, 15
κόσμος	γ 7. 2		
κόσμοι	β 23. 8	λαῶς ἀναιδής	αβ. γ 11. 3
κότον ἔχειν	β 2. 7	λαβεῖν (grasp with the mind)	β 22. 4
κοττάβια	α 12. 30	λαθητικοὶ	α 12. 5
κραυγὴν Καλλιόπης	αβ. γ 2. 11	Λακεδαιμόνιοι	α 5. 6
κρεμάθρα	γ 11. 5	ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κομᾶν καλόν	α 9. 26
κρέμνται	γ 14. 6	Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος	γ 18. 6
Κρέων	α 15. 6	Λακωνικά ἀποφθέγματα	β 21. 8
κρίνειν κατὰ φρόνησιν	α 7. 21	λανθάνειν ἐνδέχεται	γ 2. 6
οἱ κρίνοντες	α 7. 28; β 23. 12	λειτουργεῖν	β 23. 17
ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι	α 1. 7	λελοιδορησθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου	α 6. 24
(τόπος) ἐκ κρίσεως	β 23. 12	λέξις	β 26. 5
κριτῆς	α 3. 2; β 18. 1	λέξις ἡ ἐν περιόδοις	γ 9. 7
ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνῶμων	α 15. 7	ἀγωνιστική	γ 12. 2
ἡ ἐνὶ κριτῇ (λέξις)	γ 12. 5	ἀντικειμένη	γ 9. 7
οἱ κριταὶ χαρίζονται	α 12. 4	γραφική	γ 12. 2
Κριτίας	α 15. 13; γ 16. 3	δημηγορική	γ 12. 5
Κροίσος Ἄλυν διαβάς	αβ. γ 5. 4	δικανική	γ 12. 6
τὰ ῥάδια κρίψαι	α 12. 33	εἰρομένη, κατεσταμμένη	γ 9. 1
μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμφυχον	α 13. 2	ἐπιδεικτική	γ 12. 6
κτήματα ἄκαρπα ἐλευθεριώτερα	α 9. 26	ποιητική	γ 1. 9
κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων	α 5. 3	λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφὴ εἶναι	γ 2. 1
κυανόχρων	αβ. γ 3. 1	σχῆμα	γ 8. 1
κυβείαι	α 11. 15	λέξει διαθῆσθαι	γ 1. 3
κυβερνᾶν	β 20. 4	τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν	α 9. 36
κυκᾶν	αβ. α 9. 20	λέξις opp. το διάνοια	γ 1. 7
τὰ κύκλφ	α 9. 33; γ 5. 4; 14. 10	(τόπος) παρὰ τὴν λέξιν	β 24. 2
Κύνκος	β 22. 12	λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος	γ 8. 4
κυνηγία	α 11. 15	Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων	γ 10. 7 α
κυνιδίους (bis)	γ 4. 3	Λευκοθέα	β 23. 27
κυνοραῖσται	β 20. 6	Λεωδάμας	β 23. 25
κύνες οὐ δάκνοντες τοὺς καθίζοντας	β 3. 6	Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν Καλλιστράτου	α 7. 13
κύων	β 24. 2	λέων ἐπόρουσε	αβ. γ 4. 1
ὁ Κύνων	γ 10. 7 γ	ἡ λήθη	β 2. 26
κύριος α 8. 2, 3; 15. 9, 21; β 10. 11; γ 2. 6		λήθη δι' ἀμέλειαν	β 3. 26
κύριοι... ἄκυροι	α 15. 25	λήμη τοῦ Πειραιέως	αβ. γ 10. 7 ε
κύρια τε καὶ συνώνυμα	γ 2. 7	λήμματα	α 12. 10
τὰ κύρια	γ 2. 2	ληρῶδες	γ 13. 5
κύριον ὄνομα	γ 2. 2, 6	λήσειν οἶονται	α 12. 7
κύριος κριτῆς	α 1. 8	λησταί... πορισταί	γ 2. 10
κυριώτερον	γ 2. 13	λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν	α 6. 4
κυριώτατος	α 1. 11; 3. 4; β 25. 11	λιβανωτὸς	γ 4. 3
κῶλον	γ 9. 5	Διβυκοὶ	β 20. 2
ἐν κώλοις λέξεως	γ 9. 7	Λικύμνιος	γ 2. 13; 13. 5
κωλυτικά	β 9. 5	Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν	γ 12. 2
κωμωδοποιοὶ	β 6. 20; γ 3. 4		
κώπης ἀνάσσειν	αβ. γ 2. 10		

λιλαιόμενα	αφ. γ 11. 3	μακρολογίαν	γ 17. 16
λιτός	γ 16. 2	μακροτέρως	γ 10. 3
λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν	α 2. 12	μαλακίας σημεία	β 6. 9
λογικούς συλλογισμούς	α 1. 11	μαλακός	α 10. 4; β 17. 4
διὰ λογισμόν	α 10. 16	μαλακῶς λέγεσθαι	γ 7. 10
λογισμός τοῦ συμφέροντος	β 12. 12	μαλακώτερον συλλογίζονται	β 22. 10
ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμόν	β 13. 14	ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τόπος	α 2. 21
λογιστικὴ ὀρεξις	α 10. 7	μᾶλλον κάλλιον (?)	α 7. 18
λογίων	β 5. 21	τὸ μανθάνειν ἡδύ	α 11. 21
λογογράφος β 11. 7 ⁿ ; 6. 5 ⁿ ; γ 12. 2b; 7. 7		μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἡδύ	γ 10. 2
λόγος ('fable,')	β 20. 2, 5 δις, 7	μανικός	α 9. 29
λόγος γίνεται	γ 9. 6	μανικώτερα ἦθη	β 15. 3
λόγον... ποιήσεως	γ 1. 9	μάντεσιν	γ 5. 4; 17. 10
λόγου ἄξιον	β 24. 2	μαντεύονται α 13. 2; ἑμαντεύετο	γ 17. 10
λόγῳ ἐν μηδενὶ εἶναι	β 2. 18	Μαντία τῷ ῥήτορι	β 23. 11
τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη	γ 13. 1	τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην	β 22. 6
τῷ λόγῳ προκολάζειν	β 3. 15	μάρτυρες	α 2. 2
λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντ' ὀνόματος	γ 6. 1	μάρτυς πιστὸς καὶ εἰς χρήσιμος	β 20. 7
τῶν παρὰ λόγον	α 5. 17	μάρτυρες παλαιοὶ... πρόσφατοι	α 15. 13
λόγοις γ 2. 7; λόγους β 20. 7; λόγων		μαρτυρίων διαίρεσις	α 15. 18
β 20. 8		μαχετέον	β 25. 13
λοιδορημάτιον	αφ. γ 2. 15	μαχητικοί	β 4. 12, 19
λύειν	α 1. 12; β 25. 1	μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους	α 12. 19
λύσαι ἐνστάσει	γ 17. 14	μαχητικά παιδιὰ	α 11. 15
λύσαι τὸ λεχθέν	α 2. 17	μεγαλάδοι	β 17. 4
λύσομεν	β 26. 5	μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς	αφ. γ 3. 1
λέλυμαι	β 23. 23	μεγαλοπρέπεια (def.)	α 9. 12
ὁ ἐν Δυκεῖ τὸν φορμὸν δούς	β 7. 3	μεγαλοπρεπῆ (λέξιν)	γ 12. 6
Δυκολέων	γ 10. 7 ^l	μεγαλοψυχία (def.) α 9. 11; β 12. 11	
Δυκόφρων	γ 3. 1, 2	μεγαλόψυχος β 11. 2; 12. 11; 24. 7	
λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεποιημένοις	β 3. 5	μεγαλοπρεπῆς and μεγαλόψυχος α 9. 29 ⁿ	
λύπη	β 9. 3	μεγάλως	α 14. 3
λυπηρὰ	α 11. 29; β 8. 8	μέγεθος	α 5. 4
λύσις	β 25. 1	μέγεθος τῆς φωνῆς	γ 1. 4
λυσιτελεῖ	α 12. 5	μεγέθους ἀρετῇ	α 5. 13
τὰ λυτικά ἐνθυμήματα	β 26. 3	μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος	β 19. 26
λυτὸν	α 2. 18	τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθουον τῶν συλλογισμῶν	α 2. 20
λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ μύπα	αφ. γ 11. 12	μέθοδος	α 1. 10, 14
ὦν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται	α 5. 11 ⁿ	μέθοδος ἔντεχνος	α 1. 11
μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι	γ 16. 8	διὰ τῆς μεθόδου	α 2. 2
μάθησις γ 10. 2; μάθησιν ταχεῖαν	γ 10. 4	ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται	α 2. 10
μαιμᾶν	γ 11. 3	ἀδίκημα μείζον	α 14. 1
μακαρισμός	α 9. 34	τὸ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι	α 7. 7
μακρὰν ἀπαρτᾶν	γ 5. 2	μείζονος ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἑάν τις	β 25. 7
μακρόβιοι	α 5. 15	μεθύων ἀπαρτάνη	β 25. 7
δύναμις μακροβιότητος	α 5. 15	μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν	β 18. 4
μακρόκωλοι	γ 9. 6	μειρακιώδεις	γ 11. 16

Μελανιπίδης	γ 9. 6	μικραδικηταί	β 17. 4
Μελάνωπος	α 14. 1	μικροπρέπεια	α 9. 12
Μελέαγρος	β 2. 19	μικροψυχία	α 9. 11; β 6. 10; 13. 9
μελετᾶν	γ 10. 7 <i>m</i>	μικρόψυχοι	β 13. 5
μελλήσάντων	α 12. 23	Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα	γ 10. 7 &c.
ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας	α 12. 30	μιμητικώτατον (ἡ φωνή)	γ 1. 8
μέλος ἄλυρον	γ 6. 7	μῖσος	β 4. 31; γ 19. 3
ὁ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ἦδύ	α 11. 23	ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ	β 13. 12
μέν—δέ	α 1. 12; γ 5. 2	μνήμαι ἐν μέτροις	α 5. 9
μέν οὖν	β 9. 11 ⁿ ; 23. 14, 15	μνήμαι	α 6. 15
μέρη τίμης	α 5. 9	τὰ μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα	α 11. 8
(τόπος) ἐκ τῶν μερῶν	β 23. 13	τὰ μνημονευτά	α 9. 25
μέση (φωνή)	γ 1. 4	μνησικάκος	β 4. 17
ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ	β 23. 1	Μοιροκλῆς	γ 10. 7 <i>e</i>
τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ	γ 17. 14	μοναρχία	α 8. 4
μεταβαίνειν	α 4. 6	μονόκωλος περίοδος	γ 9. 6
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πραῦνεσθαι	β 3. 1	πρόκλησις	α 15. 29
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do. (Antig.)	<i>α</i> 15. 6	συγγενέστερος αὐτοῦ	β 23. 8
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		συγκρίναι	<i>α</i> 9. 38

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συλλογισμός ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο	α 11. 23	συνδιαμερεῖσαι	β 4. 12
συλλογισμὸν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμόν	α 1. 14	συνδρομὰς (ἐκκλησίας)	αφ. γ 10. 7 ^h
πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ	β 22. 4	συνδυσζόμενον	α 15. 32
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συμβουλευτικόν	α 3. 3	συνηδόμενον	β 4. 3
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συμβουλεύει	α 4. 1	τὸ σύνηθες	α 10. 18
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τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται	α 10. 19	συνήθεις	α 11. 16
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συμπαλαμβάνει	α 3. 5	συνηναγκάσθησαν	β 7. 5
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συμπέρασμα β 21. 2; 21. 7; γ 18. 2, 6(ter)		σύνθεσις	α 7. 31
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συνάγειν	α 2. 13; β 22. 15; 22. 3, 4; 23. 16	συννομολογεῖν	β 20. 5
συνάγεται	γ 11. 12	συννορᾶν α 4. 8; διὰ πολλῶν συννορᾶν	α 2. 12
συναγωγή	γ 9. 8	τὰ συντείνοντα	β 2. 3
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σχεδόν	α 6. 17; β 10. 4 ⁿ	τέλος α 3. 5; γ 9. 2; τέλος (def.)	α 7. 3
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ἀηδὲς καὶ ἀγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον·

περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῶ πάντα.

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
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